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Abstract 
 
The aim of the research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the legal means of 
resolving shareholder disputes in private companies. The principal means are ex ante 
contracting in shareholders’ agreements and court-based dispute resolution 
mechanism in sections 994-996 of the Companies Act 2006. Private companies are 
often formed on the basis of mutual trust deriving from personal relationships 
between shareholders. The breakdown of these relationships termed “relational 
breakdown” commonly precipitates squeeze-out behaviour that causes disputes over 
the terms of exit. Ex ante contracting in shareholders’ agreements cannot eliminate 
the underlying factors that cause relational breakdown, but can only mitigate the 
effects of relational breakdown by qualifying the powers of the majority and 
providing an exit to the minority on fair terms. Moreover, due to a range of 
limitations associated with ex ante contracting in shareholders’ agreements, 
shareholders need recourse to a legal mechanism such as sections 994-996 of the 
Companies Act 2006 (formerly sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985) to 
resolve their disputes. In a Consultation Paper and subsequent Report published in 
October 1997 the Law Commission criticised the length, cost and complexity of 
proceedings under these provisions which were said to diminish their effectiveness as 
a tool for resolving shareholder disputes. After the Law Commission Report there 
have been significant developments both in terms of substantive law and procedure 
which have sought to streamline the remedy and make it more effective. 
 
The present research is the first attempt to consider from a legal perspective the 
effectiveness of sections 994-996 of the Companies Act 2006 as a court-based 
dispute resolution mechanism, in the decade since the Law Commission produced its 
Report on shareholders’ remedies. The research draws extensively on empirical 
evidence derived from a series of semi-structured interviews that were carried out 
with fifteen barristers experienced in this area of work. It concludes that (i) 
substantive law developments have enhanced legal certainty in the area and 
influenced shareholders to settle early; (ii) procedural developments, in particular, 
the use of mediation, has also contributed to earlier settlement; and (iii) in sum these 
developments have improved the effectiveness of these proceedings for shareholders, 
companies and the administration of justice by the courts. 
 
  
 1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
One of the main governance mechanisms provided by company law is the application of 
the principle of majority rule: decisions regarding a company’s affairs will be made 
according to the wishes of the majority of the shareholders of the company. As the Law 
Commission in its final Report on shareholders remedies stated, the guiding principle of 
company law is that “an individual member should not be able to pursue proceedings on 
behalf of a company about matters of internal management, that is, matters which the 
majority are entitled to regulate by ordinary resolution”.1 The principle provides a 
sensible and logical approach to corporate decision making.2 Shares are the property of 
the shareholder who holds them, and a right to vote is usually attached to ordinary 
shares. Due to the proprietary nature of shares, the possibility always exists that 
shareholders may exercise the voting power attached to their shares for their own 
personal benefit and may ignore the adverse effects of the use of power upon 
minorities.3 Disputes often arise among shareholders when the majority exploit majority 
rule in an opportunistic manner against the interests of minority shareholders. As a 
counterbalance to the principle of majority rule, company law also provides minority 
shareholders with legal means to protect their interests. 
 
The aim of the research is to evaluate the effective means of resolving shareholder 
disputes in private companies.4 The principal means are ex ante contracting in 
shareholders’ agreements and court-based dispute resolution mechanism under the 
company law. Under the present law in England and Wales, the ‘unfair prejudice’ 
provisions in what are now sections 994-996 of the Companies Act 20065 (formerly 
sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985)6 are the principal mechanism for 
                                                 
1The Law Commission Report, ‘Shareholders’ Remedies’ (Cm 3769, Law Com No 246, 1997) can be 
accessed at www. lawcom.gov. uk/ (hereinafter The Law Commission’s Report) [1.9]. 
2
 Hollington, R., Minority Shareholders’ Rights. (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1990) 3. 
3
 See North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) L.R. 12 App. Cas. 589. 
4
 For the meaning of the term “effectiveness” as it is used in this thesis see para 1.2 below. 
5
 Hereinafter, CA 2006. 
6
 Hereinafter, CA 1985. 
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resolving shareholders’ disputes in private companies. However, problems have been 
identified by the courts and the Law Commission, with the operation of this court-based 
dispute resolution mechanism in practice such as cost, delay and complexity of 
proceedings. It was claimed that these problems have diminished the effectiveness of 
this mechanism. Measures have been taken on both the substantive and procedural levels 
since the Law Commission’s Report in 1997 to streamline this mechanism in order to 
improve its effectiveness. The main objective of the research is to evaluate how effective 
the mechanism under section 994-996 of the CA 2006 is in resolving shareholders’ 
disputes in private companies in the light of those later developments. This chapter 
discusses the background to the research, the nature of the research process and the 
structure of the thesis.    
 
1.1 Background: 
The significance and benefits of the corporate form as a medium of business to the 
national economy cannot be underestimated in any developed economy such as the 
United Kingdom.7 The Company Law Review stated that “a failure to provide the right 
form of company structure for carrying on business will, in time, be reflected in a drift 
towards those countries which offer what is required”.8 Hence, the successful promotion 
of business through the corporate medium must be a primary goal of company law. To 
meet this goal after providing the basic framework of the company, the function of 
corporate law - according to one influential view - is to deal effectively with the 
situations where a conflict of interest arises between different corporate constituencies 
such as directors, shareholders, creditors and employees of the company. In a company’s 
life, conflicts of interest often arise between these constituencies that may cause dispute 
when one constituency behaves in an opportunistic way towards another constituency. A 
conflict of interest may arise (i) between shareholders who are owners of the company 
and directors or managers who run the affairs of the company where there is a separation 
of ownership from control; (ii) between the majority and minority shareholders of the 
company; and (iii) between the company and ‘outsiders’ such as creditors, employees 
                                                 
7
 See Copp S., and Astbury N., ‘ADR and Shareholder Disputes- An Alternative to Using CA 1985, s 459’ 
(2001) 1(1) Journal of ADR Mediation and Negotiation 51, 51. 
8
 Company Law Review ‘Modern Company Law for A Competitive Economy’ (March 1998) [4.7]. 
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and customers.9 One significant feature of the successful promotion of the company’s 
business is harmony among these constituencies. But “it is probable that disputes 
between shareholders have been a feature of corporate life ever since the development of 
the modern company”.10 
 
A company limited by shares is initially formed by individuals but obtains its status as a 
legal person from the state.11 English company law provides two principal types of 
corporate form as a medium of business namely private and public companies limited by 
shares. The annual report of DTI (now BERR)12 in 2005-06 showed a number of total 
2,130,200 GB registered companies of which 99.5 per cent are private companies and 
only 0.5 per cent are public companies.13 The research conducted for the Company Law 
Review showed that over 70 per cent of companies have only one or two shareholders 
and 90 per cent have fewer than five shareholders.14 The same research indicates that a 
significant proportion of companies would fall into the category of owner-managed 
companies, that is companies where all shareholders are directors and vice versa. These 
figures regarding private companies also include so-called quasi-partnership companies, 
a type of corporate form that is not a statutory invention but has been developed and 
recognized in case law.15 A quasi-partnership company is a company where one or more 
of the following elements are present: (i) an association formed or continued on the basis 
of a personal relationship involving mutual confidence; (ii) an agreement or 
understanding that all or some of the shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the 
business; (iii) legal restrictions (usually in the articles of association) on share 
                                                 
9
 For detailed discussion of these conflicts of interests situations, see Kraakman R. and Hansmann H., The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University Press, New York 2004). 
10
 See Copp S., and Astbury N., ‘ADR and Shareholder Disputes- An Alternative to Using CA 1985, s 
459’ (2001) 1(1) Journal of ADR Mediation and Negotiation 51, 52. 
11
 See now CA 2006, ss 3-16. 
12
 BERR- Department for Business Enterprise and regulatory Reform can be accessed at http:// 
www.berr.gov.uk/. 
13
 DTI - Companies in 2005-2006 (October 2006), Table A2 can be accessed at  
http:// www.berr.gov.uk/files/file34501.pdf 
14
 Company Law Review ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the 
Framework’ (URN 00/656, March 2000) [6.9] can be accessed at http:// www. berr.gov.uk/. 
15
 See Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1972] 2 All ER 492, 500. 
 4 
transfers.16 Private companies in the UK are similar to close corporations in the United 
States the shares of which are not publicly traded and are largely family-owned.17    
 
In private companies or close corporations where often there is no separation of 
ownership from control and shareholders are also directors of the company, disputes 
between majority and minority shareholders arise from the application of majority rule. 
It has been asserted that in close corporations disputes between minority and majority 
shareholders give rise to potentially destructive problems including loss of management 
time and costs and can cause business failures.18 In the event of shareholder disputes the 
situation becomes more devastating for shareholders in private companies who may 
have invested large amounts of human as well as financial capital in the company 
compared to shareholders in public companies, because there is no ready market 
available to them for selling their shares comparable to that available to shareholders in 
listed or quoted public limited companies. Even if they find a buyer for their shares there 
will often be restrictions on the transfer of shares in the articles of association of private 
companies. Even if there are no restrictions on the transfer of shares to a willing external 
buyer, the value of a minority shareholding will commonly be discounted to reflect lack 
of control. Furthermore, to withdraw his investment, a minority shareholder cannot wind 
up the company unilaterally in the way that a partner can dissolve a partnership at will 
by giving notice to his fellow partners.19 Owing to the existence of the principle of 
majority rule; the lack of an organized market for selling shares; the often substantial 
investment of time and money and to protect their expectations as to the conduct of the 
company’s business, minority shareholders, in private as opposed to listed companies, 
are more closely concerned with opportunistic conduct by majority shareholders. This 
problem is known as a “close corporation problem” and is considered a universal 
                                                 
16
 See Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1972] 2 All ER 492, 500. 
17
 Most businesses in the US are closely-held corporations and approximately fifty percent of the US 
population is employed by these close corporations. See Miller, S. K., ‘Minority Shareholder Oppression 
in the Private Company in the European Community: A Comparative Analysis of the German, United 
Kingdom, and French “Close Corporation Problem”’ (1997) 30 Cornell Int’l LJ 381, 383.  
18
 Ibid 383-84. 
19
 See the Partnership Act 1890, s 32.  
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problem in private limited companies.20 Accordingly, the research is generally only 
concerned with private companies that conform broadly to the “close corporation”, 
“owner-managed” or “quasi-partnership” typologies – in other words, companies the 
operation of which is premised on close interrelationship between the various 
participants.  
 
In private companies the majority may behave opportunistically towards the minority by 
virtue of the voting power attached to their shares hence the minority need protection 
from the opportunistic conduct of majority. The relationship between majority and 
minority shareholders can be explained by reference to economists’ agency cost 
theory.21 One writer has described the economic conception of ‘agency’ in the following 
terms: 
  
For the economist, a principal/agent relationship arises out of a purely factual dependency. If the 
furtherance of A’s interests depend upon the actions of B, then A is the principal and B is the 
agent. In this situation A has an incentive to take steps to secure that B acts in a way which is 
favourable to A.22  
 
This view of the principal/agent relationship derived from the field of economics differs 
from and is wider than the legal definition of the principal/agent relationship, where the 
agent has authority from the principal to act on his or her behalf.23 The economic model 
of the principal/agent relationship based on factual dependency is an accurate and 
applicable way of capturing the relationship between the majority (agent) and the 
minority (principal) in a company. Hence, “to assure the quality of the agent’s 
performance, the principal must engage in costly monitoring of the agent” that would 
result in ‘agency costs’.24 There are different strategies available for regulating this 
principal/agent relationship “no matter who is the principal and who the agent”.25  
 
                                                 
20
 See Miller, S. K., ‘Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the European 
Community: A Comparative Analysis of the German, United Kingdom, and French “Close Corporation 
Problem”’ (1997) 30 Cornell Int’l LJ 381, 382. 
21
 Davies P., Introduction to Company Law (Oxford University Press, New York. 2002) 216.  
22
 See ibid 118. 
23
 See ibid 118. 
24
 Kraakman R. and Hansmann H., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University Press, New York 
2004) 21. 
25
 Davies P., Introduction to Company Law (Oxford University Press, New York. 2002) 217. 
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These strategies either enhance the principal’s control over the agent or constrain the 
agent’s discretion or decision making power.26 The confidence of the principal in the 
agent’s performance may, in theory, result in greater rewards for the agent.27 According 
to this theory, in the absence of any protection minority shareholders will demand 
financial compensation for the risks involved which may increase the company’s cost of 
outside equity capital28 and work against the interests of agents and those of the 
company as a whole. In private companies minority shareholders are often involved in 
the management of the company along with the majority shareholders but to protect their 
interests against the misapplication of majority rule, minority shareholders will need to 
monitor the majority shareholders since, the strict application of majority rule leaves 
minority shareholders with no power to protect their interests as company shareholders. 
As stated above minority shareholders in private companies are more concerned 
regarding opportunistic conduct of majority shareholders. Law can play an important 
role in reducing agency costs that can be beneficial for the principals as well as for 
agents. Regulatory intervention was warranted to provide adequate protection for 
minority shareholders so that investor confidence might be maintained.29 
 
Minority shareholders buy shares in a company with the prior knowledge of the 
existence of majority rule in company law and therefore with the expectation that the 
majority will use their voting power in good faith. Historically company law sought to 
regulate the exercise of majority power in various ways. In Allen v. Gold Reefs of West 
Africa, Ltd30 where fraud on minority was alleged, it was held that a power to alter a 
company’s articles of association must like all other powers, be exercised subject to 
those general principles of law and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred 
on majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It must be exercised not only in the 
                                                 
26
 For details see ibid 120. 
27
 See Kraakman R. and Hansmann H., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University Press, New 
York 2004) 22. 
28
 See Davies P., Introduction to Company Law (Oxford University Press, New York. 2002) 216 and ibid 
22. 
29
 See Chiu, I.H., ‘Contextualising Shareholders’ Disputes – A Way to Reconceptualise Minority 
Shareholder Remedies’ (2006) Journal of Business Law 312, 330-331. It is further stated that “the lack of 
protection for minority shareholders may inhibit investor participation in companies and therefore result in 
a contraction of capital availability and corporate finance options for enterprise”.    
30
 [1900] 1 Ch. 656, 670. 
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manner required by law but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole.31 
The ‘interests of the company as a whole’ in this context is a formula which is employed 
to achieve the underlying purpose of protecting the minority from unconscionable 
conduct by the majority.32 Moreover, now company law provides a mechanism under 
sections 994-996 of the CA 2006 to protect minority shareholders and to resolve their 
disputes in private companies. The present research evaluates the current effectiveness 
of this dispute resolution mechanism as a means of resolving shareholders’ disputes in 
minimum time and cost.  
 
1.2 The research process: 
To protect minority shareholders from opportunistic conduct of majority shareholders, 
shareholders’ remedies in company law include derivative action, personal action to 
enforce the rights under the articles of association, just and equitable winding up and 
unfair prejudice remedy.33 The unfair prejudice remedy under section 994 of the 
Companies Act is the most attractive and widely used remedy available to minority 
shareholders in private companies and therefore has lessened the use of other remedies.34 
The provision was initially introduced by the legislature under section 9 of the 
Companies Act 1947 which became section 210 of the Companies Act 1948. Section 
210 is a statutory predecessor of the present unfair prejudice remedy, formerly section 
459 of the Companies Act 1985 and now re-enacted as section 994 of the CA 2006.35    
 
As stated above, problems have been identified by courts and the Law Commission such 
as cost, delay and complexity of proceedings regarding the principal minority 
shareholders’ dispute resolution mechanism under sections 459-461 of the CA 1985. As 
Harman J in Re Unisoft Group Ltd36 stated petitions under section 459 have become 
                                                 
31
 The principle is now codified in section 260 of the CA 2006. See also below chapter 5. 
32
 Peter’s American Delicacy Co v Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457 H Ct Aust as qouted by E. Ferran, Company 
Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) 149 n 191. 
33
 These remedies are discussed below in chapter 5. 
34
 See below para 5.4 Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985. 
35
 In fact ss 459-461 of CA 1985 have been re-enacted as ss 994-996 of CA 2006 without any material 
difference but for the purposes of my thesis I have decided for convenience given that this change is recent 
and the vast majority of the cases and literature refers to s 459, consistency and ease of usage to refer to 
old section numbers.    
36
 Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3) [1994] 1 BCLC 609, 611. 
 8 
notorious in the Companies Court for their length and enormous costs. The Law 
Commission in its final Report stated that section 459 cases that go to trial often last 
weeks rather than days.37 It is claimed that these problems have diminished the utility of 
this mechanism to resolve shareholders disputes. Moreover, in investment terms, the 
lack of any simple, cheap procedure to resolve disputes may also cause investors to be 
more cautious before putting money into such companies.38 However, the courts have 
taken measures through case law to streamline the effectiveness of this remedy 
especially in O Neill v Phillips39 and Grace v Biagioli.40 On the procedural level the Law 
Commission in its final Report in 1997 proposed inter alia that section 459 would 
continue to be construed broadly as it was intended to give the court a wide discretion to 
remedy conduct which may fall short of actual illegality41 but recommended that 
proceedings under section 459 should be dealt with primarily by active case 
management by the courts as contemplated in the Woolf Report for the civil justice 
system as a whole and later implemented under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
 
In the light of the available legal literature the impression is that substantive law 
developments through case law have increased legal certainty and may possibly have 
encouraged early offers to settle section 459 disputes.42 Moreover, following the 
adoption of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998,43 section 459 disputes would settle more 
readily especially with the greater emphasis on ADR mechanisms such as mediation and 
that in cases where court proceedings were issued, proceedings would be more focused 
and therefore shorter and less costly, because of the civil courts’ enhanced case 
management powers.44 The question that was not addressed by the available literature 
and which therefore remains to be answered was whether these developments have in 
practice improved the effectiveness of this mechanism by resolving the identified 
                                                 
37
 The Law Commission’s Report [1.6]. 
38
 The Law Commission Consultation Paper, ‘Shareholders’ Remedies’ (Law Com No 142, 1996) [11.2] 
can be accessed at www. lawcom.gov. uk/, hereinafter The Consultation Paper. 
39
 O Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1. 
40
 Grace v Biagioli [2006] 2 BCLC 70. 
41
 The Law Commission’s Report [2.2, 4.9-4.13]. 
42
 See Hannigan B., Company Law (Lexis Nexis, UK 2003) 437, 438. 
43
 Hereinafter ‘CPR’.  
44
 Ibid.  
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problems? The present research is the first attempt to consider from a legal perspective 
the effectiveness of section 459 of the CA 1985 as a court-based dispute resolution 
mechanism in the decade since the Law Commission produced its Report on 
shareholders remedies. 
 
So it is necessary here to define the meaning of the term “effectiveness” for the purposes 
of my thesis. The Law Commission stated that one of the guiding principles for the law 
on shareholder remedies was that all shareholders’ remedies should be made as efficient 
and cost effective as could be achieved in the circumstances.45 It was stated that one of 
the major problems which had been highlighted, especially in recent years, when 
considering proceedings brought under section 459, was the length and cost of such 
cases.46 The length and costs of such proceedings were not the only problems of which 
the courts and prospective parties to such proceedings needed to be aware; the 
presentation of section 459 petition might also have a damaging effect on the business of 
a company. 47 The Law Commission stated that in small companies, the management 
time used in litigation rather than running the business was more likely to damage the 
business than in larger companies.48 Therefore for the purposes of the present thesis, 
effectiveness of section 459 means ability to resolve shareholders’ disputes in minimum 
time and cost to shareholders, companies and the administration of justice by the courts. 
 
The present research has endeavoured to explore the following main research questions. 
1. What has been the impact in practice of any substantive law developments made 
since the Law Commission’s final Report upon the identified problems?  
2. Have the procedural developments including alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) implemented under the CPR regarding the civil justice system ameliorated or 
                                                 
45
 The Consultation Paper [14.11]. 
46
 The Consultation Paper [11.1]. 
47
 The Consultation Paper [11.2].  
48
 The Consultation Paper [1.7] The Law Commission’s Report [1.6]. The Company Law Review stated 
that minority rights and remedies were principally of concern to private companies, as it was believed 
clarity, accessibility and cost-effectiveness were of prime importance, particularly in relation to smaller 
companies as their members and directors might have limited financial resources. See Company Law 
Review ‘Modern company law for a competitive economy: completing the structure’ (Company Law 
Review Steering Group, URN 00/1335, Nov 2000) Chapter 5 Corporate Governance: Shares and 
Shareholders, [5.60]. 
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resolved the problems associated with section 459 of CA 1985 identified by the Law 
Commission and courts prior to 1999? 
 
It was realized at the outset during the literature review that an analysis of the present 
effectiveness of section 459 proceedings would be premature without some 
consideration of the potential of formal shareholders’ agreements as a tool for protecting 
minority shareholders against unfairly prejudicial conduct by majority shareholders in 
private companies. Not only is there a considerable literature which champions greater 
use of shareholders’ agreements to protect minority shareholders’ and to resolve their 
disputes in private companies,49 the Law Commission also endorsed the benefits of such 
agreements although it did not explore their actual utility in any empirical sense. My 
hypothesis was that ex ante contracting might prevent the need for minority shareholders 
to have recourse to section 459 and so reduce the need for lengthy and cumbersome 
litigation. In order to explore the scope and potential of ex ante contracting it was 
necessary first to consider the nature and underlying causes of shareholder disputes in 
private companies through the study of case law. Identification of these conflicting 
situations and their causes also underpinned the study of the effective resolution of 
shareholders’ disputes: unless we could understand the nature and dynamics of these 
disputes we could not hope to understand how best to resolve them be that by 
contractual or statutory means. 
 
A study of the reported cases indicates that human factors such as conflict in 
personalities and management style are often the underlying causes of these disputes. A 
common pattern is for a dispute to arise which (i) leads to a breakdown in the personal 
relationship of the parties; (ii) ends their mutual trust; (iii) subsequently precipitates 
“squeeze-out” behaviour by the majority shareholder that exacerbates the situation and 
transforms a personal disagreement into a legal dispute. An analysis of the available 
precedent shareholders’ agreements established that, minority shareholders might seek 
to protect themselves against opportunistic conduct through ex ante contracting either by 
declaring their rights in advance or by enhancing their voice through veto powers to 
                                                 
49
 See below chapter 4.  
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reduce the impact of majority rule. It is thought that advance consideration by the parties 
may minimize the scope for disputes and in theory, lead to swifter, more cost-effective 
resolution if the means of addressing future problems have been predetermined. 
However, shareholders’ agreements cannot completely prevent and resolve 
shareholders’ disputes in these companies owing to a range of theoretical and practical 
limitations. Accordingly, shareholders need to have recourse to the courts to resolve 
their disputes. Statute therefore fills a ‘gap’ that arises from incomplete contracting.50  
 
Hence, in the light of the available legal scholarship, a qualitative empirical evaluation 
of the current effectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism under sections 459-461 
of the CA 1985 was conducted to address this question in a manner designed to fill the 
gap identified in the existing literature. A secondary aim of the empirical research was to 
evaluate the current validity of the Law Commission’s criticisms of this dispute 
resolution mechanism in the light of later substantive and procedural law developments. 
The research also investigated the nature of shareholder disputes and the role of 
shareholders’ agreements in resolving shareholders’ disputes in private companies which 
broadly confirmed the impression gained from the analysis of reported case law and the 
precedents of shareholders’ agreements. 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis: 
The thesis consists of eight chapters and proceeds in the following manner. After this 
introductory chapter, the second chapter discusses the methodology adopted which is 
socio-legal. The third chapter examines the nature and underlying causes of 
shareholders’ disputes in private companies. The fourth chapter analyses the scope and 
potential of ex ante contractual arrangements - shareholders’ agreements - to resolve 
shareholder disputes. The fifth chapter examines the nature and the evolution of the 
court-based dispute resolution mechanism under sections 459-461 of the CA 1985 and 
the criticisms of this mechanism advanced principally by the Law Commission. The 
sixth chapter analyses the impact of substantive law developments in the decade or so 
after the Law Commission Report. The seventh chapter analyses the impact of 
                                                 
50
 See below chapters 5 and 6. 
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procedural law developments including ADR under the CPR on the effectiveness of the 
mechanism. The eighth chapter concludes.  
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
This chapter discusses the nature of the socio-legal research in the thesis that involves 
combining traditional legal scholarship with empirical research. The discussion of legal 
scholarship focuses on the methods employed during the analysis of case law, legislation 
and precedents of shareholders’ agreements. The discussion of the empirical phase of the 
research focuses upon the methods deployed in the empirical evaluation and the reasons 
behind the selection of those methods.  
 
2.1.1 Aim of the research: 
The research has the following three related aims: (i) to evaluate scope and limits of 
contract-based dispute resolution through shareholders agreements; (ii) to evaluate the 
current effectiveness of section 459 in the light of post-1997 developments (iii) to re-
evaluate the continuing validity of the Law Commission’s critique in the light of (ii) 
above. In fact (iii) is a secondary aim which flows from the ‘effectiveness’ evaluation.1  
 
2.2 Legal scholarship: 
A study of the majority of section 459 reported cases, from 1980 when the provision was 
introduced, up to the present, was conducted to identify the reasons for bringing section 
459 petitions in these cases.2 Identification of those reasons assisted not only the 
understanding of the nature of shareholder disputes in private companies but also the 
underlying causes of these disputes. These reported cases were approached through 
library and learning resources of the Nottingham Law School, NTU. Along with the 
study of reported cases in hard copy available in the library, electronic databases such as 
Westlaw, Corporate Law Direct and Lawtel were also exploited to study the relevant 
case law. The study of unreported cases that might be helpful in this regard but could not 
                                                 
1
 See above chapter 1 para 1.2 The research process. 
2
 See below chapter 3 Characteristics of shareholder disputes in private companies. 
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be conducted owing to available resources operates as a limitation on this aspect of the 
research. The study is not and, by definition cannot be, wholly representative of the 
entire population of cases which have come before the courts whether reported or 
otherwise. However, the study of reported cases identified both causes and 
characteristics also identified in the legal literature and subsequently confirmed by the 
empirical research.    
 
Secondly, an analysis of the available precedents was conducted to evaluate the potential 
and limitations of shareholders’ agreements in resolving shareholder disputes.3 
Practically, it was difficult to capture the real nature of bespoke minority shareholders 
agreements in order to be able to analyse the potential and limitations of shareholders 
agreements. Since, as opposed to articles of association which are public documents 
after registration and are therefore accessible,4 real bespoke shareholders’ agreements 
are confidential as between the parties, it was impossible in practice to access and 
analyse those bespoke agreements customised by lawyers for use in specific contexts. 
The available precedents were not the actual bespoke agreements entered into by 
shareholders according to their particular needs in the real business environment. These 
precedents were sample or template agreements that resemble actual bespoke 
agreements and which could be altered if required, according to the needs of the 
shareholders in a particular business. The available precedents are also limited in 
number since law firms are not willing to share their proprietary information and to 
release in-house precedents in respect of which they may also assert intellectual property 
rights. However, the collection of precedents from different published sources was 
useful in providing a broad picture of the nature of shareholders’ agreements and a 
useful insight into the contemporary professional practice of lawyers who seek to 
anticipate and prevent shareholder disputes. Furthermore, the use of published 
precedents was a “least worst” approach to the acquisition of data for the research 
purposes given the inherent difficulties associated with acquiring copies of actual 
shareholders’ agreements entered into by “live” clients. During the research around 25 
                                                 
3
 See below chapter 4 The scope of ex ante contracting as a means of protecting minority shareholders’ 
interests. 
4
 CA 2006, s 18(2).  
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precedents of shareholders’ agreements were gathered from different sources that mainly 
include books and law firms. However, these are precedents and the execution of perfect 
minority protection shareholders’ agreement depends upon various factors e.g., inter alia 
the bargaining position of shareholders.5  
 
By bringing under consideration the nature of shareholder disputes in private companies 
through the analysis of the relevant reported case law6 the scope of ex ante contracting 
as evident in available precedents in preventing those disputes was analysed. Precedents 
were analysed to evaluate the scope of shareholders’ agreements in terms of their 
potential and limitations in preventing the identified complaints. Difference, if any, of 
approaches adopted in different precedents towards the same complaints was also 
noticed. The outcome of that analysis is found in chapter four below.  
 
Thirdly, the legal analysis of the substantive and procedural law developments under the 
case law and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, since the Law Commission review of 
shareholders’ remedies, was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
developments to resolve shareholder disputes in private companies.  
 
2.3 Empirical research: 
Empirical research was conducted to evaluate the current effectiveness of sections 459-
461 of the CA 1985 as a mechanism for resolving shareholder disputes. In what follows, 
the chapter seeks to justify the selection of a qualitative empirical research strategy 
bearing in mind the limitations of and difficulties associated with a quantitative research 
strategy. The chapter will also touch upon the following matters: (i) methods; (ii) 
limitations associated with the present empirical inquiry; (iii) the validity and reliability 
of the present research; and (iv) ethical issues.  
 
In the light of the available legal literature the impression was that in section 459 cases 
there might be an increasing tendency in favour of early settlement both pre-action and 
                                                 
5
 In practice these factors that are discussed below in para 4.6, diminished the effectiveness of these 
agreements for the minority.   
6
 See below chapter 3 para 3.1. 
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pre-trial following the House of Lords decision in O’Neill v Phillips,7 which emphasized 
the desirability of early offers to settle and reinforced the CPR, which explicitly 
encourages ADR and requires the courts to manage cases proactively. Even in cases 
where the proceedings did not settle before trial, it was thought that trials would be more 
focused and would therefore involve less time and costs following these substantive and 
procedural developments. Hence, empirical research was carried out to explore the 
impact of these developments to update the understanding of how shareholder disputes 
are resolved in practice and the extent to which practitioners perceived the situation to 
have changed on the ground since the late-1990s. 
 
2.3.1 Justification for qualitative inquiry:  
In 1997 when the Law Commission produced its Report on review of shareholder 
remedies there were no detailed judicial statistics available from which frequencies 
could be generated on variables such as incidence, duration and cost of section 459 
proceedings. The Law Commission’s findings as to length, cost and complexity of what 
were then section 459 proceedings were mainly based on quantitative data that was 
acquired by the Law Commission for the purposes of the Report.8 The Law Commission 
relied principally upon: (i) cases reported in Butterworth’s Company Law Cases during 
the period 1988 to 1997; (ii) results of a statistical survey of petitions presented to the 
Companies Court at the Royal Courts of Justice between 1994 and 1996 seeking relief 
under section 459 of the CA 1985; (iii) the responses to its initial Consultation Paper. As 
is evident from the figures below, no detailed judicial statistics were available regarding 
petitions originated in the Companies Court from the years 1987 to 2005 from which 
anything meaningful in terms of critical variables can be inferred.9 Interestingly, the 
statistics for 1987-1991 were more detailed than those published for 1992-2005 as they 
disaggregated the number of petitions commenced and orders made under sections 459-
461. The number of petitions filed under section 459 declined in 1990 and 1991 but the 
number was also low in 1988 so nothing meaningful can be inferred by way of 
                                                 
7
 [1999] 2 BCLC 1. 
8
 See below chapter 5 para 5.6.1 for details regarding data acquired by the Law Commission and criticism 
of the Law Commission’s methodology.   
9
 See below Tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
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explanation for this decline since no obvious pattern was discernible. Furthermore, there 
is no publicly available data disaggregating petitions filed and relief granted after the 
introduction of the CPR and thus no meaningful comparison of the position before and 
after 1999 can be undertaken. Data available from 1992 to 2005 was extremely limited 
as judicial statistics only provide the aggregate of originating proceedings through 
petitions, applications and summonses in the Companies Court, Chancery Division of 
the High Court excluding winding up petitions. Such aggregate data from 1992-2005 did 
not provide separate numbers of section 459 petitions filed and relief granted under 
section 461 in the Companies Court and district registries and was therefore useless. 
Hence, owing to lack of disaggregated judicial statistics regarding 459 petitions in 
Companies Court of the Chancery Division and district registries before and after the 
CPR that might show any significant change in numbers it was not possible to draw any 
inferences regarding factors that might have contributed to any change.  
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Table 2.1 
 
Number of originating proceedings through petitions, applications and summonses in the 
Companies Court, Chancery Division of the High Court except winding up petitions:10 
 
Year Number Year Number 
2005 7,549 1998 6,492 
2004 8,858 1997 7,182 
2003 10,986 1461 6,971 
2002 8,169 1995 6,419 
2001 10,003 1459 5,557 
2000 7,990 1993 5,805 
1999 7,337 1992 6,050 
 
Table 2.2 
 
Number of originating proceedings through petitions, motions and summonses under the 
Companies Act 1985:11 
 
Year 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 
Total number of originating 
proceedings 
 
1668 
 
1641 
 
1665 
 
1662 
 
1159 
Number of originating proceedings 
through petitions 
 
217 
 
228 
 
312 
 
301 
 
268 
Petitions for protection against unfair 
prejudice under sec 459 
 
24 
 
32 
 
65 
 
38 
 
70 
Relief granted under sec 459 1 3 2 1 7 
 
Scientific collection of pre and post CPR quantitative data regarding section 459 
petitions from the High court in London, district registries outside London and from 
county courts would have been required to carry out any meaningful enquiry into the 
relationship between legal and procedural change and the incidence of section 459 
proceedings over time. Collection of that quantitative data could be time consuming and 
demands extensive resources. Moreover, by exploiting extensive resources and time if 
the required quantitative data would be available it could only inform us about changes 
in selected variables and then from that data we could infer the causal factors behind 
                                                 
10
 Data (1999-2005) has been obtained from judicial statistics of Department for Constitutional Affairs 
that can be now accessed at http:// www.judiciary.gov.uk/keyfacts/statistics/index.htm and data (1992-
1998) has been obtained from hard resources of library and learning resources of NTU. 
11
 Data obtained (1991-1987) from judicial statistics of Department for Constitutional Affairs available in 
hard copy at library and learning resources of NTU. 
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those changes but quantitative data could not provide us the deep insight as to actual 
factors that possibly were behind those changes. For example by acquiring both pre and 
post CPR quantitative data as to the number of petitions filed; how long proceedings 
took from issue to final disposal; and how many orders had been made and then through 
exploring  the difference if any, in figures the changes that may have resulted from 
changes in the law could be perceived. If the acquired data told us that the number of 
petitions that had been issued had decreased, it could not necessarily be inferred from 
that such decrease was due to substantive or procedural developments or some 
combination of the two.  
 
The Law Commission asserted that the complexities associated with section 459 that 
cause lengthy and costly litigation arise in part from the generality of the wording of the 
section since it permits shareholders to put in issue anything that may be remotely 
relevant to their case.12 In O’Neill v Phillips,13 Lord Hoffmann took a number of positive 
steps to curb the width of the jurisdiction by holding that to prove unfair prejudicial 
conduct, minority shareholders must show (in effect) that there is some breach of 
express agreements or legal rules or the use of rules in a manner which equity would 
regard as contrary to good faith and sought to encourage the early settlement of disputes 
to avoid the expense of money and spirit inevitably involved in litigation and reinforced 
CPR.14 Through quantitative data it was also hard to infer whether any change that has 
occurred in the trends of section 459 proceedings was owing to the CPR or the case law 
or both or to other variables such as general changes in practice that might have been 
happening independently of legal and procedural changes such as the availability of 
formal mediation processes provided by independent organizations like CEDR (Centre 
for Effective Dispute Resolution).  
 
Also, quantitative data as to the level of pre-action settlements before and after the late 
1990s is, by definition unavailable as such settlement is a private matter which does not 
involve the court. Similarly, there is no way of telling by quantitative means whether 
                                                 
12
 The Consultation Paper[14.5]. See also below chapter 5. 
13
 [1999] 2 BCLC 1. 
14
 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1, 9, 16, for details see below chapter 6. 
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cases settled in accordance with pre-action protocols were settled by traditional means of 
party and party negotiation or by other recognised method of ADR. In any event, even if 
quantitative data on variables of interest (incidence of proceedings; average time from 
issue to disposal; average cost) were available, they could not provide actual insights 
into the mechanisms that might be operating beyond observable changes in the number 
of petitions issued and so on. What litigants experienced about remedies available under 
section 459 and why; whether in practice litigants prefer negotiated settlement or court- 
based resolution and why they chose to do so; whether they prefer mediation over inter-
lawyer negotiation to settle dispute, if so, then why; were the litigants are actually 
conscious of the time and costs involved in the litigation. Knowledge as to those actual 
factors could inform us about the actual preferences of litigants and could assist in future 
reforms. Hence, due to the limitations associated with the acquisition and utility of 
quantitative data and to obtain deep insights into the phenomena of legal change being 
researched a qualitative inquiry was considered both appropriate and desirable for the 
purposes of the present study.  
 
The purpose of the qualitative research was to get the in depth perspective of frequent 
participants who had real world experience of and expertise in shareholder disputes and 
the mechanisms for their resolution. A qualitative approach was considered most 
suitable for conducting the research in order to generate insights about the effectiveness 
of dispute resolution processes from an insider perspective.15 Accordingly, an 
interpretivist epistemology16 was adopted.  This requires the researcher to understand the 
subjective meanings attributed by participants to actions or activities in which they 
participate (specifically in my case the perceptions of experienced practitioners engaged 
in shareholder dispute resolution) in order to generate knowledge about the social 
world.17  
 
                                                 
15
 See Punch, K. F., Introduction to Social Research. (2nd ed Sage, UK 2005) 238. 
16
 Epistemology is a theory of knowledge and concerns what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable 
knowledge in a discipline. See Bryman A., Social Research Methods (2nd ed Oxford, UK 2004) 11 and 
Glossary.  
17
 Interpretivists’ epistemology is in contrast to a positivists’ epistemology that places emphasis on causal 
explanations of human behaviour. See Bryman A., Social Research Methods (2nd ed Oxford, UK 2004) 13 
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2.3.2 Methods: 
Following a consideration of the nature of qualitative research and its philosophical 
underpinnings the following methods were employed in the empirical phase of the 
research. 
 
2.3.2.1 Semi-structured interviewing 
The research was conducted by means of semi-structured interviews with chancery 
barristers in order to obtain qualitative data directed to the research questions. An 
interview schedule was structured to explore the participants’ experiences regarding the 
basic research questions explained above. In total fifteen semi-structured face to face 
interviews, including an initial pilot interview, were conducted with chancery barristers, 
the majority of whom were QC’s, each having more than fifteen years of experience 
dealing with section 459 petitions both before and after the adoption of the CPR.18  
 
Interviews were conducted with the help of an aide-memoire with appropriate 
exploitation of prompts during the course of interview.19 The aide-memoire was divided 
into two main sections: the first was introductory and the second was comprised of open 
questions. These questions were based on the issues needed to be explored through the 
intended empirical investigation. After the interviewer’s personal introduction, 
interviewees were informed about the general nature of the research project. Secondly, 
an ethical statement was read to them and they were informed briefly about 
confidentiality issues and their rights. Thirdly, their consent to digital recording was 
obtained formally and then they were requested to recount briefly the area of their 
practice. To explore the experiences of the interviewees they were asked questions about 
their experiences of the following: (i) changes in Chancery and section 459 practice 
resulting from the adoption of the CPR; (ii) changes in section 459 practice resulting 
from substantive law developments through case law; (iii) types of disputes and forms of 
relief they had encountered in section 459 context; (iv) the settlement process in 
shareholder disputes  (v) specific aspects of the CPR and (vi) the role of shareholders’ 
                                                 
18
 See below Table 2.3. 
19
 See Appendix 2. 
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agreements and the potential of default rules in model articles for private companies. 
Each interview lasted for approximately one and a half hours which allowed sufficient 
time to explore the views and experiences of the respondents regarding the research 
issues.  
 
2.3.2.2 Sample: 
 
Table 2.3: Table of conducted interviews 
 
No. Profession  Name/Code Date 
interviewed  
Location 
1 QC A 13-02-07 London 
2 Junior 
Barrister 
B 13-02-07 London 
3 Junior 
Barrister 
C 14-03-07 London 
4 QC D 15-03-07 London 
5 QC E 15-03-07 London 
6 QC F 26-03-07 London 
7 QC G 28-03-07 London  
8 Junior 
Barrister 
H 04-04-07 London 
9 QC / Mediator  J 25-04-07 London 
10 QC K 26-04-07 London 
11 Junior 
Barrister 
M 01-05-07 London/ 
Birmingham 
12 QC P 17-05-07 London 
13 Junior 
Barrister 
R 18-05-07 London 
14 QC S 30-05-07 Bristol 
15 Junior 
Barrister 
Practised as a 
solicitor before 
joining 
chambers 
T 07-06-07 Leeds 
 
The population of the research was comprised of Chancery barristers who routinely deal 
with section 459 cases to evaluate empirically the operation of the post-Woolf court 
process and the use and potential of ADR within that process, to resolve shareholder 
disputes in private companies effectively. Initially, it was planned to conduct interviews 
with solicitors as well as barristers. However, after commencing the research it was 
realized that it was hard to identify solicitors in law firms who were experienced in 
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section 459 work. The experience of the barristers interviewed was that they were 
generally instructed by solicitors at the very start of the case which showed that 
barristers are usually involved from the very beginning of the case and that there were 
not that many experienced solicitors in this area possibly because section 459 practice 
was not a repeat source of work for solicitors unlike, for example, work from insurance 
clients in the context of personal injury litigation. The barristers stated that in their 
practice they very rarely got instructions from same solicitors’ firm twice. However, 
they did also indicate that there were some experienced litigators in the big law firms 
who were capable of resolving shareholder disputes pre-action and had good knowledge 
of the legal complexities involved in section 459 cases. But these solicitors would 
invariably resort to instructing specialist counsel in cases that could not be settled pre-
action and where formal proceedings would need to be issued. A number of solicitors 
were identified by different research methods such as snowball sampling and internet 
searches. These solicitors were contacted by letter inviting them to participate in the 
research but did not respond.  
 
In any event, as the barristers interviewed had all been involved in section 459 
proceedings from inception to trial in contrast to solicitors, they had knowledge of all 
aspects of these proceedings and were therefore arguably better sources of data about   
the impact of specific aspects of the CPR and substantive law developments in practice. 
Whereas it appears that solicitors could only draw on limited experience of pre-action 
settlement, the barristers in my sample had much more extensive experience as befits 
specialist practitioners working in a niche area of Chancery practice. A common theme 
that emerged from the interviews is that most section 459 cases settle after proceedings 
are issued and there has been no felt decline in the volume of instructions since the 
introduction of the CPR. This implies that settlement after the commencement of 
proceedings has been stable over time. Furthermore, given the research questions, I was 
interested in finding out the circumstances in which section 459 petitions were issued 
and the way these petitions were dealt with by clients, by barristers and by the courts and 
barristers were in a better position to answer these queries. Unlike solicitors, barristers 
who took charge of the case later could also inform me why early settlement efforts had 
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failed. Furthermore, barristers also engage in efforts to settle disputes on behalf of 
clients and may also face the same complexities in achieving settlement that are faced by 
solicitors. Conducting interviews with actual litigants was not feasible because of access 
problems (client confidentiality and professional privilege which preclude lawyers from 
disclosing contact details) and, in any event, would only provide a narrow perspective 
based on experience of a single piece of litigation. Barristers could not only provide 
credible current data for research purposes but were be in a better position to explain the 
practical issues due to their experience and could assess the impact of legal 
developments upon the identified gaps in this area.  
 
No separate list of barristers specialising in section 459 proceedings was available from 
which a sample could be selected. Therefore, the sampling frame of the population was 
created by compiling a list of names of barristers recorded as representing the parties in 
reported cases dealt with by the higher courts in the last twenty years. In order to employ 
the theoretical sampling technique also known as purposive sampling the respondents 
were identified carefully (i) using a metric-based analysis of the reported case law in the 
last twenty years to identify experienced counsel using appearance in reported cases 
over time as a proxy for “experience” and (ii) by employing snowball sampling 
techniques. Reported cases were identified on electronic databases such as Westlaw, 
Corporate Law Direct (Lexis Nexis) and Lawtel by entering relevant terms such as 
“unfair prejudice” in their search engines. A provisional list of prospective interviewees 
was drawn up in order of the number of times the barristers listed had appeared in 
reported cases. Two barristers had seven appearances in the list. Arber has asserted that 
theoretical sampling “is entirely governed by the selection of those respondents who will 
maximise theoretical development”.20 However, from that sample frame of the 
population it was still hard to find all experienced barristers who were involved in 
section 459 cases since most of the names in the sample frame were not cited more than 
once and given the likelihood that most cases settle before trial, appearance in trial cases 
(as opposed to interim applications) is a far from perfect proxy. Indeed, the interviews 
eventually conducted revealed that barristers with only one or two appearances in the 
                                                 
20
 See Arber S., ‘Designing Samples’ in N. Gilbert (ed), Researching Social Life (Sage, London 1993) 74. 
 25 
reported cases were often vastly experienced. Conversely one barrister instructed in a 
leading case had only limited experience. This reinforced the necessity for employing 
snowball sampling techniques in the research. Hence, along with theoretical sampling, 
snowball sampling techniques were also employed (i) by asking the interviewees for 
names of other counsel experienced in handling section 459 cases more frequently and 
(ii) through exploiting existing contacts of the supervisory team and Nottingham Law 
School more generally. Interestingly the names cited by barristers in response to 
snowball sampling techniques were often names that were already on the original list. 
Thus, by a combination of sampling techniques, I arrived at a sample of highly 
specialised and experienced Chancery barristers.    
 
Getting appointments from barristers did not seem to be an easy task in the beginning, 
owing to their extremely busy diaries, but their considerations for legal research that 
might assist in future legal reforms, made it possible. Altogether fifteen face to face 
interviews with barristers from eight different chambers were conducted during the 
empirical investigation. Theoretical and snowball sampling techniques suggested that 
there were not more than 25 experienced section 459 barristers and that they were 
concentrated in around ten chambers in London; Birmingham; Leeds and Bristol. 
London chambers were on the top of the list for having experienced barristers in 
shareholder disputes which was not surprising due to their proximity to the Companies 
Court which forms part of the Chancery Division of the High Court based in the Royal 
Courts of Justice in London. Data was collected until the research experienced 
theoretical or data saturation. This is where no further new data was expected to be 
generated by the research. Theoretical saturation “is reached when no new analytical 
insights are forthcoming from a given situation”.21 As the research draws on the 
experience of a small, relatively homogenous population possessing “niche” legal 
expertise, theoretical saturation was achieved quickly in the research. Theoretical 
saturation was experienced after conducting around ten interviews. However, the 
interviewing process was continued to confirm the state of theoretical saturation.  
 
                                                 
21
 See ibid. 
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Due to the lack of a complete list of experienced section 459 barristers it is not possible 
to assert scientifically the representative nature of the sample. Given the quantum of 
expertise and experience and the appearance in the sample of counsel, many of them 
silks from leading chambers in this area, the impression is that the sample was a 
representative one. In any event, unlike quantitative research, in qualitative research the 
sample need not be representative. This is because in qualitative research, “the 
researchers’ primary goal is an understanding of social processes rather than obtaining a 
representative sample”.22      
 
2.3.2.3 Analysis of Data: 
The interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and fully transcribed later. By 
treating the interviewees’ responses as an external reality and owing to the narrative 
nature of the acquired qualitative data, a narrative approach has been applied to analyse 
the data gathered through the interviewing process.23 Every effort was made to deal 
holistically with the available qualitative data.24 The data was divided into sections and 
then coded in accordance with theoretical patterns that developed during the research 
process. Desk-based research that was conducted before the empirical investigation, 
proved very helpful in structuring the interview schedule.25 As a result the interview 
schedule has proved relevant to theoretical patterns that develop in qualitative inquiry. 
Theory that emerged from the desk-based research was then tested and developed 
against the impressions that later emerged as a result of further qualitative inquiry. These 
impressions enabled me to arrive at some conclusions about the current ‘effectiveness’ 
of the remedy and will assist to answer the research questions and will also provide a 
clear frame of reference for future research in this field. However, effort has been made 
during analysis to be careful as far as possible about any preconceptions that I might 
have developed during legal scholarship.26 Data was analyzed manually and my 
explanation of the data emerges from careful reading of the data acquired. Data obtained 
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 See ibid 73.  
23
 See Bryman A., Social Research Methods (2nd ed Oxford, UK 2004) 412-414.  
24
 Punch, K. F., Introduction to Social Research. (2nd ed Sage, UK 2005) 217.  
25
 See above para 2.3.2.1 Semi-structured interviewing, for categories of questions asked from 
interviewees.   
26
 See also below para 2.3.4 Validity of present research.  
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was analyzed even during the collection process. Data collection stopped as the research 
reached theoretical saturation and then after further analysis theory was developed from 
the acquired data27 in order to conclude the research.28 Conclusions are derived from the 
impressionistic evidence obtained from interviewees’ responses that have been collected 
during qualitative investigation.29  
 
2.3.3 Limitations of present research: 
While, a qualitative research strategy can be justified it inevitably has some limitations. 
Interviewee accounts of their “experience” may be biased by their professional interests 
in the generation of fee income. For example they may be inclined to comment 
unfavourably on the impact of the CPR if it has the impact of controlling the length and 
costs of proceedings (and vice versa). Similarly, interviewees that have strong mutual 
referral relationships with ADR providers may tend to speak in glowing terms about the 
effectiveness of ADR.  Therefore to minimize the effects of any vested interest upon the 
interview data and to get the true picture, interviewees were asked to respond in detail 
only in the light of their experiences in conducting real cases on behalf of clients. This 
will not overcome the problems of subjectivity but the consistency of the responses at 
theoretical saturation will to some extent mitigate any concerns about vested interests of 
interviewees.     
 
Secondly, owing to its qualitative nature the research did not provide any statistical 
information to compare the pre and post CPR number of early settlements after 
commencement of proceedings; mode of settlement and duration of proceedings in 
section 459 disputes. However, interviewees’ own personal experience regarding section 
459 practice, both pre and post CPR and exploitation of ADR in section 459 disputes 
was helpful to form a general impression as to settlements and duration of section 459 
proceedings.  Thirdly, the lack of solicitors’ participation in the research might be a 
limitation since it was hard to identify solicitors in law firms who were experienced in 
                                                 
27
 Ibid chapter 8.   
28
 See below chapter 8 Conclusion. 
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 All interviewees are given alphabetical names to ensure anonymity and while presenting the findings 
interviewees are referred by their alphabetical names. See above Table 2.3.  
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section 459 litigation. But as stated above, barristers were in a good position to respond 
to my research questions as compared to solicitors. 
 
2.3.4 Validity of present research: 
Validity here means, as Silverman has stated, the extent to which an account accurately 
represents the social phenomena to which it refers.30 In this context the impartiality of 
the researcher, the reliability of the research and the generalization of findings are 
discussed here. During the research, questions were designed, interviews conducted and 
the acquired data analyzed in a manner that satisfies to some extent, the requirement 
regarding impartiality of the research. The questions were designed by considering the 
aims of the research and to explore the actual experiences of the interviewees. During 
the interview, interviewees were provided a complete opportunity to discuss their 
experiences in sufficient detail. Acquired data was analyzed and findings of qualitative 
interviewing were presented in the manner that sufficiently explains the respondents’ 
views that they have expressed in the light of their personal experience. All the 
contradictory or inconsistent responses of the interviewees were properly considered at 
the time of analysis and discussed properly when findings were presented, to avoid 
oversimplifications of the research findings. While inevitably the researcher plays a 
significant role in the production and interpretation of the data, care has been taken to 
separate any personal opinions of the researcher from interviewees responses while 
analyzing the data and presenting the findings.31 The research was not sponsored by any 
external body which also ensured the impartiality of this research and its findings. 
Furthermore, the research was conducted by me in my capacity as a student of law and a 
legal researcher and without any personal interest in any outcome of the research.   
 
                                                 
30
 As quoted in glossary by Silverman, D., Interpreting Qualitative Data (3rd ed Sage, London 2006). 
31
 Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide (2nd ed Open University Press, Buckingham 2003) 268. 
Denscombe stated that researcher’s identity, value and beliefs play a role in the production and analysis of 
qualitative data and cannot be entirely eliminated from the process of analysing qualitative data. On the 
other hand it was stated that self may give researcher a privileged insight into social issues so that the 
researcher’s self should not be regarded as a limitation to the research but as a crucial resource. See 
Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide (3rd ed Open University Press, England 2007) 300.    
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Reliability of the research relates to the methods of data collection and the concern that 
these methods should be consistent.32  As indicated above, the role of the researcher is 
significant in the research. However, the way the research was conducted, including the 
sampling method, is sufficiently explained for other researchers to replicate my 
research.33 To maintain the reliability of the research the same questions were asked of 
all the respondents. However, different prompts were exploited during the course of the 
interview in order to obtain elaboration and development of particular responses. In 
order to acquire valid data, every effort was made to develop an understanding and a 
relationship of trust with the interviewees it having been explained to them that the 
interview was exclusively for the purposes of academic research, that any verbatim 
extracts reported in the final thesis would be anonymised and that their contribution 
would be valuable to the assessment of the need for future reforms in this area of law. In 
order to become familiar with the interviewees and to make them comfortable they were 
informed during the course of interview, where necessary, that as a student of law and a 
legal researcher, the researcher was to some extent aware of the problems and therefore 
had some understanding of the complexities associated with the resolution of 
shareholder disputes and the concerns of the parties. Furthermore, to obtain valid data 
respondents were asked permission for interviews to be recorded after being given 
assurances that confidentiality and anonymity would be fully respected. This reduces the 
risk that the interviewees may not have been completely candid in providing accounts of 
their experiences. The interviews were conducted at a time which was convenient for the 
respondents in order to reduce the risk of distractions. The interviews were fully 
transcribed and analyzed manually by giving proper consideration to all prompts. The 
responses were compared with the assertions made in the literature as to the 
effectiveness of section 459 proceedings as a tool for resolving shareholder disputes.  
 
As to the generalization of findings it is arguable that the data can be generalized to the 
population (lawyers experienced in section 459 cases) due to its representative nature 
discussed above. However – and to reiterate a point made earlier – the 
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 Denscombe, M., Ground Rules for Good Research (Open University Press, Buckingham 2002) chapter 
5, 100. 
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 See Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide (3rd ed Open University Press, England 2007) 298. 
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representativeness of the data is not critical because the purpose is not to attain absolute 
knowledge but to achieve a better theoretical understanding of section 459 as a process 
from the impressionistic evidence acquired by qualitative investigation. As Bryman has 
asserted:  
 
The findings of qualitative research are to generalize to theory rather than to populations. It is the 
cogency of the theoretical reasoning rather than statistical criteria that is decisive in considering 
the generalizability of the findings of qualitative research. In other words it is the quality of the 
theoretical inferences that are made out of qualitative data that is crucial to the assessment of 
generalizations”.34         
 
2.3.5 Ethical issues: 
All ethical issues that might arise in the research were considered carefully and 
respected and every possible effort was made to ensure that the interests of research 
participants were safeguarded.35 Respondents were honestly informed about the aims 
and objectives of the research. While conducting the research the confidentiality and 
anonymity of the research participants was ensured in so far as possible. Respondents 
were fully informed regarding their participation and of their right to refuse to answer 
any question or to terminate the interview at any time if they chose to do so. 
Interviewees were not compelled to participate or to provide responses if they did not 
wish to do so.  The data was collected by employing legal and fair means and was stored 
securely and anonymously. It was ensured that the acquired data was analyzed with 
complete honesty and no changes have been made to it for any personal interests of the 
researcher. The ethical codes of Nottingham Trent University and the Socio-Legal 
Studies Association were observed at all times.  
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 See Henn, M., A Short Introduction to Social Research (Sage, London 2006);  Diener E., and Crandall 
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Chapter 3 
 
Characteristics of shareholder disputes in private companies 
 
3.1 Scope of the chapter: 
This chapter discusses the characteristics of shareholder disputes in private companies in 
the light of the reported case law and findings of the empirical research. It makes a series 
of claims about the nature of these disputes generalizing from the available evidence. 
Private companies are often formed on the basis of mutual trust and personal 
relationships of shareholders. The breakdown of the relationship of shareholders causes 
disputes known as ‘exit disputes’. In this thesis the breakdown of shareholder 
relationships is termed ‘relational breakdown’. Relational breakdown occurs due to 
some underlying factors. These underlying factors are primary causes of shareholder 
disputes. Relational breakdown often precipitates opportunistic conduct by majority 
shareholders who may seek to enhance their control of the company by exploiting their 
majority power.1 The opportunistic conduct of majority shareholders occurs by 
employment of different squeeze-out techniques. Understanding the characteristics of 
shareholder disputes will assist to prevent and resolve these disputes in an effective 
manner that is, with least time and costs.2 The chapter proceeds as follows. After an 
introductory account which explores the relational nature of private companies the 
chapter firstly identifies the underlying causes of relational breakdown and then 
discusses the nature and kinds of shareholder disputes in private companies.  
 
3.2 Introduction:  
The company has a separate legal personality of its own, distinct from its members.3 
Shareholders in private companies often start and run their businesses on the basis of 
                                                 
1
 See Roberts, P., and Poole J., ‘Shareholders Remedies- Efficient Litigation and the Unfair Prejudice 
Remedy’ (1999) Journal of Business Law 38, 43. 
2
 See above meaning of “effectiveness” in chapter 1 para 1.2 The research process. 
3
 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22. 
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mutual trust and confidence arising from their personal relationships. In Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd,4 Lord Wilberforce stated that:  
 
The words ['just and equitable'] are a recognition of the fact that a limited company is more than 
a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own: that there is room in company law for 
recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations 
and obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure.  
 
It was further stated that the company structure was defined by the Companies Act and 
by the articles of association of the company by which shareholders agreed to be bound. 
Due to the presence of the element of mutual trust, small private companies may fall into 
the category of quasi-partnership companies that enable the court to subject the exercise 
of legal rights to equitable considerations.5 In R & H Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical 
Ltd6, Walker J, relying on Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd7 stated that a private 
company formed “on the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual confidence 
[is] a typical if not essential ground on which it may be equitable to view a private 
company as a quasi-partnership”. The mutual trust element is often found where a pre-
existing partnership has been converted into a limited company.8 
 
In Re a Company (No 005685 of 1988), ex parte Schwarcz (No 2) it was asserted that: 
 
No doubt in almost every case of a small or private company persons coming together to form a 
new company would not do so without placing trust and confidence in those who are to be the 
directors and managers of the company.9  
 
The study of the relevant reported case law also shows that the private companies are 
commonly formed on the basis of mutual trust and the personal relationship of 
shareholders with all shareholders participating in the management of the company10 and 
                                                 
4
 [1972] 2 All ER 492, 500. 
5
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9
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articles that restrict shareholder exit.11 One American commentator has likened the close 
corporation to a partnership asserting that the analogy between partnership in the 
commercial sense and marriage applies with equal force to a close corporation.12 In both, 
human relations are the major factor in the distribution of power between shareholders.13 
Disputes often arise among shareholders as a result of the breakdown of personal 
relations of shareholders in private companies – an occurrence that for convenience is 
referred to in this thesis as ‘relational breakdown’. It was commented that few disputes 
were as bitter and acrimonious as those between shareholders and resentment and fury 
seemed to be most intense when shareholders were from the same immediate or 
extended family.14 In Re a Company (No 005134 of 1986), ex parte Harries15 Gibson J 
stated that:  
 
Proceedings of this kind have been linked to divorce proceedings, aptly so in that the whole 
history of the relationship between the parties is paraded before the court in minute detail with 
many an imputation alleged in respect of conduct the equivalent of infidelity and cruelty that has 
contributed to the irretrievable breakdown in relations.  
 
Chiu has stated that:  
 
Some shareholder disputes are not easily boiled down to specific matters, but may contain a 
bundle of grievances and allegations involving conduct of the majority. Such matters may be 
bound up with grievances over substantive management of the company or relational issues 
between shareholders.16   
 
In fact, the appearance of conflicts between shareholders owing to relational breakdown 
should not be surprising due to the close relationship and close frequent contact of 
shareholders, in the day-to-day business and management of these companies. 
 
A detailed study of the reported cases regarding shareholder disputes and empirical 
investigation has been conducted to ascertain the characteristics of shareholder disputes 
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 See below para 3.3.1.1 Richards v Lundy [2000] 1 BCLC 376, See also R A Noble and Sons [1983] 
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 Ibid 450. 
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 [1989] BCLC 383, 385. 
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in private companies. There are three kinds of disputes that often arise once mutual trust 
has ended and the relationships which underpinned the formation of the company have 
broken down. In the first kind, relational breakdown precipitates squeeze-out behaviour 
that exacerbates the dispute. In the second kind, relational breakdown occurs as a 
consequence of negligent and inefficient management by the controlling shareholder. In 
the third kind, relational breakdown gives rise to exit disputes. These three kinds of 
disputes will be furthered referred to in the thesis as ‘type 1’, ‘type 2’ and ‘type 3’ 
disputes.  
 
In type 1 disputes relational breakdown often generates a desire in the majority either to 
enhance their stake or to obtain the outright control of the company. That desire 
precipitates opportunistic conduct on the part of the majority. Opportunistic conduct or 
squeeze-out behaviour involves the employment of different techniques, known as 
squeeze-out techniques that exacerbate the dispute. Squeeze-out behaviour occurs when 
the majority shareholders misuse their powers available under majority rule17 to gain an 
unfair advantage over minority shareholders by diminishing their role or stake in the 
company. The precipitating squeeze-out behaviour of majority shareholders in the event 
of relational breakdown exacerbates the dispute so that it is not possible for shareholders 
to work together in the same company. 
 
In type 2 disputes relational breakdown of shareholders does not precipitate squeeze-out 
behaviour. Here the negligent or inefficient management of the company triggers 
relational breakdown to such an extent that it is hard for shareholders to continue the 
business together in the same harmony. Type 3 disputes, are ‘exit disputes’ that arise 
after relational breakdown once the parties have accepted that it is not feasible for them 
to stay united in the same company. Due to the closely held nature of these companies 
there are invariably restrictions on the transfer of shares in the articles. Therefore 
relational breakdown gives rise to further complaints regarding ‘illiquidity’ and 
‘valuation’. The minority often desire to liquidate their investment at a value they 
consider is fair. However, the majority dispute the terms on which the minority are 
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 See above chapter 1 para 1.1. 
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prepared to exit. The dispute then comes down essentially to money i.e. how much and 
on what terms one or other party walks away.   
 
In fact the relational breakdown, that precipitates squeeze-outs and causes ‘exit 
disputes’, occurs owing to some underlying factors. These underlying factors are very 
often personality clashes and family quarrels, self-interest, negligent and inefficient 
management and lack of formal planning of shareholders before embarking on a 
business venture through the medium of private companies. These underlying factors 
lead to relational breakdown and can be described as primary causes of shareholder 
disputes. A probable model of the characteristics of minority shareholders disputes in 
private companies that can be inferred from the study of the reported case law and 
empirical research is set out below in figure 3.1 for convenience.18  
 
Figure: 3.1 
 
Characteristics of Shareholder Disputes in Private Companies 
 
Exit disputes 
 
Squeeze-out 
 
Breakdown of relationship 
 
Underlying factors 
 
(i) Personality clashes and family quarrels 
(ii) Self-interest 
(iii) Negligent or inefficient management 
(iv) Lack of formal business planning 
 
 
Unlike shareholders in listed companies, minority shareholders in private companies 
have no market to sell their shares. Moreover because of the closed nature of these 
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private companies there are often restrictions on transfer of shares to outsiders. Due to 
the lack of exit opportunities, minority shareholders in private companies arguably need 
recourse to the courts to resolve their disputes often by seeking exit. It is evident from 
the case law and the Law Commission Report that the resolution of these disputes and 
the provision of appropriate relief through the courts is a lengthy and expensive 
process.19 Commentators20 have suggested that this opportunistic behaviour through 
employment of squeeze-out techniques can be prevented and disputes arising from such 
opportunistic conduct can be resolved through ex ante contractual arrangements.21 It has 
been asserted that ex ante contractual arrangements can avoid the need for recourse to 
the courts and so reduce the need for lengthy and cumbersome litigation.22 Hence, to 
explore the scope and potential of ex ante contractual arrangements, it is necessary first 
to consider the characteristics of shareholder disputes in private companies. That 
includes the nature and causes of these disputes and for which ex ante contractual 
provision could be made. Identification of these characteristics also underpinned the 
study of the effective resolution of shareholder disputes: unless we could understand the 
nature and dynamics of these disputes we could not hope to understand how best to 
resolve them. 
 
During the empirical research23 the interviewees also discussed the factors underlying 
relational breakdowns and the characteristics of shareholder disputes drawing on their 
extensive practical experience. In the paragraphs below in the light of the study of the 
reported cases and interviewees’ responses the chapter discusses the common factors 
underlying relational breakdown which I have described as primary causes of these 
disputes. I then go on to provide a more detailed account of the three types of disputes 
that I have identified.   
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3.3 Causes of relational breakdown: 
As already indicated relational breakdown precipitates squeeze-out behaviour and cause 
‘exit disputes’ in private companies. Relational breakdown occurs due to underlying 
factors that are in fact primary causes of shareholder disputes. Here the chapter identifies 
the underlying factors of relational breakdown as can be inferred from the relevant 
reported case law and the empirical data. The purpose of the discussion is to identify the 
patterns suggesting that relational breakdown is a critical characteristic of shareholder 
disputes in private companies. This is highly relevant to the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of ex ante contracting and section 459 as dispute resolution mechanisms.   
 
3.3.1 Identification of the underlying factors of relational breakdown: 
There can be various possible underlying factors that end the mutual trust and lead to the 
break down of the relationship between shareholders in these companies which can be 
hard to identify. During the study of the reported case law and empirical investigation, 
an attempt was made to identify the main factors that tend to undermine shareholder 
relationships. The identification of these primary causes is very significant if we are to 
understand the nature of shareholder disputes in these types of companies with a view to 
preventing or resolving such disputes. O’Neal placed emphasis on the high desirability 
of a careful study of the underlying causes of squeeze-outs.24 Clearly, effective 
resolution depends on a proper understanding of the disputes that are sought to be 
resolved within the legal system.    
 
Due to the complex nature of these disputes it can be difficult to identify these 
underlying factors from the facts of the cases by reading the relevant law reports. It is 
often the case as in Re Bhullar Bros Ltd,25 that the court will not look into the reasons 
behind the relational breakdown because it is not material for the purposes of the case.26 
Sometimes even the shareholders who are involved in these disputes fail to identify any 
specific cause of their dispute. Indeed one of the interviewees indicated that sometimes 
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it is hard to identify any specific reason (either business or personal) that triggers 
relational breakdown [F].27 Similarly in Mckee v. O’ Reilly28 the shareholders had a very 
close and successful business and personal relationship for some fourteen or fifteen 
years but for some reason which was hard to identify even by themselves their 
relationship deteriorated rapidly to the point that it was difficult for them to continue 
business successfully together. Both parties blamed the other for the breakdown.   
 
The study of the reported case law and the empirical research show that the primary 
underlying causes of the shareholders disputes tend to be personality clashes and family 
quarrels, self-interest, negligent and inefficient management and lack of formal planning 
by shareholders before starting the business. It is these factors which tend to trigger 
relational breakdown.  The interviewees’ responses as a whole placed particular 
emphasis on personality clashes and family disputes, business conflicts and human vices 
such as greed or jealously. Interviewee T expressed the view that the breakdown of 
personal or family relationships, and factors such as dishonesty and distrust are common 
causes of shareholder disputes. Interviewee K drew the analogy between shareholder 
and matrimonial disputes and reinforced the point that dishonesty is often an underlying 
cause. Interviewee C emphasized the role of self-interested behaviour in these disputes 
and noted, in particular, how greed on the part of the controlling shareholder was often a 
trigger for squeeze-out behaviour. Relational breakdown may be caused by one factor or 
a combination of factors though, as was the case in Mckee v O’Reilly, it is not always a 
straightforward matter to identify the pivotal factor or factors. Human vices such as 
greed and jealousy may operate independently or cumulatively with other factors such as 
conflicts regarding management of the business.29 The underlying factors that lead to 
relational breakdown identified by the study of the reported case law and the empirical 
research are discussed below in detail.  
 
                                                 
27
 Here alphabet in square brackets ‘[F]’ refers to interviewee’s name given to him in the thesis instead of 
using the original name of interviewee, for the purposes of ensuring anonymity. The same practice is 
observed in the whole thesis for all interviewees. See above chapter 2 para 2.3.2.3 Analysis of Data and 
Table 2.3.  
28
 [2004] 2 BCLC 145. 
29
 See below Re London school of Electronics Ltd [1985] BCLC 273 para 3.4.1.2. 
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3.3.1.1 Personality clashes and family quarrels: 
One commentator has explained that, in practice clients who approach a lawyer with a 
view to incorporating their business tend to focus simply on the process of 
incorporation. The lawyer is not usually asked and perhaps he is not best qualified to 
answer, the important question, “are we a good fit?”30 In Re a Company (No 007623 of 
1986), Lord Hoffmann (as he then was) asserted that in many cases it becomes 
impossible in practice for shareholders to work together in the same company without it 
obviously being the fault of one party or the other. They may have come together with a 
confident expectation of being able to co-operate but found later that owing to 
insurmountable differences in their personalities it is impossible.31 He subsequently 
restated the view that relationships can break down without either side having done 
anything seriously wrong or unfair when he reached the House of Lords.32 The interview 
evidence confirms that personality differences that are latent or clouded by over-
optimism at the outset tend to cause relational breakdown subsequently once those 
differences are out in the open. O’ Neal has stated that dissension in a close corporation 
often results from personality clashes among shareholders and suggested that a 
prospective shareholder should consider the personalities of other shareholders before 
starting business with them.33  
 
Interviewee D said that relational breakdown, like divorce, often occurs not because of 
external factors but because “people cannot stand each other any more”. Interviewee S 
also observed that shareholder disputes are often personal in nature:  
 
People think they are contributing more to the business than their partners or they are not getting 
much recognition, somebody is taking too many holidays, somebody has got a better house or a 
better girlfriend. It is all personal. Alternatively they are suspicious of the other party or have 
become suspicious because even if they have not actually done something they just think they 
have. That suspicion gets worse and worse [S]. 
 
                                                 
30
 Elson, A., ‘Shareholders’ Agreements, A Shield for Minority Shareholders of Close Corporations’ 
(1967) 22 Bus Law 449, 450. 
31
 Re a Company (No 007623 of 1986) [1986] BCLC 362, 366.   
32
 See O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1, 14.  
33
 See F.H. O’Neal and R. Thompson, O’Neal’s Oppression of Minority Shareholders. (2nd ed Callaghan 
1985) chapter 2 para 2:02. See also below para 4.6.1 for scope of ex ante contracting to prevent 
personality clashes.   
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Interviewee J mentioned that people often started out in business but later discovered 
that one of them was more intelligent and hardworking and wanted to expand the 
business whereas the other was less ambitious and quite happy to maintain the status 
quo. Inevitably, this may lead to tension within the relationship [J]. In Ex parte Kremer34 
the petitioner complained that the respondent was patronising towards him, and had 
refused to accord him the status and responsibilities to which he felt he was entitled. The 
respondent denied these allegations and put a case in response to the effect that the 
petitioner was idle and frequently drunk. In Allmark v Burnham35 both shareholders had 
been friends for many years before they had decided to go into business together. After a 
short time running the business their relationship became strained and ultimately broke 
down. The court found as a fact that the majority shareholder had not treated his 
erstwhile friend, the minority shareholder as a partner having equal status in the 
business. Indeed, the majority shareholder formed the view that the minority shareholder 
was not his intellectual equal and seems to have come to regard him with some disdain. 
 
One interviewee went so far as to suggest that some people had personal characteristics 
that mean in truth “they should not be in business with someone else because they [are] 
not just made for it”. The same interviewee added that:  
 
There were people who may be well-suited to running a business on their own but who either for 
convenience or genuinely because they think it would be a good idea, go into business with 
somebody else but it turns out that they find it difficult to work with others [J].  
 
In Irvine v Irvine the majority shareholder was a dominant person who was dismissive of 
the need to involve his co-director and shareholder in decision making regarding the 
fixing of remuneration and dividends viewing himself as the generator of the bulk of the 
business profits.36 It can be inferred that disputes may arise because the majority 
shareholder equates him/herself as being akin to a sole trader.  
 
                                                 
34
 [1989] BCLC 365, 366. 
35
 [2005] EWHC 2717; [2006] 2 BCLC 437 also known as Re Distinct Services Ltd.  
36
 [2006] All ER (D) 153 para 357. 
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In Woolwich v Twenty Twenty Productions Ltd37 the aggressive and bullying conduct of 
Mr. Woolwich who was a minority shareholder in the company towards junior members 
of staff lead to relational breakdown which, in turn, caused the other shareholders to 
exclude Woolwich from the company.38 Woolwich’s personal conduct was therefore at 
the root of the dispute. On one occasion, he shouted at members of staff who employed 
an archive researcher to work in the company. He said, “I am an executive producer and 
if I tell you he’s (archive researcher) crap he is, and you do as I say”. Moreover, “he 
denied he had acted inappropriately and insisted that he was entitled to reprimand staff”. 
The court stated that the majority shareholders had been justified in concluding that Mr. 
Woolwich’s continued involvement in the management of the company business placed 
the smooth running of the company’s business in serious jeopardy and that his conduct 
was the cause of the breakdown of the original relationship of mutual confidence 
between him and his fellow shareholders.39  
 
Interviewee H said that he had come across disputes which at root were highly 
personalized and had become so because of personal prejudices relating to matters such 
as race, gender or sexual orientation:  
 
In one of my cases the majority had discriminated against the minority because the minority was 
homosexual. There are companies where people didn’t want to work with women. They wake up 
one morning and decide OK, discriminate against homosexuals this week, very odd [H].  
 
Interviewees also emphasized the role played by family quarrels in shareholder disputes. 
One pointed out that disputes in family-run companies often arise when the business is 
transferred to the next generation who may have been educated differently, have 
different personalities, face different cultural influences and may not have the same 
sense of cooperation as the previous generation who had founded the business [J]. Other 
interviewees added that often the founders of these family companies dealt with their 
differences very well but later disputes arose among their children because of their 
different personalities and goals in life [B, E]. 
 
                                                 
37
 [2003] All ER (D) 211 (Feb); [2003] EWHC 414 (Ch) 424. 
38
 See below para 3.4.1.1.1 Disregard of minority shareholders’ participation in the company. 
39
 [2003] All ER (D) 211 (Feb); [2003] EWHC 414 (Ch) 432. 
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3.3.1.2 Self-interested behaviour: 
In a great number of reported cases it can be inferred that self-interested behaviour - for 
example, the desire for power and wealth – has led to relational breakdown and caused 
one party to want to obtain outright control of the company. In these cases such 
behaviour precipitates the employment of squeeze-out techniques which elevate a 
personal dispute into a legal dispute.40 These tendencies may only manifest themselves 
over time as the business and business relationship evolve. The interview evidence 
suggests strongly that behind many disputes the motivating factors were lust for power, 
jealousy, fear and greed. For example, one interviewee said this:   
 
These businesses started in the spirit of good will like a marriage and 99 times out of 100 two 
human factors known as greed and jealousy are behind these disputes [G].  
 
Interviewee F explained a variety of reasons behind the fact that people no longer like 
each other that cause disputes in private companies, but further stated that:  
 
Disputes often arise when the company is worth something… and shareholders want to control 
the company or want to take the business in a different direction [F].   
 
Sometimes the introduction of third parties such as wives, brothers or children may 
change the dynamic between the existing parties [B]. In Richards v Lundy41 the minority 
shareholder was excluded from the management of the company by the majority on the 
basis of his alleged incompetence regarding the company’s business. No such 
incompetence on the part of the minority had been established in the evidence and no 
such personality clashes existed that had made the minority shareholder’s exclusion 
inevitable.42 It appears in fact, that the majority shareholder was probably influenced by 
his son’s return to the company, had considered the petitioner to be expendable and 
                                                 
40
 In A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 1017, Re Cumana Ltd, [1986] BCLC 430, RA Noble and 
Sons (Clothing) Ltd, [1983] BCLC 273 and North Holdings Ltd v Southern Tropics Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 
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Development Corporation Ltd [1992] BCLC 1016 that the self-interested desire to increase power or 
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or voting power in the company that cause dispute. 
41
 [2000] 1 BCLC 376. See also Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1972] 2 All ER 492. 
42
 See also below para 3.4.1.1.1  Disregard of minority shareholders’ participation in the company. 
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decided to remove him from the company with a view to acquiring his shares so as to 
make the company entirely a family concern. This self-interested behaviour of the 
majority shareholder – the desire to assert outright family control over the business – 
appears to have precipitated the squeeze-out behaviour. Moreover, it appears that his 
actions were also motivated by the desire to minimise inheritance tax that might 
otherwise have been payable in respect of his interests in the company in the event of his 
death.    
 
Interviewee H said that in one of his present cases his client who was a minority 
shareholder had been removed as a director of the company by a resolution of the board 
of directors. Even though the board of directors did not have the power to remove his 
client as a director, the resolution was passed to obtain outright control of the company. 
Furthermore, one of his client’s shareholding was diluted by the company making a 
rights issue due to the personal financial interests of the majority. His client who was 
minority did not take up the rights issue because it was not worthwhile to his client to 
pay another £20,000 for the shares [H]. So self-interested behaviour is one major factor 
behind the relational breakdown in private companies.43  
 
3.3.1.3 Lack of formal planning:  
Relational breakdown can also occur because of conflicts regarding management of the 
company’s business. In Jones v Jones44 the relationship between the two shareholders 
broke down. There were disagreements about business strategies. The first shareholder 
wanted to expand the enterprise by taking on more plant and equipment with a 
consequent increase in debt and risk. The other shareholder did not wish to do this and 
this led to a parting of the ways. This section discusses the situations in which these 
business conflicts can arise. A strong theme emerging from the desk-based and empirical 
research is that management conflicts often arise because the shareholders either give no 
or insufficient advance consideration to the nature and medium of the business venture 
upon which they are embarking.  
                                                 
43
 These examples reflect fact patterns observable in reported cases: see cases cited and discussed in paras 
3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2 below. 
44
 Jones v Jones [2003] BCC 226 para 9. 
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(i) Contradictory business interests: 
One interviewee stated that lack of shared vision and differing personal objectives 
commonly lead to relational breakdown: 
 
People can have different business interests and their goals in life may diverge. Those who have 
children want long term planning and those who don’t want profits [G]. 
 
In Re Sam Weller and Sons Ltd45 the court held that a policy of paying minimal 
dividends over a long period of time could possibly be in the interests of the respondents 
through the enhancement of the capital value of their shares but was against the 
petitioner’s interests in receiving immediate income in the form of larger dividend. 46 
Therefore, the shareholders’ contradictory business and investment objective resulted in 
diverging views over whether profits should be retained or distributed.   
 
(ii) Lack of understanding regarding the corporate medium: 
In the light of professional experience interviewee R said that shareholders’ lack of 
understanding regarding the corporate medium may often cause disputes some time after 
the incorporation of the business. Shareholders may not necessarily grasp the intricacies 
of corporate law, the strength of the majority rule, the lack of an organized market in the 
shares and the fact that under private company articles of association there are often 
limited rights of exit:  
 
People start companies and it is quite easy to do without really understanding exactly what these 
companies are. Then people find themselves in something that they have less control over than 
they thought and they find it hard to deal with. A lot of people don’t appreciate just how 
restricted the rights of a minority shareholder are in a private company not only as a matter of law 
but also as a matter of economics [R].  
 
Similarly, it appears that in Quinlan v Essex Hinge Co Ltd47  due to disagreement over 
the company’s policy and confidence of the majority upon their voting strength, the 
majority over reacted towards minority by employing squeeze-out techniques that 
caused dispute.48 
 
                                                 
45
 Re a Company (No 823 of 1987) [1990] BCLC 80.   
46
 See below para 3.4.1.2.1  Misappropriation of company’s assets and proceeds. 
47
 [1996] 2 BCLC 417. 
48
 See below para 3.4.1.1.1 Disregard of minority shareholders’ participation in the company. 
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(iii) Unforeseen developments: 
A number of interviewees confirmed that small private companies are often formed on 
the basis of mutual trust and without any formal stipulations and planning at the time of 
starting business. Lack of advance planning regarding the business may cause conflicts 
anytime during the life of the company. Elson makes the colourful point that “when the 
rosy glow of anticipated profits which had blurred the natural good sense of the client 
had dissolved or had increased beyond expectation, the trouble began”.49 Of course, the 
future direction of a business is not wholly predictable and unforeseen developments 
may frustrate shareholder expectations and overtake any plans that they may have been 
made. This point is borne out by the following interview extract:  
 
The company is either much more profitable than the shareholders thought or it is much less 
profitable than their expectations and therefore the arrangements that they have made are not 
suitable for these new circumstances. Either somebody thinks they should be getting more money 
or somebody thinks that someone else should be receiving less [R]. 
 
(iv) Disparity of contribution: 
Interviewee R also pointed out that conflicts can occur because of perceived disparities 
in contribution between shareholders:  
 
One shareholder has a bright idea and the other shareholder is going to actually make it work. In 
this situation shareholders often fall out, because one person thinks he is contributing more than 
the other [R].  
 
Similarly, in Re Cumana Ltd50 the majority shareholder thought that the success of the 
business was largely due to his efforts and that the minority had contributed little. 
However, it was stated that:  
 
Sometimes what parties call dishonesty in this context, is a question as to the parties’ belief as to 
the importance of their contribution to the business, as compared to their quasi-partners [M].  
 
Interviewee M added that shareholders’ expectations from the company’s business were 
not always the same and they often did not share those expectations with one another at 
the start of the business, which caused dispute later. 
 
                                                 
49
 Elson, A., ‘Shareholders’ Agreements, A Shield for Minority Shareholders of Close Corporations’ 
(1967) 22 Bus Law 449, 450. 
50
 [1986] BCLC 430, 434. 
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(v) Informality in the running of the company: 
Several interviewees explained that private companies are often formed on the basis of 
mutual trust so often the informal nature of governance and decision making in private 
companies can be a source of difficulty as well as flexibility.51 The Company Law 
Review in setting out their ‘think small first’ objective also proposed that the law should 
be more simplified for small private companies; their approach was later implemented in 
the CA 2006.52  Frequently directors do not have board meetings and sometimes they 
even do not have proper discussion of important business matters. In Re a Company (No 
00789 of 1987), ex parte Shooter53 the controlling shareholder did not hold annual 
general meetings and lay accounts before members, so that members were wholly 
deprived of any opportunity to know what was going on in the company.54 Such 
informality also leads to minority shareholder’s unfair exclusion from management of 
the company.55 
 
One interviewee added that shareholders generally do not complain about this informal 
decision making process but:  
 
[Once their relationship breaks down] shareholders complain when previously they would never 
have complained about [decision making processes] by saying there has been failure to comply 
with section or article such and such [S]. 
  
The theme that emerges is that relational breakdown can occur as a result of a lack of 
advance formal planning by shareholders. This can encompass lack of preparation for 
the requirements of company law, failure to anticipate foreseeable developments and an 
absence of shared vision and business objectives as regards the management of the 
company. So it stresses the need for advance formal planning by shareholders which can 
be done by ex ante contractual arrangements.56 As shareholders in these companies start 
business on the basis of their personal relationships, it seems that shareholders are 
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 See Fisher v Cadman [2006] 1 BCLC 499. 
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optimistic about the prospects of their business relationship therefore do not feel any 
need for forward planning.57   
 
3.4 Nature and kinds of minority shareholders’ disputes: 
Relational breakdown causes disputes among shareholders who are often also directors 
of the company.58 As stated in the introduction of the chapter above, in private 
companies, disputes that arise in the event of relational breakdown can be divided into 
three types. In type 1 disputes which are the major kind, relational breakdown 
precipitates squeeze-out behaviour by majority shareholders that exacerbates the dispute. 
Squeeze-out behaviour occurs when majority shareholders exploit their powers to gain 
an unfair advantage over minority shareholders or to reduce or eliminate the interests of 
minority shareholders in the company. In type 2 disputes relational breakdown occurs 
due to negligent or inefficient management of majority shareholders without any 
precipitating squeeze-out behaviour. Type 3 disputes revolve around the terms of exit of 
one or more minority shareholders from the company following relational breakdown. 
The courts do not intervene simply because relational breakdown has occurred, but only 
when it is triggered by negligent or inefficient management59 or accompanied by 
squeeze-out behaviour. 
 
3.4.1 The relational breakdown precipitating squeeze-out behaviour: 
It is evident from the desk-based and empirical research that relational breakdown in 
private companies often precipitates the opportunistic conduct of majority shareholders 
through the use of what I termed squeeze-out techniques. The employment of these 
techniques exacerbates the situation and causes shareholder disputes in these companies. 
In other words, what starts as a relational breakdown is escalated by squeeze-out 
behaviour to a full-blown legal dispute. Squeeze-out techniques invariably involve an 
abuse of majority rule. Misuse of majority rule may also involve conduct that breaches 
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of the terms upon which the company affairs should be run. In private companies these 
terms governing the conduct of the company’s affairs can be based upon (i) mutual 
understanding of the shareholders giving rise to equitable considerations60 or (ii) formal 
legal requirements and/or terms stipulated by shareholders in the articles of association 
or through private ordering in separate shareholders’ agreements. The impact of the 
squeeze-out behaviour can be either exclusionary or expropriatory on some or all of the 
shareholders’ rights regarding (i) participation in the management of the company and/or 
(ii) capital investment or returns.  
 
This section discusses the exclusionary and expropriatory impacts of squeeze-out 
behaviour drawing upon my desk based and empirical research. It is useful to mention 
that the impact of squeeze-out behaviour upon minority shareholders can be both 
exclusionary and expropriatory simultaneously.  
 
3.4.1.1 Exclusionary impact of squeeze-out: 
The impact of squeeze-out behaviour is exclusionary when minority shareholders’ rights 
to participate in the management of the company are disregarded by the majority. This 
disregard of participation includes instances where: (i) the minority is expressly 
excluded from the management of the company; (ii) the minority has not been provided 
access to information regarding the company’s affairs; (iii) the minority has not been 
consulted in the decision making process of the company. These exclusionary impacts of 
squeeze-out behaviour are discussed further below.   
 
3.4.1.1.1 Disregard of minority shareholders’ participation in the company:                                                                                   
Lord Wilberforce observed in Ebrahami v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd61 that the company 
“structure is defined by the Companies Act and by the articles of association by which 
shareholders agree to be bound”. Section 168(1) of the CA 2006 provides that a 
company may by ordinary resolution at a meeting remove a director before the 
expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in any agreement between it 
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 See O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1. For detail discussion of the case see below chapter 6 para 6.3 
O’Neill v Phillips. 
61
 [1973] AC 360, 379. 
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and him.62 Minority shareholders in private companies often complain that they have 
been excluded from the management of the company, contrary to their expectations as a 
member of the company.63 A survey conducted by the Law Commission in 1997 found 
that 67% of petitions presented by members of private companies in 1994 and 1995 to 
the Companies Court in London pursuant to section 459 of the CA 1985 for relief from 
unfair prejudice alleged exclusion from management.64 All interviewees had 
encountered shareholder exclusion from management very often in practice. One 
interviewee stated in this context that: 
 
In my experience getting rid of a shareholder as a director or employee, I mean exclusion from 
management of the company is the most common complaint [H].     
 
In Parkinson v Eurofinance Group Ltd65 the petitioner, Mr. Parkinson was excluded 
from management and control of the company. Moreover, the respondents sold the 
company to another company in which the respondents were together entitled to a 
majority of the votes. It was alleged inter alia that Mr. Parkinson had breached his duties 
as a director. Along with one alleged instance of dishonesty, it was alleged that he had 
failed to comply with the terms of a shareholders’ agreement the existence of which he 
denied. Due to these allegations the respondents argued that Mr. Parkinson’s exclusion 
was fair. The court disagreed. The trial judge, Pumfrey J, stated that: 
 
There is no doubt that by the time that Mr. Parkinson was excluded from the management of the 
company the relationship of trust and confidence which had previously existed between the 
directors had come to an end.  
 
It had also become clear to the judge during the trial that the parties’ recollection of 
events had to a significant extent been overtaken by their mutual dislike. It was found as 
a fact that the relationship between the shareholders had foundered before the 
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petitioner’s exclusion and that the main purpose of the exclusion was to prevent what 
was thought to be the risk of him launching a coup. Here, then, relational breakdown 
precipitated the desire on the respondents’ part to obtain outright control by excluding 
Mr. Parkinson from the management of the company. 
 
In R & H Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd66 a private company was planned, 
formed and set up in business in 1989 by four shareholders on the basis of their mutual 
trust.67 The petitioner who was a minority shareholder was an experienced businessman, 
believed in hard work and stressed the need for economy and sacrifice until the business 
was really well established. The petitioner in evidence concerning his relationship with 
his fellow shareholders said that “they did, in the end rely just on trust”.68 Various draft 
shareholders’ agreements were discussed but never executed.69 In 1993 it appears that 
the majority shareholders formed the view that the petitioner was a “greedy old man” 
and in 1994 they allied together to exclude the petitioner from management even though 
he had made a significant contribution to the setting up of the company. One majority 
shareholder was considered by the court as a very ambitious man with much keener 
awareness of his talents than his limitations. Here again, relational breakdown 
precipitated the desire on the respondents’ part to obtain outright control by excluding 
the petitioner from management.  
 
In Re Regional Airport Ltd70 a company was formed for the purposes of investing in and 
developing regional airports in the UK. The issued share capital was held 50 per cent by 
one shareholder and 10 per cent each by five other shareholders. Two of the minority 
shareholders complained regarding their removal as directors from management of the 
company by majority shareholders. The minority shareholders alleged that the company 
as a joint venture between the shareholders has always been a quasi-partnership 
company based upon a relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders in 
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which all the shareholders were entitled to participate as directors of the company.71 The 
court acknowledged the entitlement of the minority shareholders to participate in the 
management of company.72    
 
In Brownlow v G H Marshall Ltd73 a family run company was owned by a brother and 
two sisters who were equal shareholders in the company. The shares in the company 
were transferred to them by their late parents. The minority shareholder (Mrs. 
Brownlow) was dismissed and her service agreement was terminated with agreement of 
all other directors of the company at a board meeting without providing her any reasons 
for her dismissal. Nearly a year later she was formally removed from the office as a 
director. Mrs. Brownlow filed a petition under section 459 of the CA 1985 against her 
exclusion. The family company was formed on the personal relationship evolved over a 
long period of time. It was claimed by the respondents that there had been a breakdown 
in the necessary relationship of trust and confidence between Mrs. Brownlow on the one 
hand and the company and its other directors on the other. The company also faced 
unfair dismissal proceedings started by Mrs. Brownlow in the industrial tribunal. The 
majority resisted the claim by setting out the matters that have caused a breakdown in 
trust and confidence and which undermined the effective running of the company and 
cast doubt on the minority shareholder’s integrity and influenced the decision to dismiss 
her. The majority shareholders also contended that the minority was excluded from 
management of company under the terms of the service agreement. The court stated that 
in a family company no agreement was reached between the shareholders as to what 
would happen to the shares of a person dismissed from employment under service 
agreements. In the absence of such agreement or some contrary understanding it does 
not seem that the terms of the service agreement override the equitable considerations 
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that had already arisen from the personal relationships within the company.74 In the 
presence of such equitable considerations the minority shareholder should not have been 
removed from office without a reasonable offer being made for her shares. The court 
ordered buy-out relief sought by the minority shareholder, without discount for the 
minority nature of the holding. It can be inferred that the dispute arose in the next 
generation due to self interested behaviour of majority shareholders that caused 
relational breakdown precipitating a desire to obtain outright control of the company. A 
similar pattern can be observed in several other cases which tend to bear out the 
experience of the interviewee referred to above.75  
 
Exclusion from participation in the affairs of the company can also occur in two other 
ways: (i) failure by the majority to consult the minority when making major decisions 
and (ii) failure by the majority to provide the minority with access to information 
regarding the company’s affairs. Courts can also prefer for convenience to deal with 
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these complaints together where all these complaints regarding exclusion are present in 
one single case.76 Cases of failure to consult and inform are not uncommon. Minority 
shareholders often complain that their participating role in the company has been 
diminished since they have not been properly consulted regarding important corporate 
decisions. For example in RA Noble and Sons (Clothing) Ltd77 the petitioner alleged that 
he had not been adequately consulted and informed regarding certain key business 
transactions and that the respondent had improperly assumed control of the company 
and had excluded him from involvement in its affairs.78  
 
A member cannot inspect the accounting and financial records of the company to get 
information about the company affairs at his own will. However, a shareholder can 
complain where he has a formal right to access information regarding company affairs 
and he has been denied that formal right. The Companies Act provides that every 
company must send a copy of its annual accounts and reports for each financial year to 
every member of the company and every member is entitled to be provided on demand 
and free of charge with a copy of the annual accounts and reports of the company.79 In 
private companies, minority shareholders often complain that they have been 
inadequately informed about the company’s affairs and thus excluded from effective 
participation in the company’s affairs. . In Allmark v Burnham80 it was expressly agreed 
between the shareholders that the minority shareholder’s position as a director was not to 
be prejudiced or altered, and that he was to be kept updated on the progress of the 
business by weekly written reports. The majority ignored this agreement thus denying 
the minority what amounted to a contractual right to the provision of information. 
Complaints regarding denial to give access to company information, were made by 
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minority shareholders in various reported cases.81 It is also evident from the reported 
cases that complaint from exclusion from management can be accompanied by other 
self-serving behaviour of majority shareholders such as non-payment of dividend and 
wrongful diversion of company assets or business.82 
 
3.4.1.2 Expropriatory impact of squeeze-out: 
The impact of squeeze-out is expropriatory when the majority: (i) misappropriate the 
assets and proceeds of the company; and/or (ii) dilute the minority shareholders’ 
investment or voting power in the company. Here the chapter discusses the 
expropriatory impact of squeeze-out in detail. 
 
3.4.1.2.1  Misappropriation of company’s assets and proceeds: 
It is a fiduciary duty of directors to use the company assets for the benefit of the 
company as a whole and not for their own personal benefit.83 Section 172(1) of the CA 
2006 inter alia provides that:  
 
A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.  
 
In private companies minority shareholders often complain that majority shareholders 
who are also directors of the company have misappropriated the company’s assets and 
proceeds for their own personal needs and to satisfy their personal interests.  
 
During the empirical investigation an interviewee shared a recent experience of a case 
where the minority complained about abuse of power by majority shareholders:  
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The majority did not want to take up a particular opportunity because they did not want the 
minority to get benefit from it and wanted to avail themselves of the opportunity through a 
different company without the knowledge of the minority [G]. 
 
In Allmark v Burnham84 the majority shareholder established a business named ‘Royal's 
Greetings’ in competition with the company. Fixtures and fittings and stock belonging to 
the company were applied to the use of ‘Royal's Greetings’ business without keeping 
proper records and accounts of the inter-company trading. Some expenditure was met by 
the company for the benefit of ‘Royal's Greetings’. Inevitably, a proportion of the 
majority shareholder’s time and effort was taken up with the business of ‘Royal's 
Greetings’. The court concluded that the majority shareholder, as a director and 
fiduciary, required the fully informed consent of the company to these arrangements and 
it was accepted in evidence that the minority had been neither informed nor consulted. In 
Gerrard v Koby85  following relational breakdown the minority shareholders alleged that 
the majority had purchased property to the detriment of the company and with the 
expectation of making a secret profit that exacerbated the dispute to an extent that the 
best solution suggested was their separation. 
 
In Re Bhullar Bros Ltd86 a family company was owned by two brothers Mohan and 
Sohan. Later their children also became directors of the company. Each brother and his 
family owned 50 per cent shares in the company. The Mohan family alleged that the 
Sohan family had purchased a property for their personal benefit adjacent to the 
company’s property without communicating the existence of investment opportunity to 
the company which is against their interests. At the time of the purchase the relationship 
between the shareholders had already broken down and a state of considerable acrimony 
prevailed. Subsequent negotiations to divide the company assets and business between 
the shareholders failed. The Court of Appeal held that the existence of the opportunity to 
buy the property was information that was relevant to the company which the Sohan 
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family were therefore under a duty to communicate to it.87 Similar kinds of allegations 
of breach of fiduciary duties arising out of misappropriation of company’s assets and 
proceeds were made in various other reported cases.88   
 
Another aspect of expropriatory squeeze-out behaviour which can arise in cases where 
not all of the shareholders are directors is the application of company funds to pay 
directors’ remuneration rather than by declaring dividends. As to the proper application 
of the company’s funds in balancing the payment of remuneration to the directors and 
dividends to the shareholders, in Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd89 it was held that it was for 
the company management and not for the court to decide the amount to be awarded as 
reasonable remuneration. However, where directors’ remuneration is considered 
excessive for their personal needs disputes may arise between the shareholders.90 In 
Bonham v Crow91 the minority shareholder alleged that the majority shareholders had 
paid themselves and the wife of one of the directors, excessive remuneration. The judge 
accepted that those grounds had caused unfair prejudice to the minority. Similar 
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allegations as to excessive remuneration of directors have been repeatedly made in the 
reported cases.92  
 
Allegations of excessive remuneration of directors often accompany complaints as to 
little or no participation in the profits of the company. In reported case law minority 
shareholders repeatedly complain about the channeling of company resources towards 
the majority through unjustifiable directors’ remuneration which might otherwise have 
provided minority shareholders with an income yield on their investment. The low 
dividend policy is linked with excessive remuneration because if the company profits are 
used to remunerate directors excessively there will not be enough profits left to 
distribute by way of dividend. In Re a Company (No 00370 of 1987), ex parte Glossop93 
Harman J stated that: 
 
…in my judgment, right to say that directors have a duty to consider how much they can properly 
distribute to members. They have a duty, as I see it, to remember that the members are the 
owners of the company, that the profits belong to the members and that, subject to the proper 
needs of the company to ensure that it is not trading in a risky manner and that there are adequate 
reserves for commercial purposes, by and large, the trading profits ought to be distributed by way 
of dividends.   
 
In Re a Company (No 004415 of 1996)94 the companies were controlled both at board 
and at general meeting by the respondents. The petitioner’s main ground of complaint 
was that over the years the companies had been declaring dividends at a lower level than 
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could be justified on any reasonable commercial grounds. Moreover at the same time the 
companies had been paying directors' fees to the respondents at a higher rate than could 
be justified by any normal commercial yardstick. The petitioners alleged that behind the 
oppressive conduct of respondents was a desire to build up profits within the company 
irrespective of its financial needs. Secondly it would be more advantageous for directors 
to get remuneration instead of declaring dividends which would also be beneficial for 
petitioners. Thirdly, there was respondents’ personal antipathy towards one petitioner 
and a desire to damage his interests.95 The court found an arguable case for the 
petitioners based on the respective levels of remuneration and the dividends declared by 
the companies. 
 
In Re Sam Weller and Sons Ltd96 the shareholders held or were beneficially interested in 
42·5% of the issued share capital of a family company. It was asserted by the petitioners 
that the sole director was conducting the affairs of the company for the exclusive benefit 
of himself and his family. They alleged that even in the presence of accumulated profits 
and in absence of any remuneration from the company, the sole director had paid low 
dividends to the petitioners.97 The sole director and his sons were taking an income from 
the company and causing the company to pay inadequate dividends to the shareholders. 
The court stated while dismissing the application to strike-out the petition, that in the 
absence of any increase in the dividend for so many years and because of the amount of 
accumulated profits and the amount of cash in hand it was against the interests of the 
shareholders like the petitioners, who did not receive directors' fees or remuneration 
from the company. It might be in the interests of the sole director and his sons that larger 
dividends should not be paid out to retain the profits in order to enhance the capital 
value of their holdings. Their interests were not necessarily identical with those of other 
shareholders in the company including the petitioners, who wanted a more immediate 
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benefit to them in the form of larger dividends as their only income from the company 
was by way of dividend.98 
  
3.4.1.2.2 Dilution of minority shareholders’ investment or voting power in the company: 
A dispute may arise among the shareholders where minority shareholders’ investment or 
voting power is diluted through allotment of new shares either by altering the articles of 
association of the company, by breaching a shareholders’ agreement or by breaching the 
provisions of the statute. The CA 2006 provides under section 561 that a company shall 
not allot new shares to a person unless it has offered those shares to existing 
shareholders on a pro rata basis. As evident from the case law minority shareholders’ 
often complain against the conduct of majority shareholder where they have allotted the 
shares due to their self interest and against the interests of minority shareholders.  
 
In Re a Company (No 005134 of 1986) ex p Harries99 the petitioner complained that an 
allotment of shares was contrary to the pre-emptive provisions of the CA 1985. His 
claim was accepted that allotment of shares to the respondent without first offering them 
to the petitioner on pro rata basis was in breach of the legislative provision and therefore 
invalid.  
 
In Re Cumana Ltd100 the majority shareholder decided to make a rights issue for no good 
financial reasons and before capitalizing undistributed profits. The court inferred that the 
proposed rights issue was part of a scheme to reduce the minority shareholding in the 
company and might reduce it, if minority could not take up his proportion of the new 
share issue, from one-third to 0.33 per cent.  
 
Similarly, an interviewee observed that a common complaint in his experience is that the 
rights issue has been made at a time when the majority shareholder is aware that the 
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minority shareholder does not have sufficient personal funds or the scope to raise such 
funds and therefore knows that, in all likelihood, he will be unable to take up the rights 
and end up diluted as a result: 
 
I did one petition in Hong Kong, the result of the rights issue was to dilute 40 percent shareholder 
down to 0.4 percent, a little extreme [K]. 
 
In Parkinson v Eurofinance Group Ltd101 the petitioner shareholder alleged that sale of 
the company to another company where respondents were entitled to a majority of the 
votes was manifestly for the purpose of diluting the petitioner’s shareholding and 
destroying the effectiveness of special rights attached to his shares. Therefore, it was 
alleged that this predominant motive was an exercise of the power for sale for an 
improper purpose which was unfair.102 The court declared that dilution of petitioner’s 
interests was not justified. In reported cases minority shareholders often alleged that the 
proposed issue of shares, diluted their investment in the company.103  
 
Expropriatory squeeze-out behaviour may occur by passing a special resolution to 
change the articles with the purpose of directly or indirectly expropriating the minority. 
The majority shareholders’ by special resolution can alter the articles of the company 
and it is considered as a normal incident to run the affairs of the company.104 However, 
the alteration could be against the interests of minority shareholders.105 In Re Kenyon 
Swansea Ltd106 the respondent proposed that an extraordinary meeting of the company 
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be held to alter the company’s articles of association with the purpose of modifying the 
pre-emption provisions so that he could transfer his shares to his wife without first 
having to offer them to the other shareholders in the company. The petitioner 
complained against the proposed alteration of the articles alleging that it was unfairly 
prejudicial to his interests and court held in favour of the petitioner.107  
 
3.4.1.3 Identification of squeeze-out techniques: empirical evidence: 
Squeeze-out behaviour occurs where the majority abuse majority rule and behave in a 
self-serving manner that is against the interests of minority shareholders and the impact 
of such behaviour can be exclusionary or expropriatory. The four most common 
squeeze-out techniques encountered by interviewees were: exclusion from management; 
non payment of dividend; excessive remuneration; dilution of share value through rights 
issues at time when the minority is not in a position to buy new shares. Other variants 
identified were: diversion of corporate assets; exploitation of corporate opportunities; 
serious breach of articles of association and the running of businesses that compete 
directly with the company.    
 
In light of both the desk-based and empirical research I have adopted the following 
classification of squeeze-out techniques employed by majority shareholders while 
misusing their powers against the minority. Such classification provides a useful basis 
for exploring the extent to which such behaviour can be anticipated and regulated ex 
ante by contract, in private companies, a matter taken up in the next chapter.108    
 
1. Exclusion of member from management of company. 
2. Decisions taken without consultation. 
3. Limited access to information about company affairs. 
4. Misappropriation of company assets. 
5. Complaints regarding remuneration of directors. 
                                                 
107
 The majority’s power to alter articles of association for expropriatory purposes has long been 
constrained by equity, see Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656. See also High Court of 
Australia’s decision in  Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 C.L.R 432. 
108
 See below chapter 4 para 4.5.1 Ex ante contracting to protect the minority from squeeze-out behaviour. 
 62 
6. Little or no participation in profits or failure to pay dividends. 
7. Allotment of shares to dilute minority shareholder investment or voting power in 
the company. 
 
3.4.2 Relational breakdown flowing from negligent management:  
The study of case law suggests that disputes often arise between shareholders where 
there is a conflict between shareholders regarding the management of the company. 
These management conflicts, can lead to relational breakdown and subsequent exit 
disputes without precipitating deliberate squeeze-out behaviour. These conflicts arise 
due to serious acts of mismanagement by majority shareholders. Mismanagement can be 
direct as is the case where the majority running the company are seriously 
incompetent109 or indirect as is the case where the controlling shareholders fail to 
prevent continuous acts of mismanagement by the directors to the detriment of the 
shareholders.110 Mismanagement generally involves the taking of decisions that are 
commercially disadvantageous and can cause the relationship between parties to break 
down in circumstances where the minority cannot readily exit the company and there is 
therefore no lever of governance through exit as there is in theory in the context of listed 
companies through the market for corporate control.      
 
In Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd111 the proceedings concerned two companies. The 
mismanagement of the company’s business in a negligent and inefficient manner led to 
relational breakdown and caused dispute. The petitioner alleged that the affairs of the 
companies had been mismanaged in a negligent and inefficient manner by the 
respondent, who was a majority shareholder and sole director of the company. It was 
alleged that firstly, employees of the respondent had taken commission from the builders 
employed by the companies without accounting to the companies for these sums. 
Secondly, due to the inadequate supervision of the respondent, persons left to grant 
lettings of the companies’ properties had obtained secret payments in return for the grant 
of lettings. Thirdly, the respondent had failed to obtain competitive estimates for repair 
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work and paid too much for repair and improvement work. Fourthly, the respondent had 
caused the companies to engage in costly litigation that was not for the companies’ 
benefit. Fifthly, the respondent had failed to attend to the companies’ affairs properly 
due to his absence from the business. The court also found that these were serious acts of 
mismanagement in the affairs of the company that were against the interests of minority 
shareholders. 
 
The impact of negligent management can be exclusionary or expropriatory and may 
seriously damage the interests of minority shareholders like deliberate squeeze-out 
behaviour, discussed above. But the difference is that such mismanagement is not 
intended to squeeze-out the minority. In Re Elgindata Ltd112 a minority shareholder 
alleged that (i) he had not been consulted with respect to policy decisions on which he 
expected to be consulted, (ii) the majority had managed the affairs of the company in an 
incompetent manner, (iii) the majority had misused the assets of the company for his 
own benefit and for the benefit of his friends and family. These conflicts regarding 
serious business mismanagement, without any deliberate squeeze-out behaviour by 
majority shareholders, cause relational breakdown, so minority sought an exit. The court 
did not find any squeeze-out behaviour on part of the majority shareholder but provided 
exit to minority shareholder because of the majority shareholder’s propensity for using 
the company’s assets for his personal benefit.   
 
In Re a Company (No 00789 of 1987), ex parte Shooter113 a minority shareholder alleged 
that the company’s internal affairs had been mismanaged by the controlling shareholder 
by not holding the annual general meetings and laying accounts before members. So 
members were wholly deprived of any opportunity to consider the affairs of the 
company, to vote on the election or re-election of directors, or in any other way to know 
what was going on inevitably contrary to the interests of members. The court did not 
blame the controlling shareholder for bad faith but declared his conduct as irresponsible 
since he had conducted the affairs of the company in whatever way he thought fit and 
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without any regard for formalities or legal obligations.114 For conducting the affairs of 
the company properly in future the court ordered the controlling shareholder to divest 
himself of his shares in favour of the minority. It can be inferred that conflicts regarding 
management due to the negligent conduct of controlling shareholder breakdown the 
relationship of shareholders and cause dispute without precipitating any deliberate 
squeeze-out behaviour. 
 
In Fisher v Cadman115 a small family company was run on a very informal basis. A 
minority shareholder complained inter alia that majority shareholders had mismanaged 
the company business, by not holding the annual general meetings of the company in 
breach of articles of association and section 366 of the CA 1985.116 The court asserted 
that ‘the background to the dispute was a sad breakdown in family relationships’117 and 
considering such mismanagement to be against the interests of minority shareholder, 
ordered the exit of the minority through buy-out.  
 
It is useful to mention here, that relational breakdown can also occur due to any 
underlying factor discussed above,118 without any serious act of negligence or inefficient 
behaviour. These underlying factors include personal or business conflict due to 
personality clashes or management style.119 It may not be convenient for shareholders to 
work together in the same company in the event of such relational breakdown. In such 
circumstances the court will not provide relief to the minority in the form of an exit on 
fair terms from the company. As the judge put it in one case:  
 
…the requirement of prejudice means that the conduct must be shown to have done the members 
harm and I believe harm in a commercial sense, not in a merely emotional sense.120  
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In the more recent authority of Grace v Biagioli121 it was stated that there was no right of 
unilateral withdrawal for a shareholder when trust and confidence between shareholders 
no longer existed. It was, however, different if that breakdown in relations caused the 
minority prejudice in his capacity as a shareholder. To deal with this situation it may be 
convenient for shareholders to make provision for exit ex ante in a shareholders’ 
agreement122 or to settle the dispute out of court through negotiation.123    
 
3.4.3 Exit disputes following relational breakdown: 
All the available evidence suggests that in the event of relational breakdown, the most 
practical outcome is for the minority shareholder to be bought out.124 Where the dispute 
has escalated from a personal dispute into a legal dispute, as is the case where there is 
squeeze-out behaviour, the prospects of the parties remaining as co-participants in the 
same company will rarely be good.125 The Law Commission findings suggest that 
among the inspected petitions presented to the Companies Court at the Royal Courts of 
Justice, between January 1994 and December 1996 seeking relief under section 459 of 
the CA 1985 in 69.5 per cent of petitions the relief sought was the purchase of 
petitioner’s shares and in 23.6 per cent the relief sought was the sale of respondents’ 
shares in the company.126 In other words, in well over 90 per cent of those cases the 
purpose of the petition was to facilitate an exit by one party of the other. A good 
example is Gerrard v Koby127 where the minority shareholder sought a buy-out order 
and the majority shareholder acknowledged in evidence that:  
 
…the only practical outcome is that one or other side should end up with the company because 
after the present situation there is now no way [the parties] would be able to continue to work 
together.128   
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On the basis that the parties’ personal relationships will often be irreparably damaged 
with the consequence that future conflict disruptive to the running of the business is 
inevitable, there appears to be a strong judicial preference for buy-outs (whether by 
negotiation in the case of simple relational breakdown or by court order under section 
461 of the CA 1985).129 
 
Therefore, relational breakdown in private companies often gives rise to further 
complaints regarding ‘illiquidity’ and ‘valuation’ of the shares of the party who is to be 
bought out. In private companies shareholders have no organized market for selling their 
shares as available to shareholders in listed companies. Shareholders in listed companies 
and partners in partnerships do not face the same degree of illiquidity problems. In listed 
companies shareholders have a market in which to sell their shares and in partnerships 
partners can dissolve the partnership to realise their share by giving notice to the other 
partners.130 Though in practice to avoid cessation of business and to ensure continuity 
the partners may regulate exit through a properly drafted partnership agreement 
providing for continuation of the business and valuing of the exiting partner shares. In 
private companies even if shareholders find a buyer for their shares they might not be 
able to sell their shares due to restrictions on the transfer of shares in the articles of 
association.131  
 
As stated above owing to the non-existence of an organised market for selling their 
shares and the presence of pre-emptive provisions or other restrictions on transfer of 
shares to outsiders in the articles,132 it is often hard for minority shareholders in private 
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companies to liquidate their investment.133 Therefore minority shareholders may have to 
face a state of illiquidity as a result of relational breakdown. Minority shareholders in 
listed companies do not face anything like the same degree of illiquidity and therefore 
minority shareholders in private companies are more likely to become embroiled in 
disputes than their equivalents in listed companies.134 Generally, in exit disputes the 
issues faced by the court will include such matters as which party will sell out and which 
remain135 and the basis upon which a valuation of the shares will be determined.136 
 
In the event of relational breakdown shareholders may well be comfortable with the idea 
of buy-out as the only practical resolution but this will leave the issue of ensuring that 
the exiting shareholder gets a fair value for their shares.137 In Re a Company (No 004377 
of 1986) Hoffmann J (as he then was) commented that section 459 petitions often bear 
some resemblance to divorce petitions.138 Voluminous evidence was served which 
tracked the breakdown of a business relationship commenced in the hope and 
expectation of profitable collaboration:  
 
Each party blamed the other but often it was impossible to say more than the petitioner said in 
this case that there was a clear conflict in personalities and management style. It was almost 
always clear from the outset that one party would have to buy the other’s shares and it was 
usually equally clear who that party would be. The only real issue was the price [to be paid for] 
the shares.139  
 
In Re (No 006834 of 1988), ex parte Kremer140  it was stated that:  
 
This is an ordinary case of breakdown of confidence between the parties. In such circumstances, 
fairness requires that the minority shareholder should not have to maintain his investment in a 
company managed by the majority with whom he has fallen out. But the unfairness disappears if 
the minority shareholder is offered a fair price for his shares.  
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In O’Neill v Phillips,141 Lord Hoffmann stated that:  
 
The unfairness does not lie in the exclusion alone but in exclusion without a reasonable offer. If 
the respondent to a petition has plainly made a reasonable offer, then the exclusion as such will 
not be unfairly prejudicial and he will be entitled to have the petition struck out. It is therefore 
very important that participants in such companies should be able to know what counts as a 
reasonable offer.  
 
Disputes regarding valuation of shares are often very complicated and therefore time 
consuming for both the shareholders and courts.  The question what is fair depends upon 
the facts of the each individual case. The courts also follow the principle that the 
valuation of minority shareholding should be fair.142 In Re a Company (No 005134 of 
1986), ex parte Harries143 it was stated that there was no hard and fast rule to be applied 
and that in valuing shares the court must be guided by what was fair in particular 
circumstances. At exit, disputes regarding fair valuation of shares are about the 
following issues.  
(i) Timing of valuation.144  
(ii) Any adjustments required to be made to share valuation owing to unfairly prejudicial 
conduct such as excessive remuneration.145  
(iii) Discounts, if any, applicable due to a minority holding. In quasi-partnership 
companies at the time of buy-out of minority shareholder in pursuance of an order under 
section 461(2) of the CA 1985, where the petitioner is not at fault, his shares are valued 
on a pro rata basis according to the value of the company as a whole and without any 
discount.146 However, minority shareholders often complain at the time of buy-out that 
their shares are valued at a discount due to the fact of disposing of a minority holding in 
the company. In practice, even if there are no restrictions on transfer of shares to a 
willing buyer the value of a minority shareholding may be discounted to reflect lack of 
control in management of the company.  
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(iv) Issues about to what extent any valuation mechanism in the articles or a 
shareholders’ agreements could be overridden by courts. In Fisher v Cadman147 a 
company was based on quasi-partnership relationship giving rise to equitable 
constraints.148 The court, for fair valuation of minority’s shares, did not strictly adhere to 
the articles of association of the company that provided for the discounted price of 
shares due to minority holding at the time of buy-out.  
 
3.5 Conclusion: 
Private companies are often formed on the basis of mutual trust deriving from personal 
relationships between shareholders. Relational breakdown due to underlying factors 
such as personal or business conflicts cause disputes in these companies. The prevalence 
of relational breakdown as a trigger for legal disputes is perhaps not surprising given 
that shareholders are commonly in close proximity in the day-to-day management of 
private companies. It is evident from the study of the case law and findings of empirical 
research that shareholder disputes follow discernible patterns. They often start as 
personal disputes that may then escalate into legal disputes where the majority engages 
in squeeze-out behaviour. Alternatively, the disputes may arise as a result of damaging 
incompetence, promoting the need for the minority to find a means of exiting the 
company, or they may relate purely to exit where, following relational breakdown, the 
parties often accept the need for a parting of the ways, but are in disputes over the terms, 
most notably the price of the share.  
 
The resolution of these disputes by courts is said to be a lengthy and therefore expensive 
process. Commentators have suggested that shareholder disputes in private companies 
can be prevented and resolved through ex ante contractual arrangements.  Interviewees 
also added that relational breakdown occurs due to lack of advance formal planning of 
shareholders regarding the conduct of the business. It can also be argued that to prevent 
the relational breakdown due to personality clashes shareholders should also consider in 
advance carefully the personality of other shareholders with whom they are going to 
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start business. However, it is not completely clear that advance thought to these 
underlying factors will necessarily prevent relational breakdown or subsequent exit 
disputes or provide a viable mechanism for anticipating and controlling self-interested 
behaviour arising from human vices such as greed or jealousy. The next chapter 
considers the scope and potential of forward planning through the use of shareholders’ 
agreements as a tool for anticipating and resolving shareholder disputes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
 
Chapter 4 
 
The scope of ex ante contracting as a means of protecting minority shareholders’ 
interests 
 
4.1 Scope of the chapter: 
 
This chapter discusses the scope, potential and limitations of ex ante contracting as a 
mechanism for protecting minority shareholders’ interests and anticipating the types of 
shareholder disputes identified as recurring instances in the previous chapter. Minority 
shareholders’ interests in the event of relational breakdown can be protected by 
controlling the use of majority rule and by providing minority shareholders with an exit 
from the company on fair terms. After discussing the legal significance of shareholders’ 
agreements, the chapter discusses their utility, potential and limitations as a means by 
which minority shareholders might protect their interests in private companies. The 
discussion is made in the light of a study of the available practitioner precedents and the 
interviewees’ responses. Owing to associated limitations it is not wholly possible to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders in the event of relational breakdown by ex 
ante contracting. Therefore, shareholders need recourse to the courts to protect their 
interests in that event. The chapter proceeds as follows. After an introduction the chapter 
discusses: (i) the significance of shareholders’ agreements as an appropriate medium of 
ex ante contracting in private companies; (ii) the potential of these agreements, as a 
mechanism for forestalling use of squeeze-out techniques1 or resolving exit disputes; 
(iii) the limitations associated with ex ante contracting in the present context. 
 
4.2 Introduction: 
It is evident from the discussion in the previous chapter, that the breakdown of the 
personal relationship of shareholders where this is the basis on which the company was 
formed is commonly the backdrop to shareholders disputes. The relational breakdown in 
these companies give rises to three kinds of disputes. To reiterate: in the first kind 
relational breakdown precipitates squeeze-out behaviour which exacerbates the dispute; 
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in the second kind, negligent management causes relational breakdown, without 
precipitating squeeze-out behaviour, to such an extent that the minority shareholder  
wishes to exit; in the third kind, relational breakdown is accompanied by disputes 
regarding terms of exit.2  
 
It is asserted in this chapter that, theoretically, ex ante contracting can prevent squeeze 
out behaviour and can provide for clarity as regards exit rights. Ex ante contracting 
cannot prevent the parties from falling out but only seek to anticipate some of the 
possible consequences. The squeeze-out techniques can be prevented by providing in 
advance for how the business is to be conducted in ways that expressly limit the powers 
of majority shareholders that flow from majority rule. Type 2 disputes due to negligent 
or inefficient management can to some extent be dealt with by providing in advance how 
the business will be conducted and by putting restrictions on powers of majority 
shareholders.3  Type 3 disputes - exit disputes - can be addressed through detailed exit 
provisions giving rise to a contractual right to exit on fair terms in defined events.4 
However, ex ante contracting cannot prevent the relational breakdowns that drive 
shareholders to seek separation but can only minimize the repercussions of relational 
breakdown.5        
 
The protection of minority shareholders through ex ante contracting has received 
considerable attention in the legal literature.6 Chiu has stated that there is a room for 
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private contractual ordering in shareholder relations and contractual methods of dispute 
resolution between shareholders.7 Copp stated that:  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that many company disputes could be avoided if the parties made 
express contractual provision for the issues or were subjected to a more extensive default regime 
in Table A.8  
 
An interviewee while discussing the nature of shareholder disputes and their resolution 
asserted that:  
 
The moral of the story is that these businessmen are to blame. These businessmen cannot expect 
the court to come to their rescue under [statutory provision…] what they ought to do is to 
anticipate it and to have shareholders’ agreements or articles of association in advance. [G] 
 
With the help of professional advice the best shareholders can do is to contemplate and 
agree in advance how the business will be conducted and conflicts will be resolved in 
future, and seek to anticipate and address likely problems insofar as these can be 
foreseen. The following paragraphs discuss the appropriate medium of ex ante 
contracting in private companies. These paragraphs consider the legal significance of 
minority protection shareholders’ agreements as an additional source of legal rights and 
liabilities alongside the articles of association of the company. 
 
4.3 Ex ante contracting: 
Minority shareholders can seek to protect themselves against misuses of majority rule by 
bargaining for express protections in the articles of association or in separate 
shareholders’ agreements.9 Section 18(1) of the CA 2006 provides that ‘A company 
must have articles of association prescribing regulations for the company’.10 
Traditionally, the articles of association of the company after registration are the main 
medium of regulating the internal affairs of the company.11 In the absence of registered 
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articles of association default model articles for private companies regulate the internal 
affairs of the company so far as applicable.12 The articles of association have a 
contractual effect. Section 33 of CA 2006 provides that ‘The provisions of a company’s 
constitution bind the company and its members to the same extent as if there were 
covenants on the part of the company and of each member to observe those provisions.13  
 
The nature of this contract is very different from the ordinary commercial contract.14 In 
Bratton Seymour Service Co Ltd v Oxborough, Steyn LJ (as he then was) mentioned that 
by virtue of section 14 of the CA 1985 [now section 33 of the CA 2006] the articles of 
association become, upon registration, a contract between a company and members. It is, 
however a statutory contract of a special nature with its own distinctive features. Steyn 
LJ further mentioned the following distinctive features.  Firstly, this statutory contract 
derives its binding force not from a bargain struck between parties but from the terms of 
the statute. Secondly, unlike an ordinary contract, it is not defeasible on the grounds of 
misrepresentation, common law mistake, mistake in equity, undue influence or duress. 
Thirdly, it cannot be rectified on the grounds of mistake. Fourthly, it can be altered by a 
special resolution without the consent of all the contracting parties. Fifthly, it is binding 
only insofar as it affects the rights and obligations between the company and the 
members acting in their capacity as members. If it contains provisions conferring rights 
and obligations on outsiders, then those provisions do not bite as part of the contract 
between the company and the members, even if the outsider is coincidentally a member. 
Similarly, if the provisions are not truly referable to the rights and obligations of 
members as such it does not operate as a contract. 15  
 
Shareholders in private companies can protect their interests by declaring in the articles 
of association the manner by which the company affairs will be conducted in future. 
However, the articles of association are not the most attractive means of protecting 
minority shareholders’ interests due to the limitations associated with them.  Section 
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21(1) of the CA 2006 provides that a company may by special resolution alter its 
articles.  The articles can be altered by special resolution without the consent of all the 
members. This contrasts with the position in the general law of contract where variations 
of contract terms are only lawful if the parties to the contract all consent. Secondly, as 
discussed above, the articles of association can only be enforced by and against the 
members in their capacity as members and not in any other ‘outsider' capacity such as 
director or solicitor of the company.16  
 
Hence, to overcome these problems of variability and enforceability and to protect 
themselves effectively minority shareholders can supplement their rights under the 
articles by entering into separate shareholders’ agreements. Shareholders’ agreements 
can provide that parties to the agreement shall not vote in favour of any resolution to 
alter the articles of the company without the prior written consent of all the shareholders 
or of the minority shareholder or of his nominated director of the company, regarding 
that alteration. Care must be ensured here that the company should not be a party to such 
an agreement since any stipulation among the parties fettering the statutory power of the 
company to alter its articles is not enforceable under law.17 In Russell v Northern Bank 
Development Corp Ltd,18 clause 3 of the shareholders’ agreement provided that “no 
further share capital shall be created or issued in the company… without the written 
consent of each of the parties hereto”.19 The issue was whether clause 3 was an invalid 
fetter on the statutory power of the company to increase its share capital or whether it 
was no more than an agreement between the shareholders prescribing their manner of 
voting in a given situation. Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle confirmed that a company 
cannot be a party to a contract that fetters its statutory powers. He applied the ruling of 
the House of Lords in Welton v Saffery20 and commented that “shareholders may 
lawfully agree inter se to exercise their voting rights in a manner which, if it were 
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dictated by the articles, and were thereby binding on the company would be unlawful”.21 
This reflects the “long standing principle of English law that a company cannot by 
contract deprive itself of the right to exercise its statutory powers”.22 The Law 
Commission also regarded this principle as being axiomatic. Notwithstanding the 
principle, however, the same effect can be achieved as between the parties to a 
shareholder agreement, by the terms of such an agreement.23 The alteration of the 
articles can also be prevented by stipulating among the shareholders that a particular 
matter is a class right which cannot be altered without the consent of the holders of that 
class of shares.  
 
The most significant benefit of shareholders’ agreements for minority shareholders is 
that unlike articles, shareholders’ agreements cannot be altered by the majority 
unilaterally (e.g., by special resolution). To alter the terms of shareholders’ agreements 
the consent of all the parties to the agreement is necessary as is the case, as a matter of 
default principle, with any contract. Secondly, through shareholders’ agreements as 
opposed to articles of association, outsider rights and members’ rights other than in their 
capacity as members can be declared and enforced by the parties. Therefore, while 
enforcing shareholders’ agreements shareholders do not have to face the obstacles such 
as the legal requirement that conduct complained of must be regarding protection of 
members’ interests as members and regarding company’s affairs.24 To ensure the smooth 
and easy running of the business there should be a balance of powers among the 
different constituencies. These constituencies include the minority shareholders, the 
majority shareholders and the company, if the company is a party to the agreement for 
enforcing minority protection rights against the company. However, in the light of 
Russell v Northern Bank Development Corp Ltd25 it is generally thought for reasons set 
out above that the company should not be made a party to a shareholders’ agreement and 
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that any terms that it is desired should have contractual effect between the company and 
the shareholders are better hived off into a separate agreement. 
 
The articles of association and shareholders’ agreements are completely different 
documents.26 The articles of association are created and regulated by company law27 
whereas shareholders’ agreements are created and regulated by the principles of the law 
of contract. By shareholders’ agreements here I mean agreements to which all 
shareholders are parties rather than agreements between some of the shareholders. 
Agreements of the later type may be made between shareholders who collectively 
control the majority of the voting power and, to the extent that they regulate the exercise 
of that power, may conceivably have adverse effects on minority shareholders who are 
not parties to them. 
 
Due to their contractual rather than statutory basis shareholders’ agreements have some 
other advantages over articles of association.  
(i) They can be enforced through the traditional contractual remedies as well as 
through section 459 of the CA 1985. 
(ii) Shareholders’ agreements preserve confidentiality of the parties’ 
relationships since they are private documents and are not open to the public 
inspection, in contrast to articles of association. 
(iii) The articles deal only with matters arising after the incorporation of 
company28 because the company’s constitution only has contractual effect on 
incorporation. The shareholders’ agreements can make provision regarding 
events prior to and leading up to incorporation.29 
(iv) Shareholders’ agreements can be entered into by some or all of the 
shareholders and therefore have the merits of flexibility. 
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(v) Shareholders’ agreements can be drawn in accordance with the particular 
requirements of the shareholders even to create rights, which are not 
immediately connected with the company’s business. 
(vi) Shareholders’ agreements can be made between the shareholders and the 
company to oblige the company to act in a prescribed way regarding a 
particular issue such as directors’ remuneration. However, these stipulations 
should not be in conflict with the provisions and underlying policy of the 
statute by depriving the company of its statutory powers.30 
 
However, there is a disadvantage associated with shareholders’ agreements compared to 
articles of association. Unlike the articles of association every new member of the 
company as a result of transfer or subscription of new shares is not automatically bound 
by the existing shareholders’ agreements but has to enter specifically into the 
shareholders’ agreement at the time of obtaining membership. In contrast, a new 
registered member of a company pursuant to section 112(2) of CA 2006 is automatically 
bound by the existing articles of association of the company pursuant to section 33 of the 
CA 2006. In the following paragraphs the chapter discusses the utility and potential of 
the shareholders’ agreements as a tool of protecting minority shareholders’ interests in 
private companies.   
 
4.4 The utility of shareholders’ agreements as a tool of prevention: 
Due to the above-mentioned obstacles associated with the articles of association it can 
be advisable for minority shareholders in private companies to seek to protect 
themselves from the oppression of majority shareholders by supplementing the articles 
with shareholders’ agreements. In practice, minority protection shareholders’ 
agreements are stipulations between the shareholders having contractual effect 
governing inter alia the arrangements for managing and financing the company, the 
relationships between the shareholders and the terms upon which shareholders can exit 
the company by transferring some or all of their shares.  These agreements seek to 
anticipate and make provision ex ante to deal with anticipated problems of the various 
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types identified in the previous chapter31 that may arise in the future with the aim of 
minimising disruption to the company’s business.32   
 
Within the boundaries set by the general law the shareholders are free to agree whatever 
terms they wish in their agreements. It is asserted in the legal literature that disputes in 
these companies can be avoided by providing in advance the ways the business will be 
conducted in future.33 The drafting of provisions by ex ante contracting provides an 
opportunity for the shareholders at the very start of their business relationship, to 
consider the nature and direction of their future relations in that particular business. 
Detailed drafting of the articles of association or shareholders agreements can serve this 
purpose. Nowadays practising lawyers often emphasise and recommend ex ante 
contracting to shareholders in private companies through shareholders’ agreements, 
which can be in order to promote their own interests in generating fee earning work.34 A 
comparative study of different jurisdictions has shown that the use of shareholders’ 
agreements is widespread and in some jurisdictions shareholders’ agreements are more 
frequently used to protect minority rights than the articles of association.35 In private 
companies that have the character of a quasi-partnership, at practical level shareholders 
are commonly advised to document their relationships inter se wherever possible in the 
form of a shareholders’ agreement giving them additional, contractual rights.36 Elson 
claims that:  
 
                                                 
31
 See above, chapter 3 para 3.4.1.3 Identification of squeeze-out techniques: empirical evidence. 
32
  See See Stecher, M. W (ed) Protection of Minority Shareholders (Kluwer Law International Ltd, 
London 1997) 251; for shareholders’ agreements see Cadman, J., Shareholders’ Agreements (4th ed Sweet 
& Maxwell, London 2004) chapters 1, 4; Boros, E., Minority Shareholders Remedies (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1995) chapter 4.3 and  Introduction to Thomas R., and Ryan C., The Law and Practice of 
Shareholders’ Agreements. (Butterworths, London. 1999). 
33
 Boros, E., Minority Shareholders Remedies (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995) Cadman, J., Shareholders’ 
Agreements (4th ed Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004); F.H. O’Neal and R. Thompson, O’Neal’s 
Oppression of Minority Shareholders (2nd ed Callaghan 1985). 
34
 Law firms recommendations are evident from their websites see such as www. andrewjackson.co.uk/ 
legal-resources/ legal-fact-file/shareholders-agreements/; www. Business 
lawfirm.co.uk/Articles/company/ shareholders-agreements.aspx; www. macdonaldhenderson.co.uk/ 
articles/companyandcommercial2.html; www. ukincorp.co.uk/s-43-uk-company-shareholders- 
agreements.html.  
35
 Stecher, M. W (ed) Protection of Minority Shareholders (Kluwer Law International Ltd, London 1997) 
12. 
36
 Ibid 20. 
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The best protection that can be extended a client about to enter into a corporate venture is a well-
drawn agreement between shareholders designed to safeguard their interests on a mutually fair 
basis.37  
 
During the empirical investigation interviewee H acknowledged the importance of 
shareholders’ agreements by stating that these agreements made a lot of difference such 
as by stating clearly whether it was a quasi-partnership or not. In the absence of a 
shareholders’ agreement, proof of unfair prejudice based on breach of some implied or 
informal agreement might require the petitioner to establish first that there was a quasi-
partnership, a requirement that could prolong the proceedings: 
 
If you have a shareholders’ agreement where the parties’ expectations are spelt out in words there 
is much less scope for arguments. Shareholders’ agreements really sort matters and make life a 
lot easier [H]. 
 
 
The point was reinforced by another interviewee:  
 
The moral of all this is do not leave it to the court to sort the dispute out: provide for it in advance 
[G]. 
 
Interviewee M while expressing the merits of shareholders’ agreements stated:  
 
In large companies the parties’ rights and obligations are expressly drafted through sophisticated 
documentation which generally allows their disputes to be resolved much more quickly [M].  
 
Similarly, courts also prefer to enforce the already stipulated agreements of shareholders 
in the event of dispute.38 The Law Commission found that shareholders frequently make 
agreements with other members to give them rights in addition to those conferred by the 
memorandum and articles of association to secure greater protection for themselves.39 
As regards the attitude of the courts to shareholders’ agreements one interviewee stated 
that:  
 
Courts do like shareholders agreements because all the rights and obligations are set out in the 
agreement and it means that that is what the parties set down, thought about and agreed [T].  
 
                                                 
37
  Elson, A., ‘Shareholders’ Agreements, A Shield for Minority Shareholders of Close Corporations’ 
(1967) 22 Bus Law 449, 451. 
38
 See Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch 1. 
39
 See the  Consultation Paper [3.3] [3.4] and [3.17].  
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In the next section, the potential of shareholders’ agreements to prevent shareholder 
disputes in private companies is discussed, by linking the discussion back to the 
discussion in the previous chapter about the nature of shareholder disputes.   
 
4.5 Potential of shareholders’ agreements to protect minority shareholders 
following relational breakdown: 
It is evident from the study of the precedent shareholders’ agreements,40 that these 
agreements can theoretically be used to prevent squeeze-out behaviour.41 Furthermore ex 
ante contracting can be used to address negligent behaviour and provide an exit 
mechanism to shareholders in defined circumstances. As one interviewee put it: 
 
I think a lot of these disputes could be avoided in small private companies if the parties had 
actually thought at an early stage how the business was going to be run and how the possibility 
that one party might wish to exit would be handled [M].  
 
Interviewee H acknowledged that shareholders’ agreements would be to an extent 
exhaustive of shareholders’ rights and expectations so that shareholders know where 
they stand regarding their rights should a dispute arise [H]. Shareholder’ rights can be 
reinforced by contractually enhancing the voice of the minority in corporate decision 
making processes thus limiting the power of the majority under the constitution and as a 
matter of general corporate law. The voice of minority shareholders can be enhanced by 
giving them either extra voting rights or a veto in relation to certain decisions with the 
result that no such decision could be made without their consent. By enhancing the voice 
of minority shareholders in this way squeeze-out behaviour may be averted but instead a 
deadlock may ensue. Interviewee E was particularly enthusiastic about the potential of 
shareholders’ agreements: 
 
Good agreements can prevent disputes from arising in the first place since you have already 
agreed the way the company should be run. Shareholders’ agreements are not so much about 
speedy and cost effective resolution but to prevent disputes from arising in the first place [E].  
 
In fact, shareholders’ agreements after declaring the rights of the shareholders mainly 
enhance the voice of the minority shareholders through voting power in anticipated 
                                                 
40
 See above chapter 2 Methodology para 2.2 Legal scholarship. 
41
 See Copp S., ‘Company Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis’ (2002) 
23(12) Company lawyer 361, 370. 
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conflicting situations. This eliminates the strength of majority rule in the company and 
tries to incorporate the benefits of a partnership or joint venture structure into the 
governance of the company. As in partnerships all the partners are entitled to participate 
in the management of the partnership and decisions are usually made with the consent of 
all the partners. It is evident from the study of the available precedents of shareholders’ 
agreements that contractual provisions governing the ways in which the business will be 
conducted are of two kinds.   
 
(i) Declaration of rights: 
Shareholders’ agreements may declare after negotiation the rights and obligations of 
shareholders in anticipated conflicting situations, in an effort to avoid squeeze-out 
behaviour.42 Agreements may declare the express rights for minority shareholders to 
participate in the management of the company accompanied by express provisions on 
consultation and access to information regarding the company affairs. Agreements may 
also declare the policy regarding the dividend and remuneration of directors and 
provision to manage the business in the best interests of the company. Advance 
declaration of these rights may assist to protect the interests of minority shareholders 
from misuse of powers of majority shareholders, since there will be no ambiguity left 
behind regarding the positions of shareholders in the company.  
 
(ii) Enhanced voice: 
These rights can be reinforced by enhancing the voice of minority shareholders in the 
corporate decision making process and limiting the powers of the majority and so protect 
the minority against the opportunistic conduct of majority shareholders. The voice can 
be enhanced by giving the minority either extra voting rights or veto powers namely a 
provision of right to consent upon all important matters of the company, including 
decisions regarding management of company’s business and assets, altering the articles 
of company and allotment of new shares to obtain finance. To enhance shareholders’ 
voice agreements may declare that ‘the shareholders shall not exercise their voting rights 
                                                 
42
 Squeeze-out techniques are discussed above in chapter 3 paras 3.4.1 The relational breakdown 
precipitating squeeze-out behaviour and 3.4.1.3 Identification of squeeze-out techniques: empirical 
evidence. 
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and other powers of control available to them in relation to the company without the 
prior written approval or consent of each shareholder’. The enhanced voice of minority 
shareholders by veto power in shareholders agreements may prevent the squeeze-out but 
can create the deadlock.43   
 
There can be overlap between these two types of stipulations to protect the minority 
shareholders. Minority shareholders’ voice can be enhanced regarding the rights that 
have already been granted to them by reinforcing in agreements that no change can be 
made to these rights without the consent of minority shareholders’. For instance, 
directors’ remuneration can be declared in shareholders’ agreements and it can be 
provided further in the agreement, ‘no change can be made to such remuneration figure, 
without the consent of the minority shareholder of the company’.44  
 
Below the chapter analyses the nature, scope and potential of shareholders’ stipulations 
having contractual effect in the light of available precedents.45 By considering the nature 
of available precedents, the chapter discusses the way the rights of minority 
shareholders’ can be declared and their voice can be enhanced. The actual prevention of 
disputes depends upon the strict adherence to these agreements. Moreover, ex ante 
contracting in shareholders’ agreements cannot prevent the actual relational breakdown 
that precipitates squeeze-out behaviour or precedes exit disputes in these companies. 
Below the chapter considers the potential of shareholders’ agreements (i) to prevent 
squeeze-out behaviour,46 (ii) to prevent negligent and efficient management47 and (iii) to 
resolve exit disputes following relational breakdown.48  
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 See below para 4.5.1.1 Deadlock as a consequence of the enhanced voice of minority shareholders.  
44
 See below, Complaints regarding excessive remuneration of directors. 
45
 The precedents referred to here are easily accessible though for the convenience of the reader a number 
of precedent clauses are reproduced in Appendix 1.  
46
 See below para 4.5.1 Ex ante contracting to protect the minority from squeeze-out behaviour. 
47
 See below para 4.5.2 Ex ante contracting to address negligent mismanagement. 
48
 See below para 4.5.3 Ex ante resolution of exit disputes. 
 84 
4.5.1 Ex ante contracting to protect the minority from squeeze-out behaviour:49 
The nature and characteristics of squeeze-out behaviour were discussed extensively in 
the previous chapter. Ex ante contracting may assist in protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders from squeeze-out behaviour by reducing the scope for ambiguity 
as regards the legal relationship between the company’s participants. These stipulations 
declare the rights and enhance the voice of minority in decision making process that 
control the powers of majority, in anticipation of pre-defined squeeze-outs techniques 
and can theoretically prevent squeeze-out behaviour of majority. The scope and potential 
of ex ante contracting regarding each of the squeeze-out techniques identified in the 
classification at the end of the previous chapter is evaluated separately.  
 
(i) Exclusion of member from management of company: 
Minority shareholders can be excluded from the management of a company by the 
majority either completely or partially.50 Complete exclusion occurs when the majority 
tells the minority that he can no longer participate in the management of the company. 
Partial exclusion occurs where the majority fails to consult when making key decisions 
or fails to provide information regarding the company’s affairs. Shareholder complaints 
as to exclusion from management of the company of private companies can be prevented 
by expressly declaring in the shareholders’ agreement that all shareholders have an equal 
right to participate in the management of the company as directors of the company. Such 
clause in shareholders’ agreement may provide that: ‘company’s business shall be 
managed by all of the shareholders of the company and every member has a right to 
fully participate in the management of the company as a director of the company. All 
major and minor decisions regarding the management and the business affairs of the 
company shall be made with the mutual consent of all the shareholders of the 
company’.51 Such declaration will provide the minority shareholder with an express 
contractual right to participate fully in the management of the company.  
 
                                                 
49
 Nature of this kind of disputes is discussed above in chapter 3 para 3.4.1. 
50
 See above chapter 3 para 3.4.1.1.1 Disregard of minority shareholders’ participation in the company. 
51
 See precedents’ clauses discussed and referred below.  
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Furthermore, to entrench the participation of a minority shareholder in the management 
of the company, a right to participate in management can be attached to a separate class 
of shares allotted to the minority shareholder. The usual technique is to provide that the 
minority shareholder is entitled to appoint at least one director to represent his particular 
class of shares. Agreements may provide that, ‘each shareholder has a right in 
accordance with the articles to appoint a director and remove such director and appoint 
another person to be director in his place’.52 The right to participate in the management 
can be further reinforced by enhancing the voice of minority shareholders in 
shareholders’ agreements. Such stipulations in agreements may provide that no decision 
can be made in a shareholders’ meeting in respect of certain identified matters without 
the presence and unanimous consent of all the members of the company.53 In effect, this 
gives the minority shareholders a veto in respect of defined matters.  
 
The complaints against minority shareholders’ partial exclusion from the management of 
the company can be addressed ex ante by making express provision that decisions on 
certain identified matters can only be taken with the consent of minority shareholders.54 
Shareholders’ agreements by declaring that unanimous approval of all the shareholders 
of the company will be required to make decisions regarding the company affairs can 
entrench the right of the minority to participate in the management of the company. The 
majority will then not be legally capable of making decisions regarding the company 
affairs on his own.     
 
                                                 
52
 LexisNexis Butterworths, Butterworths Corporate Law Services - Encyclopaedia of Forms and 
Precedents (hereinafter ‘Butterworths’) see 291 Shareholders’ agreement for minority protection clause 
4.1 can be accessed at www. lexisnexis.com/uk. and Joffe V.H., Minority Shareholders: Law Practice and 
Procedure (2nd ed LexisNexis Butterworths, London 2004) (hereinafter, ‘Joffe’s’) appendix 1, Precedent 
24, clauses 3.1, 3.2. See also below appendix 1 para 1 Appointment of directors. 
53
 See ‘Butterworths’ 291 Shareholders’ agreement for minority protection clause 3 and Cadman, J., 
Shareholders’ Agreements (4th ed Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004) (hereinafter ‘Cadman’) Precedent A, 
Minority Protection Agreement, clause 12. See below appendix 1 para 2 Matters requiring consent of both 
parties. 
54
 In Re Cumana Ltd [1986] BCLC 430, pursuant to the agreement the minority was entitled to be 
consulted on all major matters concerning the affairs of the company. See above chapter 3 para 3.4.1.1.1. 
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A shareholder cannot inspect the accounting and financial records of the company to get 
information about the company affairs at his own will.55 A shareholder has the right to 
be adequately informed regarding the affairs of the company to evaluate the true position 
of the company.56 Minority shareholders’ complaints about limited access to information 
about the company affairs may be forestalled by providing expressly for greater 
information rights than they might otherwise enjoy under the Companies Act or the 
articles of association. Such clause may provide that ‘shareholders shall have full and 
free access to all trading records, accounts, books, bank statements and other financial 
records of the company for investigating and verifying the affairs of the company and its 
assets, liabilities and financial position.57 In the presence of these extra information 
rights majority will be legally bound to keep minority shareholders fully informed 
regarding the affairs of the company.   
 
(ii) Complaints regarding excessive remuneration of directors:58  
Minority shareholders’ complaints as to excessive remuneration of directors can be 
prevented by making provision for how directors’ remuneration is to be determined. 
Furthermore, this squeeze-out behaviour – which potentially reduces or eliminates the 
dividends that might otherwise be payable to minority shareholders who are not also 
directors – can be prevented by providing that directors’ remuneration shall not exceed a 
prescribed amount, without the consent of minority shareholders or without the 
unanimous consent of all or any particular group or class of shareholders of the 
company. Such clause may provide that ‘the company will not without the prior 
approval of all shareholders pay any remuneration to any person other than as proper 
remuneration for work done or services provided in connection with its business’.59 This 
will prevent majority shareholders as directors of the company from taking excessive 
remuneration against the interests of minority shareholders.    
 
                                                 
55
 See above chapter 3 para 3.2.1. 
56
 See ss 423(1) and 431(1) of the CA 2006. 
57
 See‘Butterworths’ 291 Shareholders’ agreement for minority protection clause 4.2. See below appendix 
1 para 3 Access to information.  
58
 See above chapter 3 para 3.4.1.2.1  Misappropriation of company’s assets and proceeds. 
59
 See Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 12(1)(h). See below appendix 1 
para 5 Matters requiring directors’ approval.     
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(iii) Little or no participation in profits or failure to pay dividends:60  
Minority shareholders’ complaints about non-payment or derisory payment of dividends 
can be addressed by providing for an express dividend policy ex ante in shareholders’ 
agreements.61 Such clause regarding dividend may provide that ‘the company shall 
distribute by way of dividend in respect of each financial year, certain profits of the 
company’.62 This clarity as regards participation in distributable profits can be further 
reinforced by providing further that no change can be made to the defined dividend 
policy without the consent of the minority shareholders or the unanimous consent of all 
the shareholders of the company. An express dividend policy will prevent shareholders 
from accumulating profits in the company and minority shareholders will be able to 
exert greater control over their distribution. 
 
(iv) Misappropriation of company’s assets:63  
Majority shareholders might be discouraged from misappropriating the company assets 
by stipulating in shareholders’ agreements that assets of the company must be used for 
the benefit of the company as a whole and not for majority shareholders’ personal 
benefit. Agreements may provide that ‘majority shareholders as directors of company 
shall not involve themselves in a situation that will conflict with the interests of the 
company’. This is also just a reiteration of directors’ obligation which they are supposed 
to observe under the general law.64 A range of provisions can be made in shareholders’ 
agreements to control the conduct of majority shareholders to avoid misappropriation of 
company assets.65 It can be stipulated that ‘assets can only be disposed of for the best 
price obtainable in particular circumstances’.66 Shareholders’ agreements may provide 
that ‘the company shall not incur any borrowing in excess of a certain amount’.67 
Furthermore, minority shareholders voice can be enhanced by providing in shareholders’ 
                                                 
60
 See above chapter 3 para 3.4.1.2.1  Misappropriation of company’s assets and proceeds. 
61
 see Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 9. 
62
 See ‘Butterworths’ Precedent 8, clause 8.3. See below appendix 1 para 7 Dividend policy.  
63
 See above chapter 3 para 3.4.1.2.1  Misappropriation of company’s assets and proceeds. 
64
 See s 175 of CA 2006. 
65
 See Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 12. 
66
 See Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 12(1)(o). See below appendix 1 
para 5 Matters requiring directors’ approval.     
67
 See Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 12(1)(l)(m)(n). See below appendix 
1 para 5 Matters requiring directors’ approval.     
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agreements that ‘certain defined assets or assets having a monetary value above a 
defined threshold cannot be bought or disposed of in the name of the company without 
the unanimous consent of all the shareholders’ of the company’. In this manner the 
majority shall be bound not to transact regarding the assets of the company without the 
consent of minority shareholders. This serves to reinforce further the provisions of CA 
2006, which regulate substantial property transactions.68    
 
(v) Allotment of shares to dilute minority shareholder investment or voting power in the 
company:69 
Allotment of shares to dilute minority shareholder investment or voting power in the 
company can be prevented through ex ante contracting firstly, by giving the shareholders 
a veto under shareholders’ agreements over any issuance of new shares. Such clause 
may provide that ‘the shareholders undertake to each other, that no alteration, increase or 
reduction can be made to issued share capital of the company without the prior approval 
of all the shareholders of the company’.70 Secondly, shareholders can be granted pre-
emption rights regarding new share issues which may be more extensive than their 
statutory pre-emption rights. Pre-emption clause may provide that ‘the company shall be 
financed by the shareholders in proportion to their existing cash subscription for the 
shares in the company’.71 In this way the majority will not be able to issue shares 
without the consent of minority shareholders. Moreover, on issue the minority will have 
a right to subscribe for a new shares issue in proportion to their existing shareholding 
that will not dilute their investment in the company.  However, it should be noted that 
the granting of enhanced pre-emption rights in the articles or in a shareholders’ 
agreements will not necessarily protect minority shareholders from the more subtle 
forms of squeeze-out behaviour – such as timing the allotment when minority 
                                                 
68
 See s 190 of CA 2006. 
69
 See above chapter 3 para 3.4.1.2.2 Dilution of minority shareholders’ investment or voting power in the 
company. 
70
 See Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 12(2)(a). See below appendix 1 
para 6 Matters requiring Shareholders’ approval.     
71
 See ‘Butterworths’ 291 Shareholders’ agreement for minority protection clause 8.2. See below appendix 
1 para 8 Pre-emption rights. See also Cadman’s, Precedent B, Minority Protection Articles, clause 5 
(version B).    
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shareholders have no or insufficient access to finance – discussed earlier.72 If the pre-
emption rights are included in the articles of association then any alteration of such 
article may be protected in ways also discussed above.73 
 
4.5.1.1 Deadlock as a consequence of the enhanced voice of minority shareholders: 
The enhanced voice of minority shareholders through the conferral of veto power in 
shareholders’ agreements can create deadlock among the shareholders. A deadlock is a 
situation, in which a disagreement cannot be settled and neither side has sufficient 
voting power to carry resolutions either at board level or in general meeting. In private 
companies deadlock occurs in two ways. Firstly, decisions requiring unanimous consent 
of all the shareholders of the company cannot be taken if one shareholder dissents and 
blocks the decision. Secondly, where the company is deliberately structured to give two 
shareholders or two blocks of shareholders equal shareholdings 50/50 in a company it 
will not be possible for one shareholder (or one shareholding block) to take a decision if 
it is opposed by the other shareholder (or shareholding block). Deadlock situations when 
they arise may precipitate a winding up of the company on just and equitable grounds.74 
However to avoid these drastic consequences it can be inferred from the available 
precedent shareholders’ agreements that provision for resolution of the deadlock will 
commonly be made through mechanisms designed to create breathing space for 
negotiations or by means of a referral to an independent third party. Hence, minority 
shareholders’ can use a deadlock as leverage for their voice to be heard by majority 
shareholders. In the next section the chapter discusses in the light of available 
precedents, the methods shareholders employ to resolve deadlock through ex ante 
contractual arrangements.   
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 See A Company [1985] BCLC 80; Re Cumana Ltd [1986] BCLC 430. 
73
 For alteration of articles to modify pre-emption provision see above Re Kenyon Swansea Ltd [1987] 
BCLC 514, chapter 3 para 3.4.1.2.2. For discussion as to stipulations in shareholders’ agreements to 
prevent alteration of articles, see above para 4.3 Ex ante contracting and Russell v Northern Bank 
Development Corp Ltd [1992] 1 W.L.R 588.  
74
 See below para 4.5.1.2.3 Winding-up. 
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4.5.1.2 Ex ante contracting to resolve deadlock: 
Shareholders’ agreements often provide mechanisms to resolve the deadlocks 
deliberately created through the conferral of enhanced contractual rights on minority 
shareholders that give them greater power than they would enjoy ordinarily by virtue of 
a minority shareholding. In the light of available precedents figure 4.1 below depicts a 
standard pattern of provisions that are often included in shareholders’ agreements as a 
means of resolving deadlock.  
 
Figure: 4.1  
Ex ante contracting mechanisms to resolve deadlock 
 
Enhanced voice of minority shareholders 
 
Dead-lock 
 
Resolution of deadlock through 
Negotiation (cooling-off period) 
 
Failure of Negotiation 
 
Exit by transfer of shares as provided by 
shareholders’ agreement 
Failure to exit through transfer of shares 
(non-compliance with the shareholders’ agreement) 
 
Recourse to courts 
(Enforcement of shareholders’ agreement or winding up) 
                
                                                                        
4.5.1.2.1 Negotiation: 
 
Shareholders’ agreements may provide that shareholders will use all reasonable 
endeavours to resolve the matter in dispute within a prescribed time period. That period 
can be described as a cooling-off period. In this period shareholders explain in writing 
their own stance and consider the stance of other shareholders regarding the particular 
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issue in good faith.75 Shareholders’ may resort to negotiation in the cooling off period to 
resolve deadlock. A mechanism that triggers the possibility of negotiation may prove 
helpful in creating space for shareholders to consider each others’ viewpoints with a 
view to resolve their differences amicably with or without outside assistance.  
 
At the time of deadlock when parties are not immediately willing to cooperate with one 
another these negotiations might be made more effective and successful, if conducted 
with the assistance of a third party such as a trained mediator.76 Recourse (by prior 
agreement) to a mediated negotiating process as a mechanism for breaking a deadlock 
may save time and costs and avert the risk of court proceedings which, in the context of 
shareholder disputes, may prove time consuming, costly and cumbersome.77 Judging by 
the available precedents, it is common to provide for a method to resolve disputes or 
deadlock situations either by referring the matter to a third party or by some pre-agreed 
process of dialogue between shareholders.78  
 
If the negotiation to resolve the dead lock fails shareholders may use exit mechanism by 
transferring their shares in accordance with the terms of the agreement.79 Depending on 
the circumstances negotiations could also be attractive for shareholders to resolve 
possible obstacles associated with the transfer of shares e.g., valuation of shares.80 It is 
possible that effective negotiation may preserve or repair the relationship of the parties 
and lead to the amicable resolution of the dispute without the need for any shareholders 
having to exit, especially when mutual trust and relationship of the parties still exists and 
there are possibilities for them to continue working together in harmony. 
 
Shareholders’ agreements may provide that effort to resolve the deadlock shall be made 
by referring the dispute to third party arbitration with the arbitrator having adjudicative 
                                                 
75
 See ‘Butterworths’ Precedent 1, clause 13.2, accessed on September 2006. See below appendix 1 para 9 
Negotiation.     
76
 See below chapter 7 for possible role of mediator to resolve shareholder disputes. 
77
 See below chapter 5, Resolution of disputes, for problems associated with statutory minority protection 
remedy available under s 459 of CA 1985. 
78
 See ‘Butterworths’ Precedent 8, clause 13.2.1.  
79
 See below 4.5.1.2.2 Exit by transfer of shares. 
80
 See above 3.4.3 Exit disputes following relational breakdown. 
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powers – that is ability to make determinations binding on the parties.81 A referral to 
arbitration differs from a referral to a mediator for the purposes of assisting the parties in 
negotiating a resolution.82 It appears from the available precedents that the use of 
arbitration clauses is not common in the context of minority protection shareholders’ 
agreements. 
 
4.5.1.2.2 Exit by transfer of shares: 
In the event that negotiations fail, shareholders’ agreements commonly provide for an 
exit mechanism as a means of resolving deadlock situations.83 As a result of deadlock 
where all the efforts to resolve the deadlock by referral to a third party or by the 
shareholders themselves in a cooling-off period fails, shareholders’ agreements may 
trigger share transfer provisions as a practical means of resolution. The classic pattern is 
a mechanism that enables a shareholder to exit by first offering his or her shares to the 
other shareholders at a valuation to be determined in accordance with the agreement.84 If 
a smooth exit in accordance with the transfer provisions cannot be negotiated then 
shareholders’ agreements may include provision for the company, to be wound up, 
effectively as a “nuclear option” to concentrate the parties’ minds.  
 
4.5.1.2.3 Winding-up: 
Shareholders’ agreements may provide that where shareholders cannot agree on fair 
terms of exit of minority shareholder, to resolve the deadlock the parties shall procure as 
a last resort that the company should be immediately wound up under section 122(1)(g) 
of Insolvency Act 1986.85 Winding-up is a ‘nuclear option’ exercised when there is no 
other option available to minority shareholders to protect their interests. Winding-up 
results in the cessation of the business and therefore will inevitably destroy value, but 
can be used by minority shareholder as leverage to resolve the deadlock or to exit from 
the company. 
                                                 
81
 See Arbitration Act 1996. For scope of arbitration to resolve shareholder disputes see discussion in 
Chiu, I.H., ‘Contextualising Shareholders’ Disputes – A Way to Reconceptualise Minority Shareholder 
Remedies’ (2006) Journal of Business Law 312. 
82
 See below chapter 7 para 7.4.2.3.4 Mediation. 
83
 See Cadman’s, Precedent E, clause 13. 
84
 See Cadman’s, Precedent E, clause 13 and Joffe’s appendix 1, Precedent 24, clause 5.  
85
 See Butterworths, Precedent 8, clauses 13 and 15. See also below para 4.5.3 Ex ante resolution of exit 
disputes. 
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4.5.2 Ex ante contracting to address negligent mismanagement:86 
As regards the type 2 disputes provision can be made in shareholders’ agreements to the 
effect that the majority will run the company’s business: (i) in an appropriate manner 
and in the best interests of the company as a whole in accordance with good business 
practices87 and (ii) in a proper and an efficient manner and will not behave negligently 
towards the business.88 However, relational breakdown due to negligent and inefficient 
behaviour cannot be prevented only by declaring the way the company’s business will 
be conducted. These clauses in shareholders’ agreement serve no purpose beyond 
reiterating the statutory provisions of the Companies Act 2006.89 However higher 
standard of duty of care and skill than statutory duties, may be imposed by these 
agreements. Negligent and inefficient management might be discouraged by putting 
restrictions on shareholders’ business activities and by enhancing the voice of minority 
shareholders in shareholders’ agreements, by considering the nature of particular 
business. As discussed above enhanced voice of minority shareholders may create the 
deadlock.90 Negligent behaviour of majority shareholders can also be prevented to some 
extent by conducting regular board meetings to discuss and evaluate the company’s 
progress and nature of available opportunities that company can avail. Shareholders may 
agree ex ante that complete record of company accounts and business transactions shall 
be kept and regular shareholders’ meetings shall be conducted, to fully inform 
shareholders as to company’s affairs and to avoid negligent behaviour.91  
 
4.5.3 Ex ante resolution of exit disputes:92 
Shareholders may seek to anticipate exit disputes by providing ex ante an exit strategy 
for minority shareholders, similar to exit strategy provided at dead-lock.93 The Law 
Commission came out in favour of exit rights at will for shareholders stating that:  
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 See above chapter 3 para 3.4.2 for nature of this kind of disputes. 
87
 See Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 10(1)(a)(b) and Butterworths, 
precedent 5, clause 9.1. See below appendix 1 para 4 The Company’s business. 
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It is hoped that by encouraging the parties to make provisions for a future breakdown in their 
relations…allow parties to manage the break down in such a way as to cause the minimum 
disruption to the business itself.94  
 
Shareholders agreements may provide that minority has a right to exit in the event of 
relational breakdown after a fair valuation of his shares. These agreements further 
provide the manner in which the value will be determined; the person who will 
determine the value and the pre-emption rights of the remaining shareholders in relation 
to the exiting shareholder’s shares. In ex parte Kremer95 article 7 of the company's 
articles provided that: 
 
A member desiring to transfer shares otherwise than to a person who is already a member of the 
company shall give notice in writing of such intention to the directors of the company, giving 
particulars of the shares in question. The directors as agents for the member giving such notice 
may dispose of such shares or any of them to members of the company at a price to be agreed 
between the transferor and the directors or failing agreement at a price fixed by the auditors of 
the company as the fair value thereof. 
 
Even though, as pointed out earlier, relational breakdown of itself will not ground a 
petition under section 459,96 it is open to shareholders to make provision for exit in 
circumstances where relationships have broken down without fault (in any legal sense) 
on either side. As one interviewee pointed out: 
 
O’Neill v Phillips has not permitted ‘no fault divorce’ but parties can agree in advance as to ‘no 
fault divorce’ and this can be helpful … [G]. 
 
Interviewee S acknowledged that ex ante provision of a right to exit at will was entirely 
possible in principle but expressed concern about the mechanics of such a right in 
practice:  
 
I think someone has to make if you like the political decision or the company decision as to 
whether there should in effect be ‘no fault divorce’. Because if you want to have a mechanism for 
buy-out or fair valuation you have to decide whether that should be… if you like… in any event 
without having to prove that somebody has done anything wrong… so should it be there as a no 
fault divorce mechanism [S].  
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Shareholders’ agreements firstly, may provide the procedure that will be adopted at the 
time of transfer97 and secondly, the circumstances that will trigger the transfer of shares. 
Provision can also be made by way of a “nuclear option” for the company to be wound 
up if there is non-compliance with the exit provisions where triggering circumstances 
have arisen.98 In the light of available precedents the main circumstances that are often 
included as triggers for the transfer of shares are as follows.  
 
(i) Material breach of any provision of the agreement:  
Shareholders’ agreements may provide that as a result of any material breach of the 
agreement the defaulting shareholder is deemed to serve a notice to transfer his shares to 
other shareholders in the company.99 
 
(ii) Termination of shareholders’ agreement:  
Shareholders agreements may provide that a shareholder may serve a notice to terminate 
the agreement due to the occurrence of a specified event that will then trigger the 
operation of the exit provisions.100 Agreements may provide for the company to be 
wound up if the shareholders fail to transfer their shares at such notice. These 
terminating events can be the same triggering circumstances that can cause the transfer 
of shares discussed here. 
 
(iii) Ceases to be an employee/director of the company:  
Shareholders’ agreements may provide for a shareholder who ceases to be an employee 
or director of the company or who is no longer providing services to the company to 
transfer his shares. 101  
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(iv) Death/ ill-health of a shareholder:  
As a result of death or ill-health of a shareholder, a shareholders’ agreement may 
provide for compulsory transfer of shares of a deceased shareholder or of shareholder 
who cannot perform his duties due to his ill-health.102 
 
Moreover shareholders’ agreements may provide that a shareholder may transfer his 
whole legal and beneficial title to his shares to other shareholders’ in the company or to 
a third party during the continuance of the agreement without providing any triggering 
circumstances for such transfer103 or subject to certain conditions or restrictions.104 
Shareholders’ agreements may prohibit transfer of shares to particular types of persons 
such as bankrupts or persons of unsound mind.  
 
On exit the biggest concern of a minority shareholder who has invested time, money and 
effort in that particular business, is to ensure there is a fair valuation of his shareholding. 
The reflection of minority shareholders’ investment of financial as well as human capital 
at the time the valuation is carried out can be more satisfying and fair for minority 
shareholders. Shareholders’ agreements may provide the process to value the shares at 
exit of minority shareholder.105 However, application of this ex ante valuation process 
may not be entirely satisfactory for minority shareholders at exit.106 This raises legal 
questions about the extent to which provisions made for exit in advance in articles and 
shareholders’ agreements can be overridden by the courts.  
 
4.6 Limitations of shareholders’ agreements: 
Advance declaration of rights by the parties regarding conflicting situations through ex 
ante contracting in a clear way can minimise the scope for squeeze-out behaviour and 
can put the minority shareholders in a significantly stronger position when squeeze-outs 
arise. Furthermore, ex ante contracting may, in theory, lead to swifter and more cost-
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effective resolution by means of speedy exit because the means of addressing 
foreseeable problems have been defined in advance.107 However, the study of the 
precedents and interviewees’ responses suggests that, while there is considerable 
enthusiasm for shareholders’ agreements among lawyers, that might be because they are 
a means of generating fees from clients; they cannot prevent relational breakdown per 
se. Moreover, there are a range of other limitations associated with ex ante contracting 
which may be thought of as standard limitations with any attempt to regulate 
commercial relationships by contract. This part of the chapter considers these limitations 
and argues that they are such that shareholders’ agreements are at best an imperfect 
mechanism for protecting minority shareholder interests.   
 
While as indicated above, interviewees were generally in favour of shareholders’ 
agreements and considered them to be a useful mechanism for anticipating, preventing, 
and responding to disputes, they also pointed out a number of limitations associated with 
shareholders’ agreements.  One interviewee said: 
 
I am in favour of shareholders’ agreements but it depends how good these agreements are. It 
further depends upon how sophisticated the businessmen are, and whether they are prepared to 
abide by the agreement.  If the people are prepared to abide by articles and do the decent things, 
the fact they have made an agreement is not going to make any difference. Bad behaviour is bad 
behaviour [J].108 
 
It can be asserted from the interviewees’ responses as a whole that a majority of 
interviewees recommended the use of shareholders’ agreements but recognized their 
limitations in practice. These limitations are as follows:   
 
(i) The potential of ex ante contracting to eliminate factors which contribute to 
relational breakdown 
(ii) Optimism bias 
(iii) Transaction costs 
(iv) Concerns as to over-protection of minority shareholders 
(v) Unequal bargaining position of shareholders 
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(vi) Enforcement of shareholders’ agreements 
 
Each of these limitations is discussed further below. 
  
4.6.1 The potential of ex ante contracting to eliminate factors which contribute to 
relational breakdown: 
In the previous chapter it was seen that shareholder disputes in private companies often 
follow relational breakdown which, in turn, can arise for a variety of underlying reasons. 
O’Neal has emphasised the importance of comprehensive planning to eliminate as many 
of the factors that contribute to shareholder dispute if such disputes are to be prevented 
or resolved.109 It is open to doubt whether ex ante contracting can address the underlying 
factors which contribute to relational breakdown that were identified in the previous 
chapter . Ex ante contracting in shareholders’ agreements can theoretically protect 
minority shareholders from squeeze-out behaviour and can resolve exit disputes by 
making detailed provision for how exit is to be triggered and on what terms but it is 
difficult to contend that the break down of personal relationships per se could be 
effectively prevented by contractual means. There are a number of reasons why not.  
 
Several interviewees suggested that relational breakdown arise as a result of personal 
and business conflicts.110 Business conflicts may arise due to different approaches 
among shareholders towards the management and direction of the business. Interviewees 
stated that business disagreements arise owing to lack of advance formal consideration 
of shareholders regarding the medium and nature of business they are going to enter. 
Shareholders generally do not consider in advance how the majority rule will work in a 
private company and what type of decisions will be required when the business will 
develop or decline in future.111 It can be asserted that (i) ex ante contracting can control 
the use of majority rule by enhancing the voice of the minority112 and (ii) make some 
provision for foreseeable future conflicting situations. However, ex ante contracting 
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cannot provide in advance for every eventuality that may contribute to relational 
breakdown. Shareholders’ approach towards the future direction of the business is often 
hard to foresee and may depend upon the future success or decline of the business. The 
economic polices of the country and future business or market trends may also influence 
the decisions of businessmen and have a role in shaping the direction of the business. 
Shareholders’ objectives in business and lives may change with time and age. All of 
these variables, which are impossible to foresee in advance may be factors underlying 
relational breakdown.  
  
Shareholders who start business with great enthusiasm may turn out to be negligent or 
inefficient regarding the affairs of the company. As stated above, effects of negligent 
attitude can be mitigated by keeping regular eye on shareholders’ business activities.113 
However, no ex ante contracting is possible to stop shareholder from being negligent, 
inefficient or lazy in ways that may cause relational breakdown.  
 
Personal conflicts mainly arise due to shareholders’ different personalities and different 
personal objectives in life. These personal conflicts cause relational breakdown owing to 
lack of shareholders’ understanding regarding the personalities and objectives of other 
shareholder with whom they are going to start the business.114 Shareholders personal 
conflicts might be avoided if shareholders consider the personalities and objectives of 
other shareholders before going into business with them e.g., whether the prospective 
shareholder is comfortable with the idea of team work in a company.  In fact, the scope 
of ex ante contracting is very limited to avoid such personal conflict. Ex ante contracting 
cannot prevent personal conflicts since often these personality differences are latent and 
hard to foresee at the start of the business. The obvious analogy is matrimonial disputes 
where differences in personalities, latent at the time of a marriage may become a source 
of conflict subsequently. Therefore ex ante contracting cannot be expected to be 
particularly successful as a method of preventing the kind of personal conflicts that 
cause relational breakdowns. Moreover, it is not practical to respond ex ante to all 
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foreseeable personal and business conflicts that may cause relational breakdown. One 
interviewee stated that:  
 
Shareholders’ agreements could not cover every situation, since shareholders could not legislate 
for every conceivable eventuality [C].  
 
The case law and interviewees experiences suggest that most of these private companies 
are family companies and the large amount of relational breakdown occur in the next 
generation of the founders of company. Shareholders do not get the opportunity to 
choose their business partners as they receive their interests in these companies by 
inheritance.115 Therefore often it is not possible for shareholders to choose their business 
partners and to make effective provision for possible anticipated areas of disputes.  
 
Shareholders in private companies commonly start business on the basis of mutual trust 
and personal relationship. The threat regarding relational breakdown is inherent in any 
kind of close personal relationship including family relationship. The analogy – which 
has sometimes been drawn by members of the judiciary116 – is again with marriage.117  
 
The self-interested behaviour of shareholders generates greed and jealousy and can 
contribute to relational breakdown.118 It is not possible to stop shareholders from 
thinking in a self-interested manner or from seeking to enhance their control of the 
company. The self-interested behaviour of shareholders can also affect the personalities 
and business choices of shareholders at any time during the life of the company. 
Moreover, self-interest of shareholders can breakdown the relationship of shareholders, 
independent of any personal or business conflict. Owing to a range of limitations that are 
discussed below, ex ante contracting is not always possible for shareholders to deal with 
the factors that cause relational breakdowns. Hence, owing to above reasons it does not 
seem practical to deal with these underlying factors by ex ante contracting in a way that 
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will prevent the relational breakdown among shareholders. Like pre-nuptial 
arrangements that can only respond to the consequences of marriage breakdown rather 
than its causes, ex ante contracting in shareholders agreements can generally only 
mitigate the effects of relational breakdown by controlling the powers of majority and 
providing an exit on fair terms . 
 
4.6.2 Optimism bias: 
As private companies are often founded on the basis of mutual trust and confidence, 
shareholders may well be over-optimistic and over-confident about their prospects and 
so dismiss the need for shareholders’ agreements. One interviewee said:  
 
These agreements are like pre-nuptial agreements to whom people say no at the time of the 
marriage because they think why do we need a pre-nuptial agreement… we are never going to 
fall out and corporate divorce is similar [M]. 
 
Due to factors such as personal good faith regarding business, initial trust in fellow 
shareholders and excitement regarding the new business shareholders may not anticipate 
future conflicts. Later on when shareholders try to pursue their own interests and 
business objectives, relational disputes arise. Shareholders are also confident upon their 
personal relationships to sort their differences out in future. In this spirit of optimism and 
confidence the parties neither wish to think about problems that could arise nor 
anticipate that such problems could happen to them.  
 
Interviewee R acknowledged shareholders’ optimism in the context of private 
companies and emphasised differences in the character of disputes in large private 
companies and commercial joint ventures – where there is a greater likelihood that the 
parties will have received legal advice and put in place comprehensive articles and 
shareholders’ agreements to regulate their relationship – when compared with small 
private companies. The more dependent the company is on close relationships between 
the participants for its smooth running, the more difficult it is to foresee the problems 
that can arise [R]. Interviewee T stated:  
 
Generally you do not get shareholders agreements in quasi-partnerships because they are more 
about informality [T].  
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Conversely, the more concerned the parties are to try and foresee problems in advance 
and document every conceivable aspect of their business relationship, the more one may 
doubt the wisdom of them venturing into business together. That itself indicates the lack 
of mutual trust and possibility of future conflicts in the company.  In this situation it is 
suggested not to enter into such business based on personal relationships but to treat it as 
a purely commercial enterprise and stipulate minority protection agreements 
accordingly, if possible. Recounting the experience of a prominent Wisconsin lawyer, 
O’Neal writes: 
  
…when clients who come to him to form a closely held enterprise are so concerned about 
possible future disagreements that they want binding agreements in advance to resolve such 
difficulties, he may advise them not to go into business together.119  
 
4.6.3 Transaction costs: 
One interviewee suggested, for better protection of minority, agreements needed to be 
very comprehensive so there should be no scope for any dispute left behind [S]. Drafting 
shareholders’ agreements can be a complex and lengthy process. Negotiations are 
conducted under the supervision of experienced lawyers and efforts may be made when 
drafting these agreements to cover all possible contingencies in a particular business. 
Drafting shareholders’ agreements will inevitably increase transaction costs for the 
parties. The more comprehensive and complex the agreement, the greater those 
transaction costs are likely to be. Parties who incorporate their business may well be 
deterred from putting in place a shareholders’ agreement by concerns over likely legal 
costs. The point was acknowledged by two interviewees: 
 
Disputes in private companies can be avoided by ex ante contracting but sometimes people don’t 
have money to pay lawyers to negotiate these agreements [M].  
 
Shareholders’ agreements are expensive and it can cost thousands of pounds in negotiating the 
agreement. However there are precedents available in books [G]. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the interviewees took the view that a properly drafted 
agreement which might involve the parties incurring considerable expense is better than 
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no agreement or a cheaper, badly drafted agreement. Not paying for specialist counsel 
was thought to be a false economy. Interviewee J said: 
 
There is no real excuse for not thinking about what your articles say. The trouble is of course, if 
you want an off the shelf general trading company you will get it very cheap… it won’t cost you 
much more than £100 but it won’t be tailor-made. If you want something tailor-made settled by 
an experienced lawyer it will cost significantly more but you will get something worthwhile [J]. 
 
It has been suggested that problems regarding both optimism and transaction costs can 
be dealt with to some extent by providing default rules in model articles of 
association.120  
 
4.6.3.1 The significance of default rules: 
During the empirical research while discussing transactions costs, interviewees were 
also asked to consider the significance of the inclusion of default rules in model articles. 
Interviewees acknowledged the utility of default rules providing an exit for the minority, 
but were not hopeful regarding their potential to deal with shareholders disputes. 
Interviewees indicated that the problem was as to the nature of these provisions, what 
these provisions should state on standard basis in model articles.121 Interviewee S 
acknowledged that as a principle, provision for ‘exit at will’ either in shareholders’ 
agreements or in model articles, was a very good idea but the devil would be in the 
detail of any such provisions. Interviewee A expressed the view that there would be 
difficulties arriving at any consensus around whether there should be ‘exit at will’ or 
defined circumstances triggering a right to exit and, if the later option was favoured, 
what defined circumstances might be included. Interviewee E thought that default rules 
would be useful backstop but was not ultimately persuaded that they could meet the 
circumstances of every case that may arise in future.  
 
As is the case with bespoke shareholders agreements there is an inherent limitation that 
if the default rules try to meet every eventuality they are almost certain to be 
unsuccessful given that circumstances change over time. At the same time, if they were 
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drafted in a flexible, open-ended way they may not deal effectively with the immediate 
problem at hand.  One interviewee made the point in the following way:  
 
On the one hand certainty equals fairness but on the other hand certainty as it turns out may not 
be fair because it may not deal with the particular situation. The more flexible it is the more able 
it is to cover different circumstances but the more uncertain it is because you don’t know the 
answer. So you have that tension constantly between the desire for certainty and the desire for 
flexibility [A].  
 
Interviewees also indicated:  
 
Default rules cannot cover every situation such as complexities as to basis of valuation and 
discounts. Moreover, legal questions could arise around the fair application of default rules that 
could be difficult to resolve [C]. 
 
It is also important to obtain a balance between the rights of minority and majority shareholders 
and that balance is very hard to achieve in the context of default rules [G]. 
 
Interviewee F supported the adoption of default rules and considered it helpful as a 
means for providing a clear legal justification for exit via a buy-out bearing in mind that 
Lord Hoffmann had rejected the idea of ‘exit at will’ or ‘no fault divorce’ in O’Neill v 
Phillips,122 but did not anticipate such provision being implemented in the near future.    
 
The Law Commission in its final report123 recommended the inclusion of default rules 
such as a shareholders’ exit article for smaller private companies in Table A, but it was 
not included in the model articles for private companies under the CA 2006.124 The Law 
Commission mentioned the view of respondents to their original Consultation Paper to 
the effect that exit routes too readily available might be economically damaging, leading 
to the break up of small businesses at the first sign of disagreement.125     
 
Similarly the Company Law Steering Group also expressed concern about the proposed 
exit article that: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122
 [1999] 2 BCLC 1. See below chapter 6. 
123
 The Law Commission’s Report Part 5 paras 5.4-5.32 and appendix C. 
124
 See Draft Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares in French D (editor) Blackstone’s 
Statutes on Company Law (2007-2008) (11th ed. Oxford University Press, New York  2007) 725. 
125
 The Law Commission’s Report [5.7]. 
 105 
The clear conclusion was that the article would not be used in practice because on commercial 
grounds it would not be incorporated in company constitutions by well informed founders and 
was inherently undesirable on grounds of lack of flexibility – it was impossible to prescribe in 
advance, and for the full diversity of companies, what would be a fair exit regime. For ill-
informed founders it would be a trap.126 
 
One interviewee also expressed concern:  
 
I am a bit worried about default provisions in Table A. I think that people ought to think about 
what they are doing. It is up to people to have a structure that reflects their own business and not 
for the state to provide an easy get out [J].  
 
Lack of any clear enthusiasm for default rules among experienced counsel127 may in part 
explains why the idea was not adopted in the model articles for private companies under 
the CA 2006.  
 
4.6.4 Concerns as to over-protection of minority shareholders: 
Majority shareholders may be concerned that shareholders’ agreements – especially 
those that confer veto rights and rights to exit at will – may “over-protect” the minority 
and therefore operate against their interests. Of course, the issue of “over-protection” or 
“under protection” will come down to the relative bargaining positions of the parties in 
negotiations. Needless to say the lawyers who draft and negotiate such agreements will 
be influenced by the interests of their clients. As one interviewee put it:  
 
You have to look whether you are drafting for majority or for minority. It is very difficult to 
strike a balance between majority and minority. I don’t know the perfect shareholder agreement 
[G].  
 
In company law application of majority rule is common to run the affairs of the 
company in an efficient manner. The veto power enhanced the voice of minority 
shareholders and decisions cannot be made unless there is a unanimous consent of all 
shareholders, which can slow the decision making process of the company and can 
create deadlock. The slow decision making process can be against the interests of the 
both the shareholders and the company. Moreover, minority shareholders might exercise 
their veto power in bad faith to block decisions that may not be against their interests but 
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will be beneficial for majority shareholders and the company. Therefore the possibility is 
that majority shareholders in these companies might avoid the advance stipulations to 
enhance the voice of minority shareholders and would prefer to run the affairs of 
company by applying the majority rule.   
 
Secondly, majority shareholders may hesitate to accept minority’s right to exit at will to 
avoid over-protection of minority shareholders. Exit at will can provide a useful means 
of resolving disputes without the need for costly litigation but may not be suitable for 
majority shareholders where they are relying upon the minority not withdrawing capital 
from the business and in circumstances where they may find it difficult to finance a buy-
out. This might result in the drastic consequence of a winding-up. Again, the majority 
may be concerned that the minority may exploit the right to ‘exit at will’ for his personal 
interests and to threaten majority to invest somewhere else more profitable or to leave 
majority in distress. In Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd v Larvin,128 Auld LJ made the point 
that:  
[In a small company with a few shareholders] each holding a significant proportion of the 
company’s issued capital, a sudden demand from one of them, for essentially personal reasons, to 
seek to withdraw his investment could be very damaging, even potentially ruinous, to [the other 
shareholders]  and the company.  
 
The Law Commission mentioned the views of respondents to its Consultation Paper 
that: 
 
 Serving an exit notice might enable shareholders to exert pressure improperly, knowing that the 
other party could not afford to pay for his shares.129 
 
One interviewee was particularly sympathetic to majority shareholders’ concerns about a 
‘no fault’ entitlement to buy-out:  
 
Any shareholder may suddenly insists that he wants his shares bought out after an independent 
valuation. That may be unfair on shareholders left behind in the company. These shareholders 
could complain that (i) the minority shareholder is leaving a sinking ship (ii) the majority 
shareholders do not have finances, to be able to buy him out [S].  
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Interviewee G added that:  
 
Like pre-nuptial agreements in marriage, shareholders don’t know what is going to happen in 
future. Therefore, majority shareholders are concerned that minority may use exit option in his 
own interest e.g., when the share price seems in his favour [G]. 
 
4.6.5 Unequal bargaining position of shareholders:   
Concerns about “over protection” or “under-protection” of minority shareholders will to 
some considerable extent be driven by the relative bargaining position of the parties.  
Minority shareholders’ cannot respond effectively to majority shareholders’ concerns 
regarding over protection of minority shareholders owing to their weak bargaining 
position. Minority shareholders in private companies may not have the bargaining 
strength to regulate their business affairs with majority shareholders on an equal footing. 
Minority shareholders with low bargaining power owing to their minority holdings in 
the company may not be able to stipulate agreements with majority shareholders, to 
protect their interests in future. Conversely, majority shareholders who are strongly 
placed are unlikely to want to introduce qualifications to majority rule. 
 
In fact courts also do not improve the bargaining position of minority shareholders by 
granting them what they might have stipulated in advance on the assumption of equal 
bargaining power. Courts only come to the rescue of the minority where there is a 
breach of some legal right or the exercise by the company of legal rights in a manner 
that is contrary to equity.130 Interviewee G stressed that shareholders should regulate the 
affairs of business in advance and acknowledged that in most cases the minority 
shareholder does not have the bargaining position required to stipulate minority 
protection agreements. The same interviewee further elaborated that:  
 
If shareholders did not have bargaining strength in the beginning then the court should not 
improve their bargaining position ex post… This was the real world of business and if 
shareholders did not plan then why should the court came to their rescue [G].  
 
It can be asserted that unequal bargaining positions of shareholders can be a limitation to 
drafting minority protection shareholders’ agreements in private companies. 
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4.6.6 Enforcement of shareholders’ agreements:  
Shareholders’ agreements demand strict enforcement to be effective. Shareholders’ 
agreements can be helpful on their own but may not be enough for protecting minority 
shareholders. Even declaring in the statute that a director must in good faith would 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and must 
avoid a situation in which his direct or indirect interest conflicts with the interests of the 
company cannot guarantee the protection of minority shareholders’ interests without 
effective means of enforcement.131 Majority shareholders respect ex ante contractual 
rights when there is a strict enforcement of those rights. Like any agreement on breach 
of these agreements shareholders need to have recourse to the courts for enforcement of 
their rights available under these agreements. Such as where minority has a right to 
participate in the management of the company and has been excluded from the 
management, agreement is ultimately needed to be enforced by the courts. In Rayfield v 
Hands132 to deal with the problem of illiquidity, article 11 of the articles of association 
of a private company provided that “every member who intends to transfer shares shall 
inform the directors who will take the said shares equally between them at a fair value”. 
At the time of transfer of shares the directors refused to buy the claimant’s shares. On 
the claimant’s application, the court held in his favour that article 11 constituted an 
enforceable contract between the directors who were bound to purchase his shares at a 
fair value. If the rights of the parties are clear under shareholders’ agreements regarding 
a particular conflict and the dispute is merely regarding the breach of shareholders’ 
agreement then shareholders can enforce those rights through contractual remedies 
under ordinary principles of contract law. Shareholders’ can also enforce shareholders’ 
agreements through statutory minority protection remedy under section 459 of CA 1985 
when breach of the agreement is unfairly prejudicial to their interests.133  
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 See CA 2006 ss 172(1) and 175(1).  
132
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133
 See O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1. Lord Hoffmann supported the contractual relationship of the 
parties by stating that, to prove unfair prejudicial conduct under section 459 of the CA 1985, minority 
shareholders have to show that there is some breach of their formal (legally binding) or informal (binding 
under equity) agreement. 
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Unfortunately there are problems associated with enforcement of shareholders’ 
agreements by courts such as complications regarding the fairness and interpretation of 
contractual terms needed to be enforced in particular situations. In Re Abbey Leisure Ltd, 
it was held that: 
 
There was nothing unreasonable in the petitioner refusing to accept the risk that an accountant’s 
valuation of his interest in the company under the machinery in the articles might apply a 
discount for his minority shareholding.134   
 
Interviewee S stated that there were often disputes around whether the defined 
circumstances that triggered a right to exit and buy-out had actually been triggered on 
the facts. An interviewee referred an example, that if relational breakdown due to breach 
of agreement or unfair prejudicial conduct was a trigger for buy-out of minority then to 
enforce the agreement minority needed first to prove the breach or unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. The allegation alone could not be enough to justify exit. Proving such 
triggering circumstances may prolong the court proceedings and can result in lengthy 
and expensive litigation [C]. 
  
Interviewees said that in practice shareholders’ agreements often just give something 
else to argue about. A particular problem that one interviewee identified surrounded 
possible defects at the point of contract formation: 
 
A well drafted shareholder agreement can help, but the trouble is when you have small disputes 
you will simply get collateral factual disputes, because one would say well, I know I signed the 
shareholder’s agreement, but Fred said to me we didn’t really need to worry about it, it was just a 
piece of paper. The solicitor said to me, I had to sign it but not to worry because I would always 
have a right to be a director. Then you just get arguments about whether, that was in fact said. 
Unfortunately, sometimes it adds to the problem rather than taking it away [R]. 
 
Interviewee D added that a party might argue that it was unfair for the agreement to 
work in these circumstances or that the valuation was wrong.  
 
If a shareholders’ agreement provides the exit route for a dissatisfied shareholder to 
resolve a dispute, courts always prefer to enforce that already stipulated agreement, to 
                                                 
134
 Re Abbey Leisure Ltd [1990] BCC 60 (CA). 
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avoid the cost and delay in proceedings.135 However, shareholders may claim that it is 
unfair to apply the agreement to the particular situation. Courts can ignore shareholders’ 
agreements where in particular circumstances it is fair to do so and that may diminish 
the attractiveness of entering these agreements in advance. In Exeter City AFC Ltd v The 
Football Conference Ltd136 the petitioner presented a petition under section 459 of CA 
1985. The respondent applied to stay the petition under section 9 of the Arbitration Act 
1996 by stating that there was an arbitration clause and the dispute should not go down 
section 459 route but should be arbitrated. The court did not grant a stay by stating that 
section 9 of the Arbitration Act did not apply and the court was an appropriate tribunal 
to decide these issues. 
 
One interviewee said that it was very difficult in practice to get a court to shift from the 
written shareholder agreement but it was possible. He further added that shareholders 
may have mandatory exit provisions in shareholders agreements or in the articles of 
association but the courts can ignore them if the courts consider that these agreements or 
any of their provisions operate unfairly. So, for example, if the shareholders’ agreement 
does not set out a right for the exiting shareholder to make representations to the valuer 
the judge may think that this is unfair and not a proper basis for arriving at a valuation. 
In support of his view the same interviewee mentioned that:  
 
In Re Abbey Leisure Ltd137 and Re Benfield Greig Group plc138 shareholders’ agreements say that 
if you want to exit the company this is the way we are going to value your shares. The courts said 
that you can still have 459 because the valuation process is somehow unfair or the value fixed by 
the auditor is unfair [T].   
 
In Re a Company (No 004377 of 1986) Hoffmann J held that:  
 
[Unless] there has been bad faith or plain impropriety in the conduct of the respondents or about 
cases in which, the articles provide for some arbitrary or artificial method of valuation… [I] do 
not consider that in the normal case of the breakdown of a corporate quasi-partnership there 
should ordinarily be any legitimate expectation that a member wishing to have his shares 
purchased should be entitled to have them valued by the court rather than the auditors pursuant to 
the articles.139  
                                                 
135
 See Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch 1; Russell v Northern Bank Development Corp Ltd [1992] BCLC 
1016. 
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 [2002]1 BCLC 65. 
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 Re a Company (No 004377 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 94, 102. 
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Interviewee B had recently been involved in a case where the court had held that it was 
not fair on the petitioner to require that he comply with detailed share sale provisions in 
the articles.  
 
As to the valuation process in shareholders’ agreements, one interviewee expressed 
concerns that defining a valuation process in an agreement was not enough since there 
were cases for instance, where the shareholders agreed to a valuation by the company’s 
auditor, but the auditor had previously valued the shares for tax reasons at a very low 
value or the auditor was looking for the next job from the company so the exiting 
shareholder could not trust auditor. Moreover, a minority shareholder may prefer to 
delay his exit if the valuation would subsequently be improved by foreseeable increases 
in turnover or profits in the near future [F]. Shareholders may complain that the 
valuation process prescribed in shareholders’ agreements is not fair because it has not 
considered the reduction in the value of company’s shares owing to squeeze-out 
behaviour. That may raise the question whether there is any squeeze-out behaviour or 
not and how much loss the minority may have suffered due to squeeze-out behaviour 
that may take the question into courts and prolong the dispute. In Guinness Peat Group 
plc v British Land Co plc,140 it was held that the value of minority shareholding in the 
company is a disputed question of fact. Factual disputes are normally resolved in an 
adversarial system by a trial after pleadings, discovery and oral evidence tested by cross 
examination therefore the question of valuation merits a full hearing. The ability of 
courts to override articles or shareholders’ agreements introduces uncertainties as 
regards their enforceability in the terms drafted.    
 
Shareholders agreements can cause problems regarding enforcement of informal rights 
of minority shareholders under equity. As O’Neill v Phillips141 stated that to prove the 
unfair prejudicial conduct there must be a breach of some legal or equitable rights of 
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shareholders. It is very hard to enforce any right that may otherwise be binding in equity 
if you have shareholders’ agreements.142 Interviewee T said: 
 
Generally speaking it is very difficult to argue a quasi-partnership if you have shareholders’ 
agreements [T]. 
 
Interviewee G suggested that from the minority shareholder perspective it may therefore 
sometimes be better not to enter into formal agreements with the majority:  
 
If you cannot have proper ex ante contracting it is often better not even to try it. At least you can 
say to the court, we did not bargain in advance so now it is right for you to impose a solution [G]. 
 
Hence, if the comprehensive negotiations and minority protection stipulations are not 
possible to deal with conflicting situations exhaustively, it may be advisable for 
shareholders’ in some circumstances not to enter formal agreements and rely instead 
upon section 459.143 
 
4.7 Conclusion:  
In private companies ex ante contracting through shareholders’ agreements, can 
theoretically prevent squeeze-out behaviour and provide mechanisms to resolve exit 
disputes but it cannot prevent actual relational breakdown. Relational breakdown occurs 
due to underlying factors such as personal and business conflicts. In fact ex ante 
contracting in shareholders agreements cannot eliminate the underlying factors that 
cause relational breakdown but can only mitigate the effects of relational breakdown by 
qualifying the powers of the majority and providing an exit to the minority on fair terms. 
Shareholders’ agreements can declare the rights and enhance the voice of minority 
shareholders to control the powers of majority shareholders to prevent squeeze-out 
behaviour. This enhanced voice of minority shareholders can create deadlock. Thus, 
shareholders’ agreements often provide mechanisms to resolve deadlock by negotiation, 
transfer of shares or winding up the company. Similarly, ex ante contracting cannot 
prevent the company from being negligently mismanaged. However, ex ante contracting 
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can provide provisions to lessen the opportunities for shareholders to behave in a 
negligent manner and to mitigate the repercussions of negligent behaviour. Finally, 
shareholder agreements can be useful in resolving exit disputes.  
 
However, there are limitations associated with ex ante contracting in shareholders’ 
agreements. Majority shareholders’ are always concerned with over-protection of 
minority shareholders. Minority shareholders are not always able to fully protect 
themselves because of inequality in their bargaining position. Shareholder optimism and 
transaction costs may deter parties from regulating their relationship through a 
comprehensively drafted shareholders’ agreement. Finally, shareholders’ agreements 
still have to be interpreted and enforced and it is not necessarily easy to predict when the 
courts might intervene in any event through section 459 to override their terms on the 
grounds that such terms themselves operate unfairly.  
 
Therefore, due to a range of limitations associated with ex ante contracting in 
shareholders’ agreements, shareholders need recourse to a legal mechanism other than 
contract to resolve their disputes. The principal mechanism that company law provides 
for this purpose are the provisions in sections 459-461 of the CA 1985 which enable a 
court to relieve conduct in the affairs of the company that is unfairly prejudicial to 
membership interests. The next chapter considers the evolution of these provisions up to 
the date of the Law Commission’s Report on shareholder remedies.        
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Chapter 5 
The evolution of the unfair prejudice remedy and the Law Commission’s critique 
 
5.1 Scope of the chapter: 
The chapter discusses the principle of majority rule in company law and legal 
protections available to minority shareholders against the misapplication of majority 
rule. The chapter mainly focuses upon the evolution of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy under sections 459-461 of the CA 1985 through case law, to resolve shareholder 
disputes by providing an appropriate relief to minority shareholders, after the 
promulgation of the provision until the Law Commission review of shareholders’ 
remedies in the late nineties. Problems were identified by the courts and the Law 
Commission with the application of section 459 of CA 1985, such as length, cost and 
complexity of proceedings under the section, which diminished the effectiveness of this 
remedy. Hence, the chapter provides a necessary background to the analysis conducted 
in the remaining chapters, of subsequent substantive law and procedural changes, 
introduced to improve the effectiveness of the remedy. 
 
5.2 Introduction: 
The chapter discusses here the application of the principle of majority rule in private 
companies and legal protections available to minority shareholders against the 
misapplication of majority rule. The discussion as to available protections covers law of 
shareholder remedies that includes, the derivative action on behalf of the company, 
shareholders’ personal actions, just and equitable winding up of the company and the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy. The statutory unfair prejudice remedy under section 
459 of the CA 1985 has proved the most attractive remedy for minority shareholders in 
this context.1 The discussion of majority rule and the law of shareholder remedies 
generally provides necessary context for understanding how section 459 evolved.    
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Payne J., ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’ 
(2005) 64(3) Cambridge Law Journal 647, 647. 
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5.2.1 The principle of majority rule: 
Company law provides the governance mechanism by the application of the principle of 
majority rule namely that: decisions regarding a company’s affairs will be made 
according to the wishes of the majority of the shareholders of the company. Majority 
rule is exercised by shareholders by passing ordinary (by simple majority)2 and special 
resolutions (by a majority of not less than 75%).3 The principle provides a sensible and 
logical approach to corporate decision making.4 Lord Wilberforce has stated that “those 
who take interests in companies limited by shares have to accept majority rule”.5 The 
strict application of majority rule in these companies can be against the interests of 
minority shareholders, when majorities use the voting power attached to their shares for 
their personal interests and by ignoring the adverse effects of their decision making 
power, upon minorities.6 Therefore to protect their interests minority shareholders may 
have to monitor majority shareholders and this may result in agency costs.7 Law can 
play a significant role in reducing the agency costs.       
 
In the context of minority shareholders’ protection, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled in one case that the “majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it 
occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority”.8 The decision making power of 
majority shareholders is accepted but “the limitation is only that in pursuing the best 
interests of the corporation according to their business judgment, those in control may 
not breach their fiduciary duty to the minority”.9 A fiduciary relationship arises “when 
                                                 
2
 See s 282 of CA 2006. 
3
 See s 283 of CA 2006. 
4
 Hollington, R., Minority Shareholders’ Rights. (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1990) 3. 
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6
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 S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) as quoted by Art R.C., ‘Shareholders Rights and 
Remedies in Close Corporations: Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations’ (2003) 28 
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9
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and Reasonable Expectations’ (2003) 28 The Journal of Corporation Law 371, 389. 
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one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another who as a result gains 
superiority or influence over the first”.10 That ensures that majority shareholders cannot 
use their voting power attached to their shares only for their personal interests and 
beyond any limitations.11 It has been asserted that “controlling shareholders owe a 
fiduciary duty to the minority that is comparable to the directors’ duty to the 
corporation”.12 A leading case from the Oregon Court of Appeals in 1989 stated that the 
majority shareholder of a close corporation owes the minority fiduciary duties of loyalty, 
good faith, fair dealing and full disclosure.13 
 
By contrast, in the UK, while directors owe fiduciary duties to the company, majority 
shareholders do not generally owe fiduciary duties directly to individual minority 
shareholders and such duties would only be imposed on majority shareholders in 
exceptional circumstances.14 Shares are property of the shareholder who holds them and 
a right to vote is usually attached to ordinary shares. Due to the proprietary nature of 
shares, a shareholder can exercise the voting power attached to his shares for his own 
personal benefit.15 In Northern Countries Securities Ltd v Jackson and Steeple Ltd, it 
was held that “when a shareholder is voting for or against a particular resolution he is 
voting as a person owing no fiduciary duty to the company and who is exercising his 
own right of property to vote as he thinks fit”.16 It was stated further in the same case 
that:  
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A director is an agent, who casts his vote to decide in what manner his principal shall act through 
the collective agency of the board of directors; a shareholder who casts his vote in general 
meeting is not casting it as an agent of the company in any shape or form.17  
 
Now the CA 2006 provides under section 170(1) that “the general duties specified in 
sections 171 to 177 [of the Act] are owed by a director of a company to the company”. 
In the leading section 459 case of Re Saul D Harrison and Sons plc18 it was stated:  
 
… that the powers which the shareholders have entrusted to the board are fiduciary powers, 
which must be exercised for the benefit of the company as a whole. If the board act for some 
ulterior purpose, they step outside the terms of the bargain between the shareholders and the 
company.  
 
However, the effect of breach of directors’ fiduciary duties may be unfairly prejudicial 
to the interests of minority shareholders of the company.19 In private companies, 
shareholders are often also directors of the company.20 Minority shareholders in the 
company may expect that majority shareholders will use their voting power in good faith 
and exercise their powers qua directors for the benefit of the company as a whole. 
Historically, in Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Ltd21 it was held that a power to alter 
the articles must like all other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of 
law and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and enabling 
them to bind minorities. It must be exercised not only in the manner required by law but 
also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole.22 The ‘interests of the company 
as a whole’ is a formula which is employed to achieve the underlying purpose of 
protecting the minority from unconscionable conduct by the majority.23 Now section 
172(1) of the CA 2006 provides that ‘a director of a company must act in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole’. 
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5.2.2 Derivative action: 
The principle of majority rule developed in company law, “as a result of the courts’ 
historical reluctance to become involved in disputes over the internal management of 
business ventures”.24 The Law Commission in its final Report on shareholders’ remedies 
stated that the guiding principle of company law was that “an individual member should 
not be able to pursue proceedings on behalf of a company about matters of internal 
management, that is, matters which the majority are entitled to regulate by ordinary 
resolution”.25 However, under the common law a minority shareholder could bring an 
action on behalf of the company known as a ‘derivative action’ where the act of the 
majority, who was in control of the company and might pass the resolution to block 
action on behalf of the company against the wrongdoers, amounted to a so-called fraud 
on the minority. The ‘fraud on the minority’ where the ‘wrongdoer is in control’ is an 
exception to famous rule in Foss v Harbottle.26 The rule provides that the proper 
claimant in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company is prima 
facie the company.27 In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) it 
was stated that it is “[an] elementary principle that A cannot, as a general rule, bring an 
action against B to recover damages or secure other relief on behalf of C for an injury 
done by B to C”.28 The exception to the rule provides a minority shareholder with a right 
to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the company. In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
Newman Industries Ltd (No 2), it was stated that if the act amounted to fraud and the 
wrongdoers were themselves in control of the company then the aggrieved minority 
shareholder was allowed, to bring a minority shareholders’ action on behalf of 
themselves and all others.29 Moreover ‘fraud’ in this sense has a wider meaning. In 
Daniels v Daniels, it was stated that if minority shareholders could sue for fraud there is 
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no reason why they could not sue where the action of the majority and the directors 
though without fraud, confers some benefit on those directors and majority shareholders 
themselves. A minority shareholder who had no other remedy might sue where directors 
use their powers intentionally or unintentionally, fraudulently or negligently in a manner 
which benefits themselves at the expense of the company.30  In Estmanco (Kilner 
House) Ltd v Greater London Council31 it was stated that apart from the benefit to 
themselves at the company’s expense, the essence of the matter seems to be an abuse or 
misuse of power. Now the common law derivative claims are replaced by the statutory 
derivative claims under section 260-264 of the CA 2006.32 Under section 260(3) of the 
CA 2006:  
 
A derivative claim under this Chapter may be brought only in respect of a cause of action arising 
from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or 
breach of trust by a director of the company. 
 
5.2.3 Personal action: 
A minority shareholder on his own behalf may bring proceedings to enforce his rights 
available in the articles of association of company.33 Furthermore a member may also 
bring a personal action to enforce the rights available under separate shareholders 
agreements34 or to enforce the statutory rights granted by the CA 2006 e.g., section 
431(1) of the CA 2006 provides that every member of the company is entitled to be 
provided on demand and free of charge with a copy of annual accounts and reports of 
the company.35 
 
5.2.4 Just and equitable winding-up: 
Ever since the Companies Act 1862, successive Companies Acts have made provision 
for companies to be wound up on just and equitable ground.36 The nature and scope of 
the just and equitable ground under the section (section 222(f) of the Companies Act 
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1948 -   as it then was) was reviewed in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd.37 In 1982 
the Cork Committee38 recommendations were implemented in the Insolvency Law 1985. 
Subsequently these provisions along with material contained in the Companies Act 1985 
were consolidated in the Insolvency Act 1986.39     
 
Now under Insolvency Act 1986 a minority shareholder may also apply to court for the 
company be wound up on the just and equitable ground. Section 122(1)(g) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 provides that ‘a company may be wound up by the court if the 
court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound 
up’. The House of Lords in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd40 stated a general 
approach towards just and equitable winding up. In Ebrahimi, the petitioner applied for 
an order under section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 for purchase of his shares in the 
company and in the alternative for an order under section 222(f) of the 1948 Act that the 
company be wound up on the ground that was just and equitable to do so. Lord 
Wilberforce ruled that:  
 
[the ‘just and equitable’ provision] does as equity always does, enables the court to subject the 
exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of personal character 
arising between one individual and another, which may make it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on 
legal rights, or to exercise them in a particular way.41  
 
The decision has a significant impact upon the evolution of unfair prejudice remedy, 
discussed below. The court further held that if the shareholder could prove breach of 
some basic obligation of his fellow shareholders in good faith, the conclusion must be by 
applying such equitable considerations that the association should be dissolved.42  
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 [1972] 2 All ER 492. 
38
 ‘Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice’ (Cmnd 8558, HMSO, London 
1982). 
39
 Hannigan B., Company Law (Lexis Nexis, UK 2003) 791. 
40
 [1972] 2 All ER 492. 
41
 [1972] 2 All ER 492, 500. 
42
 [1972] 2 All ER 492, 501. 
 121 
5.3 Evolution of the unfair prejudice remedy up to the time of the Law Commission 
Report: 
More than half a century ago a special remedy was introduced by the legislature to 
protect minority shareholders from oppressive conduct of majority shareholders under 
section 9 of the Companies Act 1947, which became section 210 of the Companies Act 
1948, by giving the ‘courts more flexibility and as an alternative to winding up a 
company on just and equitable grounds’.43 The section was the result of the Report 
presented by the Committee on Company Law Amendment in 1945.44 After carefully 
examining the proposals intended to strengthen the minority shareholders of a private 
company in resisting oppression by the majority, the Cohen Report concluded that it was 
impossible to frame a recommendation to cover every case of oppression. In many cases 
the winding up of the company would not benefit the minority shareholders, since the 
break up value of the assets might be small, or the only available purchaser might be that 
very majority whose oppression had driven the minority to seek redress. Therefore, it 
was suggested that the court should also have the power to impose upon the parties to a 
dispute whatever settlement the court considered just and equitable. The discretion must 
be unfettered, for it was impossible to lay down a general guide to the solution of what 
were essentially individual cases. The Cohen Report did not expect the court in every 
case to find and impose a solution but proposed to give the court a jurisdiction which the 
court lacked at that time, and thereby at least empower the court to impose a solution in 
those cases where one might be found.45 
 
It can be seen that prior to the introduction of statutory relief for unfairly prejudicial 
conduct, the application of majority rule in company law left minority shareholders with 
limited powers of bringing action to remedy the unfair conduct of majority shareholders. 
These powers included, as discussed above, the derivative action on behalf of the 
company, a personal action46 and an application to court to wind up the company on just 
                                                 
43
 The Consultation Paper [7.4] [7.8]. 
44
 ‘Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment’ (Cmnd 6659 HMSO, London 1945) 
hereinafter, The Cohen Report. 
45
 See The Cohen Report [60].  
46
 Shareholders may bring personal action to protect their rights provided by the articles of association 
under s 33 of CA 2006.  
 122 
and equitable ground. The Cohen Report proposed a wider ‘oppression’ remedy which 
the legislature introduced in section 210 of the Companies Act 1948. Section 210 is the 
statutory predecessor of the present unfair prejudice remedy (formerly section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985; now section 994 of the Companies Act 2006). Section 210 of the 
Companies Act 1948 provided that a member of a company might complain that the 
affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the 
members (including himself)… Sub-section 2 further provided that the court might make 
such order as it thought fit and if on any such petition the court was of the opinion that 
(a) the company’s affairs were being conducted in an oppressive manner and (b) to wind 
up the company would unfairly prejudice that part of the members, but otherwise the 
facts would justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it was just and 
equitable that the company should be wound up. 
 
The section did not prove useful for protecting minority shareholders’ interests owing to 
its restrictive scope. Firstly, the section was construed restrictively by the courts as the 
phrase ‘in a manner oppressive’ was interpreted by courts as behaviour that is 
burdensome, harsh and wrongful.47 In Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd it was stated 
that oppression occurred when shareholders, having a dominant power in a company 
exercise that power to conduct the company's affairs in a manner that was unfair or as 
stated above ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful’ to the other members of the company or 
some of them, and lacked that degree of probity which they were entitled to expect in the 
conduct of the company's affairs.48 In Re Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd, relying on 
the observation of Lord Keith in Elder v Elder & Watson Ltd,49  Buckley, J stated that 
“… oppression involves, I think, at least an element of lack of probity or fair dealing to a 
member in the matter of his proprietary rights as a shareholder.” Buckley J further stated 
that it was necessary to establish that oppressive conduct was designed to achieve some 
unfair advantage over those claiming to be oppressed.50 For conduct to be oppressive 
under the section it had to be wrongful. That restricted the scope of the section to acts of 
                                                 
47
 SCWS v Meyer [1959] A.C. 324, 342.   
48
 See Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1042, 1059.  
49
 [1952] SC 49, 55. 
50
 [1966] 1 All ER 242, 247-248. 
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majority shareholders which were illegal: “so that only behaviour which was unlawful 
independently of this section could be protected”.51  Therefore exclusion of minority 
shareholder from management of company was not regarded as oppressive under the 
section 210 if the majority shareholders were legally authorised to act in this way under 
the statute.52 
   
The Jenkins Committee reported in 1962 that:  
 
It is also suggested that ‘oppressive’ is too strong a word to be appropriate in all the cases in 
which applicants ought to be held entitled to relief under the section.53  
 
The Report expressed concern regarding the ambiguity that:  
 
Whether the element of wrongfulness in oppressive conduct means actual illegality or invasion of 
legal rights or was it satisfied by the conduct which without being actually illegal could 
nevertheless be justly described as reprehensible?54  
 
The Report mentioned the statement of Lord Cooper in Elder v Elder & Watson Ltd55 
with reference to the meaning of oppression in section 210 that:  
 
… the essence of the matter seems to be that the conduct complained of should at the lowest 
involve a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of the conditions of 
fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.  
 
The Committee stated that this statement accorded with their view as to the intention 
underlying section 210 as originally framed. The section was meant to cover complaints 
not only to the effect that the affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner 
oppressive (in a narrower sense) to the members concerned but also to the effect that 
those affairs were being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
those members. The Committee recommended that the section should be amended to 
make this clear.56 
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Secondly, the scope of section 210 was restrictive because to invoke the section the 
petitioner had to establish that it was just and equitable to wind-up the company but that 
a winding up order would be detrimental to the petitioner’s interests. The restrictive way 
in which the section was construed made it virtually useless in practice.57 
 
5.4 Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985: 
Therefore, to fill this gap and to strengthen the position of minority shareholders the 
Jenkins Committee58 proposed the introduction of statutory relief for ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’ conduct. This was originally enacted in section 75 of the Companies Act 
1980 and later re-enacted as section 459 of the Companies Act 1985.59 Under the present 
law in England and Wales, the unfair prejudice remedy in sections 459-461 of the 
Companies Act 1985 is the most attractive and widely used60 remedy available to 
minority shareholders in private companies. Lord Hoffmann stated that “… section 75 
[as section 459 then was] was a valuable and overdue reform of the law which conferred 
on the court a wide and useful discretion”.61  
 
The Law Commission stated that the remedy for unfairly prejudicial conduct contained 
in sections 459-461 of the CA 1985 was the most widely used by minority shareholders 
to obtain some personal remedy in the event of unsatisfactory conduct of a company’s 
business.62 The remedy was often used where there is a breakdown in relations between 
the owner-managers of small private companies.63 The wide scope of the provisions and 
a vast discretion of courts to award relief had significantly increased the attractiveness of 
the section and lessened the use of other available remedies64 by the time the Law 
Commission conducted its review.65 There are three main reasons for the attractiveness 
of this court based dispute resolution mechanism under sections 459-461 of the CA 
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 See discussion in, Instone R., ‘Unfair Prejudice: An Interim Report’ [1988] Journal of Business Law 20. 
58
 ‘Report of the Company Law Committee’ (Cmnd 1749, HMSO, London 1962).  
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1985. First, section 459 is wide in scope and therefore has the potential to deal with a 
variety of minority shareholders’ complaints concerning the conduct of majority 
shareholders even conduct which may fall short of actual illegality.66 Secondly, by using 
section 459, shareholders can avoid many of the legal and practical complexities 
associated with the other remedies such as the personal action for breach of the 
company’s constitution and the derivative action.67 Thirdly, the section provides a 
sensible, practical alternative to winding up under section 122(1) (g) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 on the just and equitable ground. 
 
The potency of the provision was highlighted in Re Saul D Harrison and Sons plc,68 
where it was said, per Hoffmann LJ (as he then was)  that:  
 
The fact that the board are protected by the principle of majority rule does not necessarily prevent 
their conduct from being unfair within the meaning of section 459. Enabling the court in an 
appropriate case to outflank the rule in Foss v Harbottle was one of the purposes of the section.69   
 
Shareholders may bring a derivative action on behalf of a company. However, by 
bringing a successful derivative action shareholders obtain a relief for the company 
whereas, by a successful petition under section 459 shareholders obtain a personal relief 
that is more attractive for a shareholder.   
 
The rights available under the provisions of the articles of association that bind the 
company and its members70 can also be enforced under section 459 of the CA 1985.71 
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Along with the articles of association rights under other contractual arrangements can 
also be enforced by a petition under section 459 of the CA 1985.  In Re BSB Holdings 
Ltd (No 2),72 Arden J stated that in Re Saul D Harrison, the reference to the articles 
applied equally to any other contractual arrangement which governed the relationship 
between the shareholders. The Law Commission stated that when the court examined 
whether the conduct of which complaint was made was wrongful, the court had to 
consider the parties’ rights under the articles and other agreements which governed the 
relationship between shareholders.73  
 
Section 125(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that the court will not make a 
winding-up order if the court is “of the opinion both that some other remedy is available 
to the petitioners and that they are acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company 
wound up instead of pursuing that other remedy.74 Section 459 provides an alternative to 
winding up in this context, which is useful because it avoids the drastic option of 
winding up in favour of a more practical solution. Moreover, the winding up jurisdiction 
is not wider than the section 459 jurisdiction and where shareholders fail to prove unfair 
prejudice they cannot apply for winding up of the company.75  
 
On the other hand the wide scope of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy has increased 
the length and consequently costs of the proceeding under section 459 and so it can be 
argued – as have the Law Commission – that the very breadth of the discretion has been 
a factor that has diminished the effectiveness of the remedy as a tool for resolving 
shareholder disputes.76  
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 [1996] 1 BCLC 155, 238. 
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 The Consultation Paper [9.15]. 
74
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At the event of dispute in private companies minority shareholders need to have recourse 
to the courts by filing a petition under the statutory unfair prejudice remedy (i) to 
enforce shareholders’ agreements77 or (ii) where no shareholders’ agreement exists 
between the shareholders due to limitations associated with shareholders’ agreements or 
(iii) where, if one exists, it is silent regarding the particular issue alleged to be unfairly 
prejudicial to minority shareholders’ interests.78 Courts are called in to adjudicate firstly, 
regarding the existence of unfairly prejudicial conduct and secondly, to provide the 
appropriate relief as a result of that unfairly prejudicial conduct inter alia by deciding 
the terms of separation such as fair valuation of shares. The chapter analyses the nature 
of this court based dispute resolution mechanism to resolve shareholder disputes in 
private companies. The resolution of shareholder disputes is comprised of two 
ingredients. The first is the provision of appropriate relief to minority shareholders as a 
result of unfairly prejudicial conduct and the second is the provision of that relief in a 
minimum time and costs.79 In fact the first ingredient is related to substance and the 
second ingredient is related to process. Both of the ingredients are discussed below in 
detail.  
 
5.5 Resolution of disputes by providing an appropriate relief to minority 
shareholders: 
The first ingredient of resolution of shareholder disputes in private companies is the 
provision of appropriate relief to minority shareholders as a result of unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. Regarding this first ingredient two questions arise: (i) what substantive law 
rights do minority shareholders in private companies have in English Law and what 
forms of behaviour will ground a cause of action; (ii) what relief is available if these 
rights are infringed and a cause of action is successfully established. The jurisdiction of 
the court based dispute resolution mechanism under sections 459-461 of the CA 1985 
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can be divided into two parts. This division helps to answer the first ingredient of the 
resolution of shareholder disputes. First is the jurisdiction of court to decide issue 
regarding establishment of the cause of action under section 459 of the CA 1985. Second 
is the jurisdiction of court to provide appropriate relief to minority shareholders under 
section 461 of the CA 1985 in the event of dispute and where shareholders established 
the cause of action under section 459 of CA 1985. Below the chapter will analyse the 
jurisdiction of the courts under sections 459-461 to provide an appropriate relief to 
minority shareholders, and how the jurisdiction evolved through case law after the 
promulgation of the section until the Law Commission review of shareholders’ remedies 
in the late nineties which criticised the effectiveness of the remedy80 and prior to the 
land mark decision in O Neill v Phillips.81 The aim is therefore to provide an account of 
the state of the law at the time it was reviewed by the Law Commission.     
 
5.5.1 Jurisdiction of the court under section 459 of the CA 1985 to decide unfairly 
prejudicial conduct: 
Here the chapter discusses the evolution of the courts’ jurisdiction to determine whether 
conduct was unfairly prejudicial under section 459 of the CA 1985 up to the time of the 
Law Commission review of shareholders remedies in the late nineties. As to the first 
question, section 459(1) of the CA 1985 provides that:  
 
a member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this part on the 
ground that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or of some part of its members (including at 
least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or 
omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.  
 
 
5.5.1.1 Member of a company: 
The conduct complained of under the section must be a conduct which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of a member or shareholder in his capacity as a shareholder 
and not in any other capacity that he might also possess such as a creditor or customer of 
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a company.82 In Re Unisoft Group Ltd Harman J, relying upon the judgment of Lord 
Grantchester QC in Re a Company,83 ruled that the complaints made in that case were 
about the relationship of landlord and tenant and the relationship of service provider and 
service user and not as a member of the company. He further stated that the allegations 
showed a course of conduct which might be objectionable but it was not activities in the 
conduct of the company’s business which had caused prejudice to the member qua 
member.84 In Re Blackwood Hodge plc85 it was stated that the petitioners must establish 
not merely that the directors breached their duties but also that those breaches caused the 
petitioners to suffer unfair prejudice in their capacity as shareholders. A member of the 
company is defined under section 112 of the CA 2006.86 Section 112 provides that 
members of the company include (i) the subscribers of a company’s memorandum and 
(ii) and every other person who agrees to become a member and his name is entered in 
company’s register of members. Section 459(2) provides that for the purpose of this 
section reference to a member in this section also includes a person to whom shares in 
the company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law.  
 
5.5.1.2 Affairs of the company: 
The conduct complained of under section 459 must be a conduct regarding the affairs of 
the company and not regarding the conduct of a shareholder behaving in his personal 
capacity. As Harman J stated in Re Unisoft Group Ltd that:  
 
Shareholders disputes concerning dealing with their shares are not the same as unfair conduct of 
the company’s business. Shareholders must be kept distinct from the company so far as their 
private position as shareholders is concerned… the vital distinction between acts or conduct of 
the company and the acts or conduct of the shareholder in his private capacity must be kept clear. 
The first type of act will found a petition under s 459; the second type of act will not.87  
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5.5.1.3 Unfair prejudice to membership interests: 
The conduct complained of to obtain relief under section 459 must be unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of the members of the company.88 The concept of unfair 
prejudice in section 459 can be described as a general standard to guide the court about 
the kind or degree of misbehaviour or mismanagement that should justify the 
intervention of court.89 In Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd90 it was stated that “the jurisdiction 
under s 459 has an elastic quality which enables the courts to mould the concepts of 
unfair prejudice according to the circumstances of the case”. In Re a Company [No. 
004475 of 1982]91 Lord Grantchester QC cited Gore-Browne on Companies92 to the 
effect that:  
 
"Clearly a 'dictionary definition' of 'unfairly prejudicial' conduct of the affairs of the company 
will require a more liberal approach to the problems of minority shareholders in small companies. 
If 'prejudicial' may be defined, in dictionary terms, as 'causing prejudice, detrimental to rights, 
interests etc.,' and 'unfair' as that which is not 'just, unbiased, equitable, legitimate,' then clearly 
the new standard will be less demanding of the petitioning shareholder in respect of the burden of 
proof and of the kind of conduct of which he is entitled to complain. Seemingly, what he must 
show is that the value of his shareholding in the company has been seriously impaired as a 
consequence of the conduct of those who control the company in a way that is 'unfair'.  
 
It follows from this that ‘prejudice’ is not particularly difficult to establish. A 
shareholder may prove prejudicial conduct under the section by establishing for example 
that the value of his shareholding has been diminished. As in Bovey Hotel Ventures 
Limited93 Slade J stated that:  
 
without prejudice to the wording of the section, which may cover many other situations, a 
member of a company will be able to bring himself within the section [section 75 of CA 1980] if 
he can show that the value of his shareholding in the company has been seriously diminished or 
at least seriously jeopardised by reason of a course of conduct on the part of those persons who 
have had de facto control of the company, which has been unfair to the member concerned.94  
 
Equally, however, while it may be sufficient to establish that the relevant conduct 
diminished the value of the petitioner’s shares, it appears that it is not a necessary pre-
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condition in all cases. Thus, in Re R A Noble and Sons (Clothing) Ltd,95 Nourse J stated 
that exclusion from participation in all major decisions affecting the company’s affairs, 
could in other circumstances be unfairly prejudicial even though, the value of the 
shareholding in the company might not have been seriously diminished or jeopardised. 
In fact the purpose of the unfair prejudice remedy under section 459 is to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders. These interests are the common understandings 
between the shareholders regarding the affairs of the company which form the basis of 
their association either in the form of (i) legal rights or express agreements or (ii) arising 
out of legitimate expectations (now ‘equitable considerations’).96  
 
Under the law as it evolved prior to 1997 unfairness occurred when these common 
understandings between the shareholders were infringed upon or disregarded by 
majority shareholders. Minority shareholders could establish a cause of action under the 
section when the unfairness was prejudicial to their interests qua shareholders of the 
company.97 In Re Sam Weller and Sons98 it was stated that  the word 'interests' was 
wider than a term such as 'rights', and its presence as part of the test of s 459(1) 
suggested that the Parliament had recognised that members might have different 
interests, even if their rights as members were the same. Further, the adverb 'unfairly' 
introduced the wide concept of fairness in relation to the prejudice to the interests of 
some part of the members that must be established. That reinforces the notion that it was 
possible that even if all the members were prejudiced by the conduct complained of, the 
interests of only some may have been unfairly prejudiced. The Law Commission stated 
that it was also important to any consideration of the meaning of the term ‘interests’ to 
recognise that it was impossible to separate the concept of ‘unfairness’ from that of 
‘interests’.99 
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In Re Saul D Harrison and Sons plc,100 Neill LJ stated, the words ‘unfairly prejudicial’ 
were general words and should be applied flexibly to meet the circumstances of the 
particular case.101 To prove the cause of action under the section a shareholder was 
required to show that the conduct complained of was both unfair and prejudicial to his 
interests. Neill LJ quoted Peter Gibson J in Re a Company (No 005685 of 1988), ex 
parte Schwarcz (No 2)102 who stated that:  
 
the conduct must be both prejudicial (in the sense of causing prejudice or harm to the relevant 
interest) and also unfairly so: conduct may be unfair without being prejudicial or prejudicial 
without being unfair, and it is not sufficient if the conduct satisfies only one of these tests.    
 
5.5.1.3.1 Meaning of unfairness: 
It was stated that “the element of unfairness is at the heart of the unfair prejudice 
remedy”.103 In Re R A Noble and Sons (Clothing) Ltd,104 Nourse J quoted Slade J in 
Bovey Hotel Ventures Limited105 that the test of unfairness must be an objective not a 
subjective one: it was not necessary for the petitioner to show that the persons who had 
de facto control of the company had acted in the conscious knowledge that this was 
unfair to the petitioner or they were acting in bad faith. It was stated that the test was 
“whether a reasonable bystander observing the consequences of their conduct, would 
regard it as having unfairly prejudiced the petitioner’s interests”.106 The test was finally 
reformulated in Re Saul D Harrison107, the leading authority on the meaning of unfair 
prejudice to membership interests prior to the Law Commission’s Report. Hoffmann LJ 
(as he then was) stated three instances when unfairness justified the application of 
section 459, (i) breach of terms agreed between shareholders of a company (breach of 
legal rights), (ii) beach of fiduciary duties of directors, (iii) breach of some sort of 
fundamental understanding between the shareholders of a company (breach of legitimate 
expectations). Section 459 of the CA 1985 due to its expansive jurisdiction, can deal 
with a variety of squeeze-out techniques that are unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
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minority shareholders in private companies. Here the chapter discusses the scope of the 
term ‘unfairness’ under the section as described by the Court of Appeal in Re Saul D 
Harrison108 to deal with squeeze-out behaviour of majority shareholders.109  However, to 
prove the cause of action under the section other elements of the section discussed 
above, must also be satisfied.110   
 
(i) Breach of legal rights: 
Breach of contractual terms either under articles of association or separate shareholders’ 
agreements can be unfair to the interests of minority shareholders of the company under 
section 459 of the CA 1985.  In Re A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd,111 the petitioners 
complained that the respondents had repudiated the petitioners' right to participate in the 
management of the company that was established by the company's articles and the 
terms of a shareholders' agreement.112 The petitioners applied for an order that the 
company be wound up under section 222(f) of the Companies Act 1948 (now section 
122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986) on the ground that it was just and equitable to do 
so. The repudiation was considered so fundamental that it rendered it just and equitable 
that the company should be wound up. Furthermore, the breach of the statutory 
provisions of the Companies Act to which the company is bound to follow may also be 
considered as unfair under the section, for example, a breach of the statutory pre-
emption rights of existing shareholders on a new allotment of shares for cash.113 In Re a 
Company (No 005134 of 1986) ex parte Harries114, the court held that there was no 
doubt there was a substantial contravention of section 17 of the then Companies Act 
1980 that provided that a company was prohibited from allotting new shares unless it 
had offered those shares to existing shareholders in proportion to their existing holdings 
in the company. Therefore, the allotment constituted unfairly prejudicial conduct.      
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Hoffmann LJ held in Re Saul D Harrison that: 
 
In deciding what is fair or unfair for the purposes of section 459, it is important to have in mind 
that fairness is being used in the context of a commercial relationship. The articles of association 
… govern the relationships of the shareholders with the company and each other… a member of 
the company is taken to have agreed to them. Since keeping promises and honouring agreements 
is probably the most important element of commercial fairness, the starting point in any case 
under s 459 will be to ask whether the conduct of which the shareholder complains was in 
accordance with the articles of association. 115  
 
(ii) Breach of fiduciary duties: 
Directors owe fiduciary duties to the company in the past under common law and now 
under section 172(1) of the CA 2006 that provides that a director must act in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole.116 One practitioner commentator has stated that 
the starting point when considering a possible claim for unfair prejudice is to ask 
whether the directors had acted in breach of their fiduciary duties?117 An academic 
commentator has written that:  
 
The courts have drawn upon the jurisprudence relating to fiduciary duties in interpreting the 
scope of section 459 but it is clear that the oppression remedy creates a standard which differs 
from both the common law of fiduciary duties and the list of fiduciary duties breach of which 
will found a derivative action, being narrower than the former and wider than the latter.118  
 
In Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd119 Buckley L.J. emphasised that a director’s 
breach of duty would not of itself amount to oppression (now unfair prejudice) unless 
the director used his majority voting powers to stifle proceedings by the company or 
other shareholders in relation to his breach.120    
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Hoffmann LJ observed in Re Saul D Harrison that:  
 
In deciding what is fair or unfair for the purposes of s 459… The answer to this question often 
turns on the fact that the powers which the shareholders have entrusted to the board are fiduciary 
powers, which must be exercised for the benefit of the company as a whole. If the board act for 
some ulterior purpose, they step outside the terms of the bargain between the shareholders and 
the company… As a matter of ordinary company law, this may or may not entitle the individual 
shareholder to a remedy. It depends upon whether he can bring himself within one of the 
exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. But the fact that the board are 
protected by the principle of majority rule does not necessarily prevent their conduct from being 
unfair within the meaning of s 459. 121   
 
Neill LJ stated in Re Saul D Harrison122 that a shareholder could legitimately complain 
if the directors exceeded the powers vested in them or exercised their powers for some 
illegitimate or ulterior purpose.  
 
In a number of cases before 1997 courts have considered breach of fiduciary duties as 
unfair to minority shareholders. Misappropriation of the company’s assets for personal 
interests of directors was considered by courts as breach of directors’ fiduciary duties to 
the company and therefore can be unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the minority 
shareholders. In Re London School of Electronics Ltd123 the minority shareholder 
complained that the City Tutorial College Limited, the majority shareholder in the 
company, had wrongfully diverted the students of the school to itself which was against 
his interests as a minority shareholder. The court held that the majority shareholders had 
diverted the company’s business in their own interests thus depriving the minority of 
expected profits. 124  
 
The amount of directors’ remuneration and the level of dividend to be declared are 
commercial decisions for the company to make but these decisions must be made in 
good faith in the best interests of the company as a whole. In Re a Company (No. 00370 
of 1987) ex parte Glossop, Harman J stated that “directors have a duty to consider how 
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much they can properly distribute to members”.125 In companies where the directors’ 
remuneration and dividend policy has not been declared in advance it is breach of 
fiduciary duty if the remuneration is beyond reasonable commercial standards and the 
company has not declared the dividend despite there being profits available for 
distribution therefore the breach can be unfairly prejudicial to the interests of minority 
shareholders.126 In Re a Company (No 4415 of 1996) it was held that:  
 
The petitioner’s case in this regard must be assessed by objective criteria.  If the remuneration 
and dividend levels cannot be justified by objective commercial criteria it is easy to conclude the 
companies have been managed in a way unfairly prejudicial to the non-directors shareholders...127 
 
Minority shareholders may express their concerns as to right issue that it is breach of 
fiduciary duties because it is for the benefit of majority shareholders and to dilute their 
investment in the company or the majority shareholders are aware that minority cannot 
afford to take up new shares in the company .128 In Re a Company (No 005134 of 1986) 
ex parte Harries129 the petitioner complained that allotment of shares was contrary to the 
pre-emptive provisions of the Companies Act 1985. The court stated that it seemed clear 
beyond argument that the allotment was invalid as being for an improper purpose, 
namely to increase the respondent’s holding and to reduce the petitioner’s holding and 
with an improper motive to reward the respondent. The court held that a director, a 
fiduciary, who unilaterally benefited himself from allotment of shares to the detriment of 
another shareholder could not consider it to be for a proper purpose130  therefore the 
allotment was unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner. However, minority shareholders 
cannot complain a rights issue that is unfairly prejudicial where they cannot take up their 
rights due to personal financial difficulties or they are not interested to invest more in a 
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company where they are in minority and the rights issue is for genuine business 
purposes.131 Consistent with Re Saul D Harrison abuse of fiduciary powers in above 
manners amounted to unfairly prejudicial conduct before O Neill v Phillips.132 
 
Directors also owe duty to a company to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence to 
a company.133 Serious mismanagement of company business can be breach of fiduciary 
duties, and therefore be unfairly prejudicial to the interests of minority shareholders of 
the company under section 459.134 
 
(iii) Legitimate expectations of shareholders: 
In Re Fildes Bros. Ltd,135 the starting point in determining the rights inter se of the 
members was said to be the articles of association. However, in that case, Megarry J 
went on to say that:  
 
One must have regard not merely to what the articles say, but also to what the parties are shown 
to have agreed in any other manner. It cannot be just and equitable to allow one party to come to 
the court and require the court to make an order which disregards his contractual obligations. The 
same, I think, must apply to a settled and accepted course of conduct between the parties, 
whether or not cast into the mould of a contract.136  
 
In Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd, Lord Wilberforce further developed this view 
of the just and equitable provision. He held that a member could rely on the provision if 
he could prove, that the members had some special underlying obligation inter se arising 
in good faith, or confidence, to the effect that so long as the business continued he 
should be entitled to participate in management, an obligation so basic that if broken, the 
conclusion must be that the association must be dissolved. The principles on which he 
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might do so were those worked out by the courts in partnership cases where there had 
been exclusion from management even where under the partnership agreement there was 
a power of expulsion.137  
 
In Re a Company (No 00477 of 1986)138 Hoffmann J (as he then was) clearly stated that 
the interests of a member are not necessarily limited to his strict legal rights under the 
constitution of the company. The use of the word 'unfairly' in section 459, like the use of 
the words 'just and equitable' in section 517(1)(g) (of the CA 1985),139 enables the court 
to have regard to wider equitable considerations. As Lord Wilberforce said of the latter 
words in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries140 they were recognition of the fact that in a 
limited company rights, expectations and obligations of shareholders’ inter se were not 
necessarily submerged in the company structure. As under the Companies Act, 
shareholders may by a simple majority remove a director before the expiration of his 
period of office.141 However, it can be unfairly prejudicial to the interests of minority 
shareholder who is also a director of a company. Hoffmann J further stated in Re a 
Company (No 00477 of 1986)142 that “the member's interests as a member who has 
ventured his capital in the company's business may include a legitimate expectation that 
he will continue to be employed as a director and his dismissal from that office and 
exclusion from the management of the company may therefore be unfairly prejudicial to 
his interests as a member”. In most companies and in most contexts, whether the 
company was large or small, the member's rights under the articles of association and the 
Companies Act could be treated as an exhaustive statement of his interests as a member. 
By referring to Hoffmann J in Re a Company (No 00477 of 1986) above, Vinelott J in Re 
Blue Arrow plc also stated that “the interests of a member are not limited to his strict 
legal rights under the constitution of the company. There are wider equitable 
considerations which the court must bear in mind in considering whether a case falls 
within s 459 in particular in deciding, what are the legitimate expectations of a 
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member”.143 This use of the phrase legitimate expectations coupled with the breadth of 
the judicial discretion conferred by section 459 marked an important milestone in the 
evolution of section 459. 
 
In Re a Company144 Hoffmann J stated that “the jurisdiction to remedy conduct 'unfairly 
prejudicial' to the interests of members enables the court to protect not only the rights of 
members under the constitution of the company but also the 'rights, expectations and 
obligations' of the individual shareholders inter se… In the typical case of the corporate 
quasi-partnership, these will include the expectations that the member will be able to 
participate in the management of the company and share in its profits through salaried 
employment”. In Re Posgate & Denby (Agencies) Ltd145 Hoffmann J (as he then was) 
reiterated that:  
 
…the concept of unfair prejudice which forms the basis of the jurisdiction under s 459 enables 
the court to take into account not only the rights of members under the company's constitution, 
but also their legitimate expectations arising from the agreements or understandings of the 
members inter se. There is an analogy in Lord Wilberforce's analysis of the concept of what is 
'just and equitable' in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd146. The common case of such 
expectations being superimposed on a member's rights under the articles is the corporate quasi-
partnership, in which members frequently have expectations of participating in the management 
and profits of the company, which arise from the understandings on which the company was 
formed and which it may be unfair for the other members to ignore…  
 
… in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd, Lord Wilberforce said that in most cases the basis of 
the association would be 'adequately and exhaustively' laid down in the articles. The 
'superimposition of equitable considerations' requires, he said, something more. This was said in 
the context of the 'just and equitable' ground for winding up, but in my judgment it is equally 
necessary for a shareholder who claims that it is 'unfair' within the meaning of s 459 for the board 
to exercise powers conferred by the articles to demonstrate some special circumstances which 
create a legitimate expectation that the board would not do so. Section 459 enables the court to 
give full effect to the terms and understandings on which the members of the company became 
associated but not to rewrite them”.147 
 
 
 
                                                 
143
 Re Blue Arrow plc [1987] BCLC 585, 590. 
144
 [1986] BCLC 391, 396. 
145
 [1987] BCLC 8.  
146
 [1972] 2 All ER 492, [1973] AC 360. 
147
 [1987] BCLC 8, 14. 
 140 
However, while deciding the question of imposition of equitable considerations in Re a 
Company (004377 of 1986)148 Hoffmann J stated that:  
 
… having regard to the articles, the petitioner could have had no legitimate expectation that in the 
event of a breakdown of relations between [petitioner] and [respondents] they would not be relied 
on to require him to sell his shares at fair value. To hold the contrary would not be to 
‘superimpose equitable considerations’ on his rights under the articles but to relieve him from the 
bargain he made.      
 
In Re a Company (No 004377 of 1986),149 the petitioner claimed that the company was a 
quasi-partnership and therefore the petitioner had a legitimate expectation that unless the 
petitioner did something which plainly justified his exclusion, he would enjoy continued 
employment and participation in the management. Hoffmann J stated that, it could not 
be accepted that if there was an irretrievable breakdown in relations between members 
of a corporate quasi-partnership, the exclusion of one shareholder from management and 
employment was ipso facto unfairly prejudicial conduct, which entitled the excluded 
shareholder to petition under section 459. It must depend upon whether, if there was to 
be a parting, it was reasonable that he should leave rather than the other member or 
members and upon the terms he was offered for his shares.150  
 
In Re Elgindata Ltd151 it was stated that in general members of a company had no 
legitimate expectations going beyond the legal rights conferred on them by the 
constitution of the company. Nonetheless, legitimate expectations superimposed on a 
member's legal rights might arise from agreements or understandings between the 
members. Where, however, the acquisition of shares in a company was one of the results 
of a complex set of formal written agreements it was a question of construction of those 
agreements whether any such superimposed legitimate expectations could arise. 
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Hoffmann LJ held in Re Saul D Harrison that:  
Not only may conduct be technically unlawful without being unfair: it can also be unfair without 
being unlawful… there are cases in which the letter of the articles does not fully reflect the 
understandings upon which the shareholders are associated. Lord Wilberforce drew attention to 
such cases… in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd…152 [It was stated that] the personal 
relationship between a shareholder and those who control the company may entitle him to say 
that it would in certain circumstances be unfair for them to exercise a power conferred by the 
articles upon the board or the company in general meeting.153  
 
Hoffmann LJ used the term ‘legitimate expectation’ to describe the correlative right in 
the shareholder to which such a relationship might give rise. He stated that: 
 
 It often arose out of a fundamental understanding between the shareholders which formed the 
basis of their association but was not put into contractual form.154                
 
Furthermore, to prove unfairness under section 459 in Re Saul D Harrison and Sons 
plc,155 Neill LJ stated that:  
 
It will be necessary to take account not only of the legal rights of the petitioner, but also consider 
whether there are any equitable considerations such as the petitioner’s legitimate expectations to 
be weighed in the balance.  
 
Neill LJ added that:  
 
Though in general members of a company have no legitimate expectations going beyond the 
legal rights conferred on them by the constitution of the company, additional legitimate 
expectations may be superimposed in certain circumstances. These may arise from the 
agreements or understandings between the members or between the members and the directors.  
 
Neill L J derived further support from Lord Wilberforce’s speech in Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd156  that the just and equitable provision in s 222(f) of the 
Companies Act 1948:  
 
[E]nable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to equitable consideration; 
considerations, that is, of a personal character arising between one individual and another, which 
may make it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in a particular 
way.157   
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In Re Estate Acquisition and Development Ltd158 it was held that:  
 
There may, of course, be special circumstances which have the result that, if removal takes place 
under the statutory provisions, there will be grounds for complaint under s 459. Circumstances of 
the kind which existed in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd159 constitute a typical example.  
 
In Re BSB Holdings Ltd (No 2)160 it was stated that section 459 had to be viewed as a 
field of law which provided extensive minority protection in specific areas. The words 
'unfairly prejudicial' were wide and general and the circumstances in which they applied 
could not therefore be exhaustively categorised. Except where the circumstances were 
governed by the judgments in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc161, the categories of unfair 
prejudice were not closed. The standards of corporate behaviour recognised through 
section 459 might in an appropriate case thus not be limited to those imposed by 
enactment or existing case law.  
 
It is evident from the discussion that in private companies, section 459 grants the courts 
a wide jurisdiction, to protect minority shareholders’ interests against unfairly 
prejudicial conduct of majority shareholders. In the context of public companies, 
legitimate expectations do not arise since in public companies rights of the parties are 
adequately and exhaustively laid down in the articles. Therefore no legitimate 
expectations beyond articles of association, fiduciary obligations and the Companies Act 
arise in such circumstances.162 As to application of the legitimate expectations in public 
listed companies in Re Astec (BSR) plc it was stated that:  
 
The concept of legitimate expectation as explained and developed in Re Westbourne Galleries 
and Re Saul D Harrison cannot apply in the context of public listed companies.163  
 
However, the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ had clearly become a potent one by 
the time the Law Commission carried out its review of this area of law.164  
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5.5.2 Jurisdiction of courts under section 461 of the CA 1985 to provide appropriate 
relief: 
 
Here the chapter discusses the evolution of courts’ jurisdiction through case law to 
provide appropriate relief under section 461 of the CA 1985, up to the point of the Law 
Commission review of shareholders’ remedies in late nineties. As to the second 
question,165 section 461(1) of CA 1985 provides that if the court is satisfied that a 
petition under this part is well founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving 
relief in respect of the matters complained of by the petitioner.166  
 
Under section 461(2) the court may order the following to provide relief to minority 
shareholder.  
 
(a) The court may make orders regulating the conduct of the company’s affairs in the 
future. In R & H Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd the court ordered that the loans 
to the company should be repaid to the company controlled by the petitioner as soon as 
reasonably possible. 167 
 
(b) The court may require the company to refrain from doing or continuing an act 
complained of by the petitioner or to do an act which the petitioner has complained it 
has omitted to do. In McGuinness v Bremner plc the petitioners sought and were granted 
an order requiring the respondent to convene an extraordinary general meeting of the 
company.168  
 
(c) The court may authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of 
the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct. Under 
this provision permission can be granted to minority shareholder to commence a 
derivative action on behalf of the company.  
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(d) The court may provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the 
company by other members or by the company itself.  
 
Orders under section 461(2) of CA 1985 are subject to wide discretionary powers of 
courts under section 461(1) of CA 1985 where the court may make such order as it 
thinks fit to provide relief to the petitioner. In Re Bird Precision Bellows169 it was ruled 
that:  
 
The whole framework of the section, and of such of the authorities as we have seen, which seem 
to me to support this, is to confer on the court a very wide discretion to do what is considered fair 
and equitable in all the circumstances of the cases, in order to put right and cure for the future the 
unfair prejudice which the petitioner has suffered at the hands of the other shareholders of the 
company.           
 
In Re a Company (No 00789 of 1987), ex parte Shooter170 Harman J stated that:  
 
The words of section 461(1) are extremely wide and are not cut down by any of the authorities 
shown to me. In my view there is a power here to make such orders as I consider will enable the 
company, for the future, to be properly run, and for its affairs to be under the conduct of 
somebody in whom shareholders generally can have confidence that the company will be 
properly conducted.    
 
Even though the court has wide discretionary powers under section 461(1) and 461(2) to 
provide appropriate relief to a minority shareholder, the most usual order sought by the 
petitioner and made by the court in this context is buy-out of shareholdings under 
section 461(2)(d). As is evident from the reported case law171 and the Law Commission 
data in the overwhelming majority of section 459 cases the remedy sought by 
shareholders and awarded by court was buy-out.172 In other words, the relief sought 
involved a cessation of the underlying business relationship and exit of one or more 
parties from the company.173 
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It is not hard to see why buy-out is often sought and awarded. If, as was discussed in 
chapter 3, shareholder disputes in private companies are more often than not the function 
of relational breakdown, possibly further exacerbated by squeeze-out behaviour, then a 
parting of the ways would seem to be the only practical solution. In these situations, if 
the parties try to stay together then the danger always exists that disputes may arise in 
future. A buy-out of one party or the other therefore seems to be the best course. It 
resolves the disputes in a practical fashion while also allowing the company to continue 
and avoiding the more drastic possibility of a just and equitable winding up. In private 
companies, owing to restrictions on transfer of shares, minority shareholders have to 
face a state of ‘illiquidity’.174 A court-ordered buy-out (or the prospects of such) 
provides a means of addressing this illiquidity by mandating an exit based on a fair 
valuation of the outgoing shareholder’s shares.  
 
In Re a Company175 Hoffmann J stated that in companies formed on the basis of 
personal relationships, the only solution where those relationships broke down was for 
the shareholders to part a company.176 If one shareholder was excluded from 
management it could not automatically be regarded as unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of the excluded shareholder. It must depend upon whether it was reasonable 
that one should leave rather than the other.  In Re a Company (No 004377 of 1986) 
Hoffmann J stated that, “the parties no doubt went into the venture expecting to get on 
with each other. But if a cautious advisor had said to them, “what is to happen if you fall 
out?” I have no doubt that they would have said, “then we shall have to part. One of us 
will have to buy the shares of the other, or the company will have to be wound up” ”.177 
Hoffmann J further stated in these disputes it was almost always clear that one party 
would have to leave and who that party would be. 178  
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Generally in making an order under section 459(2)(d) the court orders the respondent to 
buy the petitioner’s shares. However, depending on the circumstances, the court may 
order the respondent to sell his shares to the petitioner. Thus, in Re a Company (No 
00789 of 1987) ex parte Shooter,179 having ruled that affairs of the company had been 
conducted by the controlling shareholder in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests 
of the members of the company, the court ordered him to divest himself of his shares in 
the petitioner’s favour on the ground that his behaviour had been such that he was unfit 
to control the company.180      
 
Minority shareholders cannot invoke section 459 to obtain relief where majority 
shareholders have made a fair offer to buy their shares. In Re a Company (No 006834 of 
1988), ex parte Kremer, Hoffmann J stated that the unfairness disappeared if the 
minority shareholder was offered a fair price for his shares at exit. In such a case, section 
459 was not intended to enable the court to preside over a protracted and expensive 
contest of virtue between the shareholders and to award the company to the winner.181 
The position taken by Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips182 represents continuity with 
this earlier approach rather than a new significant legal change.   
 
5.5.2.1 Valuation of shares: 
If a buy-out is ordered or agreed in principle a separate ‘exit dispute’ may arise over the 
terms of the exit and, in particular, the valuation of the shares.183 In Re a Company (No 
004377 of 1986) Hoffmann J stated that in these disputes the only real issue to resolve 
was the price of the shares184 in order to encourage early consideration of the issue of 
fair valuation he developed the principle that the failure to make a fair offer may of itself 
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amount to unfair prejudice where it is clear that the relationship between the parties has 
irretrievably broken down.185  
 
Shareholders in private companies are thought to be more committed to the companies 
due to their substantive investment of time and money in the company as compared to 
shareholders in listed companies. Shareholders in listed companies are rarely involved in 
the management of the company and can diversify the possible risk by investing in 
different companies.186 
 
Generally, in private companies disputes as to valuation of shares where the minority 
shareholder is exiting have revolved around three issues: (i) whether a discount is 
applicable due to the fact that shares are minority holding; (ii) whether and to what 
extent the valuation should be adjusted to reflect the impact of any conduct found or 
agreed to have been unfairly prejudicial; (iii) date of valuation. The evolution of the law 
on these issues until the Law Commission review of shareholders’ remedies in the late 
nineties, is discussed below. 
 
(i) Discounts: 
At the time of buy-out, minority shareholders often complain as to valuation of their 
shares when their shares are valued at discount due to the fact that they are disposing of 
a minority holding in the company.187 In private companies if there are no restrictions on 
transfer of shares to a willing buyer the value of a minority shareholding may be 
discounted to reflect lack of control in management of the company unless it is a quasi-
partnership company.188 In Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd,189 Nourse J stated that the 
share price fixed by the court should be fair and, although general guidelines could be 
given as to what constituted a fair price in cases of common occurrence the issue could 
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not be conclusively determined until the facts in a particular case had been examined.190 
There was no rule of universal application either that the price of a minority 
shareholding in a small private company should be fixed on a pro rata basis according to 
the value of the shares as a whole or, alternatively, that the price should be discounted to 
reflect the fact that the shares were a minority holding. In a majority of cases where 
purchase orders were made under section 75 (now section 459) in relation to quasi-
partnerships the vendor shareholder was unwilling in the sense that the sale had been 
forced upon him. Usually the vendor was a minority shareholder whose interests were 
unfairly prejudiced by the manner in which the affairs of the company had been 
conducted by the majority.  
 
Nourse J further stated that on the assumption that the unfair prejudice had made it no 
longer tolerable for the shareholder to retain his interest in the company, a sale of his 
shares would invariably be his only practical way out short of a winding-up. In that kind 
of case it would not merely be fair, but most unfair, that he should be bought out on any 
basis which involved a discounted price. Therefore, the correct course in the 
circumstances would be to fix the price pro rata according to the value of the shares as a 
whole and without any discount, as being the only fair method of compensating an 
unwilling vendor of the equivalent of a partnership share.191  
 
However, as to discounted price it was stated that in the exceptional case where a 
shareholder had so acted as to deserve his exclusion, the price could be appropriately 
discounted since he could be treated as if he had elected to sell his shares, and such a 
sale would be at a discount.192 Secondly, a shareholder who acquired shares from 
another at a price which was discounted because they were a minority holding there 
could not be any universal or even a general rule that he should be bought out under the 
section on a more favourable basis, even in a case where his predecessor had been a 
quasi-partner in a quasi-partnership. He might himself have acquired the shares purely 
for investment and played no part in the affairs of the company. In that event it might 
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well be fair that the shareholder should be bought out on the same basis as he himself 
had bought, even though his interest had been unfairly prejudiced in the meantime. A 
fortiori, there could be no universal or even a general rule in a case where the company 
had never been a quasi-partnership in the first place.193 
 
The Court of Appeal stated in Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd194 that the trial judge had 
correctly exercised his discretion vested in him by the section that in a quasi-partnership 
company shares should be valued on a pro rata basis without any discount for the fact 
that shares represent a minority shareholding.195 So while there is a broad discretion in 
the court there seem to be well settled principles: (i) whether the valuation should be 
discounted or pro rata is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances of the 
particular case; (ii) in quasi-partnership cases where one quasi-partner has been excluded 
from management, there is virtually a presumption that a pro rata valuation will apply; 
(iii) in other cases, a discount will usually apply but this is subject always to point (i) 
above.    
 
(ii) Impact of unfairly prejudicial conduct on value of shares: 
Issues regarding the presence of unfairly prejudicial conduct of majority shareholders 
may have a considerable significance in deciding the question of valuation of shares.196 
In SCWS v Meyer197 it was stated that the correct principle of approaching the matter is:  
 
By considering what would have been the value of the shares at the commencement of the 
proceedings had it not been for the effect of the oppressive conduct of which complaint was 
made.  
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Lord Denning further stated that:  
 
One of the most useful orders mentioned in the section - which will enable the court to do justice 
to the injured shareholders - is to order the oppressor to buy their shares at a fair price: and a fair 
price would be, I think, the value which the shares would have had at the date of the petition, if 
there had been no oppression… It is, no doubt, true that an order of this kind gives to the 
oppressed shareholders what is in effect money compensation for the injury done to them: but I 
see no objection to this. The section gives a large discretion to the court and it is well exercised in 
making an oppressor make compensation to those who have suffered at his hands.198  
 
In Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd 199 it was stated that:  
 
Section 210 gives the court an unlimited judicial discretion to make such order as it thinks fit… 
in prescribing the basis on which the price on such a sale is to be calculated, the court can in 
effect provide compensation for whatever injury has been inflicted by the oppressors.  
 
Generally there will need to be an adjustment to reflect the diminishing effect of the 
majority’s conduct. But even if the court finds in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner’s 
own conduct may be taken into account in determining the valuation. In Re London 
School of Electronics200 it was held that the valuation ought to be made on the footing 
that the students which the petitioner removed to the college run by the petitioner, had 
remained with the company.  
 
(iii) Date of valuation: 
Regarding the date of valuation Nourse J in Re London School of Electronics Ltd201 
explained in his judgment that:  
 
If there were to be such a thing as a general rule, I myself would think that the date of the order 
or the actual valuation would be more appropriate than the date of the presentation of the petition 
or the unfair prejudice. Prima facie an interest in a going concern ought to be valued at the date 
on which it is ordered to be purchased. But whatever the general rule might be it seems very 
probable that the overriding requirement that the valuation should be fair on the facts of the 
particular case would, by exceptions, reduce it to no rule at all.  
 
In Re Cumana Ltd202 the Court of Appeal stated that the trial judge had chosen the date 
of the petition for valuation of shares. There was evidence that the shares had gone down 
in value between the date of the petition and the date of the judgment. They might have 
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gone up. The Court of Appeal upheld the reason the trial judge gave for choosing the 
date of the petition as a sound one, namely:  
 
The date of the petition is the date on which the petitioner elects to treat the unfair conduct of the 
majority as in effect destroying the basis on which he agreed to continue to be a shareholder, and 
to look to his shares for his proper reward for participation in a joint undertaking.   
 
The Court of Appeal stated that the choice of a date of valuation in these cases was in 
the discretion of the trial judge. If there was evidence before the court that the majority 
shareholder deliberately took steps to depreciate the value of the shares in anticipation of 
a petition being presented, it would be permissible to value the shares at a date before 
such action was taken.  Hence, prior to O’Neill v Phillips203 the general principle seems 
to be that it is discretion of the court to choose the valuation date that results in fair 
valuation of shares in any particular case.           
 
5.6 Effective resolution of shareholder disputes: 
As stated above, the second ingredient of resolution of shareholder disputes is related to 
process namely, the provision of appropriate relief to minority shareholder with 
minimum time and costs. This – the question of effectiveness – is the central concern of 
the thesis.204 Lengthy proceedings increase the costs of litigation. The Law Commission 
stated that “all shareholders’ remedies should be made as efficient and cost effective as 
can be achieved in the circumstances”.205 The question arises whether the resolution of 
shareholder disputes through courts is currently effective in this context. As it is evident 
from the above discussion, the section due to its wide scope, deals with almost all 
aspects of unfairly prejudicial conduct of majority shareholders against minority in 
private companies.206  The problems have been identified by the courts and the Law 
Commission regarding the court based dispute resolution mechanism under sections 
459-461 of the CA 1985 such as length, cost and complexity of proceedings due to wide 
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scope of the section. The efforts have been made on both the substantive207 and 
procedural level208 to streamline the effectiveness of this court based dispute resolution 
mechanism under sections 459-461 of the CA 1985.209  
 
The two ingredients of resolution of shareholder disputes are interrelated. In fact 
establishing the cause of action under section 459 of CA 1985 due to its wide scope can 
prolong the proceedings and therefore increase costs.210 On the other hand, efforts to 
reduce the length of the proceedings to avoid costs by reducing the width of the section 
may affect the process by which the cause of action can be proved by the petitioner and 
thus limit its scope.  
 
I now turn to discuss the Law Commission’s review of shareholders remedies and, in 
particular, its criticism of the effectiveness of section 459. The review – which was 
carried out during 1996 – was directed primarily at answering the question: “when can 
shareholders bring proceedings to enforce their or the company’s rights”?211 In the 
course of its deliberations, inter alia the Law Commission focused attention on the 
effectiveness of the remedy for unfairly prejudicial conduct under sections 459-461 of 
CA 1985. It confirmed that the provisions were the most widely used by minority 
shareholders to obtain some personal remedy in the event of breaches of directors’ 
duties, or other misconduct in relation to the company’s business.212 The Law 
Commission asserted that proceedings for relief from unfair prejudice often entail 
complex factual investigations and result in costly and cumbersome litigation.213 The 
vast majority of those who responded to its consultation agreed with this assessment. 214 
By considering the Law Commission’s criticism of the remedy for unfairly prejudicial 
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conduct, the subsequent chapters will evaluate the impact of the later substantive and 
procedural developments and the extent to which they have improved the effectiveness 
of the remedy, since the Law Commission reported.215  
 
5.6.1 The Law Commission’s methodology: 
The Law Commission’s review was based on (i) a survey of petitions presented to the 
Companies Court at the Royal Courts of Justice between January 1994 and December 
1996 and (ii) an analysis of the unfair prejudice cases reported in Butterworth’s 
Company Law Cases (BCLC) between the years 1988-1997. Through the survey the 
Law Commission sought to establish the nature and characteristics of section 459 
petitions: what types of company were involved; the nature and extent of the pleaded 
allegations; the relief sought; the outcome; and the length of the proceedings. As to the 
cost of section 459 petitions the Law Commission conceded that there was little publicly 
available information.216 Instead they relied on anecdotal evidence derived from a 
handful of cases that had gone to trial where the costs were substantial217 and also relied 
more generally on research done on costs in civil litigation in connection with Lord 
Woolf’s inquiry into Access to Justice.     
 
5.6.1.1 Criticism of the Law Commission’s methodology: 
The Law Commission’s assertions as to the length; cost and complexity of proceedings 
associated with section 459 petitions were in part based on quantitative data. However, 
that quantitative data was not acquired scientifically. As to the length and cost of section 
459 petitions the Law Commission mainly relied on (i) cases reported in BCLC between 
1988 and 1987; (ii) the results of a statistical survey of petitions under section 459 at the 
High Court in London that found that the average time for disposal of petitions 
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(assuming no appeal in those cases that reached trial) was 4.71 months; and (iii) 
responses to their own Consultation Paper. The Law Commission received 109 
responses to the Consultation Paper. The Law Commission did not consider unreported 
cases (although it did draw anecdotally on one unreported case as evidence of the length 
and costliness of section 459 proceedings)218 nor did it survey petitions presented in 
Chancery District Registries outside London or in the county courts. The Law 
Commission focused on authorities rather than the average cases. Moreover, the Law 
Commission reported only about the length of the trial and the data do not inform how 
the process was working in the pre-action and pre-trial phases, which is crucial to 
understand why the disputes end up in courts and do not settle. There was no focus on 
settlement of section 459 disputes. Unfortunately, at the time of the Law Commission 
review of shareholders remedies and, even now, there are no detailed judicial statistics 
available regarding section 459 petitions.219 
 
5.6.2 The Law Commission’s critique of section 459 of the CA 1985: 
Firstly, commenting on Saul D Harrison the Law Commission stated that:  
 
The courts have held in number of cases that the petitioner had a legitimate expectation of being 
able to participate in the management of the company and that exclusion from management could 
be unfairly prejudicial to his interests qua member.220  
 
The Law Commission in its Consultation Paper mentioned the view of the Jenkins 
Committee that expressly stated: 
 
... if the section is to afford effective protection it must extend to cases in which the acts 
complained of fall short of actual illegality.221  
 
The Law Commission stated that on this basis, conduct could be unfairly prejudicial 
without there being a breach of the rights belonging to the shareholder or the company. 
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Although the Court of Appeal in Saul D Harrison222 can be regarded as having laid 
down ‘guidelines’ for the application of the section, no reference was made to the 
possibility of unfairly prejudicial conduct which does not involve the invasion of a legal 
right, except where the shareholder has a ‘legitimate expectation’ over and above the 
legal rights conferred by the company’s constitution and arising out of a relationship 
between shareholders which fell within the categories or analogous situations set out in 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd.223 The Law Commission stated that therefore 
where there was no invasion of legal rights or no legitimate expectation existed conduct 
which would appear to be deserving of a remedy might be left unremedied, contrary to 
the expectation of the Jenkins Committee.224 The Law Commission stated in its Report 
that the courts would find that new situations not mentioned in Saul D Harrison225 were 
in appropriate cases capable of constituting unfairly prejudicial conduct.226 However on 
the contrary the Law Commission proposed that such proceedings should be dealt with 
primarily by active case management by the courts227 and did not suggest any 
amendment to the section.228 Secondly, the Law Commission stated that litigants may 
seek to establish a “legitimate expectation” when that was not the real substance of their 
complaint, and this might lead to a proliferation of issues in section 459 proceedings.229  
 
Secondly, some judges had been critical of the length and costs of section 459 
proceedings in the course of deciding cases that had come before them.230 The Law 
Commission echoed these criticisms and linked the problem directly to the wide scope 
of section 459. Below the section discusses the main points emerging from the Law 
Commission’s Report.  
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5.6.2.1 Wide scope of the section: 
Due to its wide scope the unfair prejudice remedy under section 459 had proved to be 
the most attractive remedy for protection of minority shareholders’ interests as compared 
to other available remedies in English Law. The Law Commission stated that the 
wording of section 459 was extremely wide and allowed conduct going back over many 
years to be raised by the parties.231 The main problem in respect of the unfair prejudice 
remedy arose out of the generality of the wording, as this permits applicants to put in 
issue anything that may be remotely relevant.232 That results in complex, often historical, 
factual investigations and, therefore, in costly, cumbersome litigation.233  
 
The courts’ wide jurisdiction under the section to promote fairness demands detailed 
examination of company affairs. In Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3)234 Harman J stated that:  
 
[In petitions under section 459 of CA 1985] it befits the court, in my view, to be extremely 
careful to ensure that oppression is not caused to parties, … by allowing the parties to trawl 
through facts which have given rise to grievances but which are not relevant conduct within even 
the very wide words of the section.  
 
Due to the wide scope of the section, shareholders may bring any issue to the court that 
they think is unfairly prejudicial to their interests. The Law Commission in its final 
Report stated that weak allegations are often made by the parties to lend ballast to what 
are essentially their main grievances.235 It is not surprising because the court will look at 
conduct cumulatively in making its assessment about unfairly prejudicial conduct 
therefore, the petitioners (or their lawyers) would look to raise as many allegations as 
they possibly could, without necessarily discriminating the strong ones from the weak.236  
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In Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3)237 Harman J stated that the words of the section “on the 
face of them are, extraordinarily wide and general”.  That as a result has enhanced the 
jurisdiction of courts to consider any relevant matter in any particular case that 
shareholders’ may consider as unfairly prejudicial to their interests as a member of the 
company. Harman J238  further stated that:  
 
[the words of the section] allow on the face of them, every sort and kind of conduct which has 
taken place over an almost unlimited – certainly upwards of 20 years – period  of time in the 
management of the company business to be dug up and gone over.  
 
The Law Commission in its Consultation Paper mentioned that in Re Macro (Ipswich) 
Ltd239 the proceedings involved an examination of events spanning some 40 years and in 
Re Sam Weller and Sons Ltd240 events spanning some 38 years.  In Rotadata Ltd241 the 
petition ran “to over 30 closely typed pages with 121 paragraphs and a total of 21 
separate allegations against the respondents”.  
 
Two other problems were identified with the scope of the provision. The first was the 
impact on courts in terms of the potential for burgeoning case loads, due to wide scope 
of the section and broad discretion of courts under the section.242 Copp has argued that 
provisions regarding unfairly prejudicial conduct were to some extent the victims of 
their own success, since due to their width, they gave rise to a considerable volume of 
litigation; therefore it was required to limit the scope of the section.243  But the limited 
scope of the provisions might also lead to the sterility of these provisions.244 Riley 
argued that the availability and sheer width of the unfair prejudice remedy has also 
                                                 
237
 [1994] 1 BCLC 609, 611. 
238
 In Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3) [1994] 1 BCLC 609, 611. 
239
 [1994] 2 BCLC 354.  
240
 [1990] Ch 682. 
241
 See Rotadata Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 122, 127f. 
242
 One main reason for introduction of this remedy by legislature after a long time apart from emphasis 
upon internal management principle (see the Law Commission Final Report para 1.9 (ii)) might be the 
awareness of the legislature as to the case load of shareholder disputes that might have upon the courts as 
a result of provision of the remedy. 
243
 Copp S., ‘Company Law: Individual Shareholder Rights’ (2000) 11(1) International Company and 
Commercial Law Review N6-8, N8. 
244
 Ibid N7-N8. 
 158 
increased the case load on the courts within a small period of its promulgation.245  
 
The second was the ever present danger that minority shareholders could use it to harass 
the majority and involve the company in unnecessary litigation contrary to the guiding 
principle of company law that those who manage the company should be free to run it 
without unnecessary shareholder interference.246 As Lord Hoffmann has stated:  
 
The very width of the jurisdiction means that, unless carefully controlled, it can become a means 
of oppression.247  
 
In Re Ring Tower (No. 2)248 it was warned that “the jurisdiction should be carefully 
controlled to prevent it from becoming an instrument of oppression”.  
 
5.6.2.2 Length and costs of proceedings: 
The Law Commission stated that the generality of the statutory wording has also 
increased uncertainty so that those who are not experts in company law may find it 
difficult to predict whether or not a court is likely to find unfairly prejudicial conduct, 
and a shareholder may not have access to the advice of an expert in company law.249 
Moreover, uncertainty may also increase the length and costs of proceedings. The width 
of the discretion tends to generate complex and highly fact-sensitive cases requiring 
historical investigation, lengthy discovery and detailed evidence all of which adds to 
legal costs.250 
 
As to the length and costs of unfair prejudice cases under section 459 of CA 1985, the 
Law Commission in its final Report mentioned, that these cases that go to trial often last 
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weeks rather than days.251 The Law Commission “has examined the cases reported in 
Butterworths Company Law Cases for the last ten years (1988-1997). Fourteen cases 
were shown to have gone to a full trial and the average length of the hearing was just 
over three weeks (16 days)”.252 The Law Commission in its final Report has provided 
some information as to costs of petitions under section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 
by stating that in Re Elgindata Ltd253 the hearing lasted 43 days, costs totalled £320,000 
and the shares originally purchased for £40,000, were finally valued at only £24,600. In 
Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd254  the hearing of section 459 proceedings and a related action 
lasted 27 days at the first instance alone. The parties subsequently claimed that they 
were entitled to recover total costs of £725,000 under orders of the court.255 The Law 
Commission in its Consultation Paper drew attention to the extreme example of Re 
Freudiana Music Co Ltd256 where the hearing lasted for a year and extended over some 
165 days in court. The judgment stretched to some 499 pages in length and the costs 
awarded in favour of the respondent alone were £2 million.257 In Rotadata Ltd258 parties 
indicated estimated time for the hearing of the petition between five and eight days.  In 
Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3)259 Harman J stated that:  
 
Petitions under s 459 have become notorious to the judges of this court – and I think also to the 
Bar – for their length, their unpredictability of management, and the enormous and appalling 
costs which are incurred upon them particularly by reason of the volume of documents liable to 
be produced. By way of example on this petition there are before me upwards of 30 lever-arch 
files of documents.  
 
5.6.2.3 Courts’ respect for majority rule: 
The wide scope of the section intended by the Parliament also provides the courts a wide 
discretion to decide the notion of fairness in any particular case and an equally broad 
discretion to grant relief under section 461 of the Companies Act 1985. The Cohen 
Committee recommended that the court should be given unfettered discretion to impose 
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upon the parties to a dispute whatever settlement it considered just and equitable.260 By 
accepting the utility of such discretion Hoffmann J in Re Company (No 007623 of 
1984)261 stated that section 75 [now section 459] was a “valuable and over due reform of 
the law which conferred on the court a wide and useful discretion”.   
 
However, due to the principle of judicial respect for commercial decisions the courts 
have showed themselves unwilling to intervene in company’s internal matters. In 
Shuttleworth v Cox Bros and Co262 court stated that “it is not the business of the Court to 
manage the affairs of the company. That is for the shareholders and directors”. In Carlen 
v Drury263, Lord Eldon LC stated that “the court could not undertake the management of 
every brewhouse and playhouse in the kingdom”. In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd,264 Lord Wilberforce stated that “there is no appeal on merits from 
management decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of 
supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at”. 
The Law Commission in its final Report also mentioned the guiding principle of 
company law that “the court should continue to have regard to the decisions of the 
directors on commercial matters if the decision was made in good faith, on proper 
information and in the light of relevant considerations, and appears to be a reasonable 
decision for the directors to have taken”.265 Therefore, the wide discretion of the courts 
under section 459, which is intended by the Parliament to assist and protect 
shareholders,266 enhances the traditional tension that exists between the legislature and 
courts in the commercial sphere. The legislature has sought to increase “the courts 
policing of the way in which companies are run” and yet courts are traditionally 
reluctant to interfere in the affairs of a company and “think it right to leave those who 
own or run companies to get on with it”.267 It was stated that “the quest for a regime 
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which provides effective minority shareholder protection continues to clash with the 
sanctity accorded to the principle of majority rule. Finding the optimum balance between 
these two opposing notions has proved elusive”.268 The petition involves the courts in an 
investigation of how a company’s affairs have been managed to consider the impact of 
decision-making on shareholders’ interests.269  Accordingly, the courts do not seem to be 
minded to intervene in shareholder disputes because of (i) their respect for majority rule 
and historic unwillingness to intervene in company’s internal matters; (ii) the potential 
impact of protracted shareholder disputes on the courts’ case burden and time.  
 
5.7 Conclusion: 
The chapter provides account of the law at the time of the Law Commission’s review of 
shareholders’ remedies in the late nineties and the Law Commission’s criticism of 
section 459 of CA 1985. The unfair prejudice remedy under section 459 of the CA 1985 
is the most attractive and widely used remedy available to minority shareholders, against 
the misapplication of the majority rule in private companies. Unfairness is an important 
element to prove cause of action under the section. Prior to O’Neill v Phillips270 and 
until the Law Commission’s review, unfairness arises in three instances: (i) breach of 
agreed terms between shareholders, (ii) breach of fiduciary duties of directors, (iii) 
breach of some sort of fundamental understanding between the shareholders giving rise 
to legitimate expectations. Buy-out is the most common relief sought and awarded in 
shareholders disputes. Section 459 cannot be invoked by minority where majority have 
made a fair offer to buy-out. The real issue to resolve in these disputes is regarding terms 
of exit or price of shares at the event of buy-out. 
 
The Law Commission and the courts identified the problems of length, costs and 
complexity of section 459 proceedings due to the wide scope of the section. 
Furthermore, along with complex, lengthy and expensive litigation, burgeoning case 
load, dangers of misuse of the remedy by minority shareholders and tension between 
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courts’ wide jurisdiction and discretion under the section and the traditional reluctance 
of courts to interfere in the affairs of the company are all factors that lessen the 
effectiveness of this remedy, for minority shareholders.  
 
To streamline the effectiveness of section 459 to resolve the disputes with minimum cost 
and delay measures have been proposed at both the substantive and the procedural 
level.271 The next chapter discusses substantive law developments after the Law 
Commission Report in 1997 – focusing particular attention on the House of Lords 
decision in O’Neill v Phillips – and the impact of those substantive law developments, 
upon the effective resolution of shareholder disputes under sections 459-461 of the CA 
1985. In chapter 7 procedural law developments after the Law Commission Report are 
discussed and the chapter also seek to evaluate their impact on the effectiveness of 
section 459 proceedings.  
 
 
 
                                                 
271
 On a procedural level case management has been implemented under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, 
SI 1998/3132. See below chapter 7.  
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Chapter 6 
Substantive law developments since the Law Commission’s review 
 
6.1 Scope of the chapter: 
The chapter discusses substantive law developments that have impacted on the 
effectiveness of sections 459-461 as a tool for resolving shareholder disputes since the 
Law Commission Report. The leading developments in this context were brought about 
by the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips.1 The chapter explores in the light of the 
analysis of the case law and interviewees’ responses the impact of O’Neill v Phillips as 
well as other case law developments in this area of legal practice and evaluates the 
extent to which these developments have enhanced the effectiveness of the dispute 
resolution mechanism in resolving disputes in minimum time and cost. 
 
6.2 Introduction:  
It was stated that after the introduction of section 459 of CA 1985, protection of 
minority shareholders “formerly one of the most stagnant areas of company law, has 
now arguably become one of the most active”.2 The Law Commission criticized the fact 
that the proceedings under section 459-461 were complex, lengthy and therefore 
expensive due to the wide scope of the section.3 The Company Law Review in one of its 
consultation documents4 stated that minority rights and remedies were principally of 
concern to private companies, as it was believed clarity, accessibility and cost-
effectiveness were of prime importance, particularly in relation to smaller companies as 
their members and directors might have limited financial resources or access to expert 
advice. This influenced the approach to personal rights, unfair prejudice, the O’Neill 
ruling and the conditions for derivative actions in that particular consultation.5 In fact, as 
                                                 
1
 O’Neill v Phillips [1999]1 WLR 1092; [1999] 2 BCLC 1; [1999] 2 All E.R. 96; [1999] BCC 600. 
2
 See Clark B., ‘Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct’ (1999) 38 Scots Law Times 321, 321.  
3
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5
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(Company Law Review Steering Group, URN 00/1335, Nov 2000) Chapter 5 Corporate Governance: 
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is evident below from the discussion of O’Neill v Phillips, the clarity of the section is 
linked to the cost-effectiveness of the remedy.6   
 
On a substantive level, to improve the effectiveness of shareholders remedies, the Law 
Commission in its final Report proposed inter alia: (i) legislative provision for 
presumptions in proceedings under section 459-4617 (ii) some reforms relating to 
proceedings under sections 459-461, to limit the difficulties caused by the wide ranging 
nature of the remedy and to address potential or perceived lacunae in the remedy8 but 
rejected any amendments to the wording of the section9 (iii) shareholders’ exit article10 
(iv) a new derivative action.11 Among these proposals, only the proposal for the statutory 
derivative action was implemented under the CA 2006.12 After the Law Commission 
Report, the substantive law developments were mainly made by case law that had an 
impact upon the proceedings under section 459-461 of CA 1985. Along with focusing 
upon the nature of the substantive law developments, the chapter explores the 
effectiveness of these developments in providing minority shareholders an appropriate 
relief in minimum time and cost, in the light of the analysis of the case law and 
interviewees’ responses.  
 
As to the scope of the section, one commentator has questioned whether, the section 
should be seen as providing merely protection from harms which were unlawful 
independent of it and if not, how and where should the courts draw the line of ‘what 
constituted unfair prejudice’ under the section.13 In fact, balance is required between the 
scope of the section and its usefulness in practice. If the section is construed too 
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 See below para 6.4.1 The reasoning behind the judicial shift in emphasis from ‘legitimate expectations’ 
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narrowly it runs the risk of limiting shareholders to just and equitable winding up (as 
was the case with section 210 of CA 1948); if it is construed too widely it may increase 
uncertainty so add to the length and costs of proceedings. The House of Lords in O’Neill 
v Phillips by restating the scope of the concept of ‘unfairness’ under section 459, 
provided an answer to these questions. As well as establishing the parameters of 
‘unfairness’ on the substantive level, O’Neill v Phillips has also impacted on the 
procedural level by emphasizing the importance of early buy-out offers at fair value as a 
means of resolving disputes.14 By considering the significance of the judgment of 
O’Neill v Phillips regarding its impact upon the section 459 practice, the chapter will 
discuss the facts of the case and judgments delivered in the case at first instance, in the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Later in the chapter, the reasoning, 
developments and the impact of the judgment is considered with the impact of the other 
developments introduced by case law.   
 
6.3 O’Neill v Phillips:15 
 
6.3.1 Facts of the case: 
A private company was operating in the construction industry. Mr. O’Neill (the 
petitioner) was employed as a manual worker in the company. Mr. Phillips (the 
respondent) was impressed by Mr. O'Neill's energy and ability and gave Mr. O'Neill 25 
per cent shares and appointed him a director. In an informal discussion, Mr. Phillips 
expressed the hope that Mr. O'Neill would be able to take over fully the day-to-day 
running of the company and indicated that on that basis he would allow him to draw 
50% of the company's profits despite only having 25% of the shares, thus waiving one 
third of his own dividend entitlement. Mr. O'Neill did take over the running of the 
business and Mr. Phillips retired from the board, leaving Mr. O'Neill as sole director. 
Mr. O'Neill was credited with half the profits.  
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 See below para 6.4.3 A fair offer to buy-out. 
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There were discussions with a view to Mr. O'Neill obtaining a 50% shareholding. 
Solicitors, counsel and the company's accountants were consulted and draft documents 
were prepared. Negotiations reached a point at which Mr. Phillips indicated that in 
principle he was willing to increase Mr. O'Neill's shareholding to 50% when the 
company's net asset value reached £500,000 and his voting rights to 50% when it 
reached £1,000,000. These figures were referred to as ‘the targets’. It was contemplated 
that a formal agreement would be drafted to embody these terms and any others found 
desirable. However this did not happen and at that point, negotiations stopped. The 
judge found at trial that no formal agreement for the allocation of more shares to Mr. 
O'Neill (whether conditionally or unconditionally) had ever been concluded. 
 
The construction industry went into recession and the company began to struggle. Mr. 
Phillips became alarmed about the company’s financial position and concerned about 
Mr. O'Neill's management. He decided as controlling shareholder, to resume personal 
command. He gave Mr. O'Neill the option of managing under him, the UK or the 
German branches of the business. Mr. O'Neill chose to go to Germany. Mr. Phillips 
resumed the position of managing director and Mr. O'Neill remained on the board as an 
ordinary director. Mr. Phillips was not as impressed with Mr. O'Neill's energy and 
commitment as he had been, when times were good. He strongly criticised Mr. O'Neill 
and told him at a meeting that he was no longer to act as managing director and would 
no longer receive 50% of the profits. He would be paid only his salary and any dividends 
payable upon his 25% shareholding. 
 
Mr. O'Neill prepared to sever his links with the company and made arrangements to set 
up a competing business in Germany. Mr. O'Neill wrote a letter to Mr. Phillips that was 
in effect a letter before action and said that Mr. Phillips had broken his promises to pay 
Mr. O'Neill 50% of the profits and to allot him (subject to reaching the targets) 50% of 
the shares. He had thereby reduced his position to that of an employee. In 1992, without 
further correspondence, Mr. O'Neill issued a petition under section 459 of CA 1985 
seeking relief for unfairly prejudicial conduct under section 461 of CA 1985 or 
alternatively an order under section 122(1)(g) of the IA 1986 for the winding up of the 
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company. The allegations of unfairly prejudicial conduct came down to two complaints. 
The first was Mr. Phillips's termination of equal profit-sharing and the second was his 
repudiation of the alleged agreement for the allotment of more shares.  
 
6.3.2 The judgment at first instance: 
The trial judge rejected these allegations and dismissed the petition on two grounds.16 
The first ground was that it failed on the facts. Mr. Phillips had not committed himself 
permanently and unconditionally to an equal sharing of profits and Mr. O’Neill's 
expectation was to receive 50 per cent profits while he acted as managing director.17 If 
circumstances changed, Mr. Phillips was entitled as controlling shareholder to redraw 
his responsibilities and remuneration.18 He had made no commitment which made it 
unfair for him to exercise this power, likewise in the case of the additional shares.19 The 
matter had never gone beyond negotiation and Mr. Phillips had made no legally binding 
promises. It was therefore not unfair for him to retain and conduct the business on the 
basis of his majority holding.20  
 
Secondly the judge dismissed the petition since the alleged prejudice to Mr. O'Neill's 
interests was not suffered in his capacity as a member of the company. The profit-share 
was his remuneration for acting as managing director and the additional shares, likewise 
a reward and incentive for working for the company. They did not derive from his 
previously having a 25% shareholding which also had been a reward for his services as 
an employee. Mr. O'Neill's membership of the company was therefore irrelevant to the 
expectations which he claimed it would be unfair to deny. They would have been exactly 
the same if he had not previously held any shares at all.21 Mr. O’Neill appealed from the 
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order of the trial judge and sought an order for the purchase of his shares in the company 
by Mr. Phillips on the basis of his unfairly prejudicial conduct.  
 
6.3.3 The Court of Appeal: 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered Mr. Phillips to buy Mr. O'Neill's 
shares.22 Nourse LJ delivering the judgment for the court held that although there was no 
concluded agreement about giving him more shares, Mr. O’Neill had a 'legitimate 
expectation' that he would receive them when the targets were reached. If this 
expectation had been fulfilled his entitlement at the first stage to 50 per cent of the 
shares would have replaced his entitlement to 50 per cent of the profits, to whose receipt 
he had a legitimate expectation in the meantime.23 The Court of Appeal held that Mr. 
Phillips “was not justified: first, in determining Mr. O’Neill’s entitlement to the 
additional 25 per cent of the profits and with it his expectation of receiving further 
shares in the company”.24 The denial of Mr. O’Neill’s expectations without an offer to 
buy his shares at a fair value was therefore unfairly prejudicial to the interests of O’Neill 
as a member of the company.25 Furthermore due to denial of his legitimate expectations, 
Mr. O'Neill had been in effect forced out of the company. He could no longer be 
expected to remain with the company and was bound to engage himself elsewhere due to 
a kind of constructive expulsion.26 The court did not consider he had been wrong to set 
up a competing business in Germany since Mr. O'Neill had not entered into any 
covenant with the company not to compete after he left its employment.27 The court 
rejected the argument that O’Neill had acted unreasonably by refusing an offer for 
shares, since the offer did not include his costs.28   Mr. Phillips appealed to the House of 
Lords against the decision of the Court of Appeal that his conduct was unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of Mr. O'Neill. Below the judgment of the House of Lords is 
considered. It is argued that the House of Lords decision has clarified the boundaries of 
the legal concept of ‘unfair prejudice’ and enhanced legal certainty.   
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6.3.4 The judgment of the House of Lords: 
Section 459 of the CA 1985 was considered for the first time by the House of Lords in 
O’Neill v Phillips.29 The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal of Mr. 
Phillips. In a speech unanimously endorsed by his fellow Law Lords, Lord Hoffmann30 
agreed with the Court of Appeal that the company had the characteristics identified by 
Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd,31 as commonly giving rise to 
equitable restraints upon the exercise of powers under the articles. It followed that it 
would have been unfair of Mr. Phillips to use his voting powers under the articles to 
remove Mr. O'Neill from participation in the conduct of the business without giving him 
the opportunity to sell his interest in the company at a fair price. Mr. O'Neill first 
received the shares as a gift and as an incentive. In making that gift Mr. Phillips did not 
surrender his right to dismiss Mr. O'Neill from the management without making him an 
offer for the shares. Mr. O'Neill was simply an employee who happened to have been 
given some shares but over the following years the relationship changed. Mr. O'Neill 
invested his own profits in the company and worked to build up the company's business. 
Lord Hoffmann stated that Re H R Harmer Ltd,32 showed that shareholders who receive 
their shares as a gift but afterwards work in the business might become entitled to 
enforce equitable restraints upon the conduct of the majority shareholder.33 
 
Lord Hoffmann further stated that the difficulty for Mr. O'Neill was that Mr. Phillips did 
not exclude him from participation in the management of the business. After the meeting 
he remained a director and continued to earn his salary as a manager of the business in 
Germany. The Court of Appeal held that he had been constructively removed by the 
behaviour of Mr. Phillips in the matter of equality of profits and shareholdings. So the 
question then was, whether Mr. Phillips acted unfairly in respect of these matters. The 
Court of Appeal said that Mr. O'Neill had a legitimate expectation of being allotted more 
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shares when the targets were met. No doubt it was legitimate or reasonable, in the sense 
that it reasonably appeared likely to happen. Mr. Phillips had agreed in principle, subject 
to the execution of a suitable document. Lord Hoffmann stated that here the Court of 
Appeal might have been misled by the expression 'legitimate expectation'. The real 
question was whether in fairness or equity Mr. O'Neill had a right to receive the 
additional shares. Lord Hoffmann stated that Mr. Phillips had never formally agreed to 
allot them and had made no legally binding promise on the point. It seemed to follow 
that there was no basis consistent with established principles of equity, for a court to 
hold that Mr. Phillips was behaving unfairly in withdrawing from the negotiation. This 
would not be restraining the exercise of legal rights but would be imposing upon Mr. 
Phillips an obligation to which he never formally agreed. On the facts the parties had 
entered into negotiations with a view to a transfer of shares on professional advice and 
subject to a condition that they were not to be bound until a formal document had been 
executed. It was not possible to say that an obligation had arisen in fairness or equity at 
an earlier stage.34 
 
Lord Hoffmann held that the same reasoning applied to the sharing of profits. Mr. 
Phillips had said informally that he would share the profits equally while Mr. O'Neill 
managed the company and he himself was not involved in day-to-day business. He 
deliberately retained control of the company and with it the right to redraw Mr. O'Neill's 
responsibilities. The consequence was that he came back to run the business and Mr. 
O'Neill ceased to be managing director. Mr. Phillips had made no promise to share the 
profits equally in such circumstances and it was therefore not inequitable or unfair for 
him to refuse to carry on doing so. The Court of Appeal seemed to have contemplated 
that Mr. Phillips might have been entitled to do what he did if he had given Mr. O'Neill 
notice of his intentions and treated him more politely at the meeting. These matters 
could not affect the question of whether a change in the profit-sharing arrangements was 
a breach of good faith. It followed that there was no basis for the Court of Appeal's 
finding that Mr. O'Neill had been driven out of the company. Mr. O’Neill might have 
decided that he had lost confidence in Mr. Phillips and that he could no longer work with 
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him but his decision was not the result of anything wrong or unfair which Mr. Phillips 
had done.35 
 
6.3.4.1 Capacity in which prejudice is suffered: 
As to the capacity in which prejudice is suffered, Lord Hoffmann stated that assuming 
there had been a contractual obligation, once Mr. O'Neill had invested his own money 
and effort in the company, his position might have changed from employee to 
shareholder. A promise to give Mr. O'Neill more shares or a larger share in the profits 
might well had been based not merely upon his position as an employee but on the fact 
that he already had a stake in the company. Lord Hoffmann referred to cases like R & H 
Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd36 which showed, the requirement that prejudice 
must be suffered as a member should not be too narrowly or technically construed.37 But 
the point did not arise because no promise was made. Below the chapter considers the 
developments made by O’Neill v Phillips and other case law. 
 
6.4 Developments introduced by O’Neill v Phillips: 
Lord Hoffmann’s speech in O’Neill v Phillips developed the law in relation to the unfair 
prejudice remedy in a number of important ways. I turn now to discuss these 
developments.     
 
6.4.1 The reasoning behind the judicial shift in emphasis from ‘legitimate 
expectations’ to ‘equitable considerations’:38 
Lord Hoffmann’s speech shifted the focus from the term ‘legitimate expectations’ to 
‘equitable considerations’ as a touchstone for establishing unfairness in section 459 
cases. In certain circumstances the exercise of a company’s strict legal rights may be 
subject to and qualified by equitable considerations. Emphasis upon equitable 
considerations flows from Ebrahimi and had been imported into section 459 jurisdiction 
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in the 1980s as is clear from the previous chapter.39  Lord Hoffmann stated that 
Parliament had chosen fairness as the criterion by which the court must decide whether 
it had jurisdiction to grant relief under section 459. Parliament chose this concept to 
confer a wide power to do what appeared just and equitable and to free the court from 
technical considerations of legal rights. Equally, however, it did not mean that the court 
can do whatever the individual judge thought to be fair. The concept of fairness must be 
applied judicially and the content it was given by the courts must be based upon rational 
principles of law and equity.  
 
Lord Hoffmann stated that in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc40 the term 'legitimate 
expectation', was used by him as a label for the 'correlative right' to which a relationship 
between company members might give rise in a case where, on equitable principles, it 
would be regarded as unfair for a majority to exercise a power conferred upon them by 
the articles (or the general company law) to the prejudice of another member. Lord 
Hoffmann amplified the point as follows: 
 
I gave as an example the standard case in which shareholders have entered into association upon 
the understanding that each of them who has ventured his capital will also participate in the 
management of the company. In such a case it will usually be considered unjust, inequitable or 
unfair for a majority to use their voting power to exclude a member from participation in the 
management without giving him the opportunity to remove his capital upon reasonable terms. 
The aggrieved member could be said to have had a 'legitimate expectation' that he would be able 
to participate in the management or withdraw from the company. 
 
Lord Hoffmann then stated that it had probably been a mistake on his part to coin the 
term ‘legitimate expectations’. In saying that it was 'correlative' to the equitable restraint, 
it was meant that it could exist only when equitable principles of the kind that had been 
described would make it unfair for a party to exercise rights under the articles: “it is a 
consequence, not a cause, of the equitable restraint”.41 Endorsing the view of Warner J42 
that “The court ... has a very wide discretion, but it does not sit under a palm tree”, Lord 
Hoffmann stressed that:  
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The concept of a legitimate expectation should not be allowed to lead a life of its own, capable of 
giving rise to equitable restraints in circumstances to which the traditional equitable principles 
have no application.43  
 
He considered that this is exactly what seemed to have happened in the Court of Appeal 
O’Neill v Phillips. Fairness was a notion which could be applied to all kinds of activities 
and its content would depend upon the context in which it was being used. Conduct 
which was perfectly fair between competing businessmen might not be fair between 
members of a family. The context and background were very important.44 
 
Lord Hoffmann discussed two features behind the formation of the company. A 
company was an association of persons for an economic purpose. The manner in which 
the affairs of the company might be conducted was closely regulated by rules to which 
the shareholders had agreed.45 Secondly, company law had developed seamlessly from 
the law of partnership, which was treated by equity, like the Roman societas, as a 
contract of good faith. One of the traditional roles of equity, as a separate jurisdiction, 
was to restrain the exercise of strict legal rights in certain relationships in which it 
considered that this would be contrary to good faith. These principles had, with 
appropriate modification, been carried over into company law.46 
 
Effectively recasting the test for ‘unfair prejudice’ that had been put forward in Re Saul 
D Harrison,47 Lord Hoffmann developed the analysis as follows:  
 
The first of these two features leads to the conclusion that a member of a company will not 
ordinarily be entitled to complain of unfairness unless there has been some breach of the terms on 
which he agreed that the affairs of the company should be conducted. But the second leads to the 
conclusion that there will be cases in which equitable considerations make it unfair for those 
conducting the affairs of the company to rely upon their strict legal powers. Thus unfairness may 
consist in a breach of the rules or in using the rules in a manner which equity would regard as 
contrary to good faith.48 
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Lord Hoffmann applied the same reasoning to the concept of unfairness under section 
459 as was applied by Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd49 for 
winding up a company. Lord Hoffmann quoted Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd50 who after referring to cases on the equitable jurisdiction to 
require partners to exercise their powers in good faith said that: 
 
The ‘just and equitable’ provision does not entitle one party to disregard the obligation he 
assumes by entering a company, nor the court to dispense him from it. It does, as equity always 
does, enable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations; 
considerations, that is, of a personal character arising between one individual and another, which 
may make it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in a particular 
way. 
 
Most importantly Lord Hoffmann stated that “a balance has to be struck between the 
breadth of the discretion given to the court and the principle of legal certainty”.51 
Petitions under section 459 were often lengthy and expensive. Therefore, certainty was 
highly desirable to identify some principles, in the light of which lawyers should be able 
to advise their clients whether or not a petition was likely to succeed. Lord Hoffmann 
stated “the way in which such equitable principles operate is tolerably well settled and it 
would be wrong to abandon them in favour of some wholly indefinite notion of 
fairness”.52 Lord Hoffmann referred to an example of such equitable principles in action 
in Blisset v Daniel53 a case to which Lord Wilberforce had referred in Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd54 where it was held that “upon the true construction of the 
articles, two-thirds of the partners could expel a partner by serving a notice upon him 
without holding any meeting or giving any reason” but “the power must be exercised in 
good faith”.55 Lord Hoffmann cited some references to contrast the 'the literal 
construction of the articles' with good faith and 'the plain meaning of the deed' and 'what 
the parties can fairly have had in contemplation'. Nineteenth century English law, with 
its division between law and equity, traditionally took the view that while literal 
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meanings might prevail in a court of law, equity could give effect to what it considered 
to have been the true intentions of the parties by preventing or restraining the exercise of 
legal rights.56  
 
In O’Neill v Phillips, Lord Hoffmann agreed with Jonathan Parker J in Re Astec (BSR) 
plc57 that: 
 
... in order to give rise to an equitable constraint based on “legitimate expectation” what is 
required is a personal relationship or personal dealings of some kind between the party seeking to 
exercise the legal right and the party seeking to restrain such exercise, such as will affect the 
conscience of the former.  
 
Lord Hoffmann stated that one useful cross-check in a case like this was to ask whether 
the exercise of the power in question would be contrary to what the parties, by words or 
conduct, have actually agreed. In Blisset v Daniel the limits were found in the ‘general 
meaning’ of the partnership articles themselves. In a quasi-partnership company, these 
limits would usually be found in the understandings between the members at the time 
they entered into association. Moreover, there might be later promises, by words or 
conduct, which it would be unfair to allow a member to ignore. A promise might be 
binding as a matter of justice and equity although would not be enforceable in law.58 
 
Lord Hoffmann added that exercising rights in breach of some promise or undertaking 
was not the only form of conduct which would be regarded as unfair for the purposes of 
section 459. There might be some event which puts an end to the basis upon which the 
parties entered into association with each other, making it unfair that one shareholder 
should insist upon the continuance of the association. The unfairness might arise not 
from what the parties had positively agreed but from a majority using its legal powers to 
maintain the association in circumstances to which the minority could reasonably say it 
did not agree. Lord Hoffmann stated that this form of unfairness was also based upon 
established equitable principles but had not arisen on the facts in O’Neill v Phillips.59  
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Lord Hoffmann also discussed two other interesting and significant issues namely, the 
possibility of ‘exit at will’ also known as ‘no-fault divorce’ in private companies and the 
scope of early offers to buy-out in shareholder disputes along with the provision of 
guidelines as to making fair offers. These developments have important implications for 
section 459 practice and therefore are discussed below.    
 
6.4.2 No right of unilateral withdrawal or ‘exit at will’:  
Lord Hoffmann stated that Mr. O'Neill claimed that the trust and confidence between the 
parties had broken down and that was accepted by Mr. Phillips. It was obvious that there 
ought to be a parting of the ways on the facts. Even if Mr. Phillips had not done anything 
unfair that caused the relational breakdown it would be unfair to leave Mr. O’Neill 
locked into the company as a minority shareholder. It was submitted on Mr. O’Neill’s 
behalf that, in a quasi-partnership company where the relationship between the quasi-
partners has broken down, one partner ought to be entitled at will to require the other 
partner or partners to buy his shares at a fair value. In the present case trust and 
confidence broke down inter alia because Mr. Phillips failed to do certain things which, 
on the judge's findings, he had never promised to do. Lord Hoffmann stated there was no 
support in the authorities for such a stark right of unilateral withdrawal.60 He referred to 
his own judgment in Re a Company (No 006834 of 1988), ex p Kremer61 and stated that 
if a breakdown in relations had caused the majority to remove a shareholder from 
participation in the management it was not fair to the excluded member, who usually lost 
his employment, to keep his investment locked in the company. It did not mean that a 
member who had not been dismissed or excluded could demand buy-out simply because 
he felt that he had lost trust and confidence in the others.  
 
In fact, Lord Hoffmann supported the Law Commission’s view that ‘exit at will’ should 
not be permitted.62 Lord Hoffmann stated that the Law Commission had not 
recommended the introduction of a statutory remedy in situations where there is no fault, 
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so that members of a quasi-partnership could exit at will. The Law Commission stated 
that:  
In our view there are strong economic arguments against allowing shareholders to exit at will. 
Also, as a matter of principle, such a right would fundamentally contravene the sanctity of the 
contract binding the members and the company which we considered should guide our approach 
to shareholder remedies.63  
 
Lord Hoffmann agreed with the Law Commission view where they plainly did not 
consider that section 459 already provided a right to exit at will.64  
 
Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips does not recognise a right of unilateral withdrawal 
on the basis that the minority has lost trust and confidence in the majority. However, 
Lord Hoffmann stated that if the exclusion from management occurred due to a 
breakdown of the parties’ personal relationship then it is usually a waste of time to try to 
investigate who caused the breakdown. Such breakdowns often occur without either side 
having done anything seriously wrong or unfair.65 Lord Hoffmann acknowledged the 
right to exit at breakdown of the personal relationship of shareholders that caused 
exclusion from management. In the later case of Grace v Biagioli66 the Court of Appeal 
clearly stated that from Lord Hoffmann’s speech it could be deduced that it was not 
enough merely to show that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken 
down. There was no right of unilateral withdrawal for a shareholder when trust and 
confidence between shareholders no longer exist. However, it was different if that 
breakdown in relations then causes the majority to exclude the petitioner from the 
management of the company or otherwise to cause him prejudice in his capacity as a 
shareholder (in other words, engages in some form of squeeze-out behaviour).  
 
6.4.3 A fair offer to buy-out: 
It was submitted on behalf of Mr. Phillips that even if (which was denied) his conduct 
was unfairly prejudicial, the petition should have been dismissed because he had made 
an offer to buy the shares at a fair price and this was the whole of the relief to which Mr. 
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O'Neill would have been entitled. Lord Hoffmann stated that in the absence of unfair 
prejudice this point did not need to be decided, in other words the relationship had 
broken down but O’Neill had not been excluded from management. But Lord Hoffmann 
considered the effect of an offer to buy the shares as an answer to a petition under 
section 459, due to its great practical importance. 
 
In fact the points of defence contained no offer to buy but later Mr. Phillips made an 
offer to buy Mr. O’Neill’s shares at a price to be agreed or in default of agreement to be 
fixed by a chartered accountant as valuer on the basis that the value was one-quarter of 
the fair value of the entire issued share capital (pro rata valuation). The offer was 
rejected inter alia on the basis that it made no provision for Mr. O'Neill's litigation costs 
since presentation of the petition. Therefore the petition went to a full hearing. The trial 
judge dismissed the petition and did not find it necessary to deal with the offer. The 
Court of Appeal accepted the argument that rejection of offer was justified because it did 
not provide for Mr. O’Neill’s costs.  
 
The House of Lords also agreed that the offer was inadequate. Lord Hoffmann stated 
that if the petitioner was offered everything to which he had been held entitled, the 
respondent might as in the case of a Calderbank letter67 be entitled to say that the costs 
after the date of the offer should be borne by the successful petitioner, who ought to 
have accepted the offer and brought the litigation to an end. On the other hand, a petition 
that was contested for nearly three years by a petitioner who had a prima facie case 
would not obtain everything to which he was entitled unless there was an offer of 
costs.68  
 
Lord Hoffmann stated that Mr. Phillips had fought the petition to the end and he was 
justified in doing so. But where personal relationships have broken down “parties ought 
to be encouraged, where at all possible, to avoid the expense of money and spirit 
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inevitably involved in such litigation by making an offer to purchase at an early stage” 69 
which supports early settlement of these disputes.70 Lord Hoffmann stated that this was a 
somewhat unusual case in that Mr. Phillips, despite his revised views about Mr. O'Neill's 
competence, was willing to go on working with him. So the court did not accept that Mr. 
O'Neill was excluded by Mr. Phillips from the company. Lord Hoffmann further stated 
that the majority shareholder was entitled to take this position, even if only because he 
might consider it less unattractive than having to raise the capital to buy out the 
minority. Usually in these types of cases, the majority shareholder would want to put an 
end to the association. In such a case, it would almost always be unfair for the minority 
shareholder to be excluded without an offer to buy his shares.71 Therefore if the majority 
is willing to work with the minority, the minority shareholder cannot exit at will but if 
the majority is not willing to continue the association then it is unfair if the minority is 
excluded from the company without a fair offer to buy-out.   
 
Lord Hoffmann referred to the Law Commission’s recommendation72 that in a private 
company limited by shares in which substantially all the members were directors, there 
should be a statutory presumption that the removal of a shareholder as a director, was 
unfairly prejudicial conduct. This did not seem to him to be very different in practice 
from the present law. In O’Neill v Phillips, Lord Hoffmann stated that if the breakdown 
in the relationship has caused the majority shareholders to exclude the minority from 
participation in the management of the company, it is unfair to the excluded member 
who will usually have lost his employment, to keep his assets locked in the company. 
Therefore in this situation his shareholding should be purchased by the majority 
shareholders. Lord Hoffmann stated that “unfairness does not lie in the exclusion from 
management alone but in exclusion without a reasonable offer. If the respondent to a 
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petition has plainly made a reasonable offer, then the exclusion as such will not be 
unfairly prejudicial and he will be entitled to have the petition struck out”.73 
 
6.5 Evaluation of the impact of case law developments: 
As discussed above, the leading case in this area was O’Neill v Phillips. The impact of 
the judgment in O’Neill v Phillips is twofold. First it discontinues the previous concept 
of ‘legitimate expectations’ in section 459 cases by wholly absorbing it within the scope 
of ‘equitable considerations’. Second the judgment articulates, endorses and reinforces a 
number of existing tendencies within section 459 law and practice namely, that (i) exit at 
will is not permitted to minority shareholders in private companies and (ii) early fair 
offers to buy-out the minority are perceived as an appropriate way of settling 
shareholder disputes with the consequence that the court may strike out the petition if it 
considers that a fair offer (including costs) has been made to purchase the petitioner’s 
shares. In addition, Lord Hoffmann also set out guidelines regarding the early fair offers 
to buy-out, to settle the shareholder dispute. Therefore, O’Neill deals with both 
substance (meaning of ‘unfairness’) and process (encouragement of early offers) of 
section 459 proceedings. Along with substance this chapter discusses the impact of 
O’Neill upon the process; however the wider discussion regarding the procedural change 
is reserved for the next chapter. A couple of other cases also have an impact upon 
section 459 proceedings which are discussed below.  
 
Interviewees acknowledged the presence of the problems identified by the courts and the 
Law Commission i.e., length, costs and complexity of the section 459 proceedings along 
with burgeoning case load upon courts.74 Their general view was that the legal 
developments discussed in this chapter had had an impact upon section 459 practice and 
affected the way in which they and the courts dealt with section 459 cases. The strong 
consensus was that O’Neill v Phillips75 and Grace v Biagioli76 were particularly 
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significant developments in terms of their practical implications because they had 
enhanced legal certainty regarding the application of statutory minority protection 
remedy and by declaring buy-out after fair valuation as the most appropriate form of 
relief in shareholder disputes.  
 
O’Neill v Phillips was probably the leading case which had the most impact in the area [M].  
 
Interviewees as a whole stated that O’Neill v Phillips played the role (i) by controlling 
the conduct of section 459 proceedings, it restricted the scope of the section and 
concluded that to prove unfairly prejudicial conduct there must be some breach of 
agreed terms, that enhanced the certainty of the provision and (ii) by reinforcing the 
already prevailing practices in the area it encouraged offers to buy-out at an early stage 
to avoid time and expense involved in the litigation [B, C, H, J].   
 
Interviewees considered that the substantive law developments – especially O’Neill v 
Phillips – had had a greater impact than the procedural developments discussed in the 
next chapter. Interviewee E stated that: 
 
The CPR was less significant for section 459 proceedings and O’Neill v Phillips had done more 
[E].  
 
Below the chapter discusses the nature and especially the impact of the case law 
developments in this area of legal practice. Discussion includes the impact of the 
discontinuation of the concept of legitimate expectations and continuation of the 
prevailing practices in the light of the analysis of the case law and the interviewees’ 
responses.  
 
6.5.1 Impact of discontinuation of the concept of legitimate expectations: 
Lord Hoffmann, who has played an important role in developing the remedy into its 
present state,77 while delivering the significant judgment in O’Neill v Phillips, he 
clarified the meaning of unfairness in the context of section 459 cases.78 Indeed in 
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O’Neill v Phillips Lord Hoffmann has taken some positive steps to curb the width of the 
jurisdiction by narrowing and recasting the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ 
regarding the affairs of the company.79 Lord Hoffmann repudiated the way that the 
Court of Appeal had broadly exploited the term ‘legitimate expectations’ and stated that 
the ‘equitable considerations’ must be the basis of the ‘legitimate expectations’ of 
shareholders. Clark stated that the Court of Appeal’s approach had widened the scope of 
‘legitimate expectations’ in a way that threatened to shift the balance too far in favour of 
minority shareholders and beyond that which the legislature had intended.80 Tilting the 
balance towards minority shareholders leads to the risk that the unfair prejudice remedy 
will become an instrument of oppression in their hands which, in turn, may subsequently 
demand a more restrictive approach towards the availability of the remedy.81 It was 
mentioned that there was a “risk that section 459 might be abused by shareholders using 
the threat of litigation as an unfair bargaining tool”.82 Furthermore, as Clark stated that 
the House of Lords’ repudiation of the liberal stance of the Court of Appeal might allay 
the fears that such stance might open the floodgates for section 459 petitions.83  
 
Section 459 could be invoked where the bargain was reached by the shareholders by 
informal and non-legally enforceable understandings between the shareholders rather 
than in the company’s formal constitution.84   In fact, Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v 
Phillips by supporting the contractual relationship85 of the parties stated that, to prove 
unfair prejudicial conduct, minority shareholders have to show that there is some breach 
of their formal (legally binding) or informal (binding under equity) rights.86 In Grace v 
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Biagioli87 the Court of Appeal by referring to O’Neill v Phillips stated, members’ rights 
and obligations in the articles of association and any collateral agreements were subject 
to established equitable principles which might moderate the exercise of strict legal 
rights when insistence on the enforcement of such rights would be unconscionable.  
 
O’Neill v Phillips was also applied in Re Guidezone Ltd88 where Parker J held that 
‘unfairness’ for the purposes of section 459 was not to be judged by reference to 
subjective notions of fairness, but rather by testing whether, applying established 
equitable principles, the majority had acted, or was proposing to act, in a manner which 
equity would regard as contrary to good faith. In the case of the quasi partnership 
company, exclusion of the minority from participation in the management of the 
company contrary to the agreement or understanding on the basis of which the company 
was formed was a clear example of conduct by the majority which equity regards as 
contrary to good faith.89 Furthermore it was stated that applying traditional equitable 
principles, equity would not hold the majority to an agreement, promise or 
understanding which was not enforceable at law unless and until the minority had acted 
relying on it.90   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, section 459 of CA 1985 confers on the judiciary 
extensive discretion, in determining both the scope of the section and the relief to be 
ordered under section 461 if the petition is successful.91 Lord Hoffmann referred to the 
concern expressed by the Law Commission in its report92 and emphasized that balance is 
required between the discretion of the court and the principle of legal certainty”.93 From 
a wider practical perspective, Cheung considered it a step in the right direction to the 
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future development of the remedy in light of the burgeoning case law on sections.94 It 
has been questioned whether in seeking to balance certainty and discretion, Lord 
Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips placed too much emphasis upon legal certainty95 and, 
more generally, whether that balance has been appropriately struck.96 The emphasis on 
contract and traditional equitable principles combined with the restriction of the concept 
of legitimate expectations would no doubt give rise to greater certainty as to the 
application of provisions under section 459-461 of CA 1985. In fact, the wide scope of 
the section leads to uncertainty and move towards greater certainty runs risk that section 
459 ends up not doing the job that the Jenkins Committee envisaged.97    
 
In 2000 the Company Law Review (CLR)98 explained that in the view of its members 
the effect of the decision was that to sustain an action for unfair prejudice in reliance on 
some claim other than a breach of the articles or some other breach of duty, a member 
must show breach of some sort of agreement, based on words or conduct, which made it 
inequitable to confine him to his strict rights under the articles. It was mentioned that 
most respondents to the CLR’s consultation favoured removing this constraint and 
allowing any case to be brought which raised an argument that the claimant had been 
prejudiced unfairly on its particular facts, whether or not an agreement of some kind had 
been breached.99  
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Notwithstanding these responses, the CLR concluded that the O’Neill ruling ought not to 
be reversed:  
 
The effect of the unfair prejudice claim being unlimited is to lead to all manner of factual 
allegations being potentially admissible, which encourages the widest possible range of evidence 
being adduced to assemble a case of unfairness. This makes proceedings lengthy and 
undisciplined and means that there is little guidance for those operating companies as to what is 
and is not acceptable conduct.100  
 
It was stated that this could also lead to enormously lengthy and expensive proceedings, 
which were unsustainable for small companies, producing potentially unjust results at 
wholly disproportionate expense.101  
 
CLR agreed with the House of Lords that the best basis for focusing such an allegation 
was the notion of departure from an agreement, broadly defined, between those 
concerned, to be identified from their words or conduct. It was believed that in clear 
cases of unfairness, where the conduct of the respondent was evidently outside the scope 
of the prior mutual contemplation of the parties, the courts would have no difficulty in 
identifying the conduct as beyond the scope of the agreement between them, as so 
broadly defined.102 Furthermore it was stated that:  
 
…where broader protection is of importance to members of a particular class it is for them to 
contract for it... We are not persuaded that the commercial uncertainty within company structures 
which would arise from providing a broad unfairness remedy for interference with economic 
interests would be justifiable… Here again section 459, as focused by the O’Neill decision, will 
continue to apply.103  
 
The House of Lords in O’Neill had skillfully navigated between the competing positions 
– danger of being ‘over broad’ and danger of it being too narrow – to arrive at the 
middle ground. It can be inferred that O’Neill v Phillips has enhanced the legal certainty 
that may have cut down the number of unrealistic or weak petitions but proving unfairly 
prejudicial conduct can still be a lengthy process. This is because petitioners still have to 
show that there is some breach of their formal or informal rights that is unfairly 
prejudicial to their interests and that may prolong the proceedings.   
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During empirical investigation interviewees stated that O’Neill v Phillips had controlled 
the conduct of section 459 proceedings by discontinuing the wide use of the concept of 
‘legitimate expectations’ and refocusing emphasis on ‘equitable considerations’. The 
interviewees all thought that the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips had restricted the 
scope of the section that thus changed the approach of shareholders, practitioners and 
courts in practice. The more restrictive interpretation was thought to have increased the 
certainty of the provision and therefore reduced the scope for petitions. Two 
interviewees expressed concerns as to narrow interpretation of the provision that was a 
wide remedy. All these responses are discussed below in detail. 
 
O’Neill v Phillips controlled the conduct of section 459 proceedings by discontinuing 
the concept of legitimate expectations since the section was excessively exploited by 
shareholders in the past due to its attractiveness:  
 
When the section was introduced, everybody saw it as a great new remedy. So there were an 
awful lot of [petitions], a lot which were very hopeless. The courts then had to step in and said, 
no hang on a minute, we need to cut back on it [R]. 
 
O’Neill v Phillips has narrowed the scope of section 459 and therefore affected the practitioners’ 
approach towards the cases [F].  
 
In the past the scope of the section was interpreted widely by courts and practitioners. 
Interviewee H gave the example: 
 
We were in a pub and he said ‘look John, you can become a shareholder and a director of the 
company and you have got the job for life’. That might become the basis of petition [for unfairly 
prejudicial conduct], but now it is different [H]. 
 
 
After O’Neill the shareholders’ and courts’ approach towards section 459 petitions had 
changed. Interviewees stated that:   
 
The way section 459 is litigated has changed. I think shareholders are more reluctant to undertake 
459 petitions now than they used to be. You cannot use 459 in all the ways that you could in the 
past… now it is more restricted. O’Neill v Phillips re-emphasised that section 459 petitions could 
not be used simply because somebody had grievances about the way the company was being run 
or indeed simply had fallen out with another person in the company. That was not enough now. 
Shareholders had to go further than that to prove that some agreed term had actually been 
infringed or breached [R].  
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Now courts are perhaps a little bit more rigorous than may be they were in past… they will look 
at allegations more carefully than before to ensure that petitions are not allowed to proceed which 
really are not going anywhere [M].     
 
However, O’Neill v Phillips increased the certainty of legal principles regarding the 
application of section 459 to resolve shareholder disputes in private companies. It had 
tightened up the section 459 so one big difference was that in quasi-partnership cases in 
particular, the ‘equitable consideration’ relied upon need to be fully particularized: 
 
I think the first big change is that in the mid eighties and in late eighties you could draft your 
section 459 petition quite loosely. The idea of ‘legitimate expectation’… that phrase… you could 
run a case basically on the basis of “my dad said to me one day, ‘son all this would be yours’, all 
the company would be yours”. You could actually run a case on that as a ‘legitimate expectation’. 
Now you cannot… I think now it’s much tighter and narrower actually. The court has made it 
more difficult to run a section 459 petition for a quasi-partnership anyway. They require much 
more detail and much more evidence [T]. 
 
Two interviewees stated that in practice, the more restrictive interpretation of the section 
may possibly have had the effect of cutting down on the number of petitions that might 
otherwise have been brought by shareholders in these companies and possibly therefore 
decreased the burden on the courts. Interviewees stated that due to increased legal 
certainty as to what unfairness meant, there was less scope for minority to misuse the 
remedy as a mean of oppression to threaten the majority shareholders. Enhanced 
certainty as to the scope of the section assisted shareholders to evaluate the strength of 
the cases and prospects in a court and was a helpful factor in encouraging a compromise 
during negotiation [R, T]. 
 
Accordingly it can be argued that enhanced certainty due to narrow interpretation of the 
provision cut down the number of petitions that otherwise might have been brought 
therefore reduced the case load upon courts104 and the discretion of courts to which the 
courts were traditionally reluctant to exploit.105 Shareholders are reluctant to bring weak 
petitions and there is less scope for minority to misuse the remedy to threaten the 
majority shareholders for increasing his bargaining position in the company.106 
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The majority of the interviewees welcomed the development and regarded it as 
contributing to greater legal certainty. However, one interviewee was rather more 
guarded and did express concern about Lord Hoffmann’s approach. Interviewee H 
criticised O’Neill as equating ‘unfairness’ to the breach of some sort of obligation 
despite its wider connotations:  
 
The statute says “unfair prejudice” but Lord Hoffmann in particular has put a gloss on that 
restricting its effect… The unfair prejudice remedy was intended to be a very broad brush section 
and gradually the judges decided, no that was too wide and cut it down. I suspect the reason is 
that judges don’t like section 459 trials, because they are very fact sensitive and involve a lot of 
hard work on the facts rather than law. So what better way to get rid of them than to construe the 
section restrictively [H]?  
 
The motive might be to lessen the scope of litigation but this is not an established canon of 
construction. It is a motive, but it is not a rule of construction. You cannot think Oh God I don’t 
want these cases in court, and use that as the basis for construing the section restrictively. You 
don’t construe an Act of Parliament by reference to the volume of litigation that it generates. 
They did a similar thing with directors’ disqualifications. These used to be heard by judges, but 
the judges hate them so they changed the rules so that a registrar can hear them [H]. 
 
Interviewee H further stated that O’Neill restricted the scope of the section. Enhanced 
legal certainty reduced the discretion of courts to which the courts were traditionally 
reluctant to exploit107 but proving unfairly prejudicial conduct in a court could still be a 
lengthy and cumbersome process and therefore expensive. The decision in Saul D 
Harrison was considered by interviewee ‘a bit harsh’. It was stated that within next few 
years somebody was going to spot this and said that it was no longer an effective 
remedy: “there would be a new Lord Greene who would give a report and Parliament 
would widen the scope”. In this interviewee’s view, the section should be construed as 
widely as possible. The wide scope of the section might increase the case load on courts 
but it would be relatively easy to get relief and lead to more cases settling earlier [H]. 
 
It can be asserted that after O’Neill, due to enhanced legal certainty there are less 
number of petitions launched in courts now, but to prove cause of action court 
proceedings can still be lengthy and expensive. Enhanced legal certainty assists 
shareholders to evaluate the strength of the cases and may help shareholders to achieve a 
compromise during negotiation.  
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6.5.2 Impact of continuation or reinforcement of prevailing practices: 
Developments under O’Neill v Phillips namely rejection of no-fault divorce and 
emphasis upon early fair offers to buy-out to settle the dispute were described as an 
articulation of prevailing practices in the area. It was stated that O’Neill was not 
necessarily new. But it had reinforced and clarified the practice of early offers to buy-out 
and had given a clear roadmap for parties wishing to make offers and to strike out the 
petitions. It was quite helpful because it gave a very clear framework to how these offers 
should be made [M]. Below the impact of case law developments that reinforced the 
prevailing practices in the area is discussed.   
 
6.5.2.1 No exit at will: 
By supporting the Law Commission’s view, O’Neill v Phillips has not permitted 
minority shareholder’s ‘exit at will’. Lord Wilberforce observed in Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd108 that the quasi-partnership analogy should not be pressed too 
far: ‘A company, however small, however domestic, is a company not a partnership or 
even a quasi-partnership ...’.109 It appears that Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips 
attempted to create a balance between equitable considerations that arise in the context 
shareholders’ rights and the fact that the company is after all a commercial enterprise.  
 
O’Neill held that to establish the cause of action under the section and to obtain the buy-
out order minority shareholders have to prove the breakdown of the personal 
relationship of shareholders and conduct that is unfairly prejudicial to minority 
shareholders’ interests e.g., exclusion from management of a company. On the other 
hand majority shareholders may claim there is no unfairly prejudicial conduct and the 
minority is trying to seek a ‘no-fault divorce’ that may prolong the court proceedings 
which necessarily involve the expenditure of time and money of both the parties and 
courts. After the prohibition of exit of minority shareholders at simple relational 
breakdown in O’Neill v Phillips, minority shareholders may turn to seek help from the 
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court’s jurisdiction under ‘just and equitable winding up’ as a means of leveraging their 
investment out of the company.    
 
In Re Guidezone Ltd110 in seeking a winding up order, the petitioners relied on Re R A 
Noble and Sons (Clothing) Ltd111 where Nourse J held that, although the petitioner had 
not established that its interests had been unfairly prejudiced, nevertheless in the 
circumstances, it was just and equitable that the company be wound up. Therefore, it 
was submitted that it was not necessary to establish ‘unfairness’ for the court to make a 
winding up order on the just and equitable ground – in other words the jurisdiction to 
make a winding up order under section 122(1)(g) was wider than the jurisdiction to grant 
relief under section 459. By discussing the relationship between the jurisdiction under 
section 459 and the jurisdiction to order a winding up on the ‘just and equitable’ ground 
under section 122(1)(g) it was held that it was plainly implicit in Lord Hoffmann’s 
reasoning in O’Neill v Phillips that the winding up jurisdiction was at the very least, no 
wider than the section 459 jurisdiction.112 The two parallel jurisdictions, in accordance 
with Nourse J’s decision in Re R A Noble and Sons (Clothing) Ltd113 that conduct which 
was not unfair for the purposes of section 459 should nevertheless be capable of 
founding a case for a winding up order on the ‘just and equitable’ ground was 
inconsistent with O’Neill v Phillips.114 The case further reinforces the point that English 
Law does not allow ‘exit at will’.   
 
Interviewees considered that  O’Neill v Phillips had not authorised ‘exit at will’ or ‘no 
fault divorce’ and stated that:  
 
The Law Commission had also decided the same before O’Neill v Phillips. It was a policy 
decision and the court had set a policy decision in O’Neill, and there was no change to section 
459 in the new Companies Act 2006. Therefore, now shareholders had to obtain the right to exit 
at will by contractual arrangements [G].  
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By reinforcing the point about ‘no-fault divorce’ in practice O’Neill v Phillips enhanced legal 
certainty to some extent as to the scope of the section.  To obtain relief under the provision it is 
necessary to prove that the conduct is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the petitioner [M].115 
 
6.5.2.2 Early fair offers to buy-out: 
O’Neill v Phillips provides considerable judicial support for early fair buy-out offers as a 
means of settling shareholder disputes. Lord Hoffmann made it clear that he regarded a 
fair offer by the majority as an appropriate form of relief with the consequences that a 
refusal to accept the offer would be a ground for striking out the petition and awarding 
costs against the petitioner.116  
 
Lord Hoffmann stated that unfairness lies in the exclusion of the minority without a 
reasonable offer. If a reasonable offer is made then the exclusion will not be unfairly 
prejudicial.117 It can be inferred that the court is accepting the strength of majority rule 
in shareholder disputes. In the event of relational breakdown leading to the exclusion of 
the minority from management the will of the majority will prevail, but the majority is 
legally bound to treat the minority fairly by providing a right to exit within a reasonable 
time after a fair valuation of their shareholdings. 
 
The courts’ approach towards buy-out orders where there is relational breakdown that 
leads to unfairly prejudicial conduct is that it is quite reasonable for parties to depart 
after getting the fair value of their shareholdings in the company.118 In Grace v 
Biagioli119 it was stated that the buy-out would usually be the most appropriate order to 
deal with shareholder disputes.120 In fact O’Neill v Phillips and Grace v Biagioli 
declared buy-out of minority shareholders to be an appropriate outcome of court 
proceedings and appropriate aim to achieve in out of court settlements in shareholder 
disputes.  
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Along with the strong judicial emphasis on buy-out as an appropriate form of relief in 
shareholder disputes, O’Neill has also had an impact on practice and procedure through 
the clear signal that it sends encouraging the use of buy-out offers at the earliest possible 
stage. This emphasis may enhance prospects for settlement through buy-out, at an early 
stage – either pre-action or after proceedings have been issued but before trial. Hanlon 
claims that Lord Hoffmann’s guidance (although obiter) as to the circumstances in 
which a reasonable offer to buy the shares of the minority shareholder should be made, 
may be helpful in ensuring that disputes are settled before they reach the doors of the 
court.121 By settling disputes either pre-action or pre-trial in circumstances where the 
court is highly likely to order a buy-out, the parties can avoid wasting time and money 
on continuing litigation. 
 
However, shareholders’ cannot be forced to settle the dispute even if an objectively fair 
buy-out offer is put forward. They may need to resort to court where issues regarding 
fair valuation of shares may also prolong the court proceedings and result in costly 
litigation. However, the fair valuation of shares can be dependent upon a range of factors 
namely, (i) any special issues that should be considered at the time of valuation in any 
particular business e.g., future return on investment (ii) whether a discount for minority 
holding is applicable or not, and (iii) most importantly whether or not there is any unfair 
prejudicial conduct that has affected the share price. These factors may obstruct the out 
of court settlement and may also lengthen the court proceedings as discussed below. 
 
6.5.2.2.1 The role of offers in settling shareholder disputes: 
Regardless of the fact that fair offers may be a promising means of settling shareholder 
disputes, shareholders cannot be compelled to make early fair offers or accept early 
offers in such disputes, especially where they have widely diverging views on the merits 
of the petition. Even if the parties are agreed in principle that one of them should exit, 
the dispute may focus on the valuation issue. One party’s view of what is a fair offer 
may not coincide with the other party’s. For instance, in a quasi-partnership company 
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dispute a minority shareholder may value his shareholding at £15,000 whereas the 
majority shareholders value it at £12,000 but offer £10,000 on the basis that it is a 
minority holding and a forced purchase because the minority is seeking an ‘exit at will’. 
The state of the negotiation is depicted in Figure 6.1 below. The minority shareholder 
claims that he is seeking to exit the company because the majority has engaged in 
unfairly prejudicial conduct and argues therefore that it is not an ‘exit at will’ and that no 
discount should be applied. He also alleges that assets have been misappropriated from 
the company and argues that the value of these assets should be taken into account in 
arriving at a fair valuation.122 Finally, the minority shareholder argues that the majority 
has failed to take into account the future return it will make on its enhanced investment.  
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Figure: 6.1 
                 Valuation by    Valuation by      Difference in 
                      Minority          Majority           Valuation 
                       £15,000          £10,000              £5000 
 
The difference is £5000: £2000 due to the discount for a minority shareholding: £2000 
as the majority is claiming that nothing happened that is unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of minority shareholders; and £1000 since the majority is not taking into 
account future returns upon the investment. The settlement of the dispute is possible if 
both parties agree upon a valuation figure that is acceptable to both. If they fail to do so, 
the basis upon which the shares are to be valued would have to be resolved by the court. 
Negotiations between the parties may assist them to agree upon a figure that is 
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acceptable to both and may result in a compromise.123 Shareholders cannot be forced to 
settle the dispute during negotiation. However, there are factors that may assist, persuade 
and motivate shareholders during negotiation to settle the dispute out of court by 
agreeing upon a figure that is acceptable to both parties, notably the costs and risks 
associated with litigation. Lengthy, complex and therefore costly section 459 
proceedings124 and the danger of an adverse costs order in the event of losing at trial, 
may persuade shareholders to settle the dispute out of court by negotiation. 
 
These factors are in fact means to an end that is a settlement by exit after fair valuation 
of shares. Moreover, the means to settle the dispute at an early stage are also introduced 
by the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR). The procedural rules under the CPR 
emphasise early settlement of disputes and are therefore reinforced by O’Neill v Phillips, 
a point that is discussed further in chapter 7.125   
 
Interviewees stated that O’Neill v Phillips reinforced prevailing practices by 
encouraging early offers to buy-out. That had an impact in practice since (i) it enhanced 
the legal certainty as to way of resolving these disputes and (ii) helped to promote a 
settlement culture as regards these disputes. The development was welcomed by almost 
all interviewees because (i) provision of fair exit often to minority shareholder was an 
appropriate way of resolving these disputes given their characteristics126 and (ii) O’Neill 
reinforced the practice of early fair offers to exit rather than late, to avoid the lengthy 
and expensive court proceedings. 
 
It was stated that O’Neill v Phillips was a logical addition that had reinforced the 
prevailing practices but got the House of Lords stamp of approval [E]. Interviewee R 
elaborated: 
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I think O’Neill re-emphasised the importance of the respondent trying to make an offer to dispose 
off the matter at an early stage… the need to try to find a sort of pragmatic way out of these 
disputes. Most of the disputes at the end of the day are going to be resolved by money changing 
hands therefore, I think the courts are emphasising need to think about that earlier rather than 
later [R].  
 
Interviewee C stated that the practice of writing so-called O’Neill letters in 459 cases 
was followed even before O’Neill v Phillips. But O’Neill v Phillips was a significant 
case which had further reinforced the practice of pre-action letters offering a buy-out 
solution at fair value given that this was the relief most likely to be awarded if disputes 
are litigated to trial. Thus, by focusing lawyers’ minds upon the process of making early 
fair offers to settle the dispute in minimum time and cost in fact, O’Neill had ensured 
good practice [C]. 
 
Interviewee J stated that he was not more careful after O’Neill v Phillips than before 
because he was already following the practice of writing a letter to offer a fair price for 
shares [J]. People who were practising in this area were consistently writing what are 
now known as O’Neill letters even before O’Neill v Phillips to settle these disputes. 
While explaining the reasons for emphasising early fair offers to buy-out to settle the 
dispute an interviewee stated that (i) section 459 proceedings were expensive and (ii) the 
judges did not like hearing these disputes: 
 
I should tell you this that I don’t really think that the judges like hearing cases under section 459. 
I think because most of them are very long. They are in effect a corporate divorce. So quite often 
there is a lot of personal animosity between the parties. The way in which section 459 case 
unfolds that quite often brings up a lot of bad history built up between the parties [C]. 
 
By encouraging the offers at much earlier stage O’Neill v Phillips has promoted a 
culture of early settlement in 459 cases, to avoid the lengthy, complex and costly section 
459 proceedings and by resolving the disputes in minimum time and cost. That was 
beneficial not only for shareholders and companies, but also contributed towards saving 
of court resources. Early settlement therefore provides an effective resolution to 
shareholder disputes127 and is consistent with the Woolf objectives.128 Interviewee F 
stated that in the past courts emphasised the need to settle early and proceedings were 
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prevented from going to trial when the court realised the impracticability of the parties’ 
aspirations and there was a sensible offer on the table. Furthermore, the court’s practice 
had long been to stay proceedings on grounds of just and equitable winding up since 
section 459 provided a suitable and less drastic alternative remedy. Interviewee E further 
stated that: 
 
An O’Neill offer letter provides to buy that person out, value to be assessed by accountant 
usually upon various parameters. Then continued pursuit of the petition would be abuse of 
process and would face costs at the end of the day [E].  
 
O’Neill focused the lawyers’ mind to contemplate traditional modes of settlement. 
However, shareholders could not be forced to settle the dispute at early fair offer to buy-
out if in their opinion the offer made was not fair. 129 Finally, to obtain the fair value for 
their shares shareholders need to resort to courts [C].   
 
However, as opposed to the common view that welcomed the development, a couple of 
practitioners pointed out that from one aspect it was unfortunate since, it was the basis of 
assertion that exclusion was permissible if you made an acceptable offer. It was in their 
view a charter for bullies. If you were prepared to pay, you could get rid of that person 
[F]. This was a situation that the majority could exploit: 
 
If you behave badly you can buy the shares of others even with a discount if it is not a quasi-
partnership. Sometimes clients are not worried about what would happen if they have done 
wrong since, they are happy to buy the minority out [C]. 
 
6.5.2.3 Fair valuation of shares at offer to buy-out: 
Lord Hoffmann encouraged early offers to settle and stated that it was very important 
that participants in such companies should be able to know what counts as a reasonable 
offer and provided guidance in this context.130 This guidance has been well received. 
Two well respected commentators have written that:  
 
The guidance provided by the House of Lords on what constitutes a reasonable offer in the 
context of section 459 is both imaginative and commercially sensible and will go a long way to 
dealing with one of the worst shortcomings of  section 459 proceedings, namely their costs.131  
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In O’Neill v Phillips,132 Lord Hoffmann considered the issue carefully and described the 
ingredients of a fair valuation of shares. Lord Hoffmann explained that it was very 
important that shareholders in small private companies should be able to know what 
counts as a reasonable offer. According to Lord Hoffmann the main elements of a 
“reasonable offer” are as follows: 
  
(i) No discount for being minority holding in quasi-partnership company: 133 
Lord Hoffmann stated in O’Neill v Phillips, unless special circumstances existed, the 
offer must represent an equivalent proportion of the total issued share capital without 
any discount for being a minority holding. In a recent Companies’ Court decision, the 
court ordered the respondent to buy out the petitioner’s shares in the company without 
applying any discount as the petitioner’s interest was not a majority interest.134 Where a 
shareholder had voluntarily exited from the company in Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd v 
Larvin135 it was held, that section 459 did not provide a member of a quasi-partnership 
company who wished voluntarily to sever his connection with the company for personal 
reasons, with the means of forcing the other members to purchase his shareholding at its 
full undiscounted value, when he had no contractual right to do so. 
 
(ii) Determination of value by an expert: 
Lord Hoffmann stated that the share value, if not agreed, should be determined by a 
competent expert. Here the court opens up the possibility of valuation of the shares by a 
competent expert to settle the valuation disputes between the shareholders. The expert 
would determine the value as an expert. The objective here should be economy and 
expedition even if this carries the possibility of a rough edge for one side or the other 
(and both parties in this respect take the same risk) compared with a more elaborate 
procedure.  
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(iii) Access to information: 
Lord Hoffmann stated that both parties should have the same access to information that 
might have an impact upon the value of the shares. Access to information will provide 
minority shareholders equal opportunity to value their shares more fairly. However, in 
quasi-partnership companies minority shareholders are also directors of the company 
and they have enough knowledge of company affairs and access to necessary 
information. Moreover, refusing access to information can itself be unfairly prejudicial 
conduct.136    
 
(iv) Offer to pay costs: 
If the majority had not made an offer within a reasonable time after the breakdown then 
a buy-out offer must be accompanied by an offer to pay the costs. Lord Hoffmann here 
is contemplating costs of the proceedings initiated by the petitioner under section 459 
before the offer to buy shares is made in any case. Costs associated with late offers to 
buy shares may increase the possibility of early offers by majority shareholders in these 
disputes. 
 
In O’Neill, Lord Hoffmann’s guidance about what counts a fair offer at the time of buy-
out was an important consideration in this context. The interview evidence confirms that 
valuation is often a key issue for practitioners seeking to resolve shareholder disputes. 
One interviewee put it bluntly: 
 
Often the practical problem in these cases is not so much, what is the appropriate remedy or who 
should buy the other out, but it is a question of price. The real battlefield is over the value of 
shares [G].  
 
His experience was that the majority usually bought out the minority. The majority 
shareholders were happy with it since it was not a punishment and they were getting 
something in return e.g., control of the whole of the company. On the face of it, it was 
not a harsh remedy. The harshness arose in the price. Too higher price for the shares was 
a ‘win’ for the minority and too lower price was a ‘win’ for the majority. So that was 
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often the sticking point in these cases. The same interviewee mentioned a recent case 
where in a 50/50 company each side made allegations of wrong doing. The problem was 
not who should buy the other out but what the parties could not agree was on how much 
[G].  
 
6.5.2.3.1 Strike-out application on the basis of fair offer: 
Interviewees stated that now after O’Neill v Phillips courts were more ready to entertain 
strike out applications. O’Neill v Phillips particularly encouraged parties to make offers 
and to look at strike out possibly on the basis of offers [M]. Interviewee E added that: 
 
I cannot say the Civil Procedure Rules have changed a lot at all. The biggest change in section 
459 was undoubtedly the development of O’Neill v Phillips style of strike out application and 
offers that force people to agree to accountant valuations [E]. 
 
In practice strike-out applications were very much more common now than in the past 
and there was much greater willingness of the courts to entertain a strike out application. 
There were a variety of grounds on which a strike out application could be made. 
Reasons for applying strike-out include (i) lack of evidence of unfair prejudice (ii) 
evidence of unfair prejudice but a fair offer had been made for the petitioner’s shares 
[T]: 
There are cases now where the courts are ready to listen to strike out applications. I wouldn’t say 
encourage them but you have got to think if you are the respondent majority now, whether I just 
put in a defence or should I apply to strike out. [T]  
 
It is evident from the case law that provision for striking-out was available before 
O’Neill v Phillips. However, it appears that exploitation of the procedure has become 
more common after O’Neill. Long before O’Neill v Phillips in Re a Company (No 
005685 of 1988), ex parte Schwarcz (No 2)137 it was stated that the developing 
jurisprudence on section 459 petitions had established that the court, even on a striking-
out application, would consider whether the relief sought by a petitioner was 
inappropriate. Whether it was unreasonable to pursue a petition when it was clear that 
the petitioner must leave the company and a fair offer had been made for the petitioner’s 
shares138 or when a petitioner seeking an order for the sale of his shares might have 
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achieved that result by invoking the transfer machinery available in the articles but failed 
to do so.139 If the court was of the view that the relief sought was wholly inappropriate 
and the petitioner was acting unreasonably in pursuing the petition, it might stay or 
strike out the petition as being an abuse of the process.140 
 
Problems were identified in making fair offers to strike out the petition and to end the 
dispute. An interviewee stated that it was difficult to make a fair offer on which majority 
shareholders could rely to strike out the petition. Shareholders making the fair offer had 
to concede certain allegations made by the petitioner otherwise it was a complete waste 
of time. To strike out an otherwise good petition, shareholders needed to make a fair 
offer that gave some sort of recompense to the petitioner for being unfairly prejudiced. 
So shareholders had to make admissions as part of the offer. If a petitioner alleged that 
directors were in breach of fiduciary duty by taking a lot of money out of the company, a 
‘fair offer’ would be to have the petitioner’s shares valued on the assumption that, that 
money was still in the company. Otherwise it was not a fair offer.  
 
If you are not going to give any compensation to the petitioner what is fair about that? 
Furthermore, the judge can hold it against you because the petitioner is going to admit that on an 
open basis. The petitioner would say that the majority shareholders have offered to settle on the 
basis of compensating him, having regard to this particular unfair prejudice [H].141  
 
6.5.2.4 Buy-out as an appropriate relief in shareholder disputes: 
After O’Neill v Phillips in Grace v Biagioli,142 the Court of Appeal stated that the most 
appropriate order to deal with shareholder disputes in small private companies was 
normally a buy-out order. In Grace v Biagioli143 the Court of Appeal discussed the issue 
regarding the need for buy-out orders in detail. The court stated that in most cases, the 
usual order to make would be the one requiring the respondents to buy out the 
petitioning shareholder at a price to be fixed by the court. This was normally the most 
appropriate order to deal with shareholder disputes involving small private companies. 
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This was the relief which the petitioner shareholder sought on this appeal. The reasons 
for making such an order were in most cases obvious. It would free the petitioner 
shareholder from the company and enable him to extract his share of the value of its 
business and assets in return for foregoing any future right to dividends. The company 
and its business would be preserved for the benefit of the respondents, free from the 
petitioner’s claims and the possibility of future difficulties between shareholders would 
be removed. In cases of serious prejudice and conflict between shareholders, it was 
unlikely that any regime or safeguards which the court can impose would be as effective 
to preserve the peace and to safeguard the rights of the minority shareholder.144 
Therefore, after taking everything into account the court held that nothing short of a buy-
out order would ensure that the petitioner’s rights were respected in the future.145 There 
was a considerable judicial support for buy-out to resolve these disputes even in the past 
but the Court of Appeal reinforces the clear judicial preference for this form of relief. 146 
This sends out a clear message to the parties to disputes to consider a buy-out solution 
early on rather than bothering the courts as more often than not buy-out is the solution 
that will be imposed. 
 
Interviewees stated that O’Neill v Phillips147 supported early fair offers to buy-out as an 
appropriate way of settling disputes and Grace v Biagioli148 held that under section 461, 
buy-out is an appropriate order to resolve minority shareholder disputes in private 
companies. It was stated that shareholder disputes were usually resolved through buy-
out and buy-out was an appropriate relief in these disputes. In experience of some 
interviewees in 90% of cases the order made by the court was buy-out [C, G, H]. 
Interviewees stated that: 
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The usual outcome of these disputes whether in courts or in settlements is buy-out. It is very 
unusual for either the minority or majority to want anything less than divorce or separation, 
therefore buy-out is the most common order in these cases [G]. 
 
It is common for shareholders at that stage of litigation to prefer exit. However, in family 
companies if disputes are not that severe, people want to stay in the same company as they are a 
family and they have to get on with things [E]. 
 
While explaining the logic behind buy-out, interviewee H stated that in a company 
where shareholders were not on harmonious terms, the obvious answer was that the 
majority had to buy out the minority otherwise, even the majority shareholder was going 
to ‘have an unpleasant life’. Other interviewees added that: 
 
Disputes are usually resolved through buy-out which is appropriate relief, as these companies are 
formed on the basis of mutual trust and confidence of shareholders and disputes arise as a result 
of the end of that mutual trust. When people fall out it will not be possible to make them work 
together, it will become necessary to effect some sort of parting of ways. In private companies if 
the minority shareholder wants to leave the company, the majority shareholder is the only buyer 
in the market for the shares and it is in his interests to buy the shares. It is quite wrong to keep 
some poor minority shareholder in a company with some unpleasant majority shareholder [H].  
 
Buy out is a final outcome in these cases since due to the end of mutual trust and confidence 
shareholders do not desire to stay in the same company and work together. There is constant 
possibility of future conflicts as the mutual trust has severely damaged, the basis upon which the 
company was once formed. In the event of a dispute, for the majority it is better to do away with 
the minority by buying him out since the minority may start proceedings against the majority 
again and for the minority even if the minority has a good case he should try to be bought out and 
invest somewhere else [B].  
 
Clients are advised firmly by any sensible solicitor or barrister that it is preposterous for them to 
stay in the same company. As the minority is never going to trust the majority again and they 
both can never get on with one another [K].  
 
The courts’ stance as to the outcome of shareholder disputes was extremely well settled.  
One interviewee stated that: 
 
I think the courts are right to say that in the great majority of cases the right solution is a clean 
break. Courts are very pragmatic about it; that these guys are not going to carry on the business 
and this is not going to be the last piece of litigation. The courts are very anxious not to create a 
situation that will lead to further litigation [G].  
 
Legal certainty regarding buy-out as an appropriate relief in shareholder disputes can 
assist to settle the disputes out of court since the way of resolving these disputes is well- 
established. 
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6.5.2.4.1 Relief other than buy-out: 
Interviewees stated that in shareholder disputes forms of relief other than buy-out 
available under section 461(2) were very rarely encountered in practice such as orders 
regulating the management of the company. If there would be a breach against that order 
parties would be in courts again. However, there were cases where the court had ordered 
the company to change the articles of association [C]. In these disputes any order other 
than buy-out could not be helpful because it was not possible to make the parties work 
together. Therefore, courts usually said that shareholders had to bring an end to an 
impossible relationship [D]. Parties to these disputes often expect buy-out. However, 
sometimes a petitioner who was a minority shareholder desired to buy the company. 
Minority shareholders virtually never or very rarely sought relief under which they 
would stay in the company [K]. 
 
It was possible that in some cases, the departing shareholder, due to the commitment of 
time and money to the company, might consider the valuation of shares at that particular 
time to be against his interests and would prefer to stay in the company. However, such 
concerns regarding the fair valuation might be reflected in the share price at the time of 
the valuation of shares.149 As opposed to the majority view, one interviewee’s isolated 
view was that in his experience in one third of cases shareholders did not want to leave 
the company and desired other remedies under section 461 of the CA 1985 [F]. 
Interviewee F stressed the point that it should not be the problem of courts or judges 
what would happen next if there were not a buy-out order. Courts should decide the 
matter by using the discretion available to them regarding other forms of relief under 
section 461. It was a defeat of the system if shareholders end up in court at trial but some 
compromises reached were not very good. There were situations where shareholders did 
not want to leave the company and where they should be granted some other remedy 
under section 461 but present case law was not taking it into account. Courts should be 
prepared to provide protection by amending the articles. Furthermore, if someone had 
worked hard and the fruits would be evident in profits some time in the future then he 
would prefer staying in the company to enjoy profits later. Courts should provide him 
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 See above para 6.5.2.2.1 The role of offers in settling shareholder disputes. 
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protection by permitting him to stay and should impose certain provisions for his 
protection in articles which the statute allowed the court to do [F]. Interviewee F was 
keen to labour the point: 
 
A much more interventionist judiciary is needed. If the shareholder wants to stay in the company, 
then it should not be the judge’s problem. Everybody thinks in terms of divorce instead of 
reconciliation. Their whole intention is to keep people out of court and it’s like one size fits all. 
Each set of proceedings should be dealt with to get a fair and just outcome. The law should be 
much more adaptable and much more flexible. Case law sets the framework and case law can be 
more imaginative in terms of remedy. When the section was introduced, parliament thought there 
were other alternatives “courts should make such order as they think fit”. Courts should exercise 
the discretion they have been given [F].  
 
Furthermore, wide exercises of the discretion might involve curbing the power of the 
majority, curbing the power of wrong doers, insisting on proper corporate governance 
and regulating procedures in private companies. A lot of disputes arose in companies 
having no shareholders’ agreements. In large joint ventures people dealt with every 
eventuality with the assistance of highly sophisticated solicitors and spent months before 
they set up the joint venture. In small private companies that seldom happened. When 
there were less protections the court could impose them in articles. Interviewee F 
mentioned that Hart J said in Re Regional Airports Ltd,150 ‘it was surprising that all that 
was asked for was buy-out because alternative remedy might be a good idea’. 
 
In response to this, it can be argued that as evident above in the majority of cases at the 
stage of conflict when shareholders are thinking to start court proceedings, shareholders 
do not prefer to stay in the company. Grace v Biagioli151 is a judicial endorsement of the 
view that buy-out will ordinarily be the appropriate practical solution. However, buy-out 
may not be an appropriate solution in every case and courts are not always inclined to 
separate the shareholders through buy-out. In exceptional cases courts considered to 
order otherwise. The interviewee himself gave the example of Re Regional Airports 
Ltd152 where the petitioner asked for buy-out, but the court was considering exploiting 
the wide discretion provided to court under section 461. It is also evident from Re 
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 [1999] 2 BCLC 30. 
 205 
Metropolis Motorcycles Ltd153 that courts are not completely inclined only towards buy-
out remedy but are also willing to use their discretion under section 461(1) and may 
refuse to order buy-out that was desired by the petitioner where circumstances of the 
case may suggest. Mann J in Re Metropolis Motorcycles Ltd stated in his judgment that:  
 
It has not been demonstrated to me on the facts that the present situation is based on a degree of 
unfairness which requires or justifies the intervention of this court, particularly to order the 
buyout claimed by [the petitioner]. I have not come to this decision lightly. Where there is a 
degree of separation and distrust that now exists in this matter between two owners of a company 
it is not an easy conclusion to come to that they should, at least for the time being, not be 
separated.154  
 
There is no doubt that there can be cases where minority shareholders will like to stay in 
the company but issue arises for courts to decide, whether such a course is in the 
commercial interests of shareholders and company. If yes, then courts should be willing 
to exercise their discretion under section 461. However, issue as to shareholders’ 
investment and future return upon it can be addressed at the event share valuation.  
 
A further point here is that relief, which involves the parties staying together, will 
usually involve some kind of order regulating the future affairs of the company. 
Consistent with the old internal management principle this is not the kind of relief, that 
courts will be keen to grant because it is too interventionist and will require policing. 
Moreover, breach of its terms will bring the matter back before the court with the 
implication that the court becomes a voice of last resort in the ongoing management of 
the company.    
 
It is evident that at relational breakdown in private companies, shareholders often 
demand exit through buy-out and courts often prefer to order buy-out.  Moreover, buy-
out is considered an appropriate relief in these disputes. Such apparent consensus among 
shareholders, practitioners and courts upon the way of resolving these disputes through 
buy-out can assist to achieve an early compromise in negotiation and possibly will 
promote a number of settlements with time, as it seems rational, to obtain the 
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appropriate relief by negotiation in an out of court settlement instead of through costly 
court process. 
  
6.5.2.4.2 Date of valuation of shares at buy-out order under section 461 of CA 1985:155 
After O’Neill v Phillips, in Re Guidezone Ltd156 as to date of valuation at the end of 
proceedings where the buy-out was ordered, it was held that “given that the value of the 
shares has increased since the events complained of, I would have directed that the 
appropriate date is the date of the order”. In Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone157 by 
referring to the judgment of Nourse J in Re London School of Electronics Ltd158 the 
Court of Appeal held that subject to the overriding requirement that the valuation should 
be fair on the facts of the particular case, “Prima facie an interest in a going concern 
ought to be valued at the date on which it is ordered to be purchased”.159 In Profinance 
Trust SA v Gladstone160 the court provided a guideline when an earlier valuation date 
was appropriate161 and stated that “the clearest reason for selecting an early valuation 
date is that there has been a major change (whether for the better or for the worse) in a 
company’s capital structure and business”.162 Therefore, the general principle remains 
the same as pre-O’Neill that the valuation should be fair on the facts of the particular 
case.163 
 
Interviewees mentioned that as to valuation and date of valuation there had been a 
change through case law in Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone164 in the Court of Appeal 
that has had an effect in practice. An interviewee stated as a general rule for the court, 
the only date of valuation of shares was the date when the court would give the 
judgment on the petition. It was not the date when the petitioner was excluded and not 
the date the petitioner issued the petition or the date of the first day of the trial. It was the 
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date the court decided there had been unfair prejudice. That was the date of valuation for 
a going concern company. It was a general rule subject to exceptions but in practice, it 
was very difficult to shift the court. The court was faced with a number of competing 
dates and there were plenty of arguments about date of valuation. So the court imposed 
that general date [T].  
 
6.6 Conclusion: 
Substantive law developments through case law, after the Law Commission Report have 
affected the way section 459 petitions are dealt with in practice. O’Neill v Phillips and 
Grace v Biagioli enhanced the legal certainty as to the scope of the provision and 
appropriate outcome of the shareholders’ disputes.  O’Neill v Phillips discontinued the 
wide use of the concept of legitimate expectations and reinforced some prevailing 
practices as regards early settlement. By circumscribing the meaning of unfairness 
O’Neill enhanced the legal certainty as to the scope of the provision. Enhanced legal 
certainty reduced the number of petitions commenced in courts and now there seems to 
be less scope for the minority to misuse the remedy165 and has therefore reduced the case 
load upon courts. But proving unfairly prejudicial conduct can still be a lengthy and 
cumbersome process. Furthermore, increased legal certainty reduces the discretion of 
courts to which the courts were traditionally reluctant to exploit166 and may assist 
shareholders while negotiating to reach a compromise.   
 
O’Neill v Phillips and Grace v Biagioli considered buy-out an appropriate outcome in 
out of court settlements and court proceedings in shareholders’ disputes. In practice 
relief other than buy-out is not common in shareholder disputes. Such legal certainty as 
to the outcome of these disputes enhances in practice the scope of achieving early 
compromise in negotiation and will promote a number of settlements in shareholder 
disputes with time.   
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O’Neill v Phillips strongly encourages early offers to buy-out to settle the disputes at an 
early stage to avoid the lengthy, complex and costly section 459 proceedings. Early 
settlement is beneficial not only for shareholders and companies but also assist to save 
court resources and therefore provide an effective resolution to shareholder disputes167 
and are also consistent with the Woolf objectives.168 Practitioners were writing early 
offers letters to buy-out even before O’Neill but O’Neill reinforces the prevailing 
practices and articulates the courts’ stance. It focuses the lawyers’ minds on traditional 
modes of settlement and therefore assists in promoting a settlement culture in these 
disputes. However, in practice shareholders cannot be forced to settle the dispute at fair 
offer to buy-out if in their opinion offers are not fair. On the basis of fair offers 
shareholders may apply for strike-out and courts are more willing now to entertain 
strike-out applications. However, the success of a strike out application also depends 
upon evaluating whether the offer made is a fair one. As a result, to obtain a fair value of 
the shares shareholders may have to become involved in lengthy and expensive court 
proceedings. Even though O’Neill v Phillips encourages early offers to buy-out to settle 
it does not permit exit at will. It increases the legal certainty as to the scope of the 
section that to obtain relief there must be unfairly prejudicial conduct against the 
petitioner.  
 
It can be asserted that although the enhanced legal certainty has proved helpful, 
establishing a cause of action under the provision to obtain relief or to get fair value of 
shares in the event of buy-out can still be subject to lengthy and costly proceedings.  
Therefore, settlement of disputes by negotiation is still a preferred way of resolving 
these disputes due to its cost effectiveness. Settlements may not be successful where the 
parties fail to reach a compromise. However, exploitation of other means may assist, 
persuade or motivate shareholders to reach a compromise in minimum time and cost. 
These means to settle the disputes, to avoid the time and costs involved in court 
proceedings, are introduced by Civil Procedure Rules 1998 for all kinds of civil disputes 
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and have received an unequivocal welcome by the Law Commission.169 O’Neill v 
Phillips encourages early fair offer to settle shareholder disputes and so reinforces the 
CPR. Lowry stated that from the wider perspective, the decision in O’Neill can be 
viewed as underpinning, for the purposes of section 459, the Woolf (the CPR) objectives 
of constructing a system of civil litigation that is accessible, speedy and certain.170 The 
CPR also implemented procedural rules controlling the conduct of proceedings, to avoid 
the delay and cost involved in court proceedings. The next chapter will discuss the 
impact of the procedural law developments under the CPR upon section 459 
proceedings. The chapter will explore (i) how effective these means are to settle 
shareholder disputes and (ii) whether the new procedural rules have enhanced the 
effectiveness of the unfair prejudice remedy to resolve shareholder disputes by courts.  
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Chapter 7 
Procedural law developments 
 
7.1 Scope of the chapter: 
The chapter mainly focuses upon the role of the Civil Procedure Rules 19981 in 
streamlining the effectiveness of section 459 proceedings by a resolution of shareholder 
disputes in minimum time and cost to shareholders, companies and the administration of 
justice by the courts.2 After the introduction and discussion of the general procedural 
law developments under the CPR, the chapter analyses the nature and impact of the 
procedural law developments upon section 459 proceedings. The impact of the 
procedural developments in practice is evaluated in the light of the findings of the 
empirical investigation.  
 
7.2 Introduction: 
In shareholder disputes in private companies courts prefer to order the remedy of buy-
out in the event of relational breakdown where a cause of action is proved under section 
459 of the CA 1985.3 Establishing a cause of action under section 459 can be a lengthy, 
cumbersome and costly process.4 Therefore, the courts have encouraged the use of buy-
out offers as a means of settling disputes at an early stage so as to avoid the time and 
costs inevitably involved in section 459 proceedings.5 This is not only in the interests of 
shareholders and companies but also makes for the better exploitation of the courts’ 
resources. However, shareholders cannot be forced to make early offers to buy-out as an 
instrument for settlement. The settlement of section 459 disputes comprises two 
ingredients. Firstly, the parties must accept that one buying out the other (or vice versa) 
is an appropriate solution. Secondly, the parties must agree a valuation that both can live 
with. As far as the first ingredient is concerned, it is evident from the discussion in 
previous chapters, that shareholders often prefer buy-out given the relational character of 
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shareholder disputes. It is also well established, the leading case now being Grace v 
Biagioli6 that courts also prefer to order buy-out at trial considering it an appropriate 
way to avoid continuing disputes within a company.7 It appears also that there is rarely 
any issue concerning which party is to be bought out, often the minority shareholder.8 
Hence, the core of the dispute may not go to the question of who is to buy-out whom but 
instead be about the second ingredient, valuation. It is often hard for shareholders to 
agree a value for the shares that is acceptable to both sides.9 If a valuation cannot be 
agreed, the basis and mechanism for arriving at a valuation may itself have to be 
resolved by the court. Effective dispute resolution in shareholder disputes will therefore 
often depend upon achieving a compromise regarding the value of shares as early as 
possible.   
 
Various means can be exploited to assist, motivate and persuade shareholders to settle 
disputed issues as to buy-out and fair valuation of shares as early as possible, as 
emphasized by the courts. These means include inter alia pre-action correspondence and 
the costs incurred by shareholders in court proceedings, especially if there are significant 
costs involved in the initial stages of case preparation, may persuade shareholders to 
settle sooner rather than later.10 However, shareholders cannot be forced to settle the 
dispute.11 These means or methods that may assist to settle disputes along with means to 
control the conduct of litigation were proposed by Lord Woolf in his final Report.12  
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7.2.1 The Woolf Reforms: 
The problems associated with section 459 as regards cost, delay and complexity13 are 
problems that Lord Woolf identified as being endemic across the whole civil justice 
system. His recommendations for addressing these problems led to the fundamental 
overhaul of the civil justice system. Lord Woolf’s interim Report stated that “The key 
problems facing civil justice today are cost, delay and complexity”.14 It further stated 
that:  
 
The overall aim of my inquiry is to improve access to justice by reducing the inequalities, costs, 
delay and complexity of civil litigation and to introduce greater certainty as to timescales and 
costs.15  
 
In his final report, Lord Woolf stated that  
 
My approach to civil justice is that dispute should, wherever possible, be resolved without 
litigation. Where litigation is unavoidable, it should be conducted with a view to encouraging 
settlement at the earliest appropriate stage.16  
 
Lord Woolf’s proposals were therefore designed to achieve two main objectives: (i) the 
avoidance of litigation wherever possible; (ii)   for litigation which cannot be avoided to 
be more focused and less costly.17 These proposals were later implemented by the Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998.18  
 
7.2.2 The Law Commission’s proposals: 
As discussed in chapter 5 above the Law Commission in its final Report considered the 
problems of excessive length, cost and factual complexity of proceedings under section 
459.19 To streamline the effectiveness of the remedy by controlling the conduct of 
proceedings on procedural level the Law Commission proposed that such proceedings 
should be dealt with primarily by active case management by the courts as proposed in 
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the Woolf Report regarding the management of proceedings.20 The proposal was later 
also supported by the Company Law Review.21 As discussed above the wide scope of 
the section 459 of the CA 1985 has increased the cost and length of the litigation under 
the section.22 The Woolf reforms23 implemented by the CPR and were further 
supplemented by practice directions24 along with the additional practical information 
provided by the Chancery Guide 2005.25 The following proposals of the Law 
Commission in relation to section 459 proceedings were implemented within the civil 
justice system as a whole for civil disputes by the CPR.  
 
1. To control the conduct of section 459 proceedings firstly, the Law Commission 
recommended that greater use should be made of the power to direct that preliminary 
issues be heard, or that some issues be tried before others.26 The CPR provide that the 
court may “direct a separate trial of any issue”27 or “decide the order in which issues are 
to be tried”.28  
2. The Law Commission recommended that in shareholder proceedings the court 
should have the power to dismiss any claim or part of a claim or defence thereto which, 
in the opinion of the court, has no realistic prospect of success at trial.29 The CPR 
provide that “the court may dismiss or give judgment on a claim after a decision on a 
preliminary issue”.30  
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3. The Law Commission encouraged the greater use of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) in shareholder disputes.31 The Law Commission recommended the 
inclusion of an express reference in the 1986 Rules32 “to the power to adjourn at any 
stage to enable the parties to make use of mechanisms for ADR for disposing of the case 
or any issue in it, together with provisions for reporting back to the court as to the 
outcome along the lines of the 1996 Commercial Court Practice Statement”.33 The 
Company Law Review also recommended that the courts should encourage the parties 
once litigation has commenced, to take a step back and use ADR wherever possible.34 
Lord Woolf stated that to avoid litigation wherever possible and to make litigation less 
adversarial and more cooperative, parties would be encouraged to start court 
proceedings only as a last resort.35 The courts would encourage the use of ADR at case 
management conferences and pre-trial reviews and would take into account36 whether 
the parties had unreasonably refused to try ADR or behaved unreasonably in the course 
of ADR.37 Therefore, the CPR encouraged the greater use of ADR in civil disputes 
backed by the threat of costs sanctions if not undertaken in circumstances where it was 
appropriate. The CPR provide that “active case management includes encouraging the 
parties to use an alternative dispute resolution procedure if the court considers that 
appropriate”.38 
4. The Law Commission also recommended that the court’s power to determine 
how facts are to be proved should be used pro-actively by the court by giving court 
powers to control the evidence to be put before it.39 The CPR contains such powers.40  
                                                                                                                                                
no real prospect of success and there is no compelling reason for the case or issue to be disposed of at a 
trial. 
31
 The Law Commission’s Report [5.34]-[5.38]. ADR mechanisms here include mediation, conciliation 
and arbitration. 
32
 Companies (Unfair Prejudice Applications) Proceedings Rules 1986. 
33
 The Law Commission’s Report [2.22]. 
34
 Company Law Review ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report’ vol. 1 (URN 
01/942, July 2001) [4.10]-[4.12].   
35
 Woolf Final Report, section 1 [9]. 
36
 Following the line of cases discussed below in the context of cost sanctions for unreasonable refusal to 
mediate in para 7.4.2.5 Factors that contribute to successful outcomes in mediations. 
37
 Woolf Final Report, section 1 [9]. 
38
 CPR, r 1.4 (2)(e), see also Chancery Guide chapter 17. ADR is discussed in detail below in chapter 8.  
39
 The Law Commission’s Report [2.24]. 
40
 CPR, r 32.1.   
 215 
5. The Law Commission recommended that in shareholder proceedings the court 
should have power to exclude an issue from determination if it can do substantive justice 
between the parties without considering that issue.41 The CPR provide that “the court 
may exclude an issue from consideration”.42  
6. The Law Commission recommended that “in proceedings under section 459 the 
court should have greater flexibility than it had previously to make costs orders to reflect 
the manner in which the successful party has conducted the proceedings and the 
outcome of individual issues” echoing the Woolf Report.43 This recommendation was 
also implemented by the CPR.44  
 
Below after outlining the main changes brought about generally by the CPR, the chapter 
considers the nature and impact of the CPR upon section 459 proceedings to effectively 
resolve shareholder disputes.   
 
7.3 Overview of the changes to civil procedure brought about by the CPR: 
 
7.3.1 Case management powers of courts: 
The CPR introduced two types of developments: firstly parties were encouraged to settle 
their dispute early, so reinforcing O’Neill v Phillips early offers to buy-out45 and 
secondly rules were implemented to control the conduct of proceedings. The CPR 
consist of (i) an overriding objective; (ii) principles to further the overriding objective 
and (iii) detailed supplementary rules and practice directions. The CPR have the 
overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly.46 CPR rule 1.1(2) 
defines the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly to include inter alia saving 
expense, ensuring that the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly and efficient use of 
court resources. Rule 1.1(2) states that:   
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Dealing with a case justly includes, so far as is practicable  
(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; 
(b) saving expense; 
(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to  
(i) the amount of money involved; 
(ii) the importance of the case; 
(iii) the complexity of the issues; 
(iv) the financial position of each party; 
(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly 
(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the               
need to allot resources to other cases. 
 
Clearly, these matters may be of relevance to section 459 proceedings given the tenor of 
the Law Commission’s critique. The CPR provide that the court must seek to give effect 
to the overriding objective while exercising its powers and interpreting any of its 
specific rules.47 The CPR set out the courts’ duty and powers to manage cases.48 CPR 
rule 1.4 states that to meet the overriding objective courts will actively manage cases. 
Rule 1.4(2) of the CPR defines the scope for active case management by the courts. By 
enhancing the case management powers of the court the CPR provide that active case 
management includes inter alia helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the 
case49 and giving directions to ensure that the trial of a case proceeds quickly and 
efficiently50. These powers of courts may be useful particularly in controlling the length 
and costs of section 459 proceedings.51 The courts have acknowledged the utility of 
these powers in the specific context of section 459 proceedings.52  
 
Rule 1.4(2) of the CPR provides the basic principles of active case management to 
achieve the overriding objective that (i) encourage the parties to co-operate with each 
other in the conduct of proceeding53 and help the parties to settle the whole or part of the 
case and also give proper consideration to ADR54 and (ii) enhance the courts powers to 
                                                 
47
 See CPR, r 1.2. 
48
 See CPR, r 1.4, 3.1. 
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 CPR, r 1.4(2)(f). 
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 CPR, r 1.4(2)(l). 
51
 See above chapter 5 para 5.6.2 The Law Commission’s critique of section 459 of the CA 1985. 
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section 459 proceedings. 
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 See CPR, r 1.4 (a). 
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 See CPR, r 1.4 (e)(f). 
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manage the proceedings55 in contrast to the pre-CPR system where it is generally 
thought that parties and their lawyers controlled the pace of litigation which often 
resulted in lengthy and costly litigation.56 Under the current system co-operation 
between the parties before or during the proceedings seems to be fundamental to meet 
the overriding objective. The court57 can actively manage cases at the pre-trial stage by 
(i) identifying the issues at an early stage and deciding promptly which issues need full 
investigation and/or need to be set down for trial and disposing summarily of the others; 
(ii) deciding the order and manner in which issues are to be resolved to ensure the quick 
and efficient progress of the case.58  
 
The court’s general powers of management are further explained in rule 3.1(2)(m) of the 
CPR which provides that except where the rules provide otherwise, the court may take 
any other step or make any other order for the purpose of managing the case and 
furthering the overriding objective.59 The Chancery Guide further describes the scope of 
case management and states that the key feature of the CPR is that cases are closely 
monitored by the court.60 By defining the duties of the parties the CPR provide that the 
parties are required to help the court and to co-operate with each other to further the 
overriding objective.61 
 
Reading the CPR along with the pre-action protocols,62 it seems evident that two broad 
measures have been introduced under the CPR, to achieve the overriding objective of 
saving expense and efficient use of court resources. These are: (i) promotion of early 
settlement of disputes especially at the pre-action stage and encouragement towards the 
use of ADR mechanisms and (ii) courts’ control over the proceedings through enhanced 
case management powers.  
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 See CPR, r 1.4 (2)(b-d)(g-l). 
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 See O’ Hare, J., and Browne, K., Civil Litigation. ( 11th ed Sweet and Maxwell, London 2003) 7. 
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In his commentary on the defects of the pre-CPR system, Zuckerman asserts that the 
courts’ main concern was to deal with cases on the merits without giving much 
consideration to the issues of cost and delay in the proceedings unless the delay was 
really prejudicial to one or more of the parties.63 To address this problem the CPR 
focuses upon the problems of costs and delay in civil proceedings. It has been rightly 
stated that case management was a corner-stone of Lord Woolf’s procedural reforms.64 
Lord Woolf’s reforms of civil procedure emphasised the need to resolve disputes 
quickly and cost effectively with proper consideration being given to the available 
resources of the parties and the courts in any particular case. The reforms have also tried 
to promote the early resolution of disputes. As Andrews has put it:  
 
[B]y exercising its case management powers, the court is expected to curb the parties’ tendency 
to take inappropriate steps or to prosecute the case in an oppressive, disproportionate, inefficient 
or unfair fashion”.65    
 
Hence, the objective to deal with cases justly includes (i) fair adjudication in accordance 
with particular facts and law (ii) decision within a reasonable time and (iii) use of 
proportionate resources in any particular case.66 There can be conflict among these three 
elements when pursuing the overriding objective. For example just and fair adjudication 
of disputes may demand considerable time and resources of both courts and parties 
which as a result may increase the length and cost of litigation. 
 
Zuckerman has suggested that to serve the community in a better way, there is 
considerable scope for simplifying and speeding up the process of litigation in order to 
yield more timely and less costly judgments even if it means some sacrifice in the 
quality of those judgments.67 He has also proposed that empirical research should be 
undertaken to assess the extent to which accuracy and/or quality of judicial product 
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 See Zuckerman, A., Zuckerman on Civil Procedure (2nd ed. Sweet and Maxwell, London. 2006) paras 
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 See ibid 338. 
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might be compromised in the interests of speed.68 In fact the CPR confer on the courts a 
wide discretion to prefer any of these three elements in the event that they conflict.69  
 
7.3.1.1 Criticism of case management powers in legal literature: 
Zuckerman stated that wide discretion of courts under the Rules does not signify that 
courts have unlimited discretion regarding case management decisions. The courts are 
supposed to make case management decisions according to established principles and 
guidelines laid down by the higher courts.70 In the lead up to the adoption of the CPR, 
there was some scepticism about the likely efficacy of case management. One concern 
was that broad discretionary powers would lead to a huge increase in inconsistent 
decision making.71 Such variations threaten to reduce the predictability of litigation 
especially where individual exercises of discretion are largely unregulated by the 
appellate courts.72 In this context Lord Woolf has stated that:  
 
…judges have to be trusted to exercise the wide discretions which they have fairly and justly in 
all the circumstances…. When judges seek to do that, it is important that the [Court of Appeal] 
should not interfere unless judges can be shown to have exercised their powers in some way 
which contravenes the relevant principles.73  
 
In a section 459 case the Court of Appeal refused to interfere in the case management 
decision of the court of first instance. At the order of the court a joint expert was 
appointed to prepare a report as to the market value of the company’s shares and a 
minority holding for the purposes of share valuation. Due to high costs of the joint 
expert the court ordered to dispense with expert services and to use a cheaper expert. On 
appeal from this order, the Court of Appeal held that it would not interfere where the 
judge exercised his discretion on such a case management decision in the absence of any 
serious procedural irregularity.74       
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 Ibid 382, 387. 
69
 See below para 7.3.1.1  
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 See Zuckermann A., Civil Procedure. (LexisNexis Butterworths, UK 2003) 15. 
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Sugarman expressed the concern that “the philosophy of greater court control may in 
practice elevate efficiency above the other goals of a civil justice system, such as fair 
justice”.75 It was asserted that the “case management is unlikely to operate effectively 
unless it is properly tested76 and refined in practice and is sustained by adequate 
resources, judicial training and careful monitoring”.77 Judicial case management powers 
under the CPR were not considered a satisfactory solution to the problem since case 
management itself relied heavily on the exercise of discretion by the courts. As a result, 
a shareholder would need more rather than less evidence to persuade the court to 
exercise its discretion in his favour at the case management stage and this would also 
increase the cost of the litigation.78 It was stated that “there is a tension between the 
extra emphasis on judicial discretion and the aim of reducing litigation costs”.79 
However, it can be argued that costs incurred up to and including the case management 
stage will be front end loaded and this may create incentives for the parties to consider 
settlement.80 
 
It was also argued that there was no solid empirical evidence of any kind to back Lord 
Woolf’s diagnosis of the problem, that the chief cause of delay was the way the 
adversary system was played by the lawyers.81 Research conducted in the US indicated 
“that case management increases the cost of litigation because it generates more work 
for lawyers”.82 Zuckerman argued that the “history of law reforms shows that a 
simplification of procedure is not enough to produce savings as long as there are 
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 Sugarman, D., ‘Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on the Law Commission’s Consultation 
Paper on Shareholder Remedies [Part 2]’ (1997) 18(9) Company Lawyer 274, 276. See below para 7.3.2 
Existing research evaluating the impact of the CPR, a research study found that case management has 
improved the pace of litigation but at higher costs. 
76
 See Rotadata Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 122; North Holdings Ltd v Southern Tropics Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 625 
where Civil Procedure Rules 1998 have been applied in unfair prejudice case under section 459 of 
Companies Act 1985. 
77
 Sugarman, D., ‘Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on the Law Commission’s Consultation 
Paper on Shareholder Remedies [Part 2]’ (1997) 18(9) Company Lawyer 274, fn 288. 
78
 Ibid 276. 
79
 Roberts, P., and Poole J., ‘Shareholders Remedies- Efficient Litigation and the Unfair Prejudice 
Remedy’ (1999) Journal of Business Law 38, 48. 
80
 See below para 7.4.2.1 Pre-action co-operation and 7.4.2.1.1 Front loading of costs.  
81
 See Zander, M., ‘Woolf on Zander’ (1997) 147 New Law Journal 768, 769.  
82
 Sugarman, D., ‘Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on the Law Commission’s Consultation 
Paper on Shareholder Remedies [Part 2]’ (1997) 18(9) Company Lawyer 274, 276. 
 221 
incentives to devise new complications”.83 Lawyers had economic incentives since their 
remuneration rose as litigation became more complicated and lengthy.84  Therefore, 
lawyers who are trained to deal with cases in an adversarial manner may exploit new 
techniques to litigate the issue for their own financial advantage.85  
 
7.3.2 Existing research evaluating the impact of the CPR: 
Research has been conducted to evaluate whether the procedural developments under 
CPR at pre-action and case management stages were as effective as anticipated.86 One 
qualitative empirical research project commissioned by the then Department of 
Constitutional Affairs considered case management in eight county courts.87 
Concentration of the research was on the typical experience of case managed litigation 
in county courts across England.88 As to case management it was stated that it is an art 
and not science and each case depends on its own facts. Practitioners expressed some 
concern as to inconsistency particularly as between courts or in very large trial centres 
where it could not be predicted what the outcome would be and this brings a lot of 
uncertainty.89  
 
However the research concluded that case management powers under the CPR had been 
successful in reducing delay and had made the process more certain.90 The settlement 
rate was found to be very high and that was felt to be a result of the CPR.91 The majority 
of cases considered settled pre-issue and only a minute number of multi-track cases had 
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gone to trial. In most areas of civil litigation, demands of the CPR required substantial 
work. Evidence from interviewees as to their impressions of the overall position 
suggested that costs had increased overall due to the CPR and cost per case was higher 
than it had been pre-CPR.92 It was stated that justice required accurate judgments at a 
reasonable cost. Case managed court based dispute resolution system was delivering 
quality at a much improved pace but not anymore cheaply and possibly, at higher costs 
than pre-CPR.93  
 
Another research project commissioned jointly by the Law Society and the Civil Justice 
Council to provide an initial evaluation of the reforms concentrated on the pre-action 
stages of litigation, particularly protocols and offers to settle disputes.94 The research 
focused on three areas of practice namely personal injury, clinical negligence and 
housing. A theme emerging from the study is that procedural rules rarely change 
cultures on their own. The possibilities for cultural change were greatest when reforms 
work with other structural and economic transformations. The court reforms had been 
most successful where they have worked alongside legal aid and managerial changes 
which also emphasised early focus on and a pragmatic approach to settlement.  
 
This research found that practitioners generally regarded the Woolf reforms as a success. 
The reforms were liked for providing a clearer structure, greater openness and making 
settlements easier to achieve. Interestingly, the housing practitioners interviewed 
reported similar experiences to the practitioners in other areas of work even though 
housing litigation was not at the time subject to a protocol.95 However, the picture was 
qualified in that many respondents reported that change had been patchy. Respondents 
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frequently criticised some their counterparts for failing to adapt to the new culture. Some 
litigants, especially specialists, had adapted while others maintained pre-Woolf attitudes 
and approaches. 
 
Respondents criticised the lack of sanctions on those who failed to act reasonably in the 
course of pre-action negotiations. Secondly, although case management was not 
explored in any depth in the research, interviewees frequently highlighted perceived 
failings within the courts and criticised the courts for inefficiency and delay. Case 
management was far more positively received in London than outside, where there were 
problems with providing experienced judges and apparently inconsistent decisions. 
Thirdly, respondents complained that the Woolf reforms had failed to reduce the cost of 
litigation.96 It was also confirmed that the study showed how intractable was the 
problem of cost. Although the reforms were well liked, and might have led to perceived 
‘soft’ improvements in, for example, the level of co-operation and settlement, it was 
much more difficult to make litigation cheaper.  
 
7.3.3 Empirical evaluation of the impact of the procedural developments under the 
CPR 
In my empirical research I explored the impact of the procedural developments under the 
CPR on both general Chancery practice and specifically in relation to section 459 
practice.  Here, the chapter discusses the findings of the research regarding the impact of 
the CPR upon general Chancery practice. 
 
The majority of the interviewees confirmed that they had experienced changes in their 
chancery practice as a result of the CPR. Interviewees stated that following the CPR the 
amount of litigation had decreased and there were more settlements of disputes due to 
                                                 
96
 It was stated in the report that “each potential saving in the reform is offset by other changes that require 
more work, or bring forward work to an early stage”. See Goriely T., Moorhead R., and Abrams, P. ‘More 
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increased costs of litigation.97 The emphasis upon pre-action co-operation along with 
appropriate exploitation of ADR, in order to settle the dispute under risk of cost 
sanctions had increased early settlements of disputes. Moreover, pre-action 
correspondence and pre-trial preparations to control the conduct of trial had made costs 
front end loaded and this had also contributed to the settlement of disputes at an early 
stage. Pre-trial preparations had increased the pace of the trial and cases took less time in 
courts. Against this prevailing view, there were some practitioners who were less 
convinced about the extent and depth of the general impact.  One interviewee described 
CPR as a bit of a ‘damp squib’ that had not significantly affected her practice [R]. These 
responses are discussed below in detail. 
 
Interviewees stated that following the CPR practice had changed because the amount of 
litigation had decreased substantially and fewer cases were starting now in courts due to 
increased litigation costs [P, J]: 
 
The CPR was intended to make the litigation cheaper but there was a perception it had made it 
more expensive and cost had gone up with the CPR because of front loaded costs. Parties have to 
follow cards on the table approach [G] 
 
I think my general view in relation to the Civil Procedure Rule is that the rules contributed 
considerably to the cost of litigation, and that has resulted in people being less willing to litigate. 
Now you have to have done the work for the trial upfront. Therefore, instead of getting a legal 
decision on their disputes people try to reach some sort of commercial compromise [P].  
 
The prevailing view was that the CPR had promoted a settlement culture in chancery 
practice. The following extract suggests that pre-action protocols have been particularly 
significant in this regard. 
 
One of the objectives of the rules has been met, which is to make people think before they issue 
proceedings. In the past you could issue and then your negotiations could catch up. Nowadays, 
because of pre-action protocols, people go through very lengthy correspondence before issuance 
of proceedings and that promotes settlement [J].  
 
However, while interviewees regarded the emphasis on pre-action correspondence and 
ADR in particular mediation as the biggest change brought about by the CPR, the 
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general impression was that there was no great appetite for forcing people to mediate in 
chancery division [A]. 
 
Interviewees stated that following the CPR costs of litigation were front end loaded due 
to pre-action co-operation and pre-trial preparations that increased the settlements and 
decreased the amount of litigation. Due to the pre-action protocols litigants had to 
engage in quite a lot of expense before they actually started the litigation and this, in 
turn, operated as an incentive to avoid litigation [R]. Secondly, the rules require much of 
the preparation for trial to be done at the outset rather than just before trial [P]. This 
further accentuated the tendency for the CPR to lead to front loading of costs and 
inclined the parties and their lawyers to think about settlement early rather than later in 
the proceedings stage [C, P]. Interviewee T explained the reasons behind the front 
loading of costs: 
 
Under the CPR before you issue any proceedings generally speaking you have got to have your 
whole case ready since, for CPR purposes once the case is issued the court takes hold of it. In 
case management terms, which is another difference now, courts get the cases by the scruff of the 
neck by applying their cases management powers available under the CPR. So under the CPR 
there is more front loading of the work, you have got to do more work before you issue 
proceedings than you used to do. Under the old procedure you could issue proceedings and you 
could go slowly and be very tactical, the parties would control the litigation [T].  
 
Interviewees were strongly of the opinion that the rules on pre-trial preparations had 
reduced the time in which cases were processed through the court system. However, 
their general view was that costs had not been reduced but merely shifted to an earlier 
stage of the process. The requirement for early filing of witness statements, for example 
forced parties to have to incur significant costs [G, M]. 
 
It is evident that following the CPR due to enhanced litigation costs there is less 
litigation and more settlements in chancery practice. Encouragement to co-operate at 
pre-action stage and front loading of costs are other factors behind early settlement of 
disputes. Due to pre-trial preparations cases proceed in a swift manner at trial and take 
less time in courts. This evidence tends to confirm the findings of the earlier research on 
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the impact of Woolf reforms – ie there are more settlements and less delay in court 
proceedings without reducing litigation costs.98  
 
The research to date has not focused specifically on litigation in the corporate context. In 
the context of section 459 proceedings the question that remains unanswered is whether 
these procedural developments have improved the effectiveness of shareholder disputes 
resolution mechanism by controlling the length and cost of section 459 cases.99 The 
empirical investigation also evaluated the impact of the procedural developments under 
the CPR in this context.  This thesis therefore contains the first attempt to assess the 
effectiveness of section 459 proceedings in the light of the procedural reforms of the 
late-1990s. Below the chapter discusses in detail the impact of the CPR upon section 459 
proceedings by considering the nature of procedural law developments and empirical 
findings.  
 
7.4 The nature and impact of procedural developments under the CPR regarding 
section 459 proceedings: 
The procedure under section 459 is governed by the Companies (Unfair Prejudice 
Application) Proceedings Rules 1986.100 Rule 2(2) of the Companies (Unfair Prejudice 
Application) Proceedings Rules 1986 provides that except so far as inconsistent with the 
Act and the 1986 Rules, the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) and the practice of the 
High Court apply to the proceedings.101 It is now clear from the decisions in North 
Holdings Ltd v Southern Tropics Ltd102 and Re Rotadata Ltd103 that the CPR apply to 
section 459 petitions and the reference in rule 2(2)104 to the RSC and the practice of the 
High Court should be read as a reference to the CPR given that rule 1.1(1) of the CPR 
states that these Rules are a new procedural code.105 Accordingly, there are five main 
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sources of procedural law which affect section 459 cases. These are: (i) the CPR; (ii) 
relevant Practice Directions under the CPR; (iii) the Companies (Unfair Prejudice 
Application) Proceedings Rules 1986; (iv) the Chancery Guide and (v) case law106 that 
further interprets the rules by applying them in particular situations and establishing 
procedural principles to be adhered to by the courts in future. The Chancery Guide 
echoing the Law Commission states that cases under section 459 of the CA 1985 are 
often liable to involve extensive factual enquiry. Many of the measures proposed in 
section A of this guide regarding general civil work, which are designed to avoid 
unnecessary cost and delay, are particularly relevant to them.107  
 
As to the application of the CPR in 459 cases in Re Rotadata Ltd108 it was stated that:  
 
[S]ection 459 petitions can, and frequently do, involve a substantial number of allegations and 
counter allegations, substantial costs and lot of court time; not to mention the strain and emotion 
on the parties involved. Anything which can be done fairly and consistently with justice to cut 
down the cost and time involved in connection with disposing of a s 459 petition is to be 
applauded.109  
 
In North Holdings Ltd v Southern Tropics Ltd110 it was stated that:  
 
[T]he new Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, have been introduced which represent a 
new way of conducting litigation. At the heart of those rules is the requirement of the courts to 
manage cases actively. That will require a new approach by the registrar to proceedings such as 
this one. He will need to give directions to enable petitions to come on for trial efficiently, 
quickly and as inexpensively as possible.111  
 
In Rotadata Ltd it was stated that the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 imposed a duty on the 
court to manage cases actively and a duty on the parties to agree as much as possible 
with a view to avoiding the necessity of going to court, or at least minimising the cost of 
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so doing.112 
 
The overriding objective of the CPR requires the courts to deal with cases justly by 
exercising their case management powers.113 To achieve the overriding objective pre-
action protocols in CPR114 states that the parties should try to avoid the litigation by 
settling the dispute at the pre-action stage. This serves to underpin the emphasis in 
O’Neill v Phillips upon early offers to buy-out and may have an impact on section 459 
practice by increasing the number of settlements reached even before proceedings are 
formally commenced. Furthermore, it may be thought that the emphasis on case 
management powers and pre-trial preparations in the CPR, should lead to section 459 
proceedings becoming more focused once they are commenced with the consequence 
that the parties may be more inclined to settle in the pre-trial phase.  
 
The procedure for section 459 cases can be divided into three distinct stages (i) the pre-
action stage (ii) the proceedings stage (iii) the assessment of costs stage. The CPR have 
enhanced the case management powers of courts at all three of these stages. The 
proceedings stage can be further divided into three sub-stages: (i) commencement of 
proceedings stage; (ii) allocation and pre-trial process stage; (iii) the trial stage. Under 
the CPR at the pre-action stage the rules encourage the parties to seek a settlement 
without proceedings having to be issued. Assuming that the dispute does not settle the 
CPR encourage the courts at the proceedings stage to actively control the conduct of the 
action by exploiting their case management powers, for example by excluding particular 
matters that have been raised in the petition. At the assessment of costs stage the courts 
are specifically empowered by the CPR to make issue based costs order and these orders 
can be made on interim applications as well as at the conclusion of proceedings. The old 
Rules of the Supreme Court did not make explicit provision for such orders. 
                                                 
112
 See Rotadata Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 122, 126. See also Blythe v Sams, December 15, 1999 (CA) 
LexisNexis Butterworths transcript can be accessed at www. lexisnexis.com/uk.  
113
 See above para 7.3.1 Case management powers of courts. 
114
 Pre-action protocols are defined by glossary to the CPR as “statements of understanding between legal 
practitioners and others about pre-action practice and which are approved by a relevant practice direction”. 
Although protocols cannot be enforced but where the proceedings are started, parties can be penalized for 
failure to follow pre-action protocols. Practice Direction to the protocols para 2.2 provides that the court 
will expect all parties to have complied in substance with the terms of an approved protocol. 
 229 
The empirical research confirmed that as well as impacting general chancery practice, 
the CPR has also affected section 459 practice. Interviewees experienced two 
fundamental developments in section 459 practice as a result of the CPR, namely the 
encouragement of early settlements of section 459 disputes and enhanced case 
management powers of courts with the consequence that cases have been processed 
more quickly through the courts than they were pre-CPR. One interviewee put it thus:  
 
In 459 practice I think the CPR has probably added in the sense that it encourages the parties to 
cooperate with each other to settle disputes, enables the courts to manage the cases in a bit more 
proactive way and people now have to set out their cases more thoroughly before the actual trial 
[R].  
 
There was a consensus that settlement was very common in 459 disputes even pre-CPR 
due to the expensive nature of section 459 proceedings but the CPR had tended to 
encourage settlements pre-action or early in the proceedings stage rather than just before 
trial at the door of the court. By encouraging early settlement the CPR tended to be 
consistent with the principles laid down in O’Neill v Phillips about early fair offers to 
settle shareholder disputes.115  
 
Even though the CPR encouraged early offers to settle and enhanced courts’ powers 
controlling the conduct of the proceedings, the CPR had not any obvious impact on the 
costs of section 459 proceedings.116 
 
7.4.1 Settlement of shareholder disputes before the CPR: 
Interestingly, there was a complete consensus among interviewees that settlement was 
very common in section 459 disputes even before the CPR. According to their own 
estimates, between 70 to 90 percent of the section 459 disputes that interviewees had 
dealt with had settled usually because the parties did not wish to incur further costs. But 
the CPR has promoted early settlement culture in section 459 disputes by emphasising 
co-operation at pre-action stage along with appropriate exploitation of ADR under the 
                                                 
115
 See above chapter 6 para 6.5.2.2 Early fair offers to buy-out. 
116
 This tends to corroborate the finding of the research reports discussed above that civil litigation is not 
cheaper after the CPR.   
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pressure of cost sanctions and due to front loading of costs. Emphasis upon pre-action 
co-operation had also accelerated the number of settlements in section 459 disputes. 
 
An interesting finding was that settlement was also very common in section 459 disputes 
even before the introduction of CPR. In the personal experience of interviewees the vast 
majority of section 459 disputes in their caseloads settle and only a small percentage 
possibly as little as 5% or less actually got to court [B, M, G, T].   
 
It is extremely unusual for these cases to go to court. In my twenty years of experience hundreds 
of cases were settled and just four cases went to trial. Two of them were before CPR and two 
were after CPR. I get two or three cases a month… 30 cases a year… therefore over 18 years of 
practice 500 cases and it is not any exaggeration. It means just one percent went to trial [B].  
 
Disputes regularly settled after the issuance of proceedings and often in the period 
immediately before trial once the issues and evidence had been clarified. Two main 
reasons were explained behind high settlement rate of section 459 disputes pre-CPR. 
Due to relational breakdowns section 459 disputes were almost invariably about 
‘separation’ and ‘money’117 that had contributed to the fact that majority of these cases 
settle [S]. If it is inevitable that there must be separation and that one party must buy the 
other out this is what the court would order and so there is no point in litigating the 
dispute to trial. Secondly section 459 disputes were very expensive to litigate [B, C, G, 
J]. Interviewees stated that shareholders were always advised by their lawyers that a trial 
should be a last resort because the proceedings were going to cost them a lot. In the 
interviewees’ experience, clients who were not put off by this at the outset would often 
become convinced of the merits of a buy-out solution once they had incurred and paid 
the initial legal costs. [B, S].118   
 
One practitioner stated that:  
 
In practice, most disputes never reach trial. The costs of the dispute are always a great incentive 
for the parties to reach a deal. The most common form of relief ordered by the courts is a buy-out 
of the petitioning shareholder’s shares. This has led to a practice whereby the respondent, at an 
early stage, is likely to make a fair offer that complies with the House of Lords guidance in 
O’Neill.119    
                                                 
117
 See above chapters 3 and 6. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1 and Grace v Biagioli [2006] 2 
BCLC 70. 
118
 These views are discussed below in detail. 
119
 Personal email correspondence 14th March 2007. 
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7.4.1.1 The expensive nature of section 459 petitions: 
 
There was a complete consensus that the expensive nature of section 459 petitions was 
always a main factor that persuaded parties to settle the disputes and, that in this respect, 
the CPR has not reduced the costs of litigation. The following cluster of extracts from 
the interviews are illustrative: 
 
 
Due to their nature section 459 petitions were ludicrously expensive before the CPR and they still 
are after the CPR... The nature of a section 459 petition is that lawyers usually have to trawl back 
through the history of the relationship between the parties… setting up the company, the falling 
out of the parties and how it all went wrong… that makes them expensive [S].  
 
The costs of section 459 proceedings are high and the CPR has not reduced them therefore it is 
still an important factor behind the settlement of disputes [C].  
 
In a small family company dispute, probably worth five million pounds, litigation costs on our 
side at an early stage were one and a half millions pounds, absolutely ludicrous, costs on the 
other side were much greater. Now witness statements have added quite substantially to the 
burden of litigation costs [P]. 
 
Section 459 proceedings are very long and expensive for most litigants. Section 459 disputes are 
prohibitively expensive to litigate. So parties realize before they get to trial that life is too short 
and they are wasting so much time and money upon litigation that lead them to some negotiated 
settlement. After the CPR litigation costs have not reduced but now there is more pressure to 
settle early [M].  
 
If parties were very rich then it would not matter for them, but normally litigation costs would be 
a big influence upon any negotiated settlement [E].   
 
It was explained that section 459 proceeding were lengthy and complex therefore 
expensive because they are often about relational breakdowns:  
 
Shareholders tend to throw the kitchen sink at the other side to prove unfairly prejudicial conduct, 
when they decide to litigate. Section 459 petitions are like divorce petitions where allegations 
start from the first day of marriage [B]. 
 
Interviewees stated that settlement was almost always in the parties’ interests in section 
459 cases since they were usually meeting legal costs out of their own pockets though 
sometimes due to high emotions at relational breakdown parties did not exercise good 
judgment at an early stage [C]. However, the risk of incurring costs generally persuaded 
parties sooner or later to settle the dispute. Sometimes a ‘stick and carrot’ approach was 
needed and parties might not be prepared to make or consider a settlement offer until 
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they were in court proceedings and facing the immediate prospect of having to pay legal 
bills [H, M].  
 
The common experience was that section 459 cases that are fully prepared for trial cost a 
fortune. Therefore, efforts to settle were common even before the CPR. The client might 
have a fantastic case in terms of legal merits but by the time they had gone through the 
litigation process they might have no money left [K].  
 
Disputes settle near the trial because very often when the trial is approaching certainly then the 
clients turn their minds to how much it is costing them, how much it had cost them and how 
much it is going to cost them [P].  
 
Most of the cases that went to trial settle on the first day of the trial. Clients ought to 
settle at an earliest stage but the difficulty was that some clients and some opponents 
would not do so [K, S].  
 
Interviewee H stated that people sometimes just got bored of the litigation:  
 
At the beginning of the dispute there is a big fight… everybody intends to [fight] the claim 
vigorously. After paying lawyers fee for about six months the [parties] think it is pointless 
exercise, [the majority is] going to buy [the minority’s] shares at the end of the day. Why don’t 
they just add the costs incurred to date to the price and do a deal… A very simple 459 petition 
can cost a minimum of £50,000 to one side… in practice it is always more than that amount. In a 
small company where the £50,000 is a significant proportion of the share price it is sensible to get 
rid of the minority by paying him that amount for the shares. Costs are a deterrent and make 
parties settle but clients do not realise this until they start writing cheques [H].  
 
Interviewee E stated that at the start of the dispute clients are often seeking moral 
satisfaction which may cloud their assessment of the legal merits of their case. E 
continued: 
 
Usually, at the start parties have an unrealistic assessment about the worth of their own shares or 
the position of the other side. Experience shows that over the course of section 459 dispute the 
position of each side are likely to close together. In other words, they would become more 
realistic about their position and risk of their loss. When these disputes settle as they more often 
do is, because the parties realize that what causing their wide position to get closer at that stage is 
not just the fact they are becoming more realistic, but because they are paying lawyers and 
accountants a lot of money to litigate the dispute. If they actually just decided to stop paying 
lawyers and accountants and treat it as a commercial enterprise they realize they actually could 
meet in middle. Cut lawyers and accountants out of the equation and do a deal and go their 
separate ways [E].  
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It is evident that litigating section 459 disputes was expensive and is still expensive 
following the CPR. Moreover, partial costs orders at the event of assessment of costs 
also persuade shareholders to settle the dispute. Interviewee C stated that litigation was a 
very stressful exercise for the clients, it was stressful for barristers but clients were 
paying for it in real money. Moreover the winning party would not be able to get all of 
the costs at the event of assessment of costs. Solicitors always told clients that they 
would not necessarily recover all their costs. Most of the clients realised that the likely 
solution was separation. So if clients got a good part of their costs and a fair price for 
their shares at settlement they would feel they had been vindicated. They realized that 
even if they won the case at the end they would recover 60% to 70% of costs and 30% 
they had to pay themselves. An exception might be where due to bad behaviour of the 
other side in conducting the litigation, an indemnity costs order was made in their 
favour. However indemnity costs orders were unusual in these cases according to the 
interviewees. 
 
7.4.2 Nature and impact of procedural developments at the pre-action stage: 
Interviewees stated that pre-CPR settlement was something that might happen near trial 
whereas after the CPR parties now focused on settlements at an earlier stage [C, M]. 
Along with the expensive nature of section 459 petitions that contribute to settlement 
interviewees further identified two other factors which contribute powerfully to earlier 
settlements of section 459 disputes following the CPR namely (i) pre-action co-
operation and (ii) the role of ADR. These factors are discussed below in detail. 
 
7.4.2.1 Pre-action co-operation: 
As to pre-action behaviour the Practice Direction - Protocols states that to meet the 
overriding objective of the CPR, the court will expect the parties to act reasonably in 
exchanging information and documents relevant to the claim and upon which they rely 
generally in trying to settle their dispute without proceedings having to be 
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commenced.120 The parties often face the problem that they lack information regarding 
the stance of their opponent and the matters in issue which in turn may prompt them to 
seek the assistance of the court. The pre-action correspondence can assist shareholders to 
identify their conflicting issues and to clarify the respective strengths and weaknesses of 
their cases and their likely prospects in court. This may convince them that settlement is 
possible and so increase the scope for early settlement. However, it also contributes to 
the front loading of costs, a point picked up further below. Foskett a leading authority on 
dispute resolution, asserts that generally speaking satisfactory settlement only occurs 
when the parties have had a fair opportunity to appraise the strengths and weaknesses of 
their cases and this at least partly depends upon the availability of relevant information 
and documentation to each of them.121 In Charles Church Developments Limited v Stent 
Foundations limited and Peter Dann Limited122 it was held that if the Protocol for 
Construction and Engineering Disputes had been followed, formal proceedings would 
probably have been avoided. The court had little difficulty reaching this conclusion, 
apparently considering that compliance with the protocol resulted in settlement in most 
cases.123  
 
It has been seen that minority shareholders often seek an exit based on a fair valuation of 
their shares a course of action seemingly given judicial endorsement by the House of 
Lords in O’Neill v Phillips.124 The requirements of the CPR as regards pre-action 
behaviour may accelerate such outcomes and therefore reinforce such course of action. 
Such early settlement at pre-action stage may save the parties’ considerable time and 
costs that they would otherwise have to expend at the proceedings stage. A further 
consequence in theory is that, through mutual reinforcement, the CPR and O’Neill may 
lessen the burden on the courts in terms of the resource that would otherwise have to be 
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 Practice Direction- Protocols, para 4.1. There is no separate pre-action protocol for s 459 cases. Hence, 
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121
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devoted to case management and trial. Moreover, if by settling at the pre-action stage the 
parties can agree a roughly similar outcome to that which would be imposed by a court 
after a trial, then any rules that increase the inclination of the parties to settle at this stage 
may be judged effective.    
 
Pre-action protocols outline the steps parties should take to seek information from and to 
provide information to each other about a prospective legal claim.125 The objectives of 
pre-action protocols include the following. 126  
 
(1) To encourage the exchange of early and full information about the prospective 
claim. In section 459 disputes the exchange of information can help shareholders to 
understand the stance of opposite party and to value the shares fairly. O’Neill v 
Phillips127 placed emphasis on the use of detailed letters  before action for this 
purpose.128  
(2) To enable parties to avoid litigation by agreeing a settlement of the claim before 
the commencement of proceedings. Again the O’Neill letter before action proposing 
buy-out terms serves a similar purpose.129  
(3) To support the efficient management of proceedings where litigation cannot be 
avoided.130  
 
Practice Direction- Protocols, para 4.2 states, that “parties to a potential dispute should 
follow a reasonable procedure, suitable to their particular circumstances, which is 
intended to avoid litigation” again providing specific underpinning in the rules for the 
detailed guidance on letters before action and buy-out offers given by Lord Hoffmann in 
O’Neill v Phillips.131 The Practice Direction further states that the procedure adopted 
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 Practice Direction- Protocols, para 1.3. 
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 Practice Direction- Protocols para 1.4. 
127
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 See above chapter 6 para 6.5.2.2 Early fair offers to buy-out. 
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should not be regarded as a prelude to inevitable litigation.132 It should normally include 
a requirement for a detailed letter before action with an express reference to ADR.133  
 
The prospective respondent [defendant]134 should acknowledge the petitioner’s 
[claimant’s] letter within 21 days of receiving the petitioner’s letter. The 
acknowledgement should state when the respondent will give a full written response.135 
If the respondent does not accept the claim or part of it, the response should give 
detailed reasons why the claim is not accepted, identifying which of the claimant's 
contentions are accepted and which are in dispute.136 The letter should also state whether 
the respondent is prepared to enter into mediation or another alternative method of 
dispute resolution.137 As was indicated above the purpose of prescribing such a detailed 
pre-action procedure in the Practice Direction- Protocols is to encourage parties to settle 
the dispute at an early stage to avoid court proceedings and is consistent with the O’Neill 
guidance. 
 
The CPR also allows a party to apply for pre-action disclosure of documents that may be 
useful and provide access to documents that may help the petitioner to assess the true 
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worth of his shareholdings and the likelihood of success in court proceedings.138 In 
Hollington’s view it might be expected that this pre-action disclosure requirement in 
CPR, rule 31.16 may assist minority shareholders – especially those who are not also 
directors and do not have ready access to company documents in that capacity – where 
they are contemplating legal proceedings.139  
 
Furthermore, at the pre-action stage a petitioner may not only make a buy-out offer 
along the lines suggested by Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips, the offer may be 
couched as an offer under part 36 of the CPR.140 Both offers have similar effect at order 
of costs. However, part 36 offers are not made on an open basis like O’Neill early offers 
to settle but are without prejudice save as to costs ie can only be referred to in relation to 
order of costs. 141 The Part 36 process and the sanctions attached to it have been 
acknowledged as being effective in civil litigation.142  
 
To increase the prospects for protocol compliance at the pre-action stage and therefore 
the prospects of avoiding proceedings in accordance with the overriding objective, the 
Practice Direction-Protocols provides that courts will consider the pre-action conduct of 
the parties at the time of determination of costs.143 Rule 44.3 (4)(a) provides that in 
deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court must have regard to inter alia 
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the conduct of all the parties. Rule 44.3 (5)(a) provides that the conduct of the parties 
includes inter alia conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings, and in particular 
the extent to which the parties followed any relevant pre-action protocols. In Charles 
Church Developments Limited v Stent Foundations limited144 the defendant argued that 
it had been forced unnecessarily into the court proceedings because of the claimant’s 
failure to comply with the relevant protocol. It was held that a claimant who issued 
proceedings without following a pre-action protocol can be penalized in costs even at an 
early or interim stage.145 It was appropriate to make a costs order early in the proceeding 
stage for failure to follow a pre-action protocol rather than leave the issue outstanding 
for consideration at an impending mediation. Moreover, it will narrow the issues in 
dispute at mediation thus making settlement more likely.146 The case is evidence of 
judicial support for the view that the making of interim costs order may increase 
settlement prospects by reducing the scope for later disputes about costs. The non-
compliance with the pre-action protocol had led to costs being incurred in the 
proceedings that might otherwise have been avoided. The likelihood was that the matter 
would have been resolved without recourse to court proceedings.147 As indicated above, 
it may be thought that this costs sanction could be an effective weapon in practice to 
encourage the parties and their legal advisors to settle the dispute at the pre-action stage. 
Costs sanctions can be imposed upon parties for failure to consider alternative means of 
resolving disputes at pre-action or proceedings stage. The role of these alternative means 
is discussed below. 
 
The Practice Direction-Protocols provides that in accordance with the overriding 
objective parties will act reasonably in exchanging information relevant to claim in 
trying to avoid the necessity for the start of proceedings.148 A clear theme emerging from 
the interviews was that the practice of writing pre-action letters with a view to early 
settlement was common in section 459 cases even before the CPR unless the petition 
needed to be issued urgently and coupled with an application for injunctive relief [B, C, 
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G, S]. Therefore, the CPR had not led to the introduction of this practice. There was 
consensus that in the past as a result of pre-action correspondence parties often started 
negotiation that in most of cases resulted in settlement near the trial. Settlement was very 
common through inter-lawyer negotiations in section 459 disputes due to the distinct 
nature of section 459 disputes even before the CPR. The common experience was that 
section 459 disputes were usually about money for both respondent and petitioner: in 
other words the parties differed in their respective valuations of the shares. It was better 
to have money quickly and with certainty rather than going to court facing all the legal 
costs and uncertainty [E, T].  
 
However, now shareholders were much more involved in the process because the 
protocol made it more explicit that there would be cost sanctions if parties would not 
comply with it [C, M, R]. The CPR cost rules imposing sanctions for failure to try to 
settle the dispute had not made a substantive difference in section 459 cases since the 
practitioners in the area were following the practice anyway. But after the CPR there 
was more pressure to settle at an early stage to avoid costs sanctions than in the past; 
therefore now disputes were settling early rather than later or at trial [H, M, S]. 
Moreover, the CPR allowed courts to award costs on the basis of individual issues and 
on an interim basis. The courts’ ability to assess costs summarily on these individual 
issues after each stage of the proceedings also influenced parties to follow Practice 
Direction- Protocols in order to settle the dispute at an early stage.149 Interim assessment 
of costs had enhanced early settlements in these disputes [J, R]. However, it was stated 
that costs would only be faced for not writing a protocol letter if it could be proved that a 
protocol letter would have led to a swift resolution of the dispute, which was very 
unlikely to happen in most cases [R]. Secondly, costs at pre-action stage are front end 
loaded and may persuade parties to settle early.150 
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Pre-action correspondence was considered very important in the context of section 459 
disputes by offering buy-out which was the most common remedy awarded by judges in 
courts [B, C, J]. Interviewees stated that: 
 
Instead of launching a petition if a protocol letter is sent to the other side, they may come back 
with an offer to buy the shares at that early stage whereas in the absence of a protocol letter the 
offer would be made later as a response to the petition [R].  
 
If there is difference in value of shares due to any reason offer at an early stage can bring parties 
to negotiation.151 During negotiation parties may agree to value the shares by an independent 
chartered accountant [C]. 
  
Pre-action letters included either O’Neill152 or Calderbank offers to settle the dispute. 
Interviewees stated that the Calderbank offers followed the decision in Calderbank v 
Calderbank,153 and were common before O’Neill v Phillips. After O’Neill v Phillips, 
O’Neill offers took the place of Calderbank offers which were by and large pretty much 
the same [C]. Calderbank offers were considered the blueprint for the part 36 offers now 
available under the CPR154 and significant to settle these disputes [B, C]. Due to their 
usefulness in settling disputes and providing protection against costs at the end of court 
proceedings, these offers were used in almost every single case both before and after the 
CPR [B, C]. O’Neill offers were made on an open basis whereas part 36 offers were 
without prejudice except as to costs. On the basis of O’Neill offers an application could 
be made to strike out the petition – this is why tactically such offers are made in open 
correspondence as opposed to correspondence for which privilege is claimed. Both kinds 
of offers put the similar pressure as to cost consequences in the event of the assessment 
of costs on the opposite party, if it could not beat the offer at trial [C, D, G].155  
 
Interviewees mentioned that in 459 cases part 36 offers were used but O’Neill offers 
were more common in practice and a preferred way if shareholders were looking for a 
buy-out because the offer can be drawn to the attention of the court as it is in an open 
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letter [D, E, R]. Part 36 offers were used where there would be some other kinds of 
claims as well such as a claim for reimbursement to the company of excessive 
remuneration and/or misappropriated assets.  As somebody had taken excessive money 
out of the company or had paid excessive remuneration and petitioner wanted to brought 
the money back and simply talking about dropping the charges if the other party was 
ready to pay the money back [R]. However, sometimes for better protection practitioners 
made both of these offers [C]. These offers were considered very crucial and 
practitioners spent much of their time drafting these offers [C, G]. Interviewees stated 
that: 
 
Offer letters either O’Neill or under part 36 are considered very effective and basic to any method 
of settlement of disputes. These offers encourage parties to settle and can drive them towards 
negotiation [B].  
 
These offers make the parties, their lawyers and accountants sit together and focus on whether an 
offer should be accepted or whether they are confident that they are going to beat it. These offers 
can also bring parties to the negotiation table [C].  
 
Interviewee C further stated that: 
 
A really clever and good offer was tempting and demanded clients’ good judgment to decide to 
make it. Clients can drive lawyers mad in this regard, by instructing them to make as low an offer 
as possible… that was just a nightmare. Then the lawyer has to explain to the client what the 
tactics are and how they would be exposed on costs, if they lost [C].  
 
A couple of interviewees stated that pre-action correspondence did not always work in 
practice but just added another layer of cost and delay [R]. It was stated that drafting a 
protocol letter and section 459 petition were equally expensive. Complying with the pre-
action protocol incurred costs itself. It was not convenient to write a pre-action protocol 
letter before drafting a petition since getting to the stage of writing a pre-action protocol 
letter was possible once the petition was drafted. There was no point in sending a pre-
action protocol letter which had to set out the detail of the main points being relied upon 
and the main documentation, unless the petition was drafted. Therefore, it was not 
saving costs associated with the drafting of the petition [S]. However, the view of this 
interviewee can be called into question. In Charles Church Developments Limited v 
Stent Foundations limited156 it was stated that it was also failure to comply with pre-
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action protocol and inconsistent with the ethos of the pre-action protocol procedure, if 
the work and costs of the letter before action was equivalent to the work and costs that 
would be incurred in commencing High Court proceedings. If the costs were the same 
then there would be little benefit in having the informal exchange which the pre-action 
protocol procedure encouraged. Furthermore, the court stated that the costs incurred at 
the pre-action stage should be proportionate to the complexity of the case and the 
amount of money which was at stake. The protocol did not require disclosure of all 
details and evidence pre-action that might ultimately be required if the case proceeded to 
litigation.  
 
7.4.2.1.1 Front loading of costs: 
The requirement to clarify the matters that are in dispute and exchange information or 
documents before the commencement of proceedings tends to lead to front loading of 
costs. Compliance with the protocols requirements may well be a costly exercise and 
encourage the parties to consider settlement in order to avoid incurring further costs at 
the proceedings stage. Moreover, the courts power to make interim costs order in the 
event of non-compliance with the pre-action protocols also accentuates front loading of 
costs and may itself concentrate minds.157  
 
Interviewees stated that litigation costs in section 459 proceedings were front end loaded 
even before the CPR but the CPR made front loading more obvious. Interviewee S stated 
as apposed to a general civil dispute in section 459 petition there was need to look at 
years of background which complicated it and made it front end loaded. The client had 
to incur those costs before they even get to issue the proceedings. Expensive nature of 
section 459 petitions along with front loading of costs was a key reason behind 
settlement of section 459 disputes. Interviewee S further explained that section 459 cases 
were notoriously expensive from a solicitor and counsel point of view as to the amount 
of costs incurred in connection with them. Part of the problem with section 459 petitions 
was that they tend to be extremely prolix because of the need to establish the detailed 
factual basis of the unfair prejudice complained of. Section 459 petitions that simply set 
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out the bare bones of the disputed issues would be vulnerable to a strike-out application. 
Therefore, the gathering of sufficient evidence to provide the necessary factual 
underpinning of the petition leads to costs being incurred up front by the petitioner. 
  
[Section 459 cases] are very intensive in solicitors’ and counsel time for example, drafting the 
petition takes a week, two weeks or whatever to get into the documentation to understand the 
history of it, to read all of documentation to try to get into chronological order and then try to 
reduce that into a petition. That is and always has been very cost intensive and it is upfront 
payment… That was the case before CPR and to my mind that is the case after CPR [S].  
 
Majority of the interviewees stated that the even though the CPR has not decreased the 
costs of section 459 proceedings but changed the time the costs were incurred by parties 
due to emphasis upon pre-action co-operation. Litigation costs in shareholder disputes 
were more front end loaded after the CPR. The CPR persuaded the parties to co-operate 
at pre-action stage to settle early rather late at trial that made the costs front end loaded. 
Interviewee C added that now case had to be prepared before going to court and witness 
statements was a huge investment of time. In the past witness statements were 
exchanged relatively near the trial. Interviewee R emphasised the point that costs could 
be awarded on an interim basis following the CPR:  
 
In the past litigants could make a lot of interim applications and they usually only had to pay 
costs if they lost on those applications at the end of proceedings. But now of course, if an 
applicant loses an interim application he will normally be ordered to pay the costs within 28 
days… that has made the difference. The ability to assess costs summarily at each stage of the 
proceedings rather than waiting for a final assessment at the end, makes the costs front end 
loaded and [may] persuade parties to settle early [R].158 
 
Interviewee J stated that the CPR did not save costs. Front loading of costs in the CPR 
just meant that substantial costs were incurred at particular points in the process. It took 
the cases out of court but what it did not do was costs saving. The same interviewee 
went on to say:  
 
The difference front loading makes is that once people are paying bills they begin to get a sense 
of it. If the client is told that the petition will cost half a million the client will still go for it. If the 
client is told that it will cost half a million and… he is required to pay that all now he will say he 
does not have it and he would have to mortgage a few houses… that concentrates minds. So a 
certain amount of front loading is fine because it helps [clients] to settle [J].  
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The impression is that in section 459 petitions costs were front end loaded even before 
the CPR therefore it did not affect section 459 petitions to great extent except the interim 
assessment of costs. However, the CPR made the front loading more obvious that had an 
impact upon early settlement. 
 
7.4.2.1.2 Lawyers’ enhanced awareness of the need to consider settlement:  
However, there was a consensus that negotiated settlement in section 459 disputes 
following the correspondence was useful for clients due to the expensive nature of the 
litigation. Interviewee P stated that due to expensive nature of section 459 proceedings 
lawyers should be more responsible in this context: 
 
Section 459 litigation is lengthy and therefore expensive not only because clients are emotional 
and aggressive in proving unfair prejudice but because some lawyers are bullish and prefer to 
litigate instead of sorting out a commercial compromise. Lawyers often give bullish advice… 
they do not advise regarding the [high litigation] costs involved… they do not say it was just 
about money and do a commercial deal. Lawyers like going to court and some counsel and 
solicitors are more bullish than others [P]. 
 
All interviewees acknowledged that it was lawyers’ professional responsibility to guide 
clients as to what was in their best interests and to assist courts to achieve the overriding 
objective. Moreover it was stated that following the CPR lawyers were most cost 
conscious and inform clients about costs at the start of the process in relation to section 
459 proceedings [C, E, G, M]. Interviewees stated that practitioners had the following 
professional responsibilities towards their clients. 
 
(i) Practitioners should be careful about wasting clients’ money. Informing clients about 
the expense involved in bringing proceedings and to make clients realise as soon as 
possible that the professional costs of litigating a dispute would be high [E, F].  
 
(ii) Practitioners should use legitimate tactical devices and pressures to put clients in the 
best negotiating position as soon as possible to facilitate a settlement [E]. 
 
(iii) Practitioners should fashion the proceedings in accordance with the size of the 
pockets of the client [F].  
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(iv)Practitioners should come up with imaginative solutions which did not necessarily 
just involve a path towards a trial [M]. 
 
The impression is that pre-action correspondence was common in section 459 cases 
before the CPR in order to settle the disputes. But the CPR has increased the clarity 
regarding pre-action behaviour and made it more explicit by introducing the costs 
sanction for failure to follow the practice. That has encouraged the early settlements of 
disputes in section 459 cases. Moreover the perception is that the CPR has increased the 
lawyers’ awareness of the need to consider settlement. 
 
7.4.2.2 The role of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in settling shareholder 
disputes: 
The CPR provide that “active case management includes encouraging the parties to use 
an alternative dispute resolution procedure if the court considers that appropriate and 
facilitating the use of such procedure”.159 Practice Direction- Protocols160 states that the 
parties should consider whether some form of alternative dispute resolution procedure 
would be more suitable than litigation and if so, endeavour to agree which form of 
procedure to adopt. The parties may be required by the court to provide evidence that 
alternative means of resolving their dispute were considered.161 The courts take the view 
that litigation should be a last resort, and that claims should not be issued prematurely 
when a settlement is still actively being explored. Parties are warned that if the protocol 
is not followed then the court must have regard to such conduct when determining 
costs.162 In cases where proceedings are issued, a party may at filing the completed 
allocation questionnaire make a written request for the proceedings to be stayed while 
parties try to settle the case by ADR.163 The CPR provides further opportunity to settle 
the dispute at that stage. Logically if non compliance with pre-action protocols may 
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attract costs sanctions then the same goes for non-compliance with rules applicable at 
the proceedings stage. 
 
Practice Direction-Protocols expressly recognises that no party can or should be forced 
to mediate or enter into any form of ADR.164 Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) provides that in the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. This right cannot be replaced 
by any form of ADR. The Chancery Guide states that “while emphasising the primary 
role of the court as a forum for deciding cases, the court encourages parties to consider 
the use of ADR (such as, but not confined to, mediation and conciliation) as a possible 
means of resolving disputes or particular issues”.165 In Exeter City AFC Ltd v The 
Football Conference Ltd166 it was said that “there is also inherent jurisdiction in the 
court to stay proceedings where there is a more suitable alternative means of resolving 
the dispute”. The courts cannot force but can merely encourage and facilitate the use of 
ADR and where the court is excessively forceful in its encouragement of the use of 
ADR, Article 6 of the ECHR may be engaged.167 Courts encourage ADR by considering 
litigation as a last resort and by exercising their case management powers in accordance 
with the overriding objective and parties are under duty to help court in furthering the 
overriding objective. Legal representative should also ensure that their clients are fully 
informed as to the most cost effective means of resolving their disputes.168 The Court of 
Appeal stated that:  
 
All members of the legal profession who conduct litigation should now routinely consider with 
their clients whether their disputes are suitable for ADR.169 
 
Boulle and Nesic argued that mediation, a common form of ADR, complemented access 
to the courts rather than displacing it. It was a first step towards resolution of disputes, if 
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mediation failed, the parties could resume court proceedings.170 Moreover, parties 
cannot be forced to achieve a compromise in mediation.171 It was stated that the 
hallmark of ADR procedures and perhaps the key to the effectiveness of ADR is that it 
is voluntarily entered into by the parties and so is premised on the willingness of the 
parties to co-operate to achieve the result.172 Therefore the courts can only encourage in 
the light of the overriding objective to an extent that parties take the possibility of using 
an ADR procedure seriously.173 Pressure to exploit ADR is persuasive rather than 
mandatory in nature174 the court's role is to encourage, not to compel.175 In Halsey v 
Milton Keynes General NHS Trust,176 Dyson LJ stated that: 
 
We heard argument on the question whether the court has power to order parties to submit their 
disputes to mediation against their will. It is one thing to encourage the parties to agree to 
mediation, even to encourage them in the strongest terms. It is another to order them to do so. It 
seems to us that to oblige truly unwilling parties to refer their disputes to mediation would be to 
impose an unacceptable obstruction on their right of access to the court. 
 
However, parties who do not consider seriously alternative means of resolving their 
dispute may be penalised in costs.177 
 
There are different methods of ADR.178 The important question for the parties is which 
of these methods may be most appropriate and effective for them. In section 459 
disputes it has been seen that shareholders regularly demand buy-out and courts often 
order it where the cause of action is proved.179 However, proving the cause of action as a 
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precursor to achieving such an outcome may well prolong the proceedings and increase 
costs. In Re Rotadata Ltd180 it was stated that so far as ADR was concerned it was often 
appropriate, and indeed in accordance with the CPR, for a judge to express the view that 
it seemed highly desirable that costs and court time involved in a hearing should be 
avoided if possible by ADR. An unreasonable refusal to go to ADR could be taken into 
account by the court when considering costs. 
 
Parties may have contradictory stances regarding the medium of resolution of dispute 
whether they want to resolve the dispute by ADR or by court. This is an important 
question to decide for the parties for which their legal advisors can help them. If only 
one party requests a stay the court is likely to try to ascertain why the other party is 
refusing, and if a party cannot offer a good reason for its refusal the stay will be 
ordered.181 If all the parties to a case request a stay or the court on its own initiative 
considers such a stay appropriate, the court will stay the proceedings.182 In Shirayama 
Shokusan Company Limited v Danovo Ltd, Blackburne J stated that the “court does have 
jurisdiction to direct ADR even though one party may not be willing to have the dispute 
submitted to ADR”.183  Threatened with a stay, the reluctant or weak co-operation of the 
unwilling party in mediation might be an issue though this could be dealt with by the 
pressure of cost sanctions.184 However, in Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS 
Trust,185 Dyson LJ stated that the exercise of such a jurisdiction might not be useful.186 It 
was stated that “in such a case, the judge should explore the reasons for any resistance to 
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ADR. But if the parties (or at least one of them) remain intransigently opposed to ADR, 
then it would be wrong for the court to compel them to embrace it”.187  
 
O’Neill v Phillips supports early offers to buy-out as a means of settling disputes and the 
CPR encourages avoidance of litigation through recourse to an appropriate method of 
ADR backed by pressure of costs sanctions. The judicial guidance in O’Neill v Phillips 
therefore reinforced the rules of procedure.188 The pressure of cost sanctions in the CPR 
is likely to be a powerful factor influencing shareholders to take part in ADR and make 
efforts to settle the dispute.189 Another factor that can persuade parties to use ADR is the 
usual costs and risks associated with protracted litigation including the risks which arise 
from the ‘loser pays’ or ‘costs follow the event’ principle.190 In cases where ADR is 
appropriate, it may assist parties to resolve their dispute more effectively as compared to 
court proceedings.191 Lord Woolf stated that ADR was usually cheaper than litigation 
and often produces quicker results.192 It also enables parties to resolve their dispute 
outside the public domain of the court room. 
 
7.4.2.2.1 Definition of ADR: 
The CPR defines ADR as a “collective description of methods of resolving disputes 
otherwise than through the normal trial process”.193  As to the form of ADR Practice 
Direction- Protocols states that it is not practicable to address in detail what methods 
parties might decide to adopt to resolve their particular dispute. However, the following 
options are mentioned which is not an exhaustive list:194 
• Discussion and negotiation 
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• Early neutral evaluation by an independent third party (for example, a lawyer 
experienced in that field or an individual experienced in the subject matter of the claim). 
• Mediation – a form of facilitated negotiation assisted by an independent neutral 
party. 
There are other different methods of ADR that may be exploited depending on the needs 
of the parties and the particular nature of the dispute. The most common ADR methods 
are mediation; conciliation; expert determination; evaluation that includes early neutral 
evaluation (ENE) and neutral fact-finding; arbitration; med-arb; and ombudsmen.195 
There is a contradiction in the literature as to the precise definition of ADR especially in 
relation to binding arbitration.196 All these methods of ADR have one common feature 
namely that the parties are assisted in resolving their disputes by a neutral third party. 
This raises a question of how ordinary party and party negotiations (possibly conducted 
through or with the assistance of lawyers) are to be classified. ADR methods which 
involve a neutral third party as mediator, conciliator, expert and so on may well also 
involve negotiation as part of the process. However, it may be thought that ordinary 
party and party negotiations in the shadow or context of court proceedings are not ADR 
because they are not directly facilitated or assisted by a third party. Nevertheless, the 
CPR treat ‘discussion and negotiation’ as a method of ADR. In what follows, in the 
context of shareholder disputes, I take ADR to include negotiation, mediation, early 
neutral evaluation (ENE) and expert determination. Empirical findings confirm that in 
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practice negotiation, mediation and expert determination are the most common forms of 
ADR to settle shareholder disputes following the CPR. In the interviewees’ experience 
of the pre-CPR period nearly all cases were settled by inter-lawyer negotiations although 
there were odd ones that were resolved by expert determination. Comparing it with the 
post-CPR period interviewees stated that more than 90% of their cases settled by inter-
lawyer negotiations pre-CPR but post-CPR mediation had become an increasingly 
common means of settling shareholder disputes especially in cases where inter-lawyer 
negotiation failed. The nature of each of these methods and their role and potential in 
settling shareholder disputes is discussed below. 
 
7.4.2.3 Appropriate methods of ADR available to resolve shareholder disputes: 
 
7.4.2.3.1 Negotiation: 
In interviewees experience the traditional mode of negotiation known as ‘inter-lawyer 
negotiation’ was the most common means of settling shareholder disputes both before 
and after the CPR. As interviewees put it: 
 
The majority of shareholders’ disputes are usually resolved by a technique known as ‘horse 
trading’… simply by negotiations [K].  
 
If the parties can agree on terms of exit or how the shares should be valued, you can clearly settle 
the dispute by a normal process of negotiation [R]. 
 
In legal literature negotiation is defined as “the process whereby two or more parties 
work through their conflict or dispute (usually) with a view to coming to some 
agreement, or settlement about that conflict or dispute”.197 Negotiation can therefore be 
treated as a dispute resolution process in its own right and it is the principal alternative 
method to adjudication by the courts.198 Negotiation between the parties or their 
representative with a view to settling disputes can be seen as a form of ADR since it 
avoids the necessity of adjudication by a court.199  
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Negotiation can be adversarial or principled.200 In adversarial negotiation parties argue 
from their particular positions to gain concessions from the opposing party before 
agreeing to a compromise solution.201 Adversarial negotiation is frequently used in 
litigation as a means of avoiding the costs and risks of further proceedings and aims to 
arrive at a settlement somewhere between each party’s initial demands.202 These 
negotiations are conducted in the shadow of the law by bargaining identical to what the 
court would award in deciding the case.203 Principled negotiation inter alia focuses upon 
interests not positions by identifying the underlying interests of the parties.204 
Negotiations to resolve legal disputes can be conducted with or without the presence of 
legal representatives.205 Negotiation in the presence of lawyers is known as ‘inter-lawyer 
negotiation’.206 However instead of or in addition to an adversarial approach, lawyers 
may also adopt a principled approach in negotiation. Inter-lawyer negotiations are a 
traditional way of settling legal disputes. In these negotiations parties are led by their 
legal representatives. The factor that can obstruct shareholders to settle disputes out of 
court by inter-lawyer negotiation is their prospects of winning in a court of law. If any 
party or both of them are confident enough that they would win in a court then they will 
be less persuaded to change their positions e.g., by agreeing upon a valuation of shares 
that is less than what they think they deserve. Nevertheless given the costs and risks 
associated with protracted litigation it may be thought that negotiation is an effective 
alternative to court adjudication especially where any compromise is likely to 
approximate roughly to the solution that the court would impose after a full trial. 
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7.4.2.3.2. Early neutral evaluation:   
In early neutral evaluation (ENE) parties refer their dispute to a neutral third party 
usually a Judge to assess the issues of fact and law in their case on the basis of agreed 
information provided by the parties regarding the dispute and to give a non-binding view 
of the possible legal outcome of the dispute.207 These neutral evaluations of either issues 
of fact or law can assist the parties to achieve a compromise in any ongoing negotiations 
(be they in traditional form or facilitated in some other way such as through mediation). 
Interviewees stated that ENE could be exploited if needed but did not show clear 
enthusiasm for it. 
 
7.4.2.3.3. Expert determination: 
During empirical investigation, interviewees stated that expert determination was very 
rare in practice in shareholder disputes, but if the circumstances suggested that it was 
appropriate, it was occasionally used.208 In expert-determination a neutral third party 
appointed by the parties who has expertise in the subject matter of the dispute gives the 
decision. Expert determination differs from arbitration in that there is flexibility for the 
parties to agree whether the expert’s decision will be binding or non-binding.209 In 
section 459 cases where the parties have agreed in principle to a buy-out solution they 
may refer the matter to an expert to determine a value for the shares. This kind of 
approach was endorsed in O’Neill v Phillips210 where it was stated that the share value, 
if not agreed, should be determined by a competent expert with the costs of the expert to 
be shared by the parties.211 Expert determination may therefore be an effective means to 
resolve disputes where the only issue outstanding is a technical matter such as share 
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valuation which if left to the court would require the parties to adduce costly expert 
evidence. In Re Rotadata Ltd212 it was stated that it would be worse than regrettable if 
the only reason the parties were unable to resolve a protracted and expensive dispute 
was the objection by one party that the appointment of an independent accountant would 
be more expensive than having the outstanding matters resolved by the company’s 
auditors. In that context the court directed that the parties should either agree to share the 
additional expense or the party who was insisting on an independent accountant should 
bear it. 
 
Interviewees considered expert determination as third popular method to settle the 
shareholder disputes after negotiation and mediation. Expert determination could be 
useful where the circumstances permit but it was rarely exploited. The method of ADR 
chosen depended upon the nature of dispute. If the dispute was regarding unfair 
prejudicial conduct then the mediation would be about that conduct and after settling 
that issue, the mediation might also focus on share valuation issues or if the parties 
agreed, there could be expert determination on that point. Interviewee A stated that: 
 
In a case where the issue as to the presence of unfair prejudice conduct still needed to be resolved 
there was no need for expert determination in advance [A].  
 
In section 459 cases where parties are agreed that one should buy the other’s shares, the 
valuation of the shares will be the most important issue to resolve. While interviewees 
suggested that expert determination was very rare in section 459 cases, it was sometimes 
considered as a means of resolving valuation issues [C, D, M]. However, interviewees’ 
views about its utility were mixed:  
 
Expert determination is possible but it is risky since parties do not know what the expert is going 
to come out with. The share valuation could be too low or too high or might be wrong and it can 
be disastrous if parties are bound by an expert determination [C].  
 
I always resist expert determination and suggest that clients should not agree in advance to be 
bound by the decision of a third party [H].  
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Interestingly, interviewees also expressed their concerns as to the determination of share 
valuations by the courts which usually relied on the judge having to arrive at a view 
based on conflicting expert evidence adduced by either side [G].  
 
Interviewee M regarded expert determination helpful where the only issue to resolve is 
valuation and in his experience, around 20% of his cases settled by expert determination.  
 
7.4.2.3.4. Mediation: 
It is clear from what has been said already that shareholder disputes of the types under 
consideration often settled. From the interviewee evidence it appears that the main 
instrument of settlement before the CPR was inter-lawyer negotiations whereas 
mediation had become increasingly popular after the CPR in cases where inter-lawyer 
negotiations are unsuccessful. Interviewees stated that inter-lawyer negotiation was the 
traditional way of settling these disputes. Lawyers invariably seek to use inter-lawyer 
negotiation first in order to avoid the additional costs of mediation, notably the fees 
payable to the mediator.  Interviewees further discussed the role of mediation to settle 
459 disputes after the CPR and factors that contribute to successful mediations.  
 
Interviewees considered that following the CPR mediation had become the principal 
method of resolving shareholder disputes either pre-action or at proceedings stage, 
where inter-lawyers negotiations did not prove successful.213 In mediation with the 
assistance of a neutral third person, who is trained and accredited mediator, parties 
endeavour to achieve a consensual solution to their dispute instead of relying on court-
based adjudication.214 Mediation can be facilitative or evaluative.215 In facilitative 
mediation a neutral third party assists the parties to identify the issues, facilitates 
communication among the parties, focuses parties on their interests and seeks creative 
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problem-solving in order to enable the parties to reach their own agreement to resolve 
the dispute.216 As stated above the Practice Direction- Protocols defines mediation as a 
form of facilitated negotiation assisted by an independent neutral party.217 The objective 
of facilitative mediation is to avoid emphasis on the strict legal positions and negotiate 
in terms of parties’ underlying needs and interests, instead of their strict legal 
entitlements. For this reason, the approach in mediation is said to be interest-based.218 In 
evaluative mediation a neutral third party may express an opinion as to strength of the 
parties’ respective cases and the likely outcome of the dispute using predetermined 
criteria to evaluate evidence and arguments presented by the parties.219 The objective of 
evaluative mediation is to reach a settlement according to the legal rights and 
entitlements of the parties and within the anticipated range of court outcomes. Therefore 
this approach to mediation is said to be rights-based.220 Both of these approaches to 
mediation can be exploited in a single mediation. Rights may significantly influence 
parties in civil and commercial mediations because parties mediate in the shadow of the 
law.221 Boulle and Nesic stated that typical techniques in mediation include encouraging 
the parties to consider the strengths and weaknesses of their cases and stressing the 
consequences, particularly the costs, of failure to reach settlement in the mediation.222 
Mediation is the most common form of ADR to the extent that the expression ‘ADR’ is 
sometimes casually assumed to mean mediation.223 In legal literature mediation is 
considered as a significant or principal form of ADR to settle disputes due to its apparent 
benefits e.g., it can save legal costs and lead to speedier settlements when compared with 
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litigation procedures.224 Due to its significance as a form of ADR the role of mediation 
in the resolution of shareholder disputes merits further detailed consideration.  
 
Mediation is initiated by the parties and mediators enter disputes as a result of inter alia 
direct invitation by one or more of the parties.225 The process of mediation can be 
divided into three main stages.226 The first stage is a preparatory stage. At this stage the 
mediator establishes a relationship with the disputing parties and collects and analyses 
relevant data about the substance of the dispute. The second stage is the beginning of the 
mediation session when negotiation starts in the presence of the mediator and options are 
generated for settlement. At the final stage compromise is achieved between parties in a 
formal manner.227   
 
Courts have encouraged mediation as compared to simple negotiation process even 
though mediation involves additional costs – not only the parties’ lawyers but also the 
costs of the mediator. By explaining the significance of mediation in comparison to 
negotiation in Hickman v Blake Lapthorn228 mediation was strongly supported. The case 
provides a brief judicial account of how mediation can work. It was stated in that case 
that mediation was a comparatively recent introduction in English civil procedure. It 
involved the services of a skilled mediator. The process might take up time and could be 
expensive. In cases of difficulty, by reason of the ability of a mediator to oil the wheels 
of settlement in various ways, it was more likely to be effective than the simpler and 
more traditional process of negotiation by discussion and offer and counter-offer. The 
main task of a mediator was commonly to lower the expectations of the parties to a point 
where agreement was possible. However, as the process of settlement by negotiation 
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was less time-consuming and cheaper than mediation, it might be suggested that parties 
should have less reluctance to enter into it. 229  
 
Mediation is considered useful in resolving disputes where there is a communication 
breakdown.230 As a consequence it can be useful in resolving shareholder disputes which 
often arise due to relational breakdown and in circumstances where shareholders are no 
longer communicating with one another. By shifting the focus of parties from right-
based arguments to interest-based negotiation, facilitative mediation seeks to produce an 
agreement which meets the interest of both parties.231 Mediation due to its interest based 
feature is thought to be suitable to settle section 459 disputes.232 Mediation can assist 
parties to settle the dispute through buy-out after the fair valuation of shares this being 
the most common form of relief sought and awarded in shareholder disputes233 Given 
the relative predictability of outcomes in section 459 cases bearing in mind their nature 
and characteristics, mediation therefore has the potential to be an effective alternative to 
court adjudication. This potential has been recognized in the legal literature.234 
Moreover, a survey of UK law firms in the year 2000 indicated that of the mediations 
with which the respondents had been involved, 8 per cent related to shareholder’s 
disputes.235    
 
In shareholder disputes during mediation, the mediator questions the parties whether 
they can work together in future if ‘yes’, then on what terms and if ‘no’, on what terms 
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they would be prepared to separate. If parties decide to separate they can stipulate the 
terms of separation namely who would buy the other out and at what value. The 
following issues may arise in the context of section 459 disputes. 
 
(i) Either any one party is not willing to separate or  
(ii) Parties are willing to separate but cannot agree who would buy the other out 
or  
(iii) Parties could not agree on the value of the outgoing shareholder’s shares. 
If parties cannot agree on these issues by negotiation in the presence of mediator they 
will resort to court. Here the mediator can motivate them to follow their best commercial 
interests instead of their legal rights to achieve a compromise. Lawyers may represent 
the parties during mediation. There is some evidence that the presence of legal 
representatives may hamper mediation either because of their tendency to concentrate on 
the legal merits or an ingrained preference for dealing with cases through ordinary 
litigation.236 Mediators handle the negotiation by focusing upon the strengths and 
weaknesses of their cases as well as underlying commercial interests of the parties. 
However, mediators had acknowledged some helpful role of lawyers during mediation 
when they spoke on their clients’ behalf about the merits of their case and matters 
relating to costs.237 In mediation, the mediator informs parties that the resolution of 
disputes by court will be expensive. The parties may have to face the costs and what 
they will achieve at winning or losing in court.238 If an outcome can be reached through 
mediation which will approximate to the outcome that would be imposed by the court it 
may be thought that the additional costs of the mediation are worth incurring to avoid 
the far greater costs of a trial process. 
 
Bearing in mind the relative predictability of outcome in many section 459 disputes, it is 
likely to be sensible for minority and majority shareholders more often than not to 
achieve a compromise by means of a buy-out at an agreed value so as to avoid the costs 
                                                 
236
 See Genn H., ‘Twisting Arms: court referred and court linked mediation under judicial pressure’ 
(Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/07, May 2007) 125. 
237
 See ibid 124. 
238
 See Corbett J., and Nicholson R., ‘Mediation and Section 459 Petitions’ (2002) 23 (9) Company 
Lawyer 274, 276. 
 260 
of court proceedings that may only serve to produce a roughly equivalent result.239 
Mediation may even assist shareholders to settle their differences and to achieve 
reconciliation.240 Brown and Marriot asserted that “the common experience is that the 
ADR process preserves or enhances personal and business relationships that might 
otherwise be damaged by the adversarial process”.241 However, since these disputes 
usually arise as a result of relational breakdown242 mediation may have a greater role to 
play in facilitating exit. Shareholders cannot be forced to reach a compromise during 
mediation. Their personal feelings as to the legal merits of their case may also influence 
the mediation and can obstruct the settlement. Therefore, mediation may fail because the 
parties are not willing to change their stance at all.243 Genn stated that there were good 
chances of achieving settlement if parties attended mediation in a spirit of willingness to 
negotiate and compromise.244 Even where mediation fails and parties have to resort to 
the court it may still have indirect benefits. So, for example, it may clarify the matters 
that are in dispute and speed up the litigation process or lead to a later settlement.  
 
7.4.2.4 The role of mediation in settling shareholder disputes: empirical evidence 
All the interviewees had experience of representing clients in a mediation and some had 
quite wide experience. Interviewees stated that mediation is useful because it helps to 
settle early shareholder disputes which are always about money and separation and 
expensive to litigate.245 Two of the interviewees were trained mediators and one had a 
vast experience as a mediator. Interviewee G stated that even though the traditional 
methods of inter-lawyer negotiation were enough to settle disputes for ‘grown up’ 
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people mediation was good for cases, mainly due to the role of the mediator.246 
Mediation is successful in section 459 cases and it had to be a really unusual case or 
probably lawyers would have been negligent if the case went to court:  
 
After the CPR the biggest change in the process is mediation which has proved very successful. 
Shareholder disputes are considered as prime examples where mediation is effective. Unless 
there is something really weird about the case it would settle by mediation. A vast majority of 
cases even really mad cases are settling through mediation now. It has also increased the number 
of settlements in the area [G].  
 
Interviewee J added that: 
 
Mediation was considered as a principal vehicle for settlement nowadays once inter-lawyer 
negotiations have failed [J]. 
 
Interviewee G making an assessment of his own cases stated that about half of the cases 
he was involved in settled through mediation and the other half by inter-lawyer 
negotiations. However, it could be a mixture of both since sometimes mediation did not 
work at first time and sometimes mediation was just a beginning of negotiated 
settlement [G]. 
 
A majority of the interviewees preferred facilitative mediation that focuses more upon 
underlying interests of the parties than the legal strengths of their cases. Interviewee J 
stated that mediations usually result in an agreement and the best point about mediation 
was that it was an interest based solution. Interviewee J who was one of the two 
interviewees who had acted as a mediator explained the actual process of mediation in 
section 459 disputes:  
 
What I usually say to people [the majority shareholder] is ok, what you want is to have overall 
control of the company but the other party has got a stake in the company... Well… do you want 
to be working for their benefit for the rest of your life because that is what you are doing and 
every day that passes is a day waiting for a petition to land on the mat. What makes you think 
they [the minority shareholders] would just walk away and hand back their shares for nothing? 
To the other side, I say why do you want to keep a stake in the company? I am not saying you 
should not but tell me why? Then I examine the reasons with them and say why not get your 
money out and put it somewhere else instead… knowing that you are never going to get a fair 
crack of the whip out of this person. That’s what I mean by interests… what do you want this for, 
not it’s yours, but what do you want to do with it. At the end, if you are a respondent and you win 
what you have got is the same shareholder in the company, it is just they are several thousands of 
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pounds poorer. You think that is going to promote greater understanding and cooperation or less? 
[J].             
 
Interviewee J added:  
 
Parties eventually realise that as a petitioner if they win, it’s fine, but if they lose it would be 
dreadful and for a respondent if they lose it will be expensive but they can get rid of the petitioner 
and if they win… well what have they won? Often disputes eventually settle… Shareholders 
eventually realise it is a matter of business and money and there has to be a price that both sides 
could agree. It may not be on the day, but sooner or later parties will arrive at a figure with which 
… they are both happy or unhappy but they can live with what ever it is [J].  
 
Interviewees found mediation ‘amazingly successful’ in settling section 459 disputes.247 
Due to the success of mediation in section 459 disputes, one interviewee suggested that 
it should be made compulsory. In his view, this would not contravene the right to a fair 
trial because shareholders would still have a right of recourse to courts. For this 
interviewee compulsory mediation would circumvent situations where there was still 
resistance to the mediation process:   
 
In practice, where the mediation is suggested the other side may still perceive it as a sign of 
weakness. Compulsory mediation will solve the problem [H].  
 
The enhanced role of mediation in 459 disputes increased the number of settlements by 
settling the difficult cases where inter-lawyer negotiation did not prove successful. 
Interviewees mentioned the following benefits of using mediation in section 459 
cases:248  
 
1. Mediation has a very high rate of success in section 459 disputes and even 
difficult cases successfully mediated [B, D].  
2. Mediation might promote dialogue subsequently and courts were willing to stay 
the proceeding to mediate [D].  
3. Bitter family disputes or personal disputes, where rational approaches to dispute 
resolution are overshadowed by personal feelings of betrayal or injustice, were hard to 
settle. But in those cases sometimes mediation could be helpful because it allowed 
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parties to sit together in the same room and to get some of those feelings off their chest 
[M].  
4. Even if disputes were not resolved through mediation immediately they can help 
to overcome parties’ completely unrealistic views about the worth of the company and 
lead to settlement shortly afterwards [M].  
5. Mediation could provide more creative ways of resolving disputes whereas the 
courts tended to favour ‘corporate divorce’ [G].  
6. Most parties whose shares are to be bought out wish to avoid paying capital 
gains tax on the purchase price. In these circumstances it is important to structure a deal 
in a tax efficient way and this was often capable of being achieved successfully through 
mediation [G]. 
 
Although the prevailing view was that mediation had proved very successful, three of 
the interviewees were rather more sceptical. Interviewee K stated that mediation was 
more common now but mediation could be a complete and utter waste of time if parties 
were not willing to compromise or the mediator was not experienced in resolving 
shareholder disputes.  
 
Interviewees E argued that:  
 
Cost and commercial pressures that make people to settle as compared to mediation. Lawyer to 
lawyer negations are more successful in my practice and cases that go to trial are very few [E].   
 
Interviewees blamed the mediation process and mediators for failure to settle at 
mediation. In fact these interviewees preferred ‘evaluative mediation’ upon ‘facilitative 
mediation’. It was stated that:  
 
An evaluative mediation where someone is going to look at the legal merits of the case is 
worthwhile. That can be done by solicitors, barristers or even by retired judges [P].  
 
Interviewees mentioned the following reasons for not recommending mediation that also 
showed their preference for ‘evaluative mediation’. 
 
 264 
(i) As compared to mediations tough commercial negotiations were 
considered more helpful [E]   
(ii) A lot of mediators were considered to be ‘touchy feely’ and too 
facilitative which did not work [E]. 
(iii) Many mediators did not have any real expertise in the area of 
shareholder disputes [K].249 
These interviewees were in fact not opposing mediation but signaling a preference for 
evaluative over facilitative mediation. They did not acknowledge that the adversarial 
approach of practitioners towards negotiation could be one factor behind failure to settle 
the disputes at mediation. One of the trained mediators stated that the failure of disputes 
to settle on mediation was often attributable to lawyers representing the parties focusing 
on the legal merits of their client’s case [J].250 On balance the interview evidence 
suggests that facilitative mediation has proved to be an effective tool in resolving cases 
that are not resolved through negotiation although there is still some resistance among 
lawyers who prefer ‘evaluative mediation’ upon ‘facilitative mediation’. Below the 
chapter discusses the factors that contribute to successful outcomes in mediations to 
resolve shareholder disputes.  
 
7.4.2.5 Factors that contribute to successful outcomes in mediations: 
Factors that contribute to settlement of disputes by inter-lawyer negotiation are also 
relevant here.251 The expensive nature of section 459 proceedings may persuade 
shareholders to take part in mediation and may contribute to successful outcomes in 
mediations. Moreover as stated above due to communication breakdown in shareholder 
disputes where the role of the mediator can be helpful and relative predictability of 
outcomes in section 459 cases mediation is helpful in resolving shareholder disputes. 
The credit of successful mediations also goes to ADR bodies. These bodies provide 
skilled mediators and other services regarding ADR that play a crucial role for ADR 
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methods to be successful. In the UK well known commercial ADR bodies are CEDR 
and ADR Group.252  
 
Interviewees stated that issues like strong and weak case; poor and rich parties could 
play a role in deciding whether parties should go for mediation or not [D]. Interviewee H 
stated that preparation for mediation from both sides was also considered terribly 
important. Valuation documents and share sale agreement should be ready in advance 
and tax advice in place otherwise it would be a complete waste of mediation [H]. In 
addition to it, interviewees discussed the following six factors that contribute to the 
recent success of mediation in practice.  
 
(i) The role of the CPR in encouraging mediation in section 459 disputes 
(ii) Courts’ encouragement of attempts to settle through mediation 
(iii) Cost sanctions for unreasonably refusing to mediate  
(iv) Clarification of conflicting issues in advance 
(v) The role of the mediator 
(vi) Low costs of mediation: 
 
Interviewees’ responses regarding the contribution of these factors are discussed below 
in detail. 
 
7.4.2.5.1 The role of the CPR in encouraging mediation in section 459 disputes: 
Pre-action Protocols under the CPR states that parties should consider alternative means 
of resolving disputes at the time of pre-action correspondence to avoid litigation and the 
court must have regard to such conduct at the time of determining costs.253 Interviewees 
stated that now under the CPR encouragement of pre-action co-operation along with 
exploitation of ADR especially mediation at pre-action stage with threat of cost 
sanctions had increased the scope and number of early settlements, in difficult 459 cases 
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[C, R]. As to enhance role of mediation in section 459 disputes following the CPR 
interviewees responded that:  
 
There are not many actual or physical changes in rules that apply to 459 petitions, but there are 
more mediations now in shareholders disputes than pre-CPR [D].  
 
In section 459 disputes there are more settlements with the help of mediation nowadays, and 
credit goes to the CPR [J].  
 
There is no dramatic procedural change following the CPR in section 459 cases. Except an 
enhanced willingness to make noises about mediation at pre-action stage and registrars are more 
interventionist than before in terms of settlement, especially by mediation [M]. 
 
As regards the pre-CPR situation interviewee D stated that:  
 
Before the CPR there were negotiated settlements and mediation was virtually non-existent in 
these disputes. Mediation in section 459 cases started when idea of mediation generally became 
popular after the CPR [D].  
 
However it was argued, that it was not yet clear whether the people were settling more 
or at least trying to settle more due to the CPR or due to a general change of culture:  
 
The CPR did not introduce mediation. It was a change of culture and the CPR was part of it. In 
the late nineties, when the CPR were being introduced ADR techniques and institutions were 
coming forward such as ADR group, CEDR and all the other bodies and that was a recognised 
way forward [J]. 
 
Negotiated settlement either principled or adversarial254 was already common in section 
459 disputes before the CPR. Interviewee B mentioned that provisions as to mediation in 
the CPR had not changed her approach to petitions at all, because she had always taken a 
very pragmatic approach to these sort of disputes. She had always adopted an approach 
that involved some sort of settlement facilitation such as mediation. Long before the 
CPR in a partnership dispute she arranged a meeting similar to mediation meeting but 
without the presence of mediator. So the formal mediation process following the CPR 
was not a complete surprise for her but something that was to some extent already in her 
practice [B]. However, she acknowledged that the CPR had made a critical difference: 
 
After the CPR everybody is aware of mediation… and there is now a widespread availability of 
formal mediation… with accredited mediators. Now solicitors often tell their clients about 
mediation before coming to counsel. Whereas, in the old times there was no regular process and 
there was no readily available third party to facilitate it [B].  
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The perception is that the CPR did not invent ADR but sought to exploit its benefits and 
bring it into the mainstream of civil justice and civil procedure. Moreover, the CPR may 
have accelerated the change in culture by giving it force through procedural rules.  
 
7.4.2.5.2 Courts’ encouragement of attempts to settle through mediation: 
Interviewees stated that following the CPR, courts were more willing to encourage 
mediation in section 459 disputes and were even prepared on occasions to stay the 
proceedings for mediation thus enhancing the prospects for out of court settlement. This 
also gives emphasis to the principle of judicial respect for commercial decisions due to 
which the courts have showed themselves unwilling to intervene in company’s internal 
matters.255 The impression is that judges are actually quite keen on driving shareholder 
disputes out of the courts because they do not like hearing and trying them. The 
following extracts from the interviews are illustrative: 
 
There has been a change of approach of courts due to the CPR regarding resolution through ADR 
particularly mediation [B].  
 
Now courts are also efficient and are willing to stay the proceedings to mediate the dispute either 
on their own initiative or when one party asks the court for mediation [D]. 
 
Stay of proceedings for mediation was common in the Commercial Court and now it is becoming 
much more common in the Companies Court as well [F].  
 
In the Companies Court I got an order saying that if you want to mediate you can, but if you are 
not going to mediate you have to put in a witness statement saying why not [H].  
 
Now a formal mediation process is really in the minds of people. It is possible to get a stay of the 
proceedings for mediation to take place. Registrars are excellent in this regard because if parties 
get the directions hearing and two months later decide to mediate, the registrar’s reaction will 
generally be favourable. He will suspend the operation of the directions order for three months 
while the parties mediate. That was extremely rare before the CPR [C].  
 
Interviewee C mentioned one of her cases, a few years ago, where the petition did not 
disclose a particularly strong case but equally it was not so weak as to be vulnerable to a 
striking out application. At the directions hearing the registrar told the petitioners that 
the defence was suggesting that mediation was an extremely good idea and he 
recommended that the parties go to mediation before bringing the matter back to the 
court. 
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Interviewee B added to it that:   
 
Courts are not only willing to stay proceedings for mediation but also like to know the efforts that 
are being made by the parties towards resolving their dispute through mediation. As a result of 
the courts’ encouragement of mediation people may think that if they could settle at the door of 
court then why not settle before that… and it will also save time and expense [B]. 
 
In seeking to explain the courts’ enthusiasm for mediation it was stated that:  
 
Mediation is a good idea since it settles disputes [F] and judges love it because they find 459 
petitions very boring256 [K].257  
 
Without going so far as to make mediation effectively compulsory, it appears then that 
the courts are doing much to support the process and ‘twist the arms’ of the parties. 
Interviewee D said that not only were the courts prepared to stay proceedings for a 
mediation, they would also make provision for the parties to apply to court in respect of 
the conduct of the mediation, for example, in relation to production of documents or 
resolving disagreements over the identity of the mediator. It seems that the courts have 
therefore sought to introduce an element of compulsion. Whilst the court cannot order 
the parties to sit in a room and mediate, it is clear that there are cases in which judges 
will do everything they can to push the parties into mediation. This particular 
interviewee was clearly strongly in favour of mediation and considered it entirely 
legitimate for the court to act in this way. Indeed he took the view that if the approach 
were challenged it would likely be sanctioned by the Court of Appeal. He further stated 
that:  
 
The process of mediation… and what actually happens in the mediation is confidential… but the 
actual fact of mediation is not without prejudice or confidential and nor should be the fact that 
some parties are not taking it seriously. If one party is refusing to go to mediation for a whole 
load of absolutely pathetic excuses then why shouldn’t the court know. It is not only relevant to 
costs but might be relevant to all sorts of other things [D].  
 
Interviewees, who favoured mediation, acknowledged that judicial encouragement and 
active oversight of the process was very useful, and enhanced the prospects of settlement 
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by mediation in shareholder disputes. Mediation both facilitative and evaluative, was 
considered suitable for settling shareholder disputes and it appears that judges are also 
promoting it because they are also not happy having their lists cluttered by these kinds of 
disputes which tend to be time consuming and highly fact sensitive.258 Courts 
encouragement to settle shareholder dispute at an early stage by mediation is in 
accordance with the CPR and O’Neill v Phillips that also encourages early fair offers to 
settle these dispute.259  
 
7.4.2.5.3 Cost sanctions for unreasonably refusing to mediate: 
 
CPR rule 44.5(3)(a)(ii) provides that in deciding the amount of costs the court must have 
regard to the conduct of all the parties, including in particular the efforts made, if any, 
before and during the proceedings in order to try to resolve the dispute. The courts have 
considered this rule in various cases and evolved principles for determining when costs 
sanctions can be imposed for refusal to participate in an ADR process, particularly 
mediation.  
 
In Burchell v Bullard 260 the court emphasised the utility of mediation as a form of ADR. 
Referring to Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust261 the court gave a strong 
endorsement of mediation and stressed the importance of the legal profession becoming 
fully aware of and acknowledging its value. The profession could no longer with 
impunity shrug aside reasonable requests to mediate. The parties cannot ignore a proper 
request to mediate simply because it was made before proceedings were issued.262 There 
were many disputes where one party offered and desired mediation and was simply met 
by a blank refusal. The court was entitled to take an unreasonable refusal to mediate into 
account even when it occurred before the start of formal proceedings.263 The principles 
evolved through case law regarding the use of ADR and in particular mediation, can be 
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regarded as a significant development in the field of civil justice generally.264 These 
principles which are discussed further below have arguably enhanced the role of ADR as 
a set of tools for resolving legal disputes. 
 
(i) Duty of litigants to consider mediation: 
The courts have strongly emphasised the costs sanctions for failure to make effort to 
resolve the dispute through mediation and consider it a duty of the parties and their 
lawyers to consider seriously the prospects of mediation. In Hurst v Leeming265 it was 
concluded that a party who refused to proceed to mediation without good and sufficient 
reasons might be penalised for that refusal most particularly, in respect of costs. 
Mediation was not compulsory in law but ADR said to be at the heart of today’s civil 
justice system. Any unjustified failure to give proper attention to the opportunities 
afforded by mediation in any case where mediation afforded a realistic prospect of 
resolution of dispute, may therefore attract adverse consequences. In Dunnett v Railtrack 
plc266 given the refusal of defendants to contemplate ADR no order as to costs were 
made in that case. Moreover, by emphasising the duties of lawyers to further the 
overriding objective of the CPR, Brooke LJ drew the attention of lawyers to the 
possibility that if they turned down the chance of ADR when suggested by the court, 
they might have to face uncomfortable costs consequences.267 
 
(ii) Risks involved for parties who refuse to mediate: 
Courts now believe in the utility of mediation to resolve disputes.268 Refusal to mediate 
can be risky choice since the parties may face costs sanctions if the court finds 
otherwise. Lightman J stated in Hurst v Leeming,269 if objectively viewed, mediation had 
no real prospect of success then a party might refuse to proceed to mediation. But refusal 
was risky since the party could be severely penalized if the court found otherwise. There 
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was also a hurdle in refusing mediation on this ground. In making this objective 
assessment of the prospects of mediation, the starting point must surely be the fact that 
the mediation process itself could and often did bring about a more sensible and more 
conciliatory attitude on the part of the parties than might otherwise be expected to 
prevail before the mediation. It might produce recognition of the strengths and 
weaknesses by each party of their cases and a willingness to accept the give and take 
essential to a successful mediation. What appeared to be incapable of mediation, before 
the mediation process began, often proved capable of satisfactory resolution later.270 
 
The court further held that in this case the defendant was justified in taking the view that 
mediation was not appropriate because it had no realistic prospect of success. It was 
plain that the claimant had been so seriously disturbed, by the tragic course of events 
resulting from the dissolution of the partnership that his judgment in respect of matters 
concerning the partnership and partnership action and the conduct of that action on his 
behalf was seriously disturbed. He was obsessed with the injustice which he considered 
had been perpetrated on him and was incapable of a balanced evaluation of the facts.271 
The court findings here are also applicable to section 459 disputes where parties are 
often very emotional due to relational breakdown272 and therefore unable to think clearly 
regarding the disputed issues. Therefore, to avoid the costs sanctions parties to section 
459 dispute are supposed to be very careful in evaluating the facts of the case and 
deciding whether mediation is appropriate or not.  
 
In Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust273 the Court of Appeal set out guidelines 
to assist the courts in determining whether parties had acted unreasonably in refusing to 
mediate.274 It was held that the burden was on the unsuccessful party to show why there 
should be a departure from the usual rule that costs follow the event depriving a 
successful party of some or all of his costs on the grounds that he had unreasonably 
                                                 
270
 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379, 381. 
271
 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379, 381. 
272
 See above chapter 3. 
273
 [2004] EWCA Civ 576. 
274
 See also Grainger I., ‘The Cost Consequences of a Failure to Mediate’ (2004) 23 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 244. 
 272 
refused to agree to ADR.275 In Halsey276 it was held that in deciding whether a party had 
acted unreasonably the court should bear in mind the advantages of ADR over the court 
process and have regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, such as (i) the 
nature of the dispute; (ii) the merits of the case; (iii) the extent to which other settlement 
methods had been attempted; (iv) whether the costs of ADR would be disproportionately 
high; (v) whether any delay in setting up and attending the ADR would have been 
prejudicial; (vi) whether the ADR had a reasonable prospect of success.277    
 
Halsey suggests that in deciding whether a party had acted unreasonably in refusing 
ADR, significant role of mediation should be borne in mind. The court accepted that 
mediation and other ADR processes did not offer a complete solution. These methods 
could have disadvantages as well as advantages and were not appropriate for every case. 
Accordingly, there could be no presumption in favour of mediation. The court 
emphasised that in many cases no single factor would be decisive, and that these factors 
should not be regarded as an exhaustive check-list.278 
 
(iii) Active and bona fide participation of parties in mediation: 
In the light of the case law not only refusal to mediate but also inactive participation in 
mediation can result in costs sanctions. In Re Midland Linen Services Ltd279 the 
respondent argued that the petitioner should be deprived of all or part of his costs on the 
grounds that inter alia, he had rejected offers made by the respondents to determine the 
dispute by mediation. It was established that the issue as to whether a party had acted 
unreasonably in refusing to mediate had to be determined having regard to all the 
circumstances of the particular case. Parties should not only show the willingness to 
negotiate but should actively take part in negotiation in good faith to settle the dispute. 
Applying the Halsey guidelines280 it was held that the respondents had failed to engage 
seriously in the mediation process. Even though they had repeatedly stated their 
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willingness to negotiate, their approach in negotiation had been inconsistent and 
uncertain. Moreover, successful mediation was doubtful to take place in the atmosphere 
that had been generated between the parties.281 In the light of Halsey there were not 
reasonable prospects of success of mediation. Therefore, the judge declined to make an 
order depriving the successful party (the petitioner) of any of the costs for acting 
unreasonably in refusing to agree to mediation. Therefore, by applying this principle a 
successful party can be deprived of costs in circumstances where their participation in an 
earlier mediation had been half-hearted.  
 
(iv) Parties’ engagement in ADR other than mediation: 
In Corenso (UK) Limited v The Burnden Group Plc282 the court clarified that ADR did 
not mean only mediation and parties might avoid costs sanctions by resorting to another 
method of ADR suitable to settle their dispute. The court stated that it was possible that 
a failure to engage in mediation might have adverse costs consequences for a successful 
party. However, it was not, by any means inevitable. Parties’ obligation is to consider 
ADR. ADR was not synonymous with mediation. Mediation was one form of ADR. A 
party could quite properly discharge the obligations to consider ADR, and to attempt to 
engage in it, without necessarily being prepared to enter into mediation, if the party took 
the view that there were other forms of ADR, which were more appropriate or more 
likely to produce the appropriately desired result.283  
 
The requirement on parties was to attempt to resolve their differences without resorting 
to court by considering ADR. So long as parties were showing a genuine and 
constructive willingness to resolve the issues between them, they would not be 
automatically penalised for not adopting a particular form of ADR proposed by the other 
side. It was in any event a matter of speculation in Corenso as to whether or not a 
mediator would have achieved any better or quicker result or would have talked the 
defendants into making the offer, which they did eventually make at an earlier stage.284 
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So the question may arise, in section 459 cases if the parties’ efforts to settle by 
negotiation fail whether costs sanctions could be imposed for failure to use a form of 
ADR involving a neutral third party such as mediation. In the light of the Corenso 
principle, it seems if parties’ endeavour in good faith to settle the dispute by negotiation 
(which is another form of ADR under the CPR) does not succeed later on, they cannot 
be penalised in court for not entering into mediation.  
 
(v) Deterring undue pressure to settle: 
It is conceivable that a party may use the threat of costs sanctions to put undue pressure 
on parties to achieve a settlement through ADR. In Hickman v Blake Lapthorn285 the 
court tried to control the undue pressure of cost sanctions upon the parties for refusing to 
negotiate or mediate. The court was asked to order costs where a party had not taken a 
course to settle the dispute.286 The court after considering Halsey287 and Hurst v 
Leeming288 held that given the difference between the claimant and the second defendant 
as to the value of the claim, it was not demonstrated that the second defendant's position 
as to mediation and negotiation was unreasonable.289 The court held that it could not be 
right that to avoid being vulnerable on costs a defendant should always be prepared to 
pay more than a claim was worth, as that would enable claimants to put undue pressure 
on a defendant to settle at a higher figure than the claim merited.290 The cases as a whole 
deliver the message that refusal to mediate without a genuine reason carries the potential 
risk of a costs penalty. There are situations where refusal to mediate is not considered 
unreasonable. Parties are required to consider carefully whether, mediation can assist to 
settle the dispute and the consequences of failure to mediate.291  
 
During empirical investigation interviewees expressed that cost sanctions were helpful 
tools in influencing settlement although the CPR had not made a big difference generally 
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as regards costs since cost rules and sanctions were already there under the old rules. 
However, now under the CPR cost sanctions could be imposed as a result of refusal to 
mediate which were helpful in resolving the dispute through mediation and enhanced the 
role of mediation to settle minority shareholders’ disputes [B, C]. Interviewees added: 
 
In 459 disputes mediation is a most common form of ADR… ADR is an umbrella term. The 
mediation process is much more formalised now… parties did try to settle the cases in past by 
mediation but it is much more formalised after the CPR. People will face penalties in costs if they 
refuse to go to mediation [C].  
 
The CPR has encouraged good practices by introducing costs sanctions for refusing to mediate 
that enhance the pressure to settle now in practice [M].  
 
If you don’t consider mediation or ADR there may be cost penalties. If I offered you mediation 
and you say no and you win at trial, I might be able to get some costs from you, because you 
were unreasonable in refusing to mediate even though you won in the end. I think that is the only 
change really in relation to costs [T].   
 
Interviewee C stated that sometimes clients were reluctant to mediate but after knowing 
about the cost sanctions under the CPR they agreed to go for mediation. There had also 
been a shift in lawyers’ perceptions of their own responsibilities: 
 
Now it is the responsibility of counsel to tell their clients to settle or to go for mediation to avoid 
costs at the end of the proceedings. Counsel should seek to convince clients of the virtues of 
mediation to avoid costs and to keep them out of court. Counsel may get into trouble for not 
encouraging the client to mediate.292 However, there can be cases where mediation is pointless, 
but these cases are very rare [C].    
 
Interviewee J stated that following the CPR, parties to disputes were more conscious 
about the impact of refusing to settle through mediation or by other methods of ADR. If 
parties would not try hard enough, then they would not get their costs even if they would 
win at trial. However people were learning to play a lot of these rules to their advantage 
rather than necessarily engaging in ADR because it was a good idea in its own right e.g., 
by agreeing to mediation but arguing about when, where and before whom.  
 
Interviewee further stated that:  
 
In a famous reported case for six months the petitioner was mucking about, a famous 
international firm acting for the petitioner was obviously bullying a much smaller firm acting for 
the company. I drafted the letter that finally resulted in the mediation. The letter reminded them 
of their agreement in previous correspondence to engage in mediation and that they were 
constantly putting up obstacles to it and the time had come for the posturing to stop. The letter 
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proposed the name of mediator, the venue and the dates to mediate and if inconvenient, option 
was there to change any of them. Furthermore, it stated whether mediation would happen or not, 
the letter would be referred on costs [J].  
 
Interviewee C stated that refusing to mediate was one thing and as a result of refusal a 
party might face costs sanctions whereas taking part in a mediation half-heartedly was 
another thing since the mediation was a private process. At the end of the trial where 
there had been a refusal to mediate the judge had wide discretionary powers regarding 
costs but the biggest disadvantage was that there were no costs sanctions against the 
pretty bad behaviour during mediation since it was not subject to sanctions of a judge.293  
 
It is evident that pressure of costs sanctions for refusing to mediate is an important factor 
influencing parties to consider mediation as a means of settling the dispute. Indeed, in 
practice, it may be difficult for a party who refuses to mediate to resist cost sanctions 
because of the problem of establishing (counter-factually) that mediation would not have 
been appropriate or successful.294 However, the potency of costs sanctions is qualified in 
a number of ways. Firstly, refusal to mediate would not result in costs sanctions if it was 
clear that the parties were negotiating or using some other method of dispute resolution. 
Moreover, a refusal to mediate before the issue of proceedings would not necessarily 
attract costs sanctions. Interviewee R explained:  
 
Most protocols letters or letters before action do not contain an offer to mediate right at the 
beginning, since people feel they do not have sufficient information to mediate… offer to 
mediate come in at a later stage. In a lot of cases it is not unreasonable not to offer to mediate 
right at the outset, because parties do not have enough information and material about the 
parameters of dispute to make any sensible proposals. If parties cannot make sensible proposals 
there is not much point in having a mediation [R].  
 
The same interviewee added that: 
 
Costs sanctions are not the main driving force for mediation.  The main driving force is to avoid 
the costs of losing at trial. This has not really been changed by the CPR [R].   
 
The overall impression then is that mediation has proved a useful additional tool 
alongside traditional inter-lawyer negotiations as a means of resolving disputes. Costs 
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sanctions for refusal to mediate have an impact but it is the general culture of judicial 
support for ADR in this area rather than individual rules such as costs sanctions that are 
providing the institutional underpinning of its success.  
 
7.4.2.5.4 Clarification of conflicting issues in advance: 
 
The success of mediation also depends upon its timing. At an early stage mediation may 
fail since the issues in disputes may not have been fully clarified between the parties.295 
Christou has stated that although ADR clauses were now being included in contracts 
more frequently, it was not necessarily the best course to commence ADR before 
resorting to litigation. The preliminary phases of litigation might assist to sufficiently 
clarify the real points of disputes between parties.296 At a later stage mediation may 
prove unsuccessful, since parties may refuse to pay costs so far incurred in the court 
proceedings. In Witham v Smith297 it was stated that a premature mediation simply 
wasted time and could lead to a hardening of the positions on both sides and resulted in 
failure of mediation.  Conversely, a delay in any mediation until after full particulars and 
documents had been exchanged could mean that the costs which had been incurred to 
get to that point, become the principle obstacle to a successful mediation. The trick to 
success in many cases was to identify the happy medium. It was the point when the 
details of the issues were known to both sides, but before incurring the huge costs in 
proceedings that a settlement was no longer possible.298 In section 459 cases the happy 
medium seems to be soon after the issuance of proceedings.299 
 
Interviewees stated that timing of mediation was an important factor for mediation to be 
successful. The best time to start mediation, for mediation to be successful and focused 
was when the issues have already been clarified by the parties by exchange of 
information [B, C, H]. As to timing of mediation in shareholder disputes interviewees 
stated that: 
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It is not appropriate in section 459 cases to have mediation at very early stage since mediation 
needs a level playing field. Particularly in the exclusion cases, where the excluded party does not 
have access to any information and is therefore unable to make any assessment as to valuation 
and strength of their cases. In that sort of case mediation may have to wait until after disclosure 
[M].  
 
 
Parties should have some idea of the fair value of their shares and the means to make an 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases, for mediation to be successful. Early 
mediations may bring an unfair result since parties do not know the true strengths of their cases 
[F].  
 
Issues are clarified often by the issue of the petition. Clarification of issues before 
mediation is considered an important factor for successful outcomes in mediation. 
Interviewees considered that the best stages for mediation were either (i) after the issue 
of proceedings when statements of case had been produced from both sides or (ii) later 
after  the exchange of witness statements which gives the parties a clear idea of the 
supporting evidence for their respective cases. There was some difference of opinion 
over which of these two stages was best. The advantage of stage (ii) is that the parties 
have the benefit of both statements of case and evidence. However, stage (i) was 
preferred by some as a means of trying to avoid the substantial costs associated with the 
preparation of witness statements [C]. Moreover, preparation to issue the petition assists 
to settle the dispute. Interviewee S stated that: 
 
Court preparation concentrates the minds of the parties as to what the strengths and weaknesses 
of their cases are and has an impetus to trying to get people to settle rather than actually fighting 
it out in court [S].  
 
Interviewees stated that there was no purpose of going to mediation when the other side 
was not providing important information about the company. However, the general 
experience was that it was usually not difficult for parties to obtain information since 
most of the times shareholders were also directors of the company and know what was 
going on in the company, had all the necessary information to draft petition and had 
right to access to documentation. If the shareholder was not a director and faced problem 
as to acquiring information he could get it in the course of the proceedings, and that’s 
good enough. At issuance of proceedings the opposite party would give the standard 
disclosure. If anything else was required then a party might apply for specific disclosure 
[D, S]. Moreover, withholding documents could create a terrible impression and would 
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be another ground for bringing a petition [J]. Interviewee B stated that it was always 
advised to disclose unless the information was sensitive or suspicion was, that opposite 
party was in competition with the company. It was better to disclose it voluntarily to 
defuse any suggestion that there was unfairness. It was a pragmatic approach and effort 
to do everything to appear fair [B]. 
  
Interviewees stated that now under the CPR, cards on the table approach before issuance 
of proceedings also assisted to get relevant information. In mediations at early stage, 
interviewees had never contested pre-action disclosure nor advised clients to go for it as 
pre-action disclosure was not common in 459 proceedings inter alia due to its expensive 
nature [S].300 Only one interviewee used the pre-action disclosure in his practice and 
considered it helpful for non-directors who do not have enough information. It was 
thought that an effective pre-action disclosure could conclude a case very quickly for 
instance, if there was a smoking gun document and that was produced at an early stage 
rather than having to wait until you had pleadings. However, it was acknowledged that 
now under CPR in terms of protocols, there was also greater expectation on the parties 
to follow cards on the table approach and there was more willingness to give advance 
disclosure voluntarily than before CPR [M].301 The impression is that for successful 
outcome in mediation information is needed to assess the merits of conflicting issues. 
Issues are often clarified by the issue of the petition. Moreover, court preparation 
concentrates the minds of the parties and assists to settle the disputes. Voluntary 
disclosure at an early stage under the CPR can be helpful in this regard. However, 
obtaining information is not difficult in shareholder disputes therefore provisions 
regarding pre-action disclosure have a marginal effect.  
 
7.4.2.5.5 The role of the mediator: 
In section 459 disputes involving relational breakdown there is likely to be considerable 
acrimony between the parties and so it may be difficult for them to conduct successful 
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principled negotiation. A mediator can bring the parties to the negotiating table and can 
facilitate the negotiations by identifying the issues in dispute. A mediator assists the 
parties to recognise where their respective interests lie and seeks to reconcile those 
interests to their mutual benefit.302 Even though mediation is primarily viewed as an 
interest-based method of dispute resolution parties can influence the negotiation with the 
strength of their rights if they are advised that they have a strong legal case, by offering 
terms that reflect their opponent’s risk of losing in a court. At this stage the mediator can 
play a role by enabling the parties to bridge this gap between their stances. A mediator’s 
neutral role and expertise are crucial to achieving compromise in mediations.303 A 
mediator cannot force the parties to reach an agreement but can inform them about the 
factors they should or should not bring under consideration to achieve a compromise. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Dunnett v Railtrack plc304, also cited by Halsey v Milton Keynes 
General NHS Trust,305 while acknowledging mediator’s role, stated that a mediator 
might be able to provide solutions, which were beyond the powers of the court to 
provide. Skilled mediators were now able to achieve results satisfactory to both parties 
in many cases which were quite beyond the power of lawyers and courts to achieve. The 
court had knowledge of cases where intense feelings had arisen, for instance in relation 
to clinical negligence claims. But when the parties were brought together on neutral soil 
with a skilled mediator to help them resolve their differences, it might very well be that 
the mediator was able to achieve a result by which the parties shook hands at the end and 
felt that they had gone away having settled the dispute on terms with which they were 
happy.306 There seems every reason to suppose that mediators may be able to play a 
helpful role in resolving shareholder disputes.307 
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Interviewees greatly acknowledged the demanding and engaging role of mediators in 
successful section 459 mediations. In a pre-CPR section 459 case need for a third person 
as a mediator, to handle the situation during negotiation and to quickly settle the dispute, 
was seriously felt in inter-lawyer negotiation [B]. Interviewee J who was an experienced 
mediator stated that the best kind of mediation was one in which both parties really 
wanted to try it. If parties were there only for protection against costs later in court then 
there was a problem. If parties were not fully engaged in the process the biggest task of 
the mediator was to get them to engage fully. These types of situation demand 
considerable skills from the mediator:  
 
I ask them, what are your prospects of success? They say, 60%. I say yes, it is pretty good, but 
60% chance of a win is also… 40% chance of losing. I say I tell you what, we go downstairs to 
the curb and if I told you, you have a 60% chance of getting to the other side of the road alive if 
you cross, would you regard it as a good or bad risk and at that point people begin to get it. 
People respond differently to different things and a mediator has to spot who is going to respond 
better to what. That is a part of mediator’s technique you have to speak the right language 
depending on the person [J].  
 
Mediators inform the clients that they have to face expensive litigation and to pay lawyers if they 
will not settle. Most people actually prefer to settle than to pay lawyers. Mediators try to focus 
the minds of both sides on the weaknesses of their cases and what would happen if they do not 
settle [G].  
 
In 459 disputes sometimes parties do not agree that tomorrow is Thursday and would have a 
debate about that. Therefore the mediator’s role and skills in facilitating negotiations will be 
critical in facilitating negotiations towards a compromise [C]  
 
Mediators basically listen to both sides and then find the common ground. It is about money at 
the end of the day and the mediator by doing his job properly manages people’s claims, 
frustrations and defences [T].  
 
Interviewees stated that good mediation needs a good mediator therefore the quality and 
skill of mediator had a crucial role to play for any successful outcome in mediation. 
Interviewees further stated that a good mediator needed the following qualities. 
 
(i) A mediator should be a facilitator who did not just sit there and waited for the parties 
to make offers [M].  
(ii) A mediator should be on top of the issues and be able to appreciate quickly what 
issues were dividing the parties [M].  
(iii) A mediator should be empathetic and inspire confidence in the parties [M].  
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(iv) A mediator needs to be able to tell the parties hard truths in terms of strengths and 
weaknesses of their cases [M].  
(v) A good mediator could see where really parties’ interests lie [J]. 
(vi) A good mediator was really dedicated, sincere and patient about mediation [G].  
Interviewee D stated that mediation was a successful method and could possibly be more 
effective than lawyer to lawyer negotiation since lawyers were trained in adversarial 
process. Mediator had a role to play during mediation and CEDR mediators were 
preferred since they were considered sensible mediators. In the experience of one 
interviewee mediation was not developed two years ago but now virtually 100% 
mediations were successful since good mediators were available:  
 
A lot depends upon the quality of mediator and not everybody is good at mediation. In fact 
people get very personal and emotional in these cases and the skill of the mediator is to take the 
emotions out of it and ask them to look at it on a commercial basis and forget about “principles” 
and “personal animosities”. The best thing to do is to move on in life, settle this and move on [G].  
 
The identity and competence of the mediator was considered very important. In very 
bitter disputes sometimes a good mediator could help by providing parties at least an 
opportunity to express themselves in an effort to settle the dispute [C, M]. Two 
interviewees shared their recent experiences: 
 
In one case it was not possible to get the parties in the same room but a mediator who was a 
commercial solicitor and was very good at negotiating deals amazingly got them to agree [C].  
 
In one case both clients were completely mad… they were going to litigate all the way to the 
House of Lords if need be and were not ready to concede even a single point. But the mediator 
did a really good job and sorted it out [H].  
 
For a successful outcome in mediation, the role quality and skill of the mediator was 
acknowledged by almost all interviewees. Therefore, it can be asserted that the future 
success of mediation in shareholder disputes may depend on commercial ADR bodies 
such as CEDR and ADR Group who have the capacity to provide well-trained mediators 
to the market.  
 
7.4.2.5.6 Low costs of mediation: 
Most interviewees considered the costs of mediation to be cheap compared to the cost of 
a court process although if the mediation failed and the parties continued to litigate it 
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would generally increase the overall costs. There might, however, be circumstances 
where even if the mediation failed it would at least clarify the issues in dispute and so 
not add significantly to costs. It is common in the section 459 context for mediations to 
last between two and three days. One of the interviewees who was a mediator stated that 
he charged between £3,000 to £5,000 for preparation and for the first day of the 
mediation and £1,500 per day thereafter. Another interviewee drew the comparison 
between the costs of mediation and the costs of a full trial: 
 
The costs for taking a section 459 case to court are high. Mediation lasts two or three days 
whereas a trial lasts for three to four weeks… therefore mediation is an attractive option. Cases 
involving companies that are not of such a high value… do not get to trial because the parties do 
not have money to litigate and hence mediation is more sensible [M]. 
 
However, the costs of the mediation were not limited to the mediator’s fee. Taking into 
account the parties’ legal representatives, mediation could cost around £10,000 for one 
day:  
 
The mediation process and good mediators are expensive and not only will the parties have to 
pay the mediators but also their lawyers if the lawyers are to be involved. This adds to the cost 
especially when the parties do not settle… at least the courts are free [G].  
 
It can be asserted that easy availability of well-trained mediators in the market possibly 
will help to control the level of the costs of mediation. Below the chapter discusses the 
nature and impact of case management powers under the CPR to manage section 459 
proceedings. 
 
7.4.3 Nature and impact of case management powers to manage section 459 
proceedings: 
Here the chapter discusses the nature of the procedural law developments under the CPR 
at proceedings stage and their impact upon section 459 proceedings, in the light of the 
findings of the empirical investigation. Empirical research is conducted to evaluate 
whether the availability of case management powers has in practice led to greater 
judicial control to manage section 459 proceedings. 
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7.4.3.1 Commencement of section 459 proceedings: 
If the parties have recourse to litigation then proceedings under section 459 must be 
commenced in the Chancery Division of the High Court in London308 (in the Companies 
Court) or if outside London in a Chancery District Registry or in a County Court having 
the jurisdiction to wind up the company in question.309 The Practice Direction that 
supplements CPR Part 49 states that applications under sections 459 and 460 of the 
Companies Act 1985 must be made by petition.310 The petition must specify the grounds 
on which it is presented and the nature of the relief which is sought by the petitioner, and 
must be delivered to the court for filing with sufficient copies for service.311 Rule 3(3) 
provides that “the court shall fix a hearing for a day (“the return day”) on which, unless 
the court otherwise directs, the petitioner and any respondent (including the company) 
shall attend before the registrar in chambers for directions to be given in relation to the 
procedure on the petition”.312 There is no requirement to file a defence in response to a 
section 459 petition since proceedings under section 459 come within the scope of 
specialist proceedings under part 49 of the CPR.313 Rule 3(4) of the 1986 Rules provides 
that “on fixing the return day, the court shall return to the petitioner sealed copies of the 
petition for service, each endorsed with the return day and the time of hearing”.314 Rule 
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 Practice Direction 49B- Applications under the Companies Act 1985 and other legislation relating to 
companies, this Practice Direction Supplements CPR Part 49, para 3. 
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 Companies (Unfair Prejudice Applications) Proceedings Rules 1986, r 3(2). 
312
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5 of the 1986 Rules provides that on the return day or at any time after it the court shall 
give such directions as it thinks appropriate with respect to service, general procedure, 
advertisement of the proceedings and as to evidence to be adduced regarding the 
petition.315   
 
As to case management it is provided that petitions under section 459 of the CA 1985 
shall be allocated to the multi-track and the general provisions of the CPR relating to 
allocation questionnaires and track allocation will not apply.316 The purpose of case 
management by allocating the case to multi-track is to conduct procedural hearings 
either to identify or settle the issues between the parties or to prepare the case for the 
trial stage. To meet this end at the multi-track case management stage (pre-trial 
hearings) procedural judges may either give simple directions or may hold case 
management conferences along with possible pre-trial reviews.317 Parties have to prepare 
their cases for case management by the court and so, for example, they will be required 
to file evidence in the form of witness statements well before the trial.318 The exchange 
of witness statements will assist the parties to assess the merits of their case and to 
explore the scope and advantages of settlement between them. Filing written statements 
is an expensive process and the costs associated with it may persuade shareholders to 
settle the dispute before starting actual trial.319 
 
Courts mainly engage in active judicial case management at two stages of the 
proceedings. However, the court can manage cases at any time from commencement of 
proceedings until final judgment at trial stage. Firstly the courts manage the cases after 
allocating the case to the procedural track by giving directions to identify, limit or settle 
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 Companies (Unfair Prejudice Applications) Proceedings Rules 1986, r 5. 
316
 Practice Direction 49B- Applications under the Companies Act 1985 and other legislation relating to 
companies, this Practice Direction Supplements CPR Part 49, para 10. 
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 CPR, r 29.2 (1) and Practice Direction 29 para 5.1. 
318
 By applying its case management powers the court will order a party to serve on the other parties any 
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matters. See Sime, S., A Practical Approach to Civil Procedure (Oxford, US 2005) para 29.1.3. 
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as many issues between the parties as possible prior to the trial stage which should be 
the last resort.320 Secondly where a trial is inevitable, courts will seek to expedite the 
process by giving directions regarding pre-trial arrangements and actual conduct of the 
trial.321  At the case management conference (CMC) the court will review the steps 
which the parties have taken in the preparation of the case and the parties’ compliance 
with any directions given by the court.322 The court will decide and give directions about 
the steps which are to be taken to secure the progress of the claim in accordance with the 
overriding objective.323 The costs of preparing and attending CMC can be very 
significant.324  
 
In theory, the courts’ case management powers should serve to focus the issues in 
dispute and speed up the litigation process. Zuckerman has stated that as a result of the 
case management powers in the CPR the courts now control the conduct of the 
proceedings whereas under the pre-CPR system the parties largely controlled it.325 This 
may help to process cases faster in courts. In order to further process the litigation and to 
determine the issues between the parties, courts are no longer supposed to wait for the 
parties to make an application but may give directions on their own initiative.326 This 
may assist the determination of issues in a swift manner. Now under the CPR pre-trial 
process is greatly linked with the trial stage. In the pre-trial process parties have to 
submit their evidence and arguments in the court well before the actual commencement 
of trial providing the court in advance of trial comprehensive information about the 
parties’ respective cases.327 The courts may order disclosure and inspection of document 
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 See below 7.4.3.3 Power to exclude issues from consideration.  
321
 The parties are required to consider whether at the case management conference provision of a case 
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at the first return date or at a case management conference.328 A party does not have an 
automatic right to disclosure but only if the court orders and to the extent the court 
orders disclosure.329 In the meantime, at this stage parties may settle their dispute any 
time by making offers under part 36 of CPR or by exploiting other methods of 
settlements.330  
 
7.4.3.2 Pre-trial review and efficient trial: 
The timetable for trial is generally prepared at the time of the pre-trial review.331 Pre-
trial review provides a further opportunity for settlement before the full trial costs are 
incurred and where the settlement is not possible timetable for trial is prepared at pre-
trial review.332 The pre-trial process also includes, filing the skeleton arguments333 and 
chronologies334 by the parties and filing the trial bundle of documents335 in accordance 
with practice direction 39 para 3.2 by the claimant. In cases where the parties fail to 
settle their dispute by negotiation or by exploiting other means of settlement, then the 
dispute is finally determined after trial by the judgment of the court. Due to pre-trial 
preparation judges would be in a good position to conduct the actual trial efficiently by 
appropriate use of the court’s and parties’ time during the trial. The court may also 
control the conduct of a trial by using its powers as to controlling evidence by giving 
directions as to presentation of evidence during the trial.336 In theory, these requirements 
should enhance the efficiency of the trial process. Under the CPR, the court may give 
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summary judgment against a petitioner or respondent.337 This power can be useful in 
section 459 cases because shareholders’ generally raise the issues in petitions to prove 
unfairly prejudicial conduct in which there is no real prospects of success.338  
 
Interviewees confirmed that the introduction of case management powers had only a 
limited impact upon section 459 proceedings. The CPR had not made any changes to the 
rules that applied to section 459 petitions. Unfair prejudice petitions continued to be 
conducted in the Companies Court in the way that they were conducted before the rules 
changed. Case management conferences had not made any significant difference, as 
under the rules applicable to section 459 cases, judges who heard these cases always had 
powers how evidence was going to be called. Section 459 practice had not changed a lot 
after the CPR or did not become easier [C]. Interviewees stated that now in practice the 
courts were actually more willing to listen to summary judgment applications, by the 
petitioner in classic unfair prejudice cases. Such as where the directors were placing 
corporate opportunities in their own pocket or issuing shares for an improper purpose 
and it was obvious that there had been unfair prejudice [T].339 
 
It was added that CPR has no real impact on conduct of section 459 petitions in any 
particular way apart from reinforcing the determination of judges to try to get the grip on 
cases by exercising their case management powers [F]. Interviewees stated that after the 
CPR section 459 cases proceeded faster than pre-CPR due to case management powers 
of courts controlling the conduct of proceedings, including the rules on pre-trial 
preparation. In the context of section 459 the most relevant case management power of 
courts was the power to exclude issues regarded by court as unimportant or irrelevant 
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from the petition in order to streamline the proceedings. However, in the interviewees’ 
experience, there was a general judicial reluctance to exercise this power because of the 
open ended nature of the enquiry that the court is required to carry out under section 459 
and the point that a finding of ‘unfair prejudice’ will often be based on the cumulative 
nature of the supporting allegations rather than on any one particular factor in 
isolation.340 Moreover, the interviewees thought that the court powers to make issue 
based costs orders had had a greater impact in focusing the parties on the real issues in 
dispute.341 Interviewees focused upon the impact of courts’ case management powers 
inter alia to strike out the issues from the petition and to make issue based costs order, 
upon section 459 proceedings, which are discussed below. 
 
7.4.3.3 Powers to exclude issues from consideration: 
Courts are granted considerable powers under the CPR to manage cases effectively by 
controlling the conduct of proceedings.  In North Holdings Ltd v Southern Tropics Ltd342 
Morritt LJ reiterated the observations of Aldous LJ in the same case that a new approach 
to manage section 459 cases actively was both possible and necessary. It will be recalled 
that one of the Law Commission’s principal criticisms of section 459 proceedings arose 
from the fact that the section permitted the applicants to put in issue anything that might 
be remotely relevant.343 That resulted in problems associated with the section discussed 
above.344 In this context, to control the conduct of proceedings rule 3.1 (2)(k) of  the 
CPR grants the court an important case management power. The rule provides that the 
court may exclude an issue from consideration. Rule 32.1 of the CPR further provides 
that the court may control the evidence by giving directions as to the issues on which it 
requires evidence and the nature of such evidence.345 By controlling the conduct of 
section 459 proceedings under this rule courts may increase the effectiveness of the 
remedy since proceedings will be more focused and timely and cost-effective resolution 
will be achievable. Writing extra judicially Lord Neuberger (as he now is) has stated that 
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to achieve the aim of quick and cheap litigation it seemed attractive to cut down the 
matters from the petition but in many cases it would be difficult to achieve. He stated 
that in Re Rotadata Ltd,346 a case in which he was a judge, a series of actions by the 
respondents, when taken together, constituted a breach of applicant’s rights such that a 
purchase order ought to be made in respect of his shares:  
 
In order to assess the seriousness of the allegations, and the reliability of the evidence called on 
behalf of the parties, I concluded that it would be very dangerous to remove some of the matters 
complained of from the dispute.347     
 
This may cast doubt on the efficacy of this case management power in meeting with the 
Law Commission criticism. 
 
It was hoped that if the parties failed to settle and case proceeded to court then the case 
management powers of courts to strike out the unnecessary issues from the petition 
under CPR would assist in streamlining the litigation. Interviewees stated that courts 
already had such powers to strike out the issues from the petition pre-CPR. The CPR had 
not introduced anything new but just had made these powers more obvious. Exploitation 
of case management powers to strike out the issues could be useful in section 459 cases. 
However, in practice judges were not exercising such powers rigorously in 459 cases 
due to fact-sensitive nature of shareholder disputes which are about relational 
breakdowns and unfairly prejudicial conduct. Exploitation of these powers also depends 
upon the attitude of individual judges towards 459 petitions some judges are pro-active 
and are interested in excluding issues from the petition but majority of judges are not. 
Interviewees’ responses regarding courts’ powers to strike out the issues are discussed 
below in detail.    
 
7.4.3.3.1 Utility of powers to strike out: 
Interviewees stated that section 459 petitions were long and covered even the irrelevant 
grievances against the respondents therefore exploitation of case management powers 
could be useful in section 459 petitions [E, M]. In the recent reported case where counsel 
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was instructed, complaint was as to excessive remuneration and non payment of 
dividend. The petition was really short but the defence that came in raised the kitchen 
sink. Then the counsel had to prepare to meet the case that was then put back against the 
petitioner. It just led to prolong the proceedings and costs. It was stated that if the core 
issues were being focused in that case then the proceedings would have been much 
shorter [C]. In a practitioner’s perspective it was not quite sensible to crowd the petition 
with small matters as this tended to detract from the ‘big picture’. It was always better to 
focus on main grievances in section 459 petitions [M].  
 
7.4.3.3.2 Impact of powers to strike out: 
Interviewees stated that case management had been carried out in the same way after the 
CPR as it was before because the petitions were always returnable to the registrar for 
directions anyway unlike things in the Chancery generally [M]. Some judges were keen 
to manage the cases even before the CPR and CPR had just enhanced the willingness of 
those judges to exploit these powers and therefore it had made some difference [E]. 
However there was no major impact of case management powers upon section 459 
cases. It had not reduced the length and costs of 459 proceedings because of the 
difficulty in severing allegations that may contribute cumulatively to a finding of unfair 
prejudice. The courts were therefore not exercising these powers rigorously in section 
459 cases: 
 
There are limits on case management powers since courts cannot limit issues without hearing 
them, by saying that some or all of these issues are irrelevant [D]. 
 
In practice the exploitation of these powers was so limited in section 459 cases due to 
courts’ conscious approach towards section 459 petitions. An experienced practitioner 
pointed out that even in North Holdings Ltd v Southern Tropics Ltd348 case the Court of 
Appeal had said that new rules or proactive case management should have a big impact 
on section 459. But since then there had been remarkably few reported or unreported 
cases where courts had used their pro-active case management powers in section 459 
cases, so as to make them quicker and cheaper [G].  
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Interviewees stated that in section 459 cases exploitation of these powers also depended 
upon the conduct of individual judges; some judges exploit these powers and tried to 
confine it to two or three complaints [E, F]. In the real world, generally judges were 
considered ‘hopeless’ in exercising pro-active case management powers [B, G, P]. 
Moreover, courts were more willing to entertain applications to strike out whole 
petitions but generally not to strike out parts of the petition [T]. Good judges acted in 
certain ways to control the conduct of the proceedings.  They tried to educate parties 
when they saw there was better way of dealing with the case by suggesting it to the 
parties almost like a second opinion. However, the worst judges imposed solutions and 
thought they knew better than the parties [G].  
 
There was a consensus among majority of the interviewees that courts were not 
exercising these powers to strike out weak issues from the petitions in section 459 cases. 
Interviewees explained the following reasons behind lack of exploitation of these powers 
by judges in section 459 cases.  
 
7.4.3.3.3 Reasons behind lack of use of powers to strike out issues: 
(i) Interviewee M explained that: 
 
The complex nature of section 459 petitions where parties have to either prove or defend a 
breakdown of relationship or unfairly prejudicial conduct, does not permit judges to exercise their 
case management powers with rigour. Registrars and judges are not pro-active in striking out 
issues from petitions on their own motion [M].  
 
Interviewees stated that the courts simply declined to exercise their most powerful case 
management powers. The nature of section 459 allegations is such that they demand to 
be heard. Therefore it is difficult for judges to strike out allegations that, taken 
cumulatively with other matters, might later prove unfair prejudice. Judges were 
conscious of the fact that a seemingly weak point in a petition might later become very 
significant. However, interviewee J stated that he could not understand why judges faced 
with 50 allegations of unfair prejudicial conduct did not say to the petitioner and 
respondent that they should choose 10 each. If they could not win on their best 10 then 
they could not win. Some judges seemed quite interested in the idea but did not apply it 
in practice. In one of very early famous cases after the introduction of the CPR.  
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Interviewee J made an effort to try and press the courts to use the new case management 
techniques but he felt that he had not succeeded. J added that this did not mean that 
judges were uninterested but some judges are wary of being too robust about what 
appear to them to be weak allegations because judges did not know as much as the 
parties knew. Some judges ‘just sat back and took the view that if that was what the 
parties wanted to talk about and waste money on, then let them get on with it.’  
 
As a part time judge interviewee G shared his experience that when a judge had a case in 
front of him nine out of ten times the judge did what the parties were ready to do. Judges 
were adjudicating just on what parties disagree on. A judge could not be sufficiently 
confident that he knew better than the parties even though he might be right. 
 
(ii) The CPR had not really changed the threshold for allowing a case to go to trial which 
was very difficult to change, because of the idea that nobody must be prevented from 
their right to have a trial. Judges were constrained by the fact that the CPR had not 
changed the fundamental rule that a mini trial should not be conducted at an early stage 
in interim proceedings. Therefore, if judges felt the case arguable then it would be 
allowed to go on even if it was very likely that it was going to fail [R].  
 
(iii) There could be at least three case management hearings in section 459 petitions 
which could be before different registrars. Pre-trial reviews would not necessarily take 
place before the trial judge. A judge would generally not take an interventionist 
approach when he knew he was not going to deal with it next time [G].  
 
The impression is that judges are not exploiting their case management powers to strike 
out issues rigorously in section 459 cases mainly due to their fact-sensitive nature. 
Therefore, to avoid the lengthy and costly section 459 proceedings and to settle early 
they prefer to refer disputes to mediation which is also in accordance with the CPR and 
O’Neill v Phillips, that encourage early settlement in these disputes.349 
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7.4.3.3.4 Lawyers’ responsibility to manage petitions: 
Interviewee B pointed out that there was a need for case management not to be only by 
courts but by counsel themselves. Counsel should tell their clients to go for the five most 
important allegations instead of a number of small allegations to prove unfair prejudice 
and to save time and expense involved in these proceedings. Sometimes parties and their 
lawyers are not willing to accept the exercise of these powers by courts. Interviewee C 
stated that:  
 
By exercising case management powers, if the court would not give a party enough time for cross 
examination it would be the first ground of appeal to the Court of Appeal [C].  
 
Interviewees had been instructed to strike out the whole petition as disclosing no cause 
of action but had never been instructed to think about striking out part of a petition [M, 
T]. It is possible that practitioners might not take seriously the harms of long petitions. 
Interviewee T considered no point in striking out part of petition when petition was 
going to be defended in a court anyway. The role of lawyers was considered important 
to control the conduct of proceedings by convincing clients to focus upon main issues in 
petitions. Lawyers should behave in a responsible manner for proceedings to be more 
focused and swift. 
 
Courts had case management powers to strike-out the issue from the petition even before 
the CPR but the CPR had made these powers more obvious. It can be asserted that in 
practice courts are not exercising these powers mainly owing to fact-sensitive nature of 
these petitions. Exploitation of such powers also depends upon the approach of 
individual judges towards the petitions. Interviewees stressed that lawyers should act in 
a responsible manner by convincing clients to focus upon the main issues for 
proceedings to be swift.  
 
7.4.3.4  Assessment of costs and issue based costs orders: 
The CPR provide that in deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court must 
have regard to all the circumstances, including the conduct of all the parties before or 
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during the proceedings.350 Where the parties fail to act reasonably either before or during 
the proceedings the court may take into account their conduct when it comes to 
determine the question of who pays the legal costs. The general rule is that the 
unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party although this 
is now qualified by the court’s power to make issue-based costs orders regardless of the 
overall outcome.351 In practice, the successful party will not usually recover all of their 
costs from the unsuccessful party. O’Hare and Brown state that “it is a fact of life that 
the costs recovered from a losing party are usually less than the costs actually incurred 
by the winning party’s side”.352 In addition to this fact, the court has discretion as to (a) 
whether costs are payable by one party to another; (b) the amount of those costs; and (c) 
when they are to be paid.353 
 
Under the CPR courts can now award an issue based costs order. The general rule that 
the successful party will always be awarded all the costs is thus qualified.354 The CPR 
provide that in determining what order to make about costs, the court must have regard 
inter alia to the conduct of all the parties.355 Rule 44.3(5) of CPR provides that the 
conduct of the parties includes inter alia:356  
(i) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular 
allegation or issue; 
(ii)  the manner in which  a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular 
allegation or issue; 
(iii) whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in whole or in part, 
exaggerated his claim. 
 
                                                 
350
 CPR, r 44.3(4)(5). 
351
 CPR, r 44.3(2).  
352
 O’Hare J. and Browne K., Civil Litigation (13th ed Sweet and Maxwell, London 2007) para 2.020. 
353
 CPR, r 44.3(1).   
354
 See CPR, r 44.3(2)(a)(b). 
355
 CPR, r 44.3(4)(a). 
356
 See CPR, r 44.3(5)(b)(c)(d). 
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In AEI Rediffusion Music limited v Phonographic Performance Limited (Costs)357 Lord 
Woolf M.R. (as he then was) stated that:  
 
I draw attention to the new Rules because, while they make clear that the general rule remains, 
that the successful party will normally be entitled to costs, they at the same time indicate the wide 
range of considerations which will result in the court making different orders as to costs… The 
most significant change of emphasis of the new Rules is to require courts to be more ready to 
make separate orders which reflect the outcome of different issues.   
 
Lord Neuberger (as he now is), writing extra judicially, has stated that in Re Rotadata 
Ltd:358  
 
[I]t did seem to me right to point out that certain issues were so marginal and so potentially 
expensive to deal with, not in terms of court time but in terms of having witnesses called from 
abroad, that I very much doubted that, even if a party would otherwise have been entitled to its 
costs, any order for costs would be made in its favour in relation to those items.359    
 
Interviewees stated that following the CPR, courts’ power to order costs on the basis of 
individual issues greatly assisted to focus the proceedings on the main conflicting issues. 
Interviewee G stated that after the CPR courts could award costs on more discretionary 
basis. Courts could not only regard who was winner or loser but also had to consider the 
way the parties conducted the case. Therefore in practice parties were conscious of 
wider discretionary powers of courts while conducting their 459 cases [G].  Interviewee 
R stated as opposed to tendency in past, courts’ significant powers to award costs 
depending on whether a party won or lost on particular issues like in Re Elgindata360 
case, discouraged shareholders to raise every single little grievance that they ever had 
against the opposite party in section 459 petition. In practice after the CPR if there were 
ten issues in the petition and really only one of them was important and nine of them 
were just minor and petitioner lost all of them then petitioner was more in danger of 
costs than he was in past. Therefore, that had the effect of cutting down the number of 
issues from the petition and focusing the proceedings upon main conflicting issues and 
proceedings moved faster [R]. Due to issue based costs order after the CPR interviewee 
                                                 
357
 AEI Rediffusion Music limited v Phonographic Performance Limited (Costs) Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) [1999] 1 WLR 1507, 1522-1523. 
358
 [2000] 1 BCLC 122. 
359
 See Neuberger D., ‘Company Law Reform: The Role of the Courts’ in John de Lacy (ed) The Reform 
of United Kingdom Company Law (Cavendish Publishing Limited, UK 2002) 67-68. Neuberger J 
delivered the judgment in Re Rotadata Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 122. 
360
 [1991] BCLC 959. 
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H suggested that it was sensible if out of 20 allegations of unfair prejudice, petitioner 
include in the petition the five most important. It might have an adverse effect on the 
share price or the fair offer but it would remove the risk of facing costs for losing on 
those issues [H]. As stressed above that, lawyers should be more responsible by focusing 
upon the core conflicting issues in petitions.361 The impression is that issue based costs 
orders are helpful in the context of section 459 cases by persuading parties and their 
lawyers to only include issues in petition that have good prospects of success. That 
assists to curtail the length of section 459 proceedings, concentrates the parties’ minds 
upon key conflicting issues that may help to settle the disputes and makes the 
proceedings focused and swift.  
 
7.5 Conclusion: 
In section 459 proceedings settlement was very common by inter-lawyer negotiation 
before the CPR. The main factors that contribute to settlement were nature of 
shareholder disputes and expensive nature of section 459 proceedings. Distinct nature of 
these disputes was one main factor behind settlement of these disputes. Minority 
shareholders’ disputes are almost always about money and separation. After the CPR 
section 459 proceedings are still expensive but the following factors have enhanced the 
early settlements of disputes. Early settlement helps to avoid costs involved in court 
proceedings.  
 
(i) The CPR emphasises pre-action co-operation to settle the disputes under 
pressure of cost sanctions to achieve overriding objective. O’Neill v Phillips also 
emphasises early offers to settle the disputes to avoid the expense inevitably involved in 
these proceedings. In the past shareholders were writing pre-action offer letters to settle 
disputes. However, there is more explicit pressure now to settle disputes at an early stage 
following O’Neill v Phillips and the CPR than there perhaps was in the past. That 
concentrates the minds of shareholders upon early settlement of disputes and has 
increased the early settlements of disputes.  
                                                 
361
 See above para 7.4.3.3.4 Lawyers’ responsibility to manage petitions. 
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(ii) The CPR do not save costs but front loading of costs are more obvious 
following the CPR due to explicit pressure of early co-operation that persuade 
shareholders to settle early rather than late. 
(iii) Lawyers seem to be more aware and conscious of their responsibilities 
following the CPR to assist shareholders achieving compromise at an early stage, to 
avoid expensive court proceedings.  
(iv) Issue based costs order concentrates the parties mind upon key conflicting 
issues and may help to promote settlements in these disputes. 
(v) Emphasis of the CPR upon ADR particularly mediation to settle the dispute 
at an early stage has enhanced the scope of early settlements in shareholder disputes.  
 
Following the CPR, mediation is becoming popular to settle shareholders disputes where 
inter-lawyer negotiations do not prove successful. People are now aware of mediation 
and now there is widespread availability of formal mediation process than in the past.362 
Prior to the CPR mediation was rarely exploited in shareholder disputes. Mediation has a 
high rate of success in shareholder disputes with a consequence that some practitioners 
favour compulsory mediation. Mediation is becoming popular to settle shareholder 
disputes mainly due to suitability of mediation for shareholder disputes and courts 
encouragement to settle these disputes by mediation. Mediation is suitable since it helps 
to settle at an early stage. Courts encourage parties to settle these disputes by mediation 
at an early stage (i) as emphasized by the CPR under the pressure of costs sanctions and 
reinforced by O’Neill v Phillips (ii) it settles disputes and therefore avoid lengthy and 
costly section 459 proceedings (iii) judges do not like hearing section 459 cases due 
their fact sensitive and time consuming nature. However, a few practitioners prefer 
evaluative mediation as oppose to facilitative mediation.  
 
In practice success of mediation in shareholder disputes depends upon six factors. 
Following the CPR courts’ role is useful to encourage attempts to settle through 
                                                 
362
 It is consistent with the findings of Genn’s report that legal profession has more knowledge and 
experience of mediation than was the case a decade ago. See Genn H., ‘Twisting Arms: court referred and 
court linked mediation under judicial pressure’ (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/07, May 2007) 
chapter 6, 204. 
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mediation. Pressure of cost sanctions is effective and lawyers are under duty to inform 
their clients about the possible cost sanction for unreasonably refusing to mediate. 
Clarification of conflicting issues in advance is considered an important factor for 
successful outcomes in mediation. Issues are often clarified by the issue of the petition. 
Court preparation at issuance of the petition concentrates the minds of the parties and 
assists to settle the dispute. Now the CPR ‘cards on the table’ approach helps to clarify 
the issues at an early stage before the issuance of proceedings and has promoted early 
settlements through mediation. Other two factors are low costs of mediation and the role 
of mediator. The cost of mediation is considerably low as compare to court proceedings. 
However, at failure of mediation where parties continue to litigate it increases the 
overall costs. The role of mediator is very important in successful outcomes of 
mediation and well-trained mediators are available. It can be asserted that the present 
availability of professional mediators is a response to the demand for mediators in the 
market, after the CPR. Due to the increased demand of well-trained mediators, success 
of mediation in future as a method of ADR also depends upon the contribution of 
commercial ADR bodies, who trained the mediators.   
 
Expert determination is rarely exploited in practice except where (i) parties are ready to 
buy-out and dispute is only regarding valuation of shares (ii) there is no factual dispute 
that affected the price of shares (iii) parties are agreed upon the identity of the expert.   
 
To manage section 459 proceedings courts were able to strike-out issues from the 
petition even before CPR but the CPR has made these powers to strike out frivolous 
issues from the petitions more apparent. However, in practice judges were not exercising 
these powers in section 459 cases mainly owing to fact-sensitive nature of these 
petitions. Exploitation of such powers also depended upon the attitude of individual 
judges towards the petitions. Issue based costs orders are helpful in the context by 
persuading parties and their lawyers to only include issues in petition that have good 
prospects of success and to avoid frivolous issues. That concentrates the parties mind 
upon key conflicting issues. It assists to curtail the length of section 459 proceedings, 
may help to settle and makes the proceedings focused and swift. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
In the light of the findings of the research, the chapter seeks to address the fundamental 
question of the research, namely whether the present means of resolving shareholder 
disputes are effective to resolve these disputes in minimum time and cost to 
shareholders, companies and the administration of justice by the courts.1 The effective 
resolution of shareholder disputes is consistent with the objective of the CPR that 
includes fair adjudication of disputes in minimum time and cost and by using 
proportionate court resources.2 The research shows that in private companies relational 
breakdown of shareholders causes exit disputes. Relational breakdown often precipitates 
the squeeze-out behaviour of majority shareholders, which exacerbates the dispute. 
Resolution of shareholder disputes focuses almost invariably upon the terms of exit. Ex 
ante contractual arrangements in shareholders’ agreements, although considered to be 
useful, cannot resolve shareholder disputes in an effective manner owing to a range of 
limitations associated with them. Therefore shareholders need to have recourse to courts 
to resolve their disputes.  
 
Under the present law in England and Wales, the provision for relief from unfair 
prejudice in sections 994-996 of CA 2006 (formerly sections 459-461 of CA 1985)3 is 
the principal mechanism for resolving shareholder disputes in private companies. 
Problems have been identified by the courts and the Law Commission with the operation 
of this court-based dispute resolution mechanism in practice, such as factual complexity, 
excessive length and cost of the proceedings. It may be thought that these problems may 
have diminished the effectiveness of the remedy for minority shareholders. Measures 
have been proposed on the level of both substantive and procedural law with the aim of 
                                                 
1
 See also above meaning of ‘effectiveness’ in chapter 1 para 1.2. 
2
 See above chapter 7 para 7.3.1 Case management powers of courts.  
3
 The reenactment of sections 459-461 took place during the course of the research.  The practice adopted 
in this thesis has been to refer to the old section numbers on the assumption that most readers will be more 
familiar with these.  See n 35 to text in para 1.2 above. 
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streamlining the effectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism under sections 459-
461 of the CA 1985.  
 
The question that was not addressed by the available literature and which therefore 
remained to be answered was whether these developments have in practice improved the 
effectiveness of this mechanism and therefore addressed the Law Commission’s 
criticism. Hence, in the light of legal scholarship, an empirical evaluation of the current 
effectiveness of this mechanism through qualitative interviews was conducted to address 
this question in a manner designed to close the gap identified in the existing literature. 
The aim of the research was to evaluate the present effectiveness of section 459 in 
practice and the continuing validity of the Law Commission’s criticisms of this dispute 
resolution mechanism in the light of subsequent substantive and procedural law 
developments. 
 
Empirical investigation gives the impression that the developments under the case law 
and the CPR have an impact in practice upon section 459 proceedings. These new 
developments on both substantive and procedural levels sought to improve the 
effectiveness of section 459 proceedings. On the substantive level case law 
developments have enhanced the certainty of the section and on the procedural level the 
CPR enhanced courts’ powers to manage section 459 cases by encouraging early 
settlement and conducting more focused trials where efforts to settle fail.  
 
However, in practice the enhanced certainty of the section and the courts’ case 
management powers have not proved successful to a significant extent in reducing the 
length and cost of section 459 cases which proceed to a full trial. O’Neill v Phillips 
enhanced the legal certainty as to the scope of the provision by defining more narrowly 
the meaning of ‘unfairness’ and by discontinuing the potentially open-ended concept of 
legitimate expectations. This has had the effect of reducing in practice the number of 
section 459 petitions that are commenced in the courts. However, where proceedings are 
commenced, proving the cause of action under the provision can still be a lengthy and 
costly process.   
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Judges are not using their case management powers under the CPR, to control the 
conduct of section 459 proceedings for effective resolution of the disputes, by striking 
out the frivolous issues from the petition. This is mainly, due to the fact-sensitive nature 
of section 459 petitions. However, powers under the CPR to award issue based costs 
orders have proved helpful to persuade parties to only include issues in the petition that 
have good prospects. That makes the proceedings focused and swift and will assist to 
curtail the length of section 459 proceedings. 
 
A key finding of the research, which does not appear to have been fully recognised by in 
the Law Commission’s report, is that negotiated settlement was very common in section 
459 disputes before 1999 by inter-lawyer negotiations often at or immediately before 
trial. The Law Commission’s criticisms of section 459 proceedings appear to have 
focused only on isolated cases that have led to lengthy trial proceedings and not on the 
extent to which cases were settling either pre-action or pre-trial. 
 
The impression from the empirical investigation is that there were two major factors that 
guided shareholders towards settlement of disputes before 1999: (i) distinct nature of 
shareholder disputes that are almost always about ‘money’ and ‘separation’, (ii) and 
expensive nature of section 459 court proceedings. These factors still exist.4 Section 459 
proceedings are still expensive following the CPR. By negotiated settlement 
shareholders can avoid the time and money inevitably involved in the lengthy section 
459 court proceedings at trial. 
 
Cases were always settling on the basis of offers to buy-out but emphasis in the case law 
and the CPR to settle early reinforce this practice and enhance the early settlements of 
shareholder disputes rather than at trial. The real difference is that in the past cases that 
did not settle at an early stage, either pre-action or pre-trial, might have drifted towards 
trial whereas they are now being actively managed by courts to settle with enhanced 
exploitation of mediation. After the CPR section 459 court proceedings are still 
                                                 
4
 O’Neill v Phillips and Grace v Biagioli declared buy-out after fair valuation at an early stage to be an 
appropriate method of resolving these disputes. See above chapter 6. 
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expensive but the impression is that the following factors enhance the early settlements 
of shareholder disputes. Early settlement assists to save the time and costs involved in 
court proceedings.  
 
(i) O’Neill v Phillips emphasises early offers to settle the disputes to avoid the 
expense inevitably involved in these proceedings. O’Neill reinforces the CPR that 
emphasises pre-action co-operation to settle the disputes under pressure of cost 
sanctions. In the past shareholders were writing pre-action offer letters with a view to 
triggering a negotiated settlement. There is more explicit pressure now to settle disputes 
at an early stage under O’Neill v Phillips and the CPR than in the past. That concentrates 
the minds of shareholders to achieve compromise and has increased the tendency for 
parties to consider early settlement.  
(ii) O’Neill v Phillips and Grace v Biagioli enhanced the legal certainty as to 
appropriate method of resolving these disputes and their outcome. It can assist to 
achieve an early compromise in negotiation and possibly will promote number of 
settlements with time.   
(iii) The emphasis of the CPR and courts upon ADR particularly mediation to 
settle the disputes at an early stage with threat of costs sanctions has enhanced the 
exploitation of mediation, and therefore scope of early settlements in shareholder 
disputes. Following the CPR mediation is also becoming popular to settle shareholder 
disputes along with inter-lawyer negotiation. Mainly, due to (i) suitability of mediation 
for shareholder disputes since it helps to settle early and (ii) courts encouragement to 
exploit mediation to settle these disputes at an early stage, as emphasised by the CPR 
and O’Neill v Phillips, and judicial enthusiasm for out of court settlement to avoid fact-
sensitive and time consuming section 459 proceedings.5    
(iv) The front loading of costs is more ‘felt’ following the CPR e.g., an issue 
based interim assessment of costs, which persuades shareholders to settle early rather 
than late. 
                                                 
5
 This also gives emphasis to the principle of judicial respect for commercial decisions due to which the 
courts have showed themselves unwilling to intervene in company’s internal matters. See above chapter 5 
para 5.6.2.3 Courts’ respect for majority rule. 
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(v) In the light of the CPR lawyers are more aware of the need to consider 
settlement with a view to avoiding cost sanctions and seem to some extent to be more 
proactive in assisting shareholders to achieve a compromise at an early stage in section 
459 cases.  
 
In the light of the empirical investigation, the answer to the question as to whether the 
developments after 1999 improve the effectiveness of means to resolve shareholder 
disputes seems positive. Therefore, the Law Commission criticism upon section 459 
proceedings in mid nineties is addressed by the subsequent developments. The 
impression is as discussed above, that there are significant developments as to 
alternative means of resolving shareholder disputes namely, the negotiated settlement 
often now achieved with the assistance of a mediator. The new legal developments 
persuade shareholders to settle the dispute at an early stage to avoid the time and costs 
inevitably involved in section 459 proceedings. This is also in the wider interests of the 
company because the company is likely to invest the considerable time in litigation 
instead of running the business. Moreover, by emphasising these developments courts 
are also keen to keep section 459 cases out of court due to their inherent fact-sensitive 
therefore lengthy nature to save court resources. 
 
Even though shareholder disputes have tended to settle earlier, shareholders cannot be 
forced to settle their disputes as they are entitled to their day in court should they so 
wish. Hence, the early settlement of disputes also depends upon the rational and 
professional attitude of shareholders and their legal representative towards resolution of 
these disputes. As it was asserted above, that for cultural change along with procedural 
rules, pragmatic approach towards settlement is needed.6 But shareholder disputes are 
now settling early and due to legal developments discussed above, the number of early 
settlements is expected to increase in future and cases that might in the past have been 
                                                 
6
 See above para 7.3.2 Existing research evaluating the impact of the CPR. The evidence of Genn’s report 
also suggested that the motivation and willingness of parties to negotiate and compromise is critical to the 
success of mediation and an effective mediation-promotion policy might combine education and 
encouragement. See Genn H., ‘Twisting Arms: court referred and court linked mediation under judicial 
pressure’ (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/07, May 2007) chapter 6. 
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allowed to drift towards trial are more likely to settle at an earlier stage rather than at the 
door of the court.    
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Appendix 1 
 
Clauses of shareholders’ agreements 
 
1. Appointment of directors: 
 
The parties shall procure that there shall be not more than (number) directors of the 
Company of whom not more than (number) shall be persons for the time being 
nominated by the Majority Shareholder and not more than (number) shall be persons for 
the time being nominated by the Minority Shareholder. The first such nominees are 
(name) and (name) appointed by the Majority Shareholder and [(name) appointed by the 
Minority Shareholder or the nominee of the Minority Shareholder shall be himself].1 
 
1.1 Each shareholder shall be entitled by notice in writing addressed to the Company to 
replace any person nominated by him… 2  
 
2. Matters requiring consent of both parties:3 
 
2.1  The Shareholders shall exercise all voting rights and other powers of control 
respectively available to them in relation to the Company so as to procure (insofar as 
they are able by the exercise of such rights and powers) that the Company shall not 
without the prior written approval of each Shareholder: 
 
2.1.1  sell, transfer, lease, assign or otherwise dispose of a material part of the 
undertaking, property and/or assets of the Company or any subsidiary (or any interest 
therein), or contract so to do whether or not for valuable consideration 
2.1.2  do or permit or suffer to be done any act or thing whereby the Company may be 
wound up (whether voluntarily or compulsorily), save as otherwise expressly provided 
for in this Agreement or unless the Company is insolvent 
2.1.3  enter into any contract or transaction except in the ordinary and proper course of 
its business on arm's length terms 
2.1.4  borrow or raise money (which shall include the entry into of any finance lease but 
exclude normal trade credit) 
2.1.5  take major decisions relating to the conduct (including the settlement) of material 
legal proceedings to which the company is a party (a potential liability, or claim, in 
excess of £... being regarded as material for these purposes) 
2.1.6  incur capital expenditure in respect of any item or project in excess of £... or such 
other sum as may be agreed between the parties from time to time 
2.1.7  hold any meeting of Shareholders or purport to transact any business at any such 
meeting unless there are present duly authorised representatives or proxies for each of 
the Shareholders 
2.1.8  amend the memorandum or articles of association of the Company 
                                                 
1
 See Butterworths, 291 Shareholders’ agreement for minority protection clause 4.1. 
2
 See Joffe’s, Appendix 1, Precedent 24, clause 3.2. 
3
 See Butterworths, 291 Shareholders’ agreement for minority protection clause 3. 
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2.1.9  alter any rights or restriction attaching to any class of share in the capital of the 
Company 
2.1.10  change the name of the Company 
2.1.11  pass any resolution or engage in any other matter which represents a substantial 
change in the nature of the business of the Company or in the manner in which such 
business is conducted 
2.1.12  remove any director appointed… 
2.1.13 issue any additional shares… 
 
3.  Access to information:4 
 
3.2 The Directors appointed by the Majority Shareholder and the Minority Shareholder 
shall be entitled either in person or by means of an agent nominated by them in writing 
to have unrestricted access to: 
   
3.2.1  all trading records and information relating to the operations of the Company 
3.2.2  all accounts, books, bank statements and other financial records of the  
Company 
3.2.3  records held in any form including those held in computer files controlled or used 
by the Company 
 
4.   The Company’s business:5  
 
4.1. Except as the Shareholders may otherwise agree in writing or save as otherwise 
provided or contemplated in this Agreement [or in the Business Plan], the Shareholders 
shall exercise their powers in relation to the Company so as to ensure that: 
 
4.1.1 the Company carries on and conducts its business and affairs in a proper and 
efficient manner and for its own benefit [and in accordance with the Business Plan]; 
4.1.2 the Company transacts all its business on arm’s length terms; 
4.1.3 Each of the parties covenants with each other to use all reasonable endeavours to 
promote and develop the business of the Company to the best advantage in accordance 
with good business practice and the highest ethical standards.6  
4.1.4 the Company allots and issues its shares and other securities at the best price 
reasonably obtainable in the circumstances; 
4.1.5 the Company shall not acquire, dispose of, hire, lease, licence or receive licences 
of any assets, goods, rights or services otherwise than at the best price reasonably 
obtainable in the circumstances; 
4.1.6 the Company shall keep books of account and therein make true and complete 
entries of all its dealings and transactions of and in relation to its business; 
 4.1.7 the Company shall keep each of the Shareholders fully informed as to all its 
[material] financial and business affairs. 
 
                                                 
4
 Butterworths, 291 Shareholders’ agreement for minority protection, clause 4.2. 
5
 Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 10. 
6
 Butterworths, Precedent 5, clause 9.1.  
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5.  Matters requiring directors’ approval:7  
 
The Shareholders shall exercise their powers in relation to the Company to procure that, 
save as otherwise provided or contemplated in this Agreement [or in the Business Plan] 
and save with the prior approval of a resolution of the Directors on which an ‘A” 
Director and a “B” Director voted in favour or of a written resolution of the Directors, 
the Company will not and none of the other companies in the Group will: 
  
5.1 pay any remuneration or expenses to any person other than as proper remuneration 
for work done or services provided or as proper reimbursement for expenses incurred in 
connection with its business; 
5.2 create or allow to subsist any Encumbrance over any of its assets; 
5.3 borrow any money or obtain any advance or credit in any form other than normal 
trade credit or other than on normal banking terms for unsecured overdraft facilities or 
vary the terms and conditions of any borrowings or bank mandates; 
 5.4 lend any money to any person (otherwise than by way of deposit with a bank or 
other institution, the normal business of which includes the acceptance of deposits) or 
grant any credit to any person (except to its customers in the normal course of business); 
5.5 sell, transfer, lease, licence or in any other way dispose of any of its assets otherwise 
than in the ordinary course of its business. 
 
6.  Matters requiring Shareholders’ approval:8  
 
Unless otherwise agreed between the Shareholders in writing, the Shareholders shall 
exercise their powers in relation to the Company to procure that (save as otherwise 
provided or contemplated in this Agreement [or in the Business Plan]) the Company will 
not and none of the other companies in the Group will: 
    
6.1 issue, allot, redeem, purchase or grant options over any of its shares or other 
securities or  reorganise its share capital in any way. 
 
7.  Dividend policy:9 
 
Subject to circumstances prevailing at the relevant time including, in particular, the 
working capital requirements of the Company, it is the intention of the parties that the 
Company shall distribute by way of dividend in respect of each financial year provided 
that the same will not contravene the Companies Act 1985 [not less than ......% of the 
post-tax [consolidated] profits of the Company [and its subsidiaries] for that financial 
year available for distribution]. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 12. 
8
 Cadman’s, Precedent A, Minority Protection Agreement, clause 12(2)(a). 
9
 Butterworths, Precedent 8, clause 8.3. 
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8.  Pre-emption rights:10 
 
Each Shareholder shall have the option but not the obligation to subscribe at the price set 
forth in the Company's Notice for that proportion of the Shares proposed to be issued 
which the number of Shares held by him bears to the total number of Shares outstanding 
at the time the Company gives its notice. Such option may be exercised by notice to the 
Company given at any time within (specify) days following the Company's Notice 
accompanied by payment in full for the Shares to be subscribed for. 
 
9.  Negotiation:11 
 
In any case of dead-lock each of the shareholders shall, within [14] days of such dead-
lock having arisen or become apparent, prepare and circulate to the other shareholder a 
memorandum or other form of written statement setting out its position on the matter in 
dispute and its reasons for adopting such position. Such memoranda or statements shall 
be considered by the shareholders who shall use their reasonable endeavours to resolve 
such disputes within [seven] days of exchange of the memoranda. If the shareholders 
shall agree upon a resolution of the matter, they shall exercise their respective Voting 
Powers to procure (so far as they are able) that such resolution or disposition is fully and 
promptly carried into effect.      
 
10.  Termination:12 
 
The agreement shall continue in full force and effect until terminated in accordance with 
the provisions of this clause…  
The termination events are if: 
   
10.1  any party shall commit [any (or) a material] breach of any of its obligations under 
this agreement and shall fail to remedy the breach, if capable of remedy, within 30 days 
after being given notice by the other party or parties to do so; or 
 
10.2  any party, being a company, shall go into liquidation whether compulsory or 
voluntary (except for the purposes of a bona fide reconstruction or amalgamation with 
the consent of the other [party (or) parties], such consent not to be unreasonably 
withheld or delayed) or any party shall have an administrator appointed or shall have a 
receiver, administrative receiver or manager appointed over any part of its assets or 
undertaking; or 
 
10.3  any party (being an individual) shall be adjudged bankrupt or shall die or become a 
patient for the purposes of any statute relating to mental health; or 
 
                                                 
10
 Butterworths, 291 Shareholders’ agreement for minority protection, clause 8.2. 
11
 Butterworths, precedent 1 clause 13.2.  
12
 Butterworths, precedent 5 clauses 14.1, 14.2. 
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10.4  any party (being an individual) shall cease for any reason to make his substantially 
full-time services available to the Company and/or any subsidiary of the Company or 
both; or 
 
10.5  there shall be any change in control of any party. 
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Appendix 2  
 
Interview schedule/aide memoire for use with barristers 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Introduce myself:  
 
My name is Asim Iqbal. I am a PhD student at Nottingham Law School, Nottingham 
Trent University.  
 
2. General nature of my research: 
 
I am conducting research into the effective resolution of minority shareholders’ 
disputes in private limited companies with particular reference to section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985. I am carrying out a series of interviews with Chancery 
practitioners in order to evaluate empirically the effectiveness of shareholder dispute 
resolution in private companies. 
 
3.  Ethical statement:  
 
Your participation in the present research is confidential and your responses would 
be mentioned in the PhD thesis anonymously. During the interview you have a 
complete right to refuse to answer any question and you may withdraw at any time 
between now and the submission of my PhD thesis in which case I would not use 
your interview in the writing up of my research. 
 
4. Seek consent for digital recording:  
 
Would you permit me to record our conversation for my future analysis? I will store 
the digital record on a password protected computer and destroy it once the PhD is 
completed.  I ask you also to waive confidentiality to the extent necessary to allow 
me to quote anonymously from your interview transcript  
 
5. Please tell me a little bit about yourself – in particular, about your practice 
and experience: 
 
Questions 
 
Changes in Chancery practice: 
 
1. In your experience how has your practice changed as a result of the Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998 (i) generally (ii) in relation to section 459? 
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2. In your experience has the section 459 process been improved by the CPR?     
[Length, cost and complexity] 
 
3.  In your experience how has your practice changed as a result of substantive law 
developments through case law in this area? [O’Neill v Phillips (increased the 
certainty of legal principles) (encouragement towards early settlement)] 
 
Types of disputes and types of relief: 
 
4. From your experience tell me what kinds of disputes you have encountered in the 
section 459 context? Are there any common themes in terms of causes/factual 
basis of disputes? 
 
5. In your experience, in terms of final outcomes, how are shareholders’ disputes 
usually resolved? To what extent do you think these outcomes reflect client 
aspirations/expectations? 
 
Settlement processes including ADR: 
 
6. Explain the process by which section 459 cases settle? In your experience how 
has this changed (if at all) since 1999? Please give examples if possible. 
  
     [Processes means: Lawyer to lawyer negotiation, mediation, expert 
determination] 
 
7. What is your experience (if any) of alternative methods of dispute resolution 
(ADR) as a means of resolving shareholders’ disputes? Do you actively 
recommend the use of such processes for your clients and if so, why? Please give 
examples if possible. 
 
[a. If positive response: Which ADR methods have you experienced and with what 
sort of results? 
Do you consider that some methods are better than others and if so, why? 
What do you consider are the benefits and pitfalls of ADR? 
b. If negative response: how do you handle the risk of costs sanctions?] 
 
Specific aspects of the CPR: 
 
8. In your experience, how have the pre-action disclosure rules affected your 
practice in shareholder dispute? 
 
9. In your experience, are Part 36 offers used by the petitioners and respondents in 
section 459 cases? Do you think they are useful?  
      [If so, why? 
If not, why not?] 
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10. In your experience, are single experts appointed to resolve issues on share 
valuation? [If so, do you think that this has been a useful and welcome 
development?] 
 
11. In your experience, how have the courts’ case management powers affected the 
conduct of section 459 cases? Would you say ─  again from your own 
experience ─ that case management has reduced the length and cost of 
proceedings in line with the overriding objective? 
 
12. In your experience, how have the CPR’s costs rules and sanctions affected your 
conduct of section 459 cases?    
 
Shareholders’ agreements: 
 
13. In your experience, does the existence of a shareholders’ agreement improve the 
prospects for speedy and cost-effective resolution of shareholder dispute?   
 
Default rules in Table A/articles of association: 
 
14. Do you think that the inclusion of default provisions for buy-out and fair 
valuation by a competent expert (ie an exit mechanism) in Table A would assist 
parties to resolve their disputes with less cost and delay [and why]? 
 
Snowball Sampling 
 
Could you suggest to me names of other practising lawyers, especially solicitors who 
have experience of dealing with section 459 cases both pre- and post-CPR, whom I 
could approach with a view to them participating in the present research. It would be 
very helpful and greatly appreciated. 
 
 
Thank you. 
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